13 – Fruit Trees and Bal Tashḥit

01. The Proper Attitude Toward Fruit Trees

Fruit trees hold a special place in halakha and in Jewish thought. Anyone who plants fruit trees to increase the world’s food supply becomes God’s partner in creating and sustaining the world, as it says, “The Lord God planted a garden in Eden, in the east” (Bereishit 2:8). Thus, when the people of Israel enter the Land, they too are called to follow God’s ways and plant fruit trees, as it says, “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food” (Vayikra 19:23; Vayikra Rabba 25:3). Planting fruit trees is also included in the mitzva of settling the Land (Ḥatam Sofer, Sukka 36a). Today, this mitzva is fulfilled primarily by farmers who plant orchards, since the benefit of fruit trees in private gardens is small compared to the fruit grown in orchards for the Jewish people at large.

A person is compared to a fruit tree, as it says: “For man is a tree of the field” (Devarim 20:19). Unlike shrubs, which grow quickly and reach their peak within a short time, trees grow slowly, and only after reaching maturity do they produce fruit. So too, a person’s development is relatively slow compared to that of other living creatures, and only after reaching maturity can he produce fruit and become a partner in sustaining and developing the world. This purpose-oriented ideal is especially evident in fruit trees: although they are generally less beautiful, they do not grow for their own sake; their purpose is to produce fruit that nourishes people and animals. A properly developed person should likewise strive to resemble a fruit tree — sharing his goodness with those around him — rather than living only for himself.

God also taught us to treat fruit trees with proper respect. Even for the Mishkan, God commanded that acacia wood be used — from a non-fruit-bearing tree — teaching how carefully one must treat fruit trees (Shemot Rabba 35:2; Tanḥuma, Vayakhel 9).

The general prohibition of bal tashḥit derives from the prohibition against destroying fruit trees. A fruit tree is the clearest example of something valuable, for it is a source of blessing, producing fruit that sustains and gladdens. Therefore, the Sages said that when a fruit tree is uprooted unlawfully, sorrow is stirred in the world, and the voice of the tree travels from one end of the world to the other, though its voice is not heard (Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer 34). Thus, the Torah gave fruit trees a voice and commanded that they not be destroyed. Human history teaches the same lesson: when conquerors destroyed the fruit trees and irrigation systems of conquered lands, history demonstrates they later caused famine and suffering for millions of people. Similarly, modern society must treat natural resources and all the systems that sustain life with respect, caution, and responsibility.

02. The Prohibition Against Uprooting Fruit Trees

The Torah presents this prohibition in the context of warfare: even when Israelite soldiers lay siege to an enemy city, they may not uproot or destroy its fruit trees, as it says: “When you besiege a city for many days, waging war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them; you may eat from them, but you shall not cut them down. Are the trees of the field human beings, that they can withdraw before you into the besieged city?” (Devarim 20:19).

Ramban explains that the prohibition was addressed specifically to soldiers because the turmoil of war can awaken an impulse toward vengeance and destruction; they therefore needed a special warning not to destroy fruit trees. This mitzva also expresses faith that God will grant success to our soldiers: there is no reason to destroy the fruit trees, for after the war those trees will be ours. According to Ramban, the prohibition applies only in Eretz Yisrael and in places Israel intends to settle, and there is therefore also a mitzva to eat from the fruit of those trees during the siege (Ramban to Devarim 20:19; Ramban, Additions to Rambam’s Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 6). Most poskim, however, understand that the prohibition against uprooting a fruit tree applies everywhere in the world.

When fruit trees are needed for the siege, they may be uprooted. The Torah teaches that one must first uproot non-fruit-bearing trees, and only if the non-fruit-bearing trees are insufficient for the needs of the siege may one uproot fruit trees as well (Bava Kama 91b). Rambam explains that the primary prohibition is to destroy fruit trees in order to distress those under siege and cause them anguish when they see their trees being uprooted. [1]

The prohibition against uprooting a tree also applies when one blocks the irrigation channel that waters it, since this is one of the normal ways of destroying a tree. However, one is liable to lashes only when he destroys the tree with an axe or the like, as it says, “You shall not destroy its tree by wielding an axe against it.” By contrast, one who blocks the irrigation channel violates a Torah prohibition but is not liable to lashes.

Only damaging the irrigation channel or the piping that brings water to the tree is prohibited by Torah law. One who merely stops watering the tree, however, does not violate the prohibition of destruction, even though the tree will die on its own, for a person is not obligated to keep a tree watered. Still, it is the way of the righteous to make the effort to preserve things that benefit life, when the benefit is worth the effort. [2]


[1]. This is Rambam’s formulation in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, negative commandment 57. Some maintain that during a siege the prohibition is more severe (Smag, negative commandments 229; Leḥem Mishneh to MT, Laws of Kings and Wars 6:8; R. Goren, Torat ha-Mo’adim). Nevertheless, when life is at stake, one may uproot trees even during a siege in order to distress those under siege. Others maintain that the prohibition applies only when the purpose is to distress those under siege; but if the purpose is to help the siege effort, then even when life is not at stake it is permitted (R. Waldenberg, Hilkhot Medina 2:7). Most poskim maintain that there is no difference between a siege and any other situation. The Torah teaches that during a siege one must first use non-fruit-bearing trees; but if there is a need to use fruit trees, then since the purpose is victory and not destruction for its own sake, it is permitted, as we learned in Bava Kama 91b and in Sifrei to Devarim 20:19. This is also the position of Rashi, Ramban, Meiri, and others.

[2]. Rambam writes that blocking the irrigation channel is also prohibited by Torah law (MT, Laws of Kings and Wars 6:8). Ha’amek Davar and Maharsham explain that one is liable to lashes when he damages the tree with an axe, whereas for an act that kills the tree indirectly, such as cutting off its irrigation channel, he is not liable to lashes. Clearly, a person is not obligated to water a tree – unlike his obligation toward another person, regarding whom the Torah says, “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow” (Vayikra 19:16). Therefore, even if there is an automatic irrigation system, one may turn it off so that water no longer flows to the trees, since this does not damage the pipes that sustain the tree. Ḥazon Ish writes similarly in his comments to this passage. He adds that preserving the tree is an act of piety, for “the property of the righteous is dearer to them than their bodies,” because they are careful to avoid theft (Sota 12a). Similarly, Minḥat Yitzḥak 3:45 writes that a person is not required to eat ordinary bread when he has better bread available; as long as he does not perform an act that directly or indirectly causes the food to be destroyed, there is no prohibition.

03. What Is Included in the Prohibition Against Destroying a Fruit Tree

The prohibition against uprooting a fruit tree applies only when the tree produces fruit. If, however, the tree has aged or become diseased to the point that it produces less than a kav of fruit per year (approximately 1,200 cc), it no longer has the halakhic status of a food-producing tree and may be uprooted. For an olive tree, because of its special importance, the rule is stricter: as long as it produces a quarter-kav per year (approximately 300 cc), it may not be uprooted. To be certain that the tree does not produce the required amount, one must observe it for several years. This is especially true of an olive tree, whose yield varies greatly from year to year. Only when it is clear that it cannot produce a quarter-kav in a year may it be uprooted. This is measured according to the owner’s ordinary watering and care: if he waters and tends the tree as he understands the tree’s needs and as he normally does, and despite this it does not produce that amount of fruit, there is no prohibition against uprooting it. [3]

One may not uproot even a young sapling that has not yet produced fruit, because it is destined to produce a kav of fruit. Plants that produce foods whose berakha is ha-adama are not included in the prohibition, since the prohibition concerns only uprooting a tree that produces fruit for many years, as explained above, 2:8. [4]

Of course, one may prune the branches of a fruit tree in order to enhance its growth. However, when cutting additional branches will not benefit the tree, some maintain that one may not cut them (Mahari Basan 101). In the opinion of most poskim, however, there is no prohibition against cutting branches as long as the tree itself remains alive and healthy (Meiri; Mishneh La-Melekh; Ḥavot Ya’ir; Har Tzvi 2:101; and many others).

Some maintain that one may uproot a fruit tree together with its roots and the surrounding soil in order to plant it in another place where it can survive, as explained above, 2:5. Since the prohibition is to kill a fruit tree, if it is nearly certain that replanting it elsewhere will succeed and the tree will continue living, there is no prohibition (She’elat Ya’avetz 1:76; Shevut Yaakov 1:159; Maharash Engel 3:111). Others maintain that the act of uprooting itself is forbidden, and the fact that the tree will later be planted elsewhere does not help. Moreover, there is a reasonable concern that the tree will not take root in its new location (Ḥatam Sofer, YD 102; Mahari Ashkenazi 34; Zivḥei Tzedek). In practice, it appears that in a case of need, when it is nearly certain that the replanting will succeed, it is permitted. To ensure the success of the replanting, one should use an experienced gardener. When there is doubt whether halakha permits uprooting the fruit tree, one may uproot it in order to replant it as long as it is very likely to survive, even though there remains some risk that it may die.


[3]. The source for the particular need for caution in this law is the verse, “Only a tree that you know is not a food tree” – meaning that only when one knows with certainty that the fruit tree does not produce enough fruit may it be uprooted (Ḥatam Sofer, YD 102; Arugat ha-Bosem, YD 119). The volume of a kav is calculated as follows: an egg-volume is 50 cc; a log is six egg-volumes, or 300 cc; and a kav is four log, or 1,200 cc. Although according to R. Ḥayim Naeh an egg-volume is approximately 56 cc, and according to Ḥazon Ish approximately 100 cc, the precise measure is approximately 50 cc, as explained in Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 10, note 11, and above, 11:6, note 6.

[4]. Many authorities write that the prohibition also applies to a young sapling that is not yet producing fruit, including Erekh Shai, YD 116; Shevet Sofer, YD 94; Maharsham 7:178; Responsa R. Eliyahu Guttmacher, YD 34; and Beit Shlomo, YD 2:176. Ḥatam Sofer and Ha’amek Davar write, however, that one is not liable to lashes for uprooting such trees. Maharil Diskin suggested a reason to be lenient during the years of orla, since the fruit is forbidden to eat, but his view was not accepted in practice; see Har Tzvi, OḤ 2:102. Some maintain that a tree that produces fruit edible only in pressing circumstances, such as crabapples, is included in the prohibition (Darkhei Teshuva 116:51). Others maintain that since in practice people do not eat these fruits, and the trees are not planted for their fruit, the prohibition does not apply to them (Arugat ha-Bosem, YD 120), and this appears correct.

04 When Uprooting Serves a Greater Need

The Torah frames the prohibition around the act of destruction: “You shall not destroy its tree” (Devarim 20:19). This teaches that when uprooting is not done for the sake of destruction, but for a constructive purpose whose value is far greater than the tree itself, there is no prohibition, since this is not considered destruction (Bava Kama 91b). Therefore, one may uproot fruit trees in order to build a home in their place, or in order to expand a synagogue or mikveh.

Some permit it only for a genuine, essential need, such as when a growing family has made the home too cramped. But for comfort or luxury – such as expanding a balcony when there is no real need or redesigning a garden – they maintain that one may not uproot fruit trees. Others permit it for any significant purpose that would be considered a need among the wealthy, even redesigning a garden or expanding the open space in the garden for strolling.

In practice, it appears that one who wishes to be lenient and uproot a tree for beauty or luxury has authorities on whom to rely, provided that he weighs the matter carefully and waits before deciding, so that he can be certain that this is a genuine desire and not a passing one. It is proper to have the uprooting done by a non-Jew.[5]

At times, orchard owners wish to uproot their fruit trees in order to plant other trees or vegetables in their place. Since the orchard was planted for livelihood, the financial calculation is central. If the orchard has reached a point where it is no longer worthwhile to maintain it, such as when the cost of upkeep exceeds the value of the fruit, then even though each tree produces far more than a kav per year, it is clear that one may uproot the orchard’s trees and plant in their place trees that can reasonably be expected to generate profit. However, if the orchard is still profitable, but the owner believes that he would earn far more by uprooting the trees and planting others in their place, the matter must be weighed carefully. He should consult knowledgeable people and ask a halakhic authority. Only if it becomes clear that there is indeed a high likelihood that uprooting will lead to significant profit may the authority rule that the trees may be uprooted.

When saplings were initially planted densely, with the intention that they would be spread out over the area once they developed, there is no prohibition against moving them elsewhere, since the transfer is for the sake of the trees. One may also thin out some of the saplings so that the neighboring saplings can develop properly. When one tree harms another, it is permitted to uproot the less beneficial tree, as will be explained in the next section.


[5]. Rosh (Bava Kama 8:15) writes that when the space occupied by the tree is needed, it may be uprooted. Rambam and Rabbenu Yeroḥam write similarly. On this basis, Taz 116:6 permits uprooting a fruit tree in order to expand a dwelling. Some maintain that this leniency is limited to an essential need. Thus, Ḥavot Ya’ir 195 writes that it applies specifically to residential needs, but not to expanding one’s yard or creating space for strolling. This is also the view of She’elat Ya’avetz 1:76, Zivḥei Tzedek, and Arukh ha-Shulḥan 116:13. Others maintain that the leniency extends to any need commonly recognized by people. This is the view of Mahari Basan 101, Ḥida in Ḥayim Sha’al 1:22, She’elat Shalom, and others. In any event, when the act is done by a non-Jew, the prohibition is rabbinic, and some maintain that it is even permitted; see Peninei Halakha: Shemita Ve-yovel 5, note 9. When there is no place to build a sukka unless one uproots a fruit tree, one may uproot the tree for the sake of the mitzva. In addition, the value of the place needed for the sukka is greater than the value of the fruit tree; see Har Tzvi, OḤ 2:102.

05. When the Tree Causes Damage

Sometimes a fruit tree causes damage. In such cases, one may uproot it, since the uprooting is not an act of destruction but a way to remove harm. The Gemara recounts (Bava Kama 92a) that the amora Shmuel noticed that date palms planted among grapevines were harming the vines, to the point that the taste of dates could be detected in the grapes. Since the palms were less valuable than the grapevines, he instructed his sharecropper to uproot them. The Gemara also recounts (Bava Batra 26a) that Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s palms were planted near Rav Yosef’s vineyard. Birds would come to the palms and then descend and damage Rav Yosef’s grapes, and it was ruled that the palms had to be uprooted so that they would not harm the grapevines. The same rule applies when a fruit tree becomes infected with a disease that will spread to other trees if the tree is not uprooted: one may uproot it to prevent the damage.

When a fruit tree attracts gnats and flies that enter the home and cause great distress, especially when the distress affects neighbors and may even lead to conflict between them, one may cut down the tree if attempts to eliminate the problem by spraying or similar methods have failed. Likewise, when the powerful roots of a fig tree repeatedly penetrate sewage pipes and crack them, one may uproot the fig tree, since this causes significant damage. In cases of doubt, one should ask a halakhic authority.

One may uproot a fruit tree that blocks a window and prevents light from entering the home, since blocking a window’s light is considered significant damage, and people are normally particular about it. However, if the damage can be prevented by cutting the branches that block the window, one must suffice with cutting them, even if this must be done every few months, because avoiding this degree of effort does not permit uprooting a fruit tree (Ḥavot Ya’ir §195). This applies even when one must pay a gardener to cut the branches every few months and the cost exceeds the value of the fruit. Only a commercial orchard may be uprooted when it operates at a loss. In a private garden, however, the tree was not originally planted for financial reasons, and therefore one may not permit its uprooting based on an ordinary financial calculation. It may be permitted only when preventing the damage involves great effort that is difficult to carry out, or a much greater financial cost. [6]


[6]. One cannot argue by analogy from a commercial orchard to a private garden. True, one may uproot an orchard whose maintenance costs exceed its profit. But it does not follow that one may uproot a fruit tree in a private garden that produces 50 shekels’ worth of fruit per year simply because the gardener’s work in tending it, or in pruning the branches that shade the window, is worth 200 shekels.

A fruit tree in a private garden is not planted for financial benefit. Any sensible person knows that growing fruit in a private garden, including the value of one’s own labor time, costs incomparably more than growing fruit in a commercial orchard. For people who plant a fruit tree in their garden, every kilogram grown there is worth many times more than fruit bought in high-end stores, as the Sages said: “A person prefers one kav of his own to nine kav of another’s” (Bava Metzi’a 38a). Therefore, only when preventing the damage involves very great effort or a far greater expense may the tree be uprooted.

The owner of the garden is not obligated to continue watering the fruit tree, even if this will cause it to die, as explained above, section 2 and note 2.

One may also uproot a fruit tree whose roots have penetrated deep into a person’s grave and are causing serious indignity – either to the deceased, because he was an important person, or to his family, who are deeply distressed by it (see Shevet ha-Levi 2:208).

06. The Spiritual Danger in Uprooting a Fruit Tree

As we have learned, halakha permits uprooting fruit trees that seriously harm people, whether by attracting gnats or by damaging sewage pipes. It is also permitted to uproot fruit trees in order to build a home in their place or expand one. Still, the matter is not simple. There is a tradition that anyone who uproots a fruit tree brings danger upon himself, as R. Ḥanina said: “My son did not die before his time except because he cut down a fig tree before its time” (Bava Kama 91b). According to most poskim, this danger applies only when one uproots a tree contrary to halakha; when halakha permits the uprooting, there is no danger.

Some poskim, however, understood that even in cases where halakha permits uprooting a fruit tree, one who does so brings danger upon himself. The most direct basis for this view is the ethical will of R. Yehuda He-ḥasid, one of the great early Ashkenazic kabbalists, who warned against uprooting fruit trees. Some were very concerned about all his warnings and maintained that anyone who violates them brings danger upon himself (She’elat Ya’avetz 1:76; Ḥayim Be-yad 24). For this reason, some rabbis were cautious and hesitated to permit uprooting a fruit tree even when it was permitted by halakha. Many recommended, as an added precaution, that the uprooting be done by a non-Jew, who is not prohibited from uprooting a fruit tree, thereby protecting the Jew from danger. [7]


[7]. The position of most poskim is clear: the danger applies only when one uproots a tree contrary to halakha. Therefore, the Rishonim addressed the halakhic question and did not discuss danger. This is also the position of Taz YD 116:6; Ḥida in Ḥayim Sha’al 1:23; Binyan Tziyon 1:61; SA Harav; Ḥikrei Lev; Arukh ha-Shulḥan 116:13; and many others. Those who are concerned about danger even when the matter is permitted by halakha include Tzava’at R. Yehuda He-ḥasid 45; She’elat Ya’avetz 1:76; and Ḥayim Be-yad 24. Some maintain that the concern for danger is relevant only when the owner of the tree has genuine reasons to uproot it, such as personal suffering, but those reasons do not appear justified to the public (Divrei Ḥayim II, YD 127; Maharshag 1:24).

Regarding uprooting by a non-Jew: According to one view, the Sages prohibited asking a non-Jew to act on behalf of a Jew only when the act is prohibited by Torah law and punishable by death (Ra’avad). Most poskim, however, maintain that the Sages prohibited asking a non-Jew to perform any Torah prohibition on behalf of a Jew. Accordingly, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to uproot a fruit tree that may not be uprooted according to halakha. But when there is doubt whether the tree may be uprooted, the prohibition against asking a non-Jew is rabbinic (shevut), and in such a doubtful case one may be lenient (as explained in Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 5:9, note 9). Similarly, when the fruit tree may be uprooted according to the letter of the law, there is no concern for danger if a non-Jew is asked to do it. For this reason, many poskim recommended that even where one may uproot the tree, it is preferable to have it done by a non-Jew.

07. Bal Tashḥit: The General Prohibition

There is a Torah mitzva not to destroy things that are useful, whether food, utensils, or raw materials. The basis of the mitzva is the Torah’s warning to soldiers not to destroy fruit trees in wartime. If even during war one must be careful not to destroy, then all the more so in ordinary times. From here we learn that one who breaks utensils, tears clothing, demolishes a building, or blocks a spring without need violates the prohibition of bal tashḥit. [8]

The prohibition reflects a clear moral principle. A person should treat useful things with respect and care for their preservation. Even if a certain food is of no use to him because it is not to his taste, he is not alone in the world. There are other creatures, human beings and animals alike, that can benefit from it. One must therefore be careful not to destroy it for no reason.

The prohibition of bal tashḥit also includes destroying natural resources. If even in wartime the Torah forbids soldiers to destroy fruit trees unnecessarily, and even by Torah law forbids destroying the irrigation channel that brings water to a fruit tree (see above, section 2), then certainly in ordinary times one may not destroy or pollute natural resources. In the past, human beings had only a limited ability to harm the environment, so the prohibition focused mainly on damaging fruit trees or the channels that watered them. In recent generations, however, technology and population growth have greatly increased humanity’s ability to pollute the air, soil, and water, and to cause destruction. A great responsibility therefore rests on the leaders of every country and community to establish laws and regulations protecting the environment, and there is a Torah mitzva for every person to observe these laws in order to prevent the destruction of natural resources. Similarly, the Sages said (Kohelet Rabba 7:13): “When God created Adam, He took him around to all the trees of the Garden of Eden and said to him: ‘Look at My works, how beautiful and excellent they are. Everything I created, I created for you. Take care not to ruin and destroy My world, for if you ruin it, there will be no one to repair it after you.’”


[8]. One who destroys fruit violates bal tashḥit by a kal va-ḥomer: if the Torah warned against destroying a tree that produces fruit, then certainly one may not destroy the fruit itself (Sifrei to Devarim 20:19). We find in the Talmud that the prohibition of bal tashḥit applies to all useful things, including killing animals (Ḥullin 7b), destroying utensils (Shabbat 129a), wasting food (Shabbat 140b), and ruining clothing (Kiddushin 32a). Most Rishonim therefore maintain that the prohibition of bal tashḥit applies by Torah law (Tosafot, Bava Metzi’a 32b; Rabbenu Yona; Rabbenu Peretz; Rabbenu Yeroḥam; and Smag). Rambam writes (MT, Laws of Kings and Wars 6:10; Sefer ha-Mitzvot, negative commandment 57) that since the prohibition is stated explicitly regarding a fruit tree, the punishment of lashes applies only to one who destroys a fruit tree. One who destroys other things is subject only to rabbinic lashes. (Some maintain that, according to Rambam, even the prohibition against destroying other things is rabbinic. Others maintain that he too agrees with the other Rishonim that the prohibition applies by Torah law.)

Destruction for a Legitimate Purpose

When destruction is done for an important reason, it is not considered destruction and is not prohibited. Therefore, one may destroy fruit for financial reasons. For example, if the market is flooded with inexpensive fruit, and unless some of the fruit growing in the fields is destroyed it will no longer be worthwhile to pick and cultivate the crop, one may destroy part of it (see Ta’anit 20b).

For the same reason, the mitzva for a groom to break a glass under the ḥuppa does not violate bal tashḥit. It serves the mitzva of recalling the sorrow over the Temple’s destruction at the height of his joy (Berakhot 31a; Rema OḤ 560:2). Similarly, a mourner has a mitzva to tear his garment for the deceased. This is not prohibited as bal tashḥit, since it is a mitzva through which he honors the deceased and mourns him. Nevertheless, a mourner can go too far in the number of garments he tears for the deceased; at a certain point, the tearing becomes destructive (Bava Kama 91b).

The Gemara recounts (Shabbat 105b) that when members of the household of one of the great amora’im acted improperly, he wanted to educate and rebuke them, and to show them the severity of what they had done. He therefore made himself appear angry and broke a utensil before them, as if to say: nothing retains its value when people act so terribly. Since he remained in control of himself, he was careful not to destroy an important utensil, and instead broke one that was already about to break. Although even this involved a degree of destruction, it was done for educational benefit and was therefore not prohibited. It is forbidden, however, to break utensils in a fit of uncontrolled anger, for such anger is itself severely prohibited. The Sages said (Shabbat 105b): “Anyone who becomes angry is as if he worships idols,” for one who loses control in anger becomes enslaved to his anger, and in this sense is considered like one who worships idols. [9]


[9]. Although the Sages said that one may not tear excessively for the deceased, one may tear many garments for exceptionally great Torah scholars. Thus, R. Yoḥanan tore thirteen silk garments for his teacher R. Ḥanina. Each time he removed the torn garment and put on an intact one, the memory of R. Ḥanina’s death overcame him again, and he tore his garment once more (Mo’ed Katan 24a; Tosafot, Bava Kama 91b, s.v. over).

According to Sefer ha-Ḥinukh §529 and Smak §175, one may destroy certain utensils for educational purposes: utensils that are already about to break, utensils that serve no useful purpose, or utensils that can be thrown to the ground without actually breaking. A good utensil, however, may not be destroyed even for educational benefit. Others maintain that one may even break a good utensil for educational purposes; this is implied by Tosafot, Kiddushin 32a, s.v. Rav Yehuda, and Hagahot Maimoniyot to MT, Laws of Kings and Wars 6:3. In practice, there may be no fundamental dispute; everything depends on the circumstances. As a rule, one may not break a good utensil for educational purposes, because the act of breaking itself appears to model a lack of self-control, to the point of violating bal tashḥit. In very rare cases, however, when people have acted severely inappropriately, one may “break the vessels” in order to impress upon them the severity of the matter. This is similar to Moshe Rabbenu’s breaking of the Tablets after seeing the Golden Calf, an act to which God agreed (Yevamot 62a).

If a person is fasting and wants to keep it secret, and food is brought before him, some authorities permit him to throw the food away if that is the only way to avoid revealing his fast (Ginzei Ḥayim, ma’arekhet bet §32), while others prohibit it (Yafeh La-lev II, 565:3).

09. Destroying Food and Treating It Disrespectfully

Destroying food is especially serious. Food sustains human life, and the prohibition of bal tashḥit is itself stated in connection with food. The Sages therefore added safeguards and warnings to keep people from wasting food, especially bread, which is the basic staple of human sustenance.

The Sages warned not to pass a filled cup of liquid over bread, lest some of the liquid spill onto the bread and make it unfit to eat. One may likewise not place a possibly dirty utensil near bread, lest it ruin the bread. This applies to other foods as well – one may not do anything that could ruin or destroy them (Berakhot 40b; SA OḤ 171:1). Accordingly, when filling his plate, one should be careful not to take more than he can eat, so that food is not thrown away unnecessarily. When preparing a meal, too, one must be careful not to prepare excessive amounts of food that are very likely to be discarded. If, however, the setting is one in which honor requires serving in abundance, one may prepare and serve large quantities even though some of the food will be thrown away.

One may not sit on a backpack or sack containing foods that may be crushed (SA OḤ 171:2). Similarly, one may not throw foods that may become unappealing as a result. When there is no such concern, one may throw them. For example, one may distribute almonds and pomegranates by tossing them. Likewise, many synagogues have the custom to throw candies when a groom is called up to the Torah. Since the candies are wrapped and there is no concern that they will become unappealing when thrown, there is no prohibition. Bread, however, may not be thrown even onto a clean table, even when there is no concern that it will become unappealing. Since bread is the staple of human sustenance, it must be treated with special respect and not thrown in the way one throws less important foods (SA OḤ 171:1). [10]

One may use bread as a utensil to eat another food, provided that the bread is eaten afterward. Those who are meticulous are careful to eat a little of the bread each time, so that it is not degraded by being treated merely as a spoon (SA OḤ 171:3).


[10]. When bread is distributed after the berakha of ha-motzi, some have the custom to toss small pieces of bread. It may be that this is not prohibited, since this is only a slight toss and does not convey disrespect. On the contrary, it expresses affection for the bread, as people want to distribute it quickly to all those present, so that there will not be a long interruption between the berakha recited on their behalf and their actual tasting of the bread. Nevertheless, it is proper to be stringent and not throw bread at all, as stated in MB 167:88.

10. Leftover Food

When a person feels full, there is no mitzva, not even an act of piety, to finish the food on his plate, even though whatever he does not eat will be thrown away. True, the pious are pained when food is discarded, and they would not waste even a mustard seed for no reason. If they can save something from destruction, they do so (Sefer ha-Ḥinukh §529). Still, since overeating is unhealthy, and bal tashḥit of the body is more serious than bal tashḥit of food that will be discarded, it is better for the food to be thrown away than for a person to eat it unnecessarily (Shabbat 140b). A person may likewise remove from his home unhealthy foods that he or members of his household may be tempted to eat. In times of poverty, it was better for a person to eat whatever he was given, so that he could build up reserves for difficult times. That reality gave rise to the practice of being careful to finish everything on one’s plate. Today, however, when even the poor generally suffer less from hunger than from obesity, it is better to throw away excess food than to eat it unnecessarily. The main care today must come earlier: one should not fill one’s plate with food one does not need, and should not buy unnecessary food in the first place.

A person who prepared a large meal and has a great deal of healthy, tasty food left over may not throw it into the garbage. Rather, he should keep it in the refrigerator or freezer to eat later. If his family alone cannot eat all of it, he should make an effort to share what remains with relatives or neighbors. If poor people would benefit from the food, it is especially praiseworthy to give it to them, thereby saving the food from destruction while also fulfilling the mitzva of tzedaka. Owners of banquet halls and restaurants likewise have a mitzva to give the good food they have left over to educational institutions or poor families. If the effort involved in finding people who will take the leftovers and bringing the food to them is worth more than the value of the leftover food itself, there is no obligation to do so, though one who does is considered especially pious. When it is difficult to find people who would benefit from the leftovers, it is an act of piety to give them to animals, such as dogs or cats, rather than let the food go to waste. However, if a person can use that time for something more important or beneficial, caring for the leftovers does not take priority. True piety means choosing the most beneficial course of action. [11]


[11]. The value of the effort involved in distributing food to the needy can be estimated by what one would have to pay one of the meal workers to handle the distribution. If that cost exceeds the value of the leftover food, there is no mitzva to go to the trouble of distributing it, since saving the food would mean wasting work time worth even more. If a person has free time, however, it is an act of piety to make the effort so that food and other useful things do not go to waste.

It also seems that even when the effort required to distribute the food to the needy is worth less than the leftover food itself, there are cases where no mitzva requires it. If the effort or awkwardness is so burdensome that he would be willing to pay the value of the leftovers simply to avoid the trouble of finding people to eat them, then distributing the food is not required; it remains an act of piety (see SA ḤM 263:1–3).

11. Discarding Clothing and Objects, and Replacing Furniture

A person who owns used clothing may decide that he no longer wishes to wear it and may buy new clothing instead. Even if the used clothing is still wearable, this does not violate bal tashḥit. A person is not required to keep wearing clothing until it wears out. Rather, once it no longer suits him or gives him satisfaction, he may purchase other clothing to replace it. If the clothing is still in good condition, he should try to pass it on to someone who can use it. If he gives it to the poor, he also fulfills the mitzva of tzedaka. The same applies to used utensils and furniture. A person is not required to keep using them until they wear out; once they no longer suit him or bring him satisfaction, he may replace them. If others could still benefit from them, however, there is a mitzva to pass them on. Even if he does not personally know anyone in need, he should avoid destroying them for no reason by giving them to secondhand stores or distribution centers for the needy. Furniture and other objects can also be posted on websites for selling or giving away used items.

However, when the effort required to find people who will use these items is worth more than the items themselves, there is no obligation to extend oneself. Doing so is only an act of piety, as explained in the previous section and note.

One may cut old tzitzit strings in order to tie new ones in their place. True, with effort, they could be untied and reused. Nevertheless, when this would involve significant effort, one may cut them, even though this destroys them (Ḥayei Adam 11:32). Similarly, one may replace an unattractively written parchment panel in a Torah scroll with one written more beautifully, even though the removed panel will have to be placed in geniza (Sefer Ḥasidim §879). Likewise, one may place old ḥumashim in geniza and purchase newer ones that are more aesthetically pleasing.

People who are financially comfortable may replace kitchen cabinets, countertops, flooring, and furniture, even when these are still in good condition, since they are doing so to bring themselves satisfaction and not to destroy the old items. Still, they should make an effort to find people who will benefit from the furniture they are replacing. The proper standard seems to be how such conduct would be viewed by the overwhelming majority of their peers at the same social and economic level. If those peers would consider it destructive and excessively wasteful, then replacing these items involves a violation of bal tashḥit. They avoid the prohibition only if people can be found who will benefit from the items being replaced, or if the project provides work for people who need employment to support their families. In such cases, even though they are acting with great extravagance, they do not violate bal tashḥit.

12. Respectful Disposal of Leftover Food

Even when there is no prohibition of bal tashḥit in throwing away leftover food, one must be careful not to disgrace it by actively destroying it, especially leftover bread. Therefore, if pieces of bread larger than an olive’s volume remain on the table at the end of a meal, one may not wash the table while they are still there, since wetting them ruins them and is considered destroying them (SA OḤ 180:3). Rather, the leftover bread should be wrapped and placed in the garbage respectfully.

If crumbs smaller than an olive’s volume remain after the meal, there is no prohibition against disposing of them, even disrespectfully. Nevertheless, the Sages said that it is proper not to disgrace them, but to gather them respectfully. One who throws crumbs onto the floor is, in effect, spurning the goodness that God has bestowed upon the world. Because he fails to recognize that goodness and to honor bread properly, Heaven withholds its blessing from him, until he is reduced to poverty. There is also a spiritual dimension to this. The Sages said that the angel appointed over food and livelihood is named Nakid, meaning “cleanliness,” while the angel appointed over poverty is named Naval, meaning “filth.” Therefore, where food crumbs are left on the floor, the angel of poverty dwells; but where there is cleanliness, the angel of wealth dwells (Pesaḥim 111b; Ḥullin 105b).

One should therefore be careful not to leave crumbs scattered on the floor, and not to sweep them from the table onto the floor. Rather, they should be gathered and thrown into the garbage or into water. Although throwing them into water will ruin them, since they are smaller than an olive’s volume, there is no prohibition against disposing of them. One must simply be careful not to disgrace them by throwing them onto the ground (SA OḤ 180:4; MB 10).

It is permitted, and to some extent even proper, to throw leftover bread into the yard so that birds can eat it. This applies only to a small amount of crumbs. If many pieces of bread remain, the birds are unlikely to eat them quickly, so leaving them outside would show greater disrespect to the bread and may also bother the neighbors. For the same reason, one certainly should not leave leftover bread on top of a public garbage bin. When there is a relatively large amount of leftover bread, it should be wrapped in a bag and placed in the garbage.

One who sees bread or another food in a place where people walk and it is being disgraced should, out of respect for the food, lift it onto a rock or place it at the side of the path, where it will not be stepped on (Eruvin 64b; Beit Barukh 45:31).

13. Non-Fruit-Bearing Trees

In general, the prohibition of bal tashḥit applies to things that are useful. A non-fruit-bearing tree, however, was not considered important enough for the prohibition of bal tashḥit to apply to it (MT, Laws of Kings and Wars 6:9). Today, however, the situation is different. As the world’s population has grown and more people live in crowded apartment buildings, ornamental gardens have become highly valued. They allow people to enjoy the beauty of nature and its contribution to health, and people are willing to spend money cultivating them. As a result, all trees, shrubs, and flowers that people normally grow and tend have monetary value, and one who destroys them violates a Torah prohibition. In addition, non-fruit-bearing trees help purify the air.

As an act of piety, one should avoid needlessly harming any living creature or plant, even when it presently has no monetary value. It is not fitting to harm any created thing, for nothing in the world was created in vain. Every creature has its own unique value, and through it one can gain a deeper understanding of the purpose of the Creator of the world. The Sages likewise said (Bereishit Rabba 10:6): “There is not a single blade of grass that does not have a heavenly force above that strikes it and says, ‘Grow.’” Similarly, the Zohar teaches that every plant, even the smallest, has a higher force above, and everything done with it in this world comes through that force (Zohar III 86a). Although we have not yet merited to understand all the wisdom hidden within trees and plants, nor can we grasp the secret of their song, which constantly praises God, we can still be moved by the beauty of creation and by the wisdom and greatness of the Creator. In a similar vein, the Sages teach that the earth’s covering of vegetation is like a beautifully set table, prepared so that a person can fulfill his God-given purpose with splendor and dignity (see Vayikra Rabba 11:1). Piskei Tosafot, Pesaḥim 132, states that one who cuts down a non-fruit-bearing tree will see no blessing. The Sages also said (Ketubot 112b): “In the future, all non-fruit-bearing trees in Eretz Yisrael will bear fruit.” Thus, even non-fruit-bearing trees contain something of the power of fruit trees.

All this points to the value of preserving plant and animal species and preventing them from disappearing from the world. It also makes clear that one must observe the laws enacted to protect wildlife and protected wild plants. These laws rest on two foundations. First, preserving creation in all its variety has intrinsic value. Second, laws enacted by the public’s representatives are binding on everyone, both by virtue of the community’s authority to establish regulations and by the principle of dina de-malkhuta dina.

Nevertheless, when human needs conflict with the preservation of a particular animal or plant species, human needs take precedence, provided the matter is handled thoughtfully and not with contempt for the environment or disregard for its needs. This concern for the environment also includes a mitzva to preserve its cleanliness and the beauty of nature, and to refrain from throwing garbage in places not designated for it. In Eretz Yisrael, this care is connected to the mitzva of settling the Land (see Ketubot 112a).

14. The Rabbinic Enactment Not to Raise Small Livestock in Eretz Yisrael

During the Second Temple period, the Sages saw that goats and sheep sent out to pasture were causing widespread damage to trees and fields, threatening Jewish farmers’ ability to make a living and continue settling the Land. To protect both agriculture and the settlement of the Land, they enacted that small livestock may not be raised west of the Jordan River. “Small livestock” refers to sheep and goats. Because they are nimble, they can reach almost anywhere and graze from nearly any tree or plant, making them the main cause of damage to vegetation. Later history showed the importance of this enactment. After the Arab conquest of the Land, the conquerors were not careful to preserve its vegetation, and their herds destroyed the plant life, turning the Land that had flowed with milk and honey into desolation.

Large livestock, namely oxen and cows, can also damage trees. Nevertheless, the Sages did not prohibit raising them, because they do not impose a decree on the public unless most people can abide by it. Since oxen and cows are needed for plowing, milk, and meat, are difficult to bring from outside the Land over long distances, and cause less damage, the Sages permitted raising them in the Land. Their owners must still guard them carefully, and if the animals damage fields, the owners must pay for the damage.

Small livestock, by contrast, can be brought from outside the Land, since sheep and goats are capable of walking long distances. The Sages therefore decreed that they may not be raised in the settled areas of the Land. They may be raised only in the deserts and forests of Eretz Yisrael, east of the Jordan River, and in countries near Eretz Yisrael. One who wishes to buy small livestock for meat for a festival or wedding may buy it and keep it for up to thirty days, provided that it is not taken out to graze; rather, he must bring it its food. Meat sellers may likewise bring in small livestock for sale, provided they do not keep them for more than thirty days and do not let them graze in fields or gardens (Bava Kama 79b–80a; MT, Laws of Damage to Property 5:2, 7). [12]


[12]. The Gemara relates (Bava Kama 80a) the story of a pious man who was ill and groaning from heart pain. When the doctors were consulted, they said that there was no remedy for him unless he drank warm milk directly from an animal’s udder each morning. They brought him a goat and tied it to the legs of his bed so that it could not go out and cause damage, and each morning he would drink its milk. Some time later, his colleagues, the Sages of Israel, came to visit him. When they saw the goat tied to his bedposts, they immediately turned back and said: “An armed robber is in this man’s house, and we should enter?” According to most commentators, this pious man was suffering from a non-life-threatening illness; had his illness been dangerous, he would have been permitted to keep the goat. Ben Ish Ḥai explains in Ben Yehoyada that even an ordinary sick person would have been permitted to keep a goat tied to his bed, since the Sages permitted one who is ill to violate a rabbinic prohibition. However, because this pious man was known as a great person, he should have been especially careful so that others would not learn from him to be lenient. That is why the Sages were strict with him. Indeed, at the time of his death, this pious man himself acknowledged this and said: “I know that I have only the sin of that goat, for I violated the words of my colleagues.”

The main reason for the enactment is the settlement of the Land (Rashi). Therefore, the concern is not only that small livestock might damage other people’s property, but also that they might damage their owners’ own fields (Tosafot Yom Tov and Tiferet Yisrael, Bava Kama 7:7). Kaftor Va-feraḥ 10 adds that the prohibition applies even when there are no Jewish-owned fields at all, due to the damage these animals cause to wild vegetation. SA ḤM 409:1, however, rules that the prohibition applies only where there is Jewish settlement. Although the enactment was primarily for the sake of settling the Land, after Rav moved to Babylonia he instituted the same rule in the Jewish communities there: small livestock may not be raised near settled areas (Bava Kama 80a; MT, Laws of Damage to Property 5:8).

15. Raising Small Livestock in Our Times

During the period when the Land was desolate, without Jewish orchards or fields, the prohibition against raising small livestock lapsed (SA ḤM 409:1). After we merited returning to the Land of our ancestors and making its desolate places bloom, the question arose anew. Some maintain that since the reason for the decree is known – to prevent damage to fields – the decree remains in force as long as the reason remains. Since today there are fields that could be damaged by these animals, the decree has regained its force (Yabi’a Omer ḤM 3:7; Shevet ha-Levi 4:227).

  1. Tzvi Pesaḥ Frank, however, maintains that when a decree has lapsed for a period of time, it does not come back into force without a new enactment. Since the decree lapsed during the exile, its force expired, and today there is no prohibition against raising small livestock in the Land (Har Tzvi, notes to Tur ḤM 409).

In addition, during the early period of renewed Jewish settlement in the Land, it was accepted practice to raise herds of small livestock. It therefore follows that all the settlers who planted fields and engaged in agriculture settled there with the understanding that small-livestock herders were permitted to graze their animals in open fields, provided they were careful not to damage orchards or vegetable fields. Since the entire enactment was made for the farmers’ benefit, and they agreed that small livestock could be raised around their fields, there is no basis for restoring the enactment (Amud ha-Yemini 23; Tzitz Eliezer 7:24:3).

Moreover, it may be that the reason for the enactment itself no longer applies. Today law-enforcement authorities can reach virtually any place and enforce the law in a way that protects fields from animals. Accordingly, there is no need to restore the enactment.

In practice, since the dispute concerns a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha follows the lenient view, in keeping with the rule that in cases of uncertainty regarding rabbinic law, one may be lenient. Not only may one be lenient in this matter; it is proper to do so. Today, grazing small livestock helps fulfill the mitzva of settling the Land, since grazing makes it possible to hold broad expanses of land and fulfill the mitzva of inheriting the Land, so that it remains in our hands and not in the hands of another nation. Since the original enactment was rooted in the mitzva of settling the Land, when raising these animals benefits the settlement of the Land, doing so is a mitzva.

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