15 – Tza’ar Ba’alei Ḥayim

01. Treating Animals Properly

There is a mitzva to treat animals with compassion, and it is prohibited to cause them unnecessary suffering. At the same time, people may use animals for labor and food: donkeys and mules for carrying loads, oxen for plowing, horses and camels for riding, and animals for their meat. The Torah goes further still, commanding us to offer animal and bird sacrifices, including the scapegoat and the heifer whose neck is broken. This is what the Sages meant when they said that animals were created to serve human beings (Kiddushin 82a; Sanhedrin 108a). Included in this is their use for food: just as animals may eat plants, human beings may eat animals.

These two values must therefore be balanced. On the one hand, human needs take precedence over the needs of animals. On the other, one must make every effort, as far as possible, to avoid causing animals to suffer. Thus, even when Bnei Noaḥ were permitted to eat meat, the Torah forbade the cruelty of eating a limb from a living animal.

In practice, when a human need conflicts with the duty to prevent animal suffering, one weighs how essential the human benefit is against the suffering caused to the animal. Eating meat, for example, is a very significant human need, and sheḥita causes only mild suffering (see below, 18:3); therefore one may slaughter animals for food. But when the human need is less essential, or when meeting it would cause the animal great suffering, the question becomes more complex. Halakha addresses such cases by weighing three fundamental principles:

The first principle concerns the degree of suffering: mild, ordinary, great, and extreme. The greater the suffering, the more serious the matter becomes; only rarely, for a truly essential need, is there room to be lenient.

The second principle concerns the animal itself. The more cognitively complex the animal, the more intensely it can experience suffering, and the more careful one must be not to cause it pain. This level of complexity is determined primarily by the animal’s brain and nervous system. Mammals, such as dogs, livestock, monkeys, and dolphins, have relatively complex brains and nervous systems: they visibly experience distress and joy, can be trained to some extent, and display maternal care, as a mother recognizes her offspring and tends to them with compassion. Even among mammals there are differences. A dog, for example, is more cognitively complex than a sheep; it can express certain emotions more clearly, and its suffering is greater when it is hurt. Below mammals are birds, followed by reptiles such as lizards, and then fish. Fish generally do not care for their young; indeed, only a few minutes after giving birth to small fry, a female fish may devour many of them without any sign of hesitation. Below fish are insects.

The third principle is that the more an animal serves human beings, the greater the compassion and fairness with which it must be treated. The Torah therefore commands us to help unload a donkey that has collapsed under its burden (below, section 2) and forbids one to muzzle an animal while it is working with food, thereby preventing it from eating (below, section 3). Accordingly, particular compassion should be shown to domesticated animals, such as cows, goats, sheep, and chickens. The same applies to dogs, which help guard the home, and cats, which rid the house of snakes and mice.

In summary: Ideally, one should not cause any living creature to suffer, even the lowest forms of animal life, as it is written (Tehilim 145:9): “His compassion extends to all His works” (see Bava Metzia 85a). When a person genuinely needs to cause animals suffering, each case must be weighed in light of the three principles explained above.^[1]

02. Unloading a Donkey: Tza’ar Ba’alei Ḥayim by Torah Law

There is a Torah mitzva to have compassion for animals and not cause them suffering. Therefore, one who sees a donkey that has collapsed under the weight of its burden is commanded to help unload it so that it can stand, as the Torah states (Shemot 23:5): “If you see the donkey of your enemy lying under its burden, and you would refrain from helping him, you must surely help him.” In other words, even if one sees the donkey of someone with whom he is in conflict and feels inclined not to help, he must overcome that impulse and help. There are two reasons for this. First, one may not refrain from helping a person with whom one is in conflict. Second, one must relieve the suffering of the donkey that has collapsed under its heavy load (Bava Metzia 32b).

Because unloading fulfills the mitzva of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim, one who sees a collapsed donkey must help unload it without expecting payment. Helping to load, by contrast, carries no such obligation: as with other labor, one is not required to work for another person without compensation. Even when unloading, if helping requires one to stop working, he may ask to be paid for the loss he incurs by interrupting his work (Rosh; Rema ḤM 272:6; Sema 272:9). According to some authorities, however, since the animal is suffering, he must stop and help even if he will not be compensated (Ran).

Because relieving the donkey’s suffering is one purpose of the mitzva, unloading takes precedence over loading. Thus, if two donkey owners need help – one to load his donkey and the other to unload a burden that has caused his donkey to collapse – one should first help unload the burden and relieve the donkey’s suffering. However, if the donkey that needs loading belongs to someone with whom one has a conflict that has reached the point of hatred, one should first help load that individual’s donkey. The goal is to subdue the evil inclination that led to hatred; perhaps through this they will return to loving one another (Bava Metzia 32b; SA ḤM 272:10).

If the person who sees the donkey lying under its burden is a distinguished person who is not accustomed to unloading donkeys in the street, he is not obligated to help unload it. His dignity takes precedence, and therefore there is no mitzva requiring him to forgo his honor in order to prevent the donkey’s suffering. Nevertheless, if he does forgo his honor and helps the donkey, he has performed a mitzva. A Torah scholar of public stature, however, is in a different position: his standing reflects on the Torah itself, and he may not act in a way that diminishes the honor of the Torah. If he wishes to help, he should hire someone else to unload the donkey (Rosh; Rema; AHS ḤM 263:4). Others maintain that a Torah scholar who conducts himself with extra piety and is not concerned for his own honor may help unload the donkey himself (Rambam and SA 272:3).

Sefer Ḥasidim (§44, §666, §668) writes that those who mistreat their donkeys by overloading them and then physically abusing the donkey when it is unable to walk, as well as those who kick their horses excessively when riding them, will ultimately face divine judgment for their cruelty. A light blow that gets an animal moving, however, is permitted, since this is how one urges it to do its work. We find the same idea when God was angry with Bilam for striking his donkey for no reason, as it is stated (Bamidbar 22:32): “Why did you strike your donkey?” Since Bilam knew that his donkey always obeyed him, he should not have struck it after it lay down; he should have understood that something was apparently preventing it from continuing. Because he acted cruelly and threatened it, “If I had a sword in my hand, I would kill you now,” he was punished measure for measure and killed by the sword.

03. “Do Not Muzzle”: The Treatment of Working Animals

There is a Torah mitzva not to prevent an animal from eating the produce it is working with, as it is stated (Devarim 25:4): “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.” To separate kernels of grain from the stalks and chaff, people would lead an ox, a heavy animal, back and forth over the sheaves. This act is called threshing: treading and pressing to release the kernels. The Torah forbids muzzling the ox while it threshes, because the smell of the grain rises to its nostrils and it longs to eat; when it tries to eat and meets the muzzle instead, its eyes grow dim with distress. It is not right for the ox to labor on our behalf while we deny it a share in the benefit produced by its labor. Although the Torah mentions an ox, this does not exclude other animals. Rather, the ox is the example of an animal that works with food. Therefore, all domesticated and wild animals that work with produce growing from the ground, whether still attached or already detached, must be allowed to eat from it. This includes the prohibition against preventing a donkey from eating the grain it carries on its back. The exception is food that would harm the animal: if eating it is likely to cause intestinal illness and suffering, one may prevent it from eating, since the restraint is for its benefit (MT, Laws of Hiring 13:1–3). If the owner of the ox is concerned for the wheat, he may tie a basket filled with cheap wheat stalks to the ox’s head so that it can eat from them while threshing. Since the prohibition is against causing it suffering, this satisfies the law (ibid. 13:6).

A related law permits milking cows that are full of milk on Shabbat. Although milking is prohibited by Torah law as the melakha of threshing, if the cows are not milked they will suffer greatly; the Sages therefore permitted setting aside a rabbinic prohibition in order to relieve their suffering. The simplest method is to ask a gentile to milk them. If no gentile is available, a Jew may milk the cow and let the milk go to waste, since in that manner the milking does not involve a Torah prohibition (Peninei Halakha: Shabbat 20:4).

04. Feeding Animals

A person who owns domesticated or wild animals must provide for their food, and may not eat before feeding them. The Sages based this (Gittin 62a) on the order of the verse (Devarim 11:15): “I will give grass in your field for your animal,” and only afterward, “you shall eat and be satisfied.”^[2]

This prohibition is easy to understand. Domesticated animals cannot provide food for themselves; if their owners forget to feed them, the animals will suffer. In addition, since these animals work for people or produce milk for them, it is proper to repay them for their service by providing their food. They must therefore be fed at fixed times. To ensure that they are not forgotten, the Sages established that a person should feed his animals before feeding himself.

The main prohibition applies to animals that cannot find food for themselves, such as livestock in pens, chickens in coops, and caged parrots; compassion for these animals is especially important. Dogs and cats are different from animals kept entirely in confinement: dogs and cats sometimes roam outdoors, and in pressing circumstances they can survive on whatever they find there. Their owners are therefore not prohibited from eating before feeding them. Nevertheless, it is an act of piety to feed even dogs and cats first. Although domesticated dogs and cats can manage on their own with difficulty, domestication has made it harder for them to find food, and it is proper to have compassion for them. Moreover, both species benefit people: cats catch mice and snakes, and dogs are loyal to their owners and guard their homes. It is therefore fitting to repay them for their service (She’elat Ya’avetz 1:17).

The Sages said that a person should not bring an animal into his domain unless he knows that he will be able to feed it properly (Yerushalmi, Ketubot 4:8). They also taught that God tested the leaders of Israel through their treatment of animals. Moshe Rabbeinu and King David were first shepherds, and only after God saw that they led their flocks with kindness and compassion and cared for their food did He choose them to lead Israel (Shemot Rabba 2:2).

05. Why Animal Suffering May Be Permitted for Human Need

A person may cause animals to suffer for the sake of livelihood, honor, or enjoyment. Thus, one may load animals with heavy packs and strike them to make them move; one may ride horses, guide them with a bit that hurts their mouths, and urge them forward with a whip or boot spurs. Just as a person may exert himself, sweat, and endure indignity in order to earn a living, so too his animal may share in the strain of that work. Since an animal’s stature and sensitivity are lower, it may be put to harder and more painful labor.

Indeed, just as people are sometimes prepared to endure very great suffering for the sake of their honor and religious commitments, so too, at times, it is permitted to cause animals to suffer for the sake of human honor and faith. For example, after a king died, his possessions would be burned in his honor so that others would not use them. This included hamstringing his horses – cutting their legs above the hooves so that they could no longer be used. Although this caused them very great suffering, the honor of the king, which is the honor of all Israel, takes precedence (Avoda Zara 11a; Tosafot, s.v. okrin).

Similarly, before Israel’s war against the kings of the north, it is stated (Yehoshua 11:6): “The Lord said to Yehoshua, ‘Do not fear them, for tomorrow at this time I will deliver all of them slain before Israel. You shall hamstring their horses and burn their chariots with fire.’” Yehoshua was commanded to hamstring the horses by cutting their legs above the hooves, so that they would limp on the stumps of their legs as a disgrace for having taken part in the war. Although the horses could have been taken as spoils or killed, he was commanded to leave them maimed, thereby teaching both the enemies and Israel a lesson: not to trust in horses (Radak; Abarbanel). Even though the hamstringing caused the horses great suffering, we learn from this that for a great moral purpose of this kind, it is permitted to cause them suffering.

We also find that the Sages penalized someone who went to do business on a market day devoted to idolatry: everything he bought there must be destroyed, and if he bought animals, their legs must be cut above the hooves so that he cannot benefit from them. Although this entails tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim, they decreed it in order to distance Israel from idolatry (Avoda Zara 13a; Tosafot, s.v. amar Abaye).

Similarly, R. Yehuda permitted selling a white rooster to a gentile, provided one first cut off its toe so that the gentile could not use it for idolatry. Thus, for financial gain, the Sages permitted causing it suffering by cutting off a toe (Mishna, Avoda Zara 13b).

The Sages also enacted that if someone consecrated an animal to the Temple when the Temple was in ruins, the animal should be placed in an enclosed area until it dies of starvation, so that people would not stumble by misusing consecrated property and using the animal. They did not suggest slaughtering it, which would reduce its suffering, lest people mistakenly eat its meat. Nor did they suggest killing it in some other manner, lest they appear to be inflicting a blemish on a consecrated animal (Avoda Zara 13b). Thus, to prevent people from erring, they accepted causing an animal to suffer by leaving it to die of starvation (Ramban to Avoda Zara 13b; R. Akiva Eger to Avoda Zara 13a notes that hamstringing is more painful).

Finally, an elderly person for whom it is beneath his dignity to unload a donkey is exempt from the mitzva, even though the donkey is suffering and lying under its burden. This too shows that human dignity takes precedence over animal suffering (Nimukei Yosef to Bava Metzia 32b).

06. When It Is Forbidden to Cause Suffering

As we have learned, a person may cause animals to suffer for the sake of livelihood or honor. Without need, however, one may not cause them to suffer. Therefore, someone who enjoys hitting and tormenting an animal may not do so, since there is no genuine need – only an evil desire to cause animal suffering.

Even if cruel people were to offer the owner of a dog a very large sum of money to let them torture it, he may not give them his dog for any amount of money. No amount of money can turn cruelty itself into a legitimate need, and such cruelty is forbidden by Torah law. Similarly, a person who is nervous or in a bad mood may not hit an animal. Even if he claims that hitting the animal helps calm his nerves, it is prohibited by Torah law (Igrot Moshe, EH 4:92; this also follows from Ḥatam Sofer’s definition in his comments to Bava Metzia 32b).

Accordingly, it is improper to hunt wild animals and birds for sport and amusement. The permission to kill animals for their meat or hides is a necessity, not something to celebrate; it is not fitting to kill them as recreation. It is not fitting for Jews to take pleasure in this, for the trait of Israel is compassion (Yevamot 79a). The hunters mentioned in the Torah, Nimrod and Esav, were wicked people who enjoyed the cruelty of hunting (Or Zaru’a; Rema OḤ 316:2; Noda BiYehuda Tinyana, YD 10).^[3]

However, there is no prohibition against fishing with a rod for enjoyment when the intention is to eat the fish. This is preferable to hunting in two respects. First, the intent is to eat the fish that are caught, so this is a real benefit and not cruelty for its own sake, whereas meat from hunted animals and birds is generally forbidden for Jews to eat. Second, fish are less cognitively complex than mammals and feel less pain and suffering, so fishing involves less cruelty. But it is not proper to fish with a rod for enjoyment when one intends to return the fish to the water afterward, because in that case the enjoyment is tied to causing suffering. Although fish are not cognitively complex and their suffering is slight (above, note 1), ideally one should not wound fish except when catching them for food.^[4]

07. Killing Animals

The attitude toward animal life differs from the attitude toward human life. Because human beings were created in the image of God, endowed with a living soul, and entrusted with responsibility for perfecting the world, human life has sanctity. Every moment of human life, while the divine soul rests within the body, is more precious than gold. Under no circumstances may a person’s life be shortened, even to end the suffering caused by severe illness. Animal life, however, does not have that same sanctity. The mitzva is to avoid causing animals to suffer, but there is no mitzva to preserve their lives. Accordingly, if a cat or dog under a person’s care is suffering from a terminal illness or from injuries sustained in an accident, and it is in pain with no chance of recovery, it is preferable to have it put down painlessly in order to spare it suffering.

Moreover, animal-welfare organizations that are left with dogs or cats no one is willing to adopt may have them put down painlessly. Similarly, if caring for a dog has become too difficult and the dog is suffering as a result, and no one else is willing to take it, the owner may put it down painlessly (Maharshal, Bava Kamma 10:37). We have learned that the Sages warned a person not to bring an animal into his domain unless he knows that he will be able to feed it properly (Yerushalmi, Ketubot 4:8). But this warning applies before he takes responsibility for the animal; it does not make him enslaved to the animal for the rest of its life. If he took in the animal thinking he would be able to support it, but later realized that doing so is too difficult, he may put it down in order to spare it suffering, so that it will not die of starvation.

At times there is an economic necessity to kill animals. For example, the owner of a fishpond must market the fish at certain times, according to market demand. If the fish mature too early or too late, he may be left with a pond full of fish and no market for them. Ideally, of course, he should look for a way to sell the fish and not dispose of them unnecessarily. But if no solution is found, the owner is not obligated to continue spending money to feed them, and he may kill them.

The same applies to chicks and chickens that have no market value, when the cost of raising them would exceed whatever breeders could earn from selling them. In such cases, breeders may kill them, since they are not obligated to feed animals from which they will derive no financial benefit (see above, 13:8).^[5]

08. Borderline Cases

There are borderline cases in which a person has a genuine need but meeting that need will cause an animal to suffer. The question is whether the human benefit is significant enough to justify the suffering. The guiding principle is that when the suffering is caused for human benefit and not out of cruelty, there is no prohibition. Nevertheless, since the need is not absolute, one should ideally avoid causing the suffering when possible. The more the animal suffers, and the less necessary the act is for the person, the more proper it is to refrain. Ordinary human judgment and accepted practice are used to assess both sides: how substantial the human need is, and how severe the animal’s suffering is. On that basis, one can determine when it is proper to refrain and when the act should even be prohibited.

For example, strictly speaking, one may pluck feathers from living geese to make quills. But since this causes the geese great suffering, and feathers can instead be taken from geese after slaughter, it is proper to avoid doing so (Terumat ha-Deshen; Rema EH 5:14).

Similarly, one should avoid plucking feathers from a bird’s neck merely to clear the place of slaughter, since this causes needless suffering. If, however, the slaughterer is not skilled enough to slaughter properly without doing so, it is permitted (Or Zaru’a; Rema YD 24:8).

Likewise, one may crop a dog’s ears or dock its tail so that it will look more attractive, since this is done for the owner’s benefit, not out of cruelty. Nevertheless, out of compassion, it is better not to cause the dog suffering. A similar principle applies to a parrot: strictly speaking, one may cut a small part of its tongue so that it can produce words, since this gives its owners pleasure. Ideally, however, it is better to have compassion on the parrot and refrain. If avoiding the procedure would lead the owner not to keep the dog or parrot at all, then the procedure is considered a genuine need for that owner. He may therefore arrange for it to be done, just as people are willing to spend money and undergo surgery to improve their appearance.

One may train animals even when this requires striking them lightly. Even if the training requires harsher strikes, it is permitted, though avoiding such methods is an act of piety. If the animal would otherwise not be used and would likely be killed, even this more difficult form of training is permitted as ordinary practice.

Strictly speaking, one may hunt animals in order to use their hides for coats, wallets, and similar items. As an act of piety, however, it is proper to be stringent. In the past, many were not stringent about this, because people relied on animal hides for warm coats and blankets. Today, when coats and blankets can be made from synthetic materials, it is proper, as an act of piety, not to hunt animals solely for their hides (see Mayim Ḥayim 2:50, by R. Ḥayim David HaLevi).

09. Methods of Raising Animals and Fowl for Food

The general rule is that anything done for human benefit, and not out of cruelty, is permitted. Therefore, one may raise chickens and calves for meat in cramped quarters in order to reduce costs. The same applies to hens raised for eggs and cows raised for milk. Just as people sometimes accept the discomfort of cramped working or living conditions in order to save money, animals too may be raised in tighter quarters when this reduces the cost of production.

Some authorities maintain, however, that this permission does not extend to practices that cause animals severe and extreme suffering. The cases in which halakha permits such suffering — such as cutting horses’ legs above the hooves — are exceptional cases, allowed for a special need such as royal honor or uprooting idolatry. In their view, it is forbidden to impose that level of suffering on animals as a regular, systematic practice for the sake of livelihood. Others maintain that even severe suffering may be imposed on animals when livelihood is at stake. In practice, though, the disagreement usually centers less on the principle than on the facts: whether the practice in question truly causes extreme suffering. Raising and feeding animals for meat, milk, and eggs does not, by its nature, entail that level of suffering.^[6]

One example is the following. Hens naturally lay eggs from about six months of age until about twenty months, at which point they are slaughtered. Farmers can extend the laying period by withholding food from the hens for about ten days during their fifteenth month. The hens then lose their feathers; once they begin eating again, their strength returns, their feathers regrow, and they can continue laying eggs until about twenty-eight months. May farmers cause hens this suffering in order to extend their productive life? Some authorities prohibit it, arguing that one may cause animals only ordinary suffering for the sake of livelihood, but not great suffering, which already falls under forbidden cruelty (Shevet ha-Levi 2:7). Many authorities, however, permit this method, since it benefits the farm and serves the very purpose for which the hens are raised. They add that, in the long run, this process improves the hens’ health, as shown by the fact that they live longer. After all, people too would be willing to go hungry for ten days if doing so would extend their lives. This was also the view of R. Goldberg, rabbi of Kfar Pines (Ha’aretz U-mitzvoteha), and Minḥat Yitzḥak 6:145 rules accordingly.

In practice, it seems proper to be lenient, both because the reasoning is sound and because rabbis of farming communities have an advantage in these matters. As the local halakhic authorities, they know from close experience how animals and fowl are raised and are therefore more suited to weigh the human benefit against the animals’ suffering. Someone unfamiliar with these methods may be shocked when first seeing them. This is like a city-dweller who arrives in a remote village, sees people living without electricity or running water as their ancestors did for generations, and concludes that their lives must be full of suffering — when in fact they may be quite content.

Still, one could argue that as moral sensitivity and economic conditions improve, the standards of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim may change as well. Just as people today find certain conditions distressing that previous generations accepted as normal, we may come to view certain methods of raising animals the same way. Methods once seen as acceptable suffering for the sake of livelihood may come to be regarded as severe and extreme suffering and therefore may no longer be practiced systematically for commercial gain. As this awareness spreads, parts of society may stop eating meat from animals raised in ways they believe cause the animals suffering, and their stance may gradually shape public attitudes. At that stage, lawmakers will need to balance two concerns: reducing the suffering of animals and fowl raised for food, while also ensuring that food does not become prohibitively expensive, especially for the poor. It would be less desirable for laws to be passed under pressure from animal-welfare activists without sufficient regard for the poor or for the other values involved. Such laws would eventually need to be corrected and rebalanced.^[7]

10. Scientific Experiments

It is permitted, and even a mitzva, to conduct scientific experiments on animals in order to understand diseases and develop cures for human beings. Even when these experiments cause animals great suffering, they are not prohibited, because they are done for human benefit and not out of cruelty. Nor should one refrain from them as an act of piety. Through such research, cures may be found for many illnesses, and the highest moral duty is to protect human life and health (see Shevut Yaakov 3:71; Seridei Esh 3:7). Indeed, people are prepared to suffer and even risk their lives in order to save and heal their children or friends. The more lives are at stake, the more willing people are to endure severe suffering and danger to save others. All the more so, one may cause animals under human control to suffer in the search for cures for human disease.

Nevertheless, each proposed experiment must first be evaluated to determine whether it is truly necessary. When the research can be done equally well on different species, one should choose the species with the lower capacity for suffering. For example, if the same experiment can be done on either monkeys or mice, it is better to use mice, whose brains and nervous systems are less complex and whose experience of pain and suffering is more limited. Monkeys, by contrast, are cognitively complex enough that one can tell when they are happy and content or sad and in pain, and one must therefore be especially careful not to cause them to suffer (above, note 1, principle 2). Even when animal research is necessary, every effort should be made to minimize the animals’ suffering. Surgery, for example, should be performed with anesthesia when possible. If the research leaves the animals physically damaged, they should be put down painlessly in order to spare them further suffering (Tzitz Eliezer 14:68).

Strictly speaking, high school students may experiment on insects, such as testing the temperatures at which they can survive, whether extreme heat or extreme cold. True, these experiments have already been performed by others. Still, students gain something by learning how experiments are conducted and by practicing scientific observation. In addition, the main prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim applies to animals that serve human beings or have a meaningful level of awareness; it does not apply in the same way to insects, whose nervous systems are far simpler. Nevertheless, since these classroom experiments do not add to scientific knowledge, and it is far from clear that the students will become scientists who need this kind of training, it is better for them to perform experiments that do not cause living creatures to suffer. It is proper to have compassion for all creatures, as it is stated (Tehilim 145:9): “His compassion extends to all His works.”

11. Dangerous or Harmful Animals

One may not own or keep a pet that disturbs the neighbors. Thus, one may not have a dangerous dog, including a dog likely to frighten people or children who pass by the owner’s yard. One may also not have a dog whose barking disturbs the neighbors’ rest. Even if a dog is trained, poses no real danger of attack, and does not bark in a way that disturbs the neighbors, it may not be kept where passersby who do not know the dog will be frightened when it barks. One may keep such a dog only when passersby are not afraid of it – for example, when it is secured with iron chains or kept behind a fence, so that everyone can see it cannot attack. In remote areas, where there is a security need, intimidating guard dogs may be allowed to patrol at night to protect the settlement, provided they do not endanger the residents. Dogs that do not frighten people at all, whether because they are especially friendly or because the local residents are used to them, do not need to be restrained (Bava Kamma 79b–80a; SA ḤM 409:3).

If a person sees a snake or scorpion in a place where people walk, there is a mitzva to kill it before it harms anyone. The same applies to a lion, wolf, or leopard roaming in a populated area. If, however, a predatory animal or venomous snake is kept in a secure enclosure where it cannot harm anyone, it should not be harmed. However, if the owner fails to guard the animal properly and the situation becomes dangerous, the owner must kill it. If the owner does not do so, anyone may kill the animal in order to protect himself and the public from danger (Tosafot, Bava Kamma 16b, s.v. Rabbi, according to Rabbeinu Tam’s explanation; Noda BiYehuda Tinyana, YD 10).

One may also kill mice and rats that damage one’s fields or enter one’s home (Mishna, Mo’ed Katan 6b). The same applies to insects and other pests in fields or homes, since they harm people (Radvaz 2:727). Moreover, the main prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim does not apply to creatures of this sort in the same way, as their brains and nervous systems are very simple and their experience of pain and suffering is very weak. Although it is an act of piety to avoid harming any living creature needlessly, when pests cause damage, one may kill them; refraining from doing so is not an act of piety.

The same is true of ants, flies, and other insects that enter the home and interfere with its cleanliness. Although one should be careful not to harm any living creature needlessly, even of a lowly species, when such creatures bother a person, one may kill them without compromising that piety. The cleanliness and dignity of a person’s home take precedence.^[8]

12. Cruel Spectacles

It is forbidden to organize or attend bullfights, because they cause animals suffering and also endanger human life. The bulls are first starved in order to make them agitated. Then, in the arena, the bullfighter, or matador, waves a red cloth before the bull, provoking and enraging it until it attacks. If the bull refuses to fight, the matador stabs it until it rises in anger. When the bull finally charges at the man who provoked it, the matador must evade the charge and stab the bull to death, while the crowd roars and cheers. Occasionally, the bull is quicker than the matador, and the matador is killed or injured. In such a case, halakha does not assign the bull any guilt. Ordinarily, an ox that kills a person must be killed; here, however, since the matador provoked the attack, the bull is exempt from punishment (Bava Kamma 39a; MT, Laws of Monetary Damages 6:5).

In the Roman period, cruel spectacles of this sort were a popular form of entertainment. At first, they would set dogs against other animals and watch with pleasure as the animals tore one another apart. Whenever one animal overpowered another and ripped out its throat, the spectators would rejoice and cheer. They would then bring slaves and captives into the arena to fight wild beasts, and even when a beast killed a person, the crowd would rejoice and cheer. Many Jews captured by the Romans were killed in this way. Shamefully, some Jews were drawn after the dominant culture and wanted to watch these acts of cruelty, presumably when the captives were from other nations. The Sages firmly opposed this and ruled that it is forbidden to attend such wicked spectacles, applying to them the verse (Tehilim 1:1): “Happy is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked, nor stood in the way of sinners.” Happy is one who did not go to the theaters, circuses, and stadiums of the gentiles, where the murder of slaves and the suffering of animals were staged amid revelry and mockery (Avoda Zara 18b). In our time, thankfully, public spectacles in which human beings are murdered are no longer staged. Bullfighting, however, remains forbidden, both because of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim and because it endangers human life. Similarly, it is forbidden to train roosters to fight and kill one another. Anyone who buys a ticket to such a spectacle becomes a partner in sin and damages his own capacity for compassion.^[9]

13. Keeping Pets

One may keep pets such as a dog, cat, or parrot. Even though the Sages prohibited Jews from trading in non-kosher animals, that prohibition only applies to those animals whose meat gentiles commonly eat; the Sages were concerned that if such animals were commonly found in Jewish possession, Jews might come to eat their meat. By contrast, there is no prohibition against trading in non-kosher animals whose meat is not commonly eaten. One may therefore trade in such animals and keep them for enjoyment and affection (Beit Yosef, YD 117; Birkei Yosef 2).

Some argue that since these animals are defined by halakha as impure, it is improper to keep them. This concern, however, is not mentioned by the poskim. These animals are called impure because their meat is forbidden to eat, and eating it spiritually defiles a person. But it does not mean that the animals themselves have corrupt traits or that keeping them causes spiritual harm to the owner. On the contrary, each species has its own distinctive quality, and the Sages even praised qualities found in impure animals, such as the loyalty of the dog and the modesty of the cat. It is therefore permitted to keep such pets.

A pet may not be kept when it causes distress to members of the household. Therefore, if a dog intimidates visitors, the owner must have it trained so that guests can enter the home comfortably and be received with proper respect (Shabbat 63a–b).

The Sages said that a person should not bring an animal into his domain unless he knows that he will be able to care for it properly (Yerushalmi, Ketubot 4:8). This includes feeding it, providing it with a suitable doghouse or cage, keeping its area clean, and vaccinating it when necessary.

When an animal under a person’s care becomes sick, the owner must provide the appropriate care. If the animal has a terminal illness and is suffering, it is better to put it down painlessly in order to spare it further suffering. If a person took in an animal thinking he would be able to care for it, but later realizes that he truly cannot, he should try to find someone else who will take proper care of it. If no such person can be found, he is not obligated to keep supporting the animal indefinitely; when necessary, he may put it down in order to spare it suffering (above, section 7).

One may feed live worms to aquarium fish without concern for the worms’ suffering. The prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim applies when suffering is caused needlessly; when there is a genuine need, it is permitted. In addition, tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim applies primarily to animals with enough sensitivity to experience suffering more fully. With simpler creatures, the main concern is not to destroy them needlessly (above, section 1, the second principle). Similarly, one who needs to keep a snake may feed it mice. Although a mouse is more cognitively complex than a snake, feeding mice to a snake is permitted when keeping the snake serves a human need.

It is permitted, and even worthwhile, to maintain a zoo, since the animals receive proper food, and people benefit from seeing them and learning about them (Yabia Omer 4, OḤ 20).

It is permitted to provide psychological treatment with the help of animals. Through caring for an animal – feeding it, cleaning its place, and accepting responsibility for its well-being – the patient learns to take others into account and strengthens his confidence and sense of responsibility. Although patients who do not yet know how to relate properly to others may initially frighten the animal, become angry at it, or hold it too tightly, such treatment is permitted because it serves an important need and there is no intent to cause the animal suffering. The aim is to help the patient become someone capable of caring for the animal and treating it well.

14. The Prohibition of Sterilizing Animals

Creation is meant to increase life in the world, as it is stated after the creation of the fish and birds (Bereishit 1:22): “God blessed them, saying: Be fruitful and multiply.” In keeping with this, the Torah prohibited the act of sterilization – that is, any act that damages one of the reproductive organs of a person, domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird. Anyone who sterilizes any of these violates a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes (Vayikra 22:24; SA EH 5:11).

The Torah prohibition of sterilization was stated regarding males, whose reproductive organs are exposed and who were the ones normally sterilized. According to most poskim, however, sterilizing females is prohibited rabbinically. Some maintain that sterilizing a female is also prohibited by Torah law, though one does not receive lashes for sterilizing a female. Others maintain that there is not even a rabbinic prohibition against sterilizing females; rather, because sterilization involves great pain, it is forbidden on account of the suffering it causes. According to this view, if they were sterilized without suffering, there would be no prohibition.

In recent times, animal-welfare organizations have become concerned with the problem of street cats. With no predator to reduce their numbers, they have multiplied greatly; the food discarded in garbage bins is insufficient for them, and they roam hungry and emaciated, crying from distress and trying to sneak into homes to still their hunger. Some suggested trapping male cats and sterilizing them by cutting the ducts that carry sperm. The cats would then be marked by clipping part of the ear, so that they would not be trapped again by mistake. Once about eighty percent of the males were sterilized, the overwhelming majority would be unable to impregnate females, and the cat population would gradually decline.

However, as we have learned, sterilizing the male cats is prohibited by Torah law. It is also forbidden to hire gentiles to do it, because whenever an act is forbidden to Jews by Torah law, the Sages prohibited Jews from asking a gentile to perform it (SA EH 5:14). In addition, some maintain that Bnei Noaḥ too are forbidden to sterilize animals. According to this view, asking them to sterilize cats would be prohibited by Torah law, since we are commanded not to cause another person to stumble in sin. Sterilizing females is also forbidden by rabbinic law according to most poskim. A possible non-sterilizing solution is to periodically place appealing bait containing contraceptive medication in the streets. This would prevent the female cats from ovulating and going into heat, allowing the cat population to gradually decline without violating the prohibition of sterilization.

The same approach should be used when a person does not want his dog to become pregnant: he should give the dog contraceptive medication. Although there is concern that such medication may cause illness, it remains the proper halakhic solution. Just as contraceptive medications were developed for human beings without causing illness, similar medications could be developed for animals as well. In pressing circumstances, since many authorities maintain that sterilizing a female animal is prohibited only rabbinically, there is room to permit a Jew to sterilize a female dog or cat indirectly, such as by injection or by blocking the fallopian tubes. This is a form of grama, an indirect act whose sterilizing effect takes place only later. The more straightforward solution, however, is for a gentile veterinarian to perform the surgical sterilization.^[10]

15. The Treatment of Ownerless Animals

As explained above (section 4), a person must provide food for the animals in his care, but he is not obligated to feed ownerless animals. Thus, one who sees hungry animals in the wild need not go out of his way to provide them with food, since the mitzva of tzedaka applies to human beings, not animals. For this reason, one is not obligated to save food scraps for ownerless animals. Nevertheless, one who has compassion on such animals and gives them leftover food fulfills a mitzva, as it is stated about God: “His compassion extends to all His works” and “You open Your hand and satisfy every living thing with favor” (Tehilim 145:9, 16), and a person is commanded to cleave to God’s ways. Since feeding them is a mitzva, one may even make a small effort on Shabbat, a day meant for rest, to place leftover food where hungry animals can eat it. This applies only to animals that are hungry and have difficulty finding food, such as dogs and cats. Animals that readily find food without human help, such as bees, do not warrant this effort on Shabbat (SA OḤ 324:11; AHS OḤ 324:2–3; MB 324:31).

It is also proper to take care not to drive any species of animal or plant to extinction. In recent times, technological development has enabled the human population to grow dramatically. As a result, many forests have been cut down, fields have been cleared, and many species have been forced out of their natural habitats and now face extinction. We should therefore try to limit the harm done to animals and preserve the species God created, for each one has its own value and special role. As the Sages said (Shabbat 77b): “Everything God created in His world, He did not create a single thing for nothing.” They gave examples of animals that seem useless but in fact serve various purposes, including medical uses. The Sages further taught, as reflected in Perek Shira, that each species offers God its own unique praise. When a species becomes extinct, the world’s wholeness is diminished, as it were, and God’s praise is diminished as well. It is therefore proper to support efforts and organizations dedicated to preventing animal species from becoming extinct. Nevertheless, when genuine human needs conflict with the needs or survival of animals, human needs prevail.