Kashrut I

Preface

Translated and abridged from the Hebrew edition

I thank God, Who has granted me the merit to complete the first of two volumes on the laws of kashrut. The subject of kashrut is broad and complex. At first, I thought to arrange the halakhot according to the order in which they appear in the Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’a, where the laws of kashrut are presented: beginning with the laws of sheḥita and tereifot, blood and forbidden fat, meat and milk, mixtures, bishulei goyim, the immersion and kashering of utensils, and yayin nesekh, and only afterward turning to the mitzvot dependent upon the Land and the laws pertaining to plants and animals.

However, since my aim is to explain the halakhot from their foundations, I found, while studying the laws of sheḥita and tereifot, mixtures, and meat and milk, that one who wishes to understand the laws of kashrut in their wholeness must first address the laws of plant foods before those of animal foods. After all, the mainstay of our diet is plant-based: grain, legumes, fruits, and vegetables. Therefore, the first part of this volume deals with the laws pertaining to the cultivation of plants, including the mitzvot of ḥadash, orla, the grafting of trees, the crossbreeding of animals, and kilayim of seeds and vineyards, as well as the gifts to the poor (chapters 1–6). It then addresses how plant produce becomes permitted for consumption through the mitzvot of terumot, ma’aserot, and ḥalla (chapters 7–12). Since the discussion focuses on plant life, one chapter is devoted to the laws pertaining to the prohibition of bal tashḥit, whose foundation lies in the protection of fruit trees and food (chapter 13).

After completing the laws pertaining to plant foods, three chapters are devoted to the basic approach to eating meat and to the raising of animals, including a general treatment of the laws of tza’ar ba’alei ḥayim and shilu’aḥ ha-ken (chapters 14–16). An additional chapter details the kosher and non-kosher species (chapter 17). Two further chapters address the laws of sheḥita, the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day, the covering of the blood, and the gifts from animals that the Torah commands us to give: the foreleg, cheeks, and maw; firstborn animals; the animal tithe; and reishit ha-gez (chapters 18–19).

With this, I have completed the first volume of the laws of kashrut, which is called “Plants and Animals.” In the second volume, with God’s help, I will explain the details of the halakhot pertaining to eating itself: checking for tereifot; preparing animal foods by removing blood and forbidden fat; meat and milk and the required separations between them; creeping creatures and worms; the arrangement of the kitchen; kashering utensils; and the restrictions concerning bishulei goyim, yayin nesekh, and the immersion of utensils. It will therefore be called “Food and the Kitchen.”

One might have expected the second volume to be longer. Yet in terms of the number and breadth of mitzvot and halakhot, the subject matter of this first volume is far broader. Most of Seder Zera’im, one of the six orders of the Mishna, is devoted to these matters, along with several chapters of tractate Ḥullin, whereas the second volume, though very practical, draws on a narrower range of sugyot.

The Jewish people’s relationship to the food they eat in Eretz Yisrael is one expression of a life of faith. This is reflected in the Torah’s commandment to recite Birkat Ha-mazon after eating, whose primary berakha is Birkat Ha-aretz, the blessing over the Land (Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 5:1, 5:4). For in Eretz Yisrael, the sanctity within nature is revealed (Orot Ha-teḥiya 28), and consequently food and eating are bound up with holiness.

In Birkat Ha-mazon, we thank God for this. Through the system of mitzvot dependent upon the Land, we express the full range of values that come to light through the food that Israel grows in its Land. The mitzvot of ḥadash and orla are meant to sanctify the first produce: grain through the omer offering brought to God each year, and the fruit of trees through eating the fourth-year fruit in holiness in Jerusalem. Through both, we also learn the foundation of restraint.

Kilayim expresses the distinctiveness of each species, reflecting faith in divine unity as it is revealed in a world of many species, each with its own unique character. Through the gifts to the poor, we learn to reveal the values of ḥesed precisely when we merit harvesting the fruit of our labor. Through terumot, ma’aserot, and ḥalla, we learn how to uphold the values of holiness and education in Israel by giving gifts to the kohanim and levi’im, and by having the people of Israel eat ma’aser sheni in holiness in Jerusalem while including the poor in their rejoicing.

In this way, holiness is revealed within reality itself, elevating the foods of Eretz Yisrael to the level of the sacred. Through them, Israel receives strength and vitality to reveal God’s word in the world and thereby help repair it.

In light of this, we can better understand why it is fitting to begin the laws of kashrut with plant foods in Eretz Yisrael and with the fundamental laws pertaining to eating meat. Through these laws, the values that ought to be revealed through food come to expression. Only afterward do we proceed to the second volume, which deals with the prohibitions connected to animal foods and with the restrictions concerning bishulei goyim.

During the long exile, the central subjects in the laws of kashrut were meat and milk, mixtures of meat and milk, and other prohibitions, because our primary concern was survival. In halakhic terms, this found expression in careful avoidance of prohibitions, in keeping with the order of the laws in Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’a. But now that we have merited the ingathering of the exiles and the rebuilding of the Land, it is fitting to return to the proper order, in which we can first express the sacred values revealed through the mitzvot dependent upon the Land. This is also the order of the Mishna, which begins with the order of Zera’im: first with the berakhot recited over benefit, and then with the mitzvot dependent upon the Land.

Since most of this book deals with the mitzvot dependent upon the Land, I have devoted an extended chapter to surveying these mitzvot throughout the history of Israel: from the time Israel entered the Land under Yehoshua bin Nun, through the destruction of the First Temple, the building of the Second Temple and its destruction, and up to the time when God, in His abundant mercy, granted us the merit to return to the Land and establish the State of Israel.

In earlier books, I found it necessary to introduce the spiritual and theological foundations of the subject, sometimes in the opening chapter of the book and sometimes at the beginning of individual chapters. In this book, however, whose main subject is the mitzvot dependent upon the Land, I found no need for this. The explanation of the mitzva is itself the idea; no further introduction is necessary.

This helps us appreciate how much our lives still lack: the Jewish people have not yet been fully gathered from exile, the Temple still lies in ruins, and we cannot yet fulfill the mitzvot dependent upon the Land as they are meant to be fulfilled or reveal holiness throughout the full breadth of lived reality. Nevertheless, observing these mitzvot according to the guidance of the Sages inspires us and guides us toward revealing sacred values in every area of life. May we thereby merit, with God’s help, to fulfill them in their complete form, and may the Torah’s guidance extend from the mitzvot of agriculture to every other field of human endeavor.

I am grateful to my partners in the study of these topics, to the authors and scholars whose work informed this volume, and to all those who assisted in its preparation and publication. Each is named and thanked individually in the Hebrew edition. My deepest thanks go to my father and teacher, Rabbi Zalman Baruch Melamed, shlita, and to my mother and teacher, from whom I received the foundations of my Torah and worldview, and to my dear wife, Inbal, for her unwavering devotion to the success of this work and to the many who will benefit from it.

May it be God’s will that we merit to see all our children and grandchildren growing in Torah and mitzvot, and increasing truth, ḥesed, and peace forever. May God grant strength and success to all who labor in this sacred work, and fulfill the desires of their hearts for good.

Eliezer Melamed

Iyar 5778

01. The Omer Offering and the Prohibition of Ḥadash

Every year, on the day after the first day of Pesaḥ – the 16th of Nisan – there is a mitzva to offer the first of the new grain as a meal offering to God, so that the first of each year’s harvest is dedicated to Him. In addition, one may not eat from the new grain before the Omer offering has been brought, and one may not harvest the new grain before the barley for the Omer offering has been harvested. The Torah states (Vayikra 23:9–14):

The Lord spoke to Moshe, saying: Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When you come into the land that I am giving you and reap its harvest, you shall bring the Omer, the first of your harvest, to the kohen. He shall wave the Omer before the Lord, that it may be accepted on your behalf; on the day after the “Shabbat” the kohen shall wave it. On the day you wave the Omer, you shall offer an unblemished yearling lamb as an olah to the Lord. Its meal offering shall be two-tenths of an eifa of fine flour mixed with oil, a fire offering to the Lord, a pleasing aroma; and its libation shall be a quarter of a hin of wine. You shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain until this very day, until you have brought the offering of your God – an everlasting statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings.

The Omer offering is brought on the day after the first festival day of Pesaḥ. This is the Sages’ received tradition in interpreting the verse’s phrase, “the day after the Shabbat”: the day after the rest of the first Yom Tov of Pesaḥ. The rest of that day is meant to strengthen our faith through the memory of the Exodus and the mitzva of eating matza on the Seder night. Having deepened that faith, we are then commanded to offer the new grain, so that all our eating throughout the coming year is shaped by that intention. Since the day of the Omer offering is fixed, its harvesting, preparation, and offering override Shabbat even when it falls on Shabbat.

Although wheat is the finest of the five species of grain, the Omer offering is brought from barley. This is the tradition transmitted from Moshe at Sinai, and it also reflects agricultural reality: in Eretz Yisrael, barley ripens before Pesaḥ, while wheat ripens only later. This choice is also significant. Barley is animal feed, and it represents the basic, lower side of human life. Precisely because this side of life emerges first, it too must be connected to holiness. From the night of the Omer harvest, we count seven weeks — forty-nine days — during which we prepare ourselves to receive the Torah on Shavu’ot, when we are commanded to bring the shtei ha-leḥem, the “two loaves,” the first offering brought from that year’s new wheat.

The Omer permits all Israel to eat from the new crop; the shtei ha-leḥem permits meal offerings from the new crop to be brought in the Temple. (Menaḥot 68b; see Peninei Halakha: Mo’adim 13:7).

The mitzva of harvesting the Omer is performed on the night of the 16th of Nisan, and the harvest may be done at any point during the night. Ideally, the barley should be grown near Jerusalem. If the nearby barley had not yet ripened, it could be brought from farther away, provided it was grown in Eretz Yisrael. The Omer was customarily harvested and brought to the Temple courtyard in a dignified ceremony, before a large public gathering, in order to reinforce the Sages’ tradition regarding this mitzva. Once it was brought to the courtyard, the kernels were removed from the ears, lightly roasted, and ground. The resulting flour was then sifted through thirteen sieves.

The next day, after the daily offering and the additional festival offering were brought, one-tenth of an eifa was taken from that flour, mixed with one log of oil, and a handful of frankincense was placed upon it. The kohen waved it before God, took a handful from it, and burned it on the altar. Once this handful was burned, all Israel was permitted to eat from the new grain (Menaḥot 63–68; MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:3–12).

2. The Mitzva Across Time and Place

Until Israel entered the Land, they were not obligated to bring the Omer offering, and there was no restriction on eating from the new grain. On the 10th of Nisan in the year 2489 from Creation, Israel crossed the Jordan and entered Eretz Yisrael. From that point onward, it became forbidden to eat from the new grain before the Omer was brought. This prohibition applies not only in Eretz Yisrael but throughout the world, and it applies both to grain owned by Jews and to grain owned by gentiles, as the verse states: “an everlasting statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Vayikra 23:14; see below, section 5).

The prohibition remained in force even after the destruction of the Temple, as the verse states, “an everlasting statute throughout your generations.” When the Temple stood, the new grain became permitted once the Omer was offered on the 16th of Nisan. After the destruction, however, it becomes permitted only after the 16th of Nisan has fully passed, as the verse also says, “until this very day, until you have brought the offering of your God.” When the Temple is standing, the determining phrase is “until you have brought the offering of your God”; when the Temple is no longer standing, it is “until this very day.” In the Diaspora, where two festival days are observed, one must wait an additional day; the new grain therefore becomes permitted only after the 17th of Nisan has ended (Menaḥot 68b; MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:2; SA YD 293:1).

This mitzva is rooted in the fact that grain provides the staple of human nourishment; for that reason, the divine values bound up in it must be given special expression. The Torah therefore commands us to restrain ourselves and not eat from the new grain before offering its first portion to God. In this way, we return our food to its sacred root and prepare ourselves to receive His goodness as we eat. Through this, holiness and divine values illuminate our eating throughout the year. Yet only after Israel entered the Land was its holiness revealed, enabling grain to be connected to its sacred root through the Omer offering.

Even now, when the Temple is destroyed and we cannot offer the Omer, this awareness still elevates the Jewish people and shapes our eating: the first portion of the grain should have been offered to God, and for that reason one may not eat from the new grain until the day of the Omer (see Sefer ha-Ḥinukh §303; Ḥizkuni to Vayikra 23:10; below, 2:2).

3. The Prohibition of Ḥadash

The prohibition of ḥadash applies to the five grain species from which bread is made: wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye, as the verse states (Vayikra 23:14): “You shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain until this very day.” Bread is made from flour produced from these five grains, which are capable of becoming ḥametz. If dough made from them is left to stand, it ferments, allowing it to become fine bread, the staple of human nourishment. By contrast, if the dough is kneaded and baked quickly, before it has time to ferment, it becomes “bread of affliction” (leḥem oni) – the matza we are commanded to eat on Pesaḥ (Menaḥot 70a–b).

Ḥadash – grain subject to the prohibition of the new crop – may not be eaten, but one may derive benefit from it. Therefore, one may feed ḥadash to animals (Mishna, Menaḥot 10:8; Pesaḥim 23a). Likewise, one may sell ḥadash to a gentile, provided there is no concern that Jews will come to eat it.

The Torah specifies “bread, parched grain, and fresh grain” to teach that new grain is prohibited in every edible form. “Bread” is the most refined form, since its preparation requires grinding the kernels, kneading the flour with water, and baking the dough. “Parched grain” (kali) refers to kernels roasted over fire, while “fresh grain” (karmel) refers to raw kernels eaten as they are. Cooked dishes made from new grain are included in the prohibition as well, since the prohibition of ḥadash takes effect once the grain has reached the stage of karmel, and cooking does not remove that status. The prohibition also includes all flour products, such as bran, coarse bran, starch, and gluten, as well as oatmeal, which is made from crushed oats. Beverages produced from new grain are included as well, whether made by pressing, cooking, or brewing – such as beer and other grain-based drinks.[1]

Any grain that had taken root by the 16th of Nisan – even if it had not yet emerged above ground – is permitted on the day of the Omer. Grain that had not taken root by the 16th of Nisan is not permitted by the Omer that year and remains forbidden until the Omer of the following year. Grain seeds are presumed to take root in the soil two weeks after they are sown (Dagul Me-Revava; R. Akiva Eiger). Some authorities maintain that grain takes root within only three days of sowing (Terumat Ha-deshen). Since this is a Torah prohibition, the halakha follows the stringent view. However, if it is known with certainty that the grain took root before the 16th of Nisan, it becomes permitted on the day of the Omer even if two full weeks have not passed since sowing (see Yerushalmi, Shevi’it 2:4).

The prohibition of ḥadash applies to all grain, including grain grown in an unperforated pot or in water (Rashash to Pesaḥim 36b; Divrei David, vol. 4, YD 50:2).

Grain kernels that became permitted on the day of the Omer may be sprouted, and the leaves that grow from them may be eaten without waiting for the next Omer. The prohibition of ḥadash applies to the kernels themselves, even before they have reached one-third of their growth; it does not apply to the stalks (Sha’agat Aryeh, Ḥadash §4).


[1]. The Sages state that one who violates this prohibition by eating an olive-bulk of bread, an olive-bulk of parched grain, and an olive-bulk of fresh grain is liable for three sets of lashes (Keritot 5a). Likewise, one who eats a cooked dish made from new grain violates a Torah prohibition and is liable for lashes; since the prohibition already took effect when the grain was in the stage of karmel, grinding and cooking it do not remove the prohibition (Ḥatam Sofer, YD 114; see Har Tzvi, YD 239).

One who drinks a beverage made from new grain violates a Torah prohibition but is not subject to lashes. Only wine and oil are treated as equivalent to the fruit itself; liquids extracted from other produce do not have that status for purposes of lashes (MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:22; see Peninei Halakha: Shabbat 12, note 13). Some authorities maintain that a beverage derived from ḥadash is prohibited only rabbinically, since it is not the grain itself but merely liquid extracted from it (Mishkenot Yaakov, YD 68; Penei Yehoshua, Kuntres Aḥaron to Kiddushin). Leḥem Mishneh to Mishna, Terumot 11:2 goes further and maintains that such beverages are permitted. However, the overwhelming majority of authorities maintain that beverages made from ḥadash are prohibited by Torah law (Maharam of Rothenburg; Rosh; Semag; Rokeaḥ; Ḥakham Tzvi §20; Shev Yaakov §61; Sha’agat Aryeh Ha-ḥadashot, Ḥadash §13; Ḥok Yaakov 489:22; AHS YD 293:23–27).

4. The Prohibition Against Harvesting

One may not harvest any of the five species of grain growing in Eretz Yisrael before the barley for the Omer offering has been harvested. The verse states: “You shall bring an Omer, the first of your harvest, to the kohen” (Vayikra 23:10), teaching that the Omer offering must be the first grain harvested. One who harvests earlier violates this positive mitzva. Nevertheless, the grain that was harvested becomes permitted after the Omer is offered (MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:21). Even after the destruction of the Temple, this prohibition remains in effect. The prohibition applies specifically to harvesting with a tool; picking by hand is permitted (Pesaḥim 11a).

The prohibition applies only to grain grown in a place from which the Omer offering may be brought. Therefore, grain grown in beit ha-shelaḥin – manually irrigated fields in valleys – may be harvested before the Omer, since such grain is of inferior quality and unfit for the Omer offering. The Sages, however, decreed that this grain may not be gathered into a heap before the day of the Omer, lest people come to eat it while it is still forbidden as ḥadash. They could have prohibited even its harvest, but because delaying the harvest could damage the crop, they limited the decree to gathering the grain into a heap (Menaḥot 71a; Shita Mekubetzet to Menaḥot 71a; MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:13).

Nowadays, in cases where harvesting is permitted, one may harvest with a combine, even though it separates the kernels from the ears during harvesting and gathers them in a grain bin.[2]

One may likewise harvest new grain growing among young saplings, since such grain is sparse and unfit for the Omer. The Sages also did not prohibit harvesting it, because leaving it in place would damage the young saplings. It is also permitted to harvest new grain for the sake of a mitzva, such as clearing a field to make room for people to sit at a mourners’ meal or for a Torah class. This, too, is because the prohibition applies only to harvesting grain fit for the Omer for personal use, not to harvesting done for the sake of a mitzva.

To prevent people from mistakenly eating this grain, the Sages decreed that it may not be tied into sheaves in the usual way. Rather, it must be left in small, untied bundles called tzevatim. By minimizing the processing, people would remember that the grain is forbidden as ḥadash (Menaḥot 71a, 72a; Rashi to Menaḥot 71a; MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:15–16). [3]

Before the day of the Omer, one may harvest grain that has not yet reached one-third of its growth if it is being cut for animal fodder, since the harvest is directed primarily toward fodder rather than the kernels. “One-third growth” is the stage at which grain is fit for human consumption in pressing circumstances and, if planted, will grow. [4]

Outside Eretz Yisrael, one may harvest grain before the day of the Omer, since the Omer offering may not be brought from grain grown outside the Land. However, authorities disagree over whether the Sages’ decree against gathering the grain into a heap applies there as well.


[2]. Some have suggested that after the destruction of the Temple, the prohibition on harvesting before the Omer ceased to apply (Keren Ora; Rashash). However, the wording of Rambam (MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:13) and Shita Mekubetzet to Menaḥot 84a, citing Rabbeinu Yitzḥak, indicates that the prohibition remains in effect. This is also the view of Sha’agat Aryeh Ha-ḥadashot, Ḥadash §8, and Malbushei Yom Tov, vol. 2, Ḥovat Karka §11.

Grain from beit ha-shelaḥin – manually irrigated fields – and from valley fields may be harvested before the Omer because it is not of choice quality and is therefore unfit for the Omer. According to Maharam Ḥalawa, this leniency applies specifically to beit ha-shelaḥin located in valleys, where the produce is so inferior that it is invalid for the Omer even after the fact. According to Tosafot, Ran, and Rabbeinu Peretz, however, the leniency applies even to grain that would be valid for the Omer after the fact, as the Mishna teaches regarding beit ha-shelaḥin or valleys (Menaḥot 85a).

Even so, the Sages prohibited harvesting even grain whose harvest is permitted by Torah law, lest one come to eat it while it is still ḥadash. When delaying the harvest would cause loss, however, they permitted harvesting it, provided the grain was not gathered into a heap. This unusual handling would remind people not to eat it. Although several Rishonim write that the leniency depends on the potential loss involved (Rabbeinu Gershom; Tosafot; Ran; Shita Mekubetzet), it seems clear that financial loss itself cannot override a Torah prohibition. Rather, they mean that the basic leniency rests on the fact that grain grown in these places is unfit for the Omer. The Sages prohibited harvesting it only as a safeguard, lest one come to eat it, and they did not impose that decree in a case of financial loss. This is explicit in Meiri (Pesaḥim 11a). It also accords with the practice of the people of Jericho, who harvested before the Omer with the approval of the Sages (Menaḥot 71a); the Rishonim explain that this was because the Omer was not brought from there (Rashi; Rivan; R. Yeshaya di Trani; Shita Mekubetzet).

Apparently, “grain of the valleys” refers to grain grown in Jericho and the Jordan Valley. Because rainfall there is sparse, the grain required irrigation, like beit ha-shelaḥin. It was also unfit for the Omer because the region’s warm climate caused it to ripen early; by the time the Omer was offered, it was already past its prime and no longer of choice quality. It may also be that grain grown through manual irrigation is generally of lower quality than grain grown naturally. In any event, the same ruling appears to apply to the Beit She’an Valley, where the hot climate causes barley to ripen well before Pesaḥ; by Pesaḥ, it is no longer fresh or of superior quality and is therefore unfit for the Omer. This also fits the reasoning that manually irrigated grain is of lesser quality, for even though more rain falls there, supplemental manual watering is still needed.

Harvesting with a combine: Today, grain is normally harvested with a combine, which separates the kernels from the ears as it harvests. Therefore, wherever harvesting is permitted, it may be done with a combine as well. There is no need to prohibit this because of the rabbinic decree against gathering grain into a heap, since that decree may be understood to apply specifically to a heap of grain, not to combine harvesting, which is an entirely different process. One could argue the opposite: combine harvesting is more severe, because it brings the grain closer to an edible state. Nevertheless, today people do not normally eat raw grain, so the concern that someone may come to eat it does not apply. In addition, prohibiting the standard method of harvesting with a combine would cause enormous financial loss. It therefore stands to reason that just as the Sages waived their rabbinic prohibition against harvesting in cases of financial loss, they would likewise waive the prohibition against gathering grain into a heap in cases of loss. See R. Shlomo Rosenfeld’s article in Teḥumin 7.

[3]. A practical issue concerns harvesting the edges of grain fields to create firebreaks and prevent fire from spreading. At first glance, the Gemara permits harvesting only for the sake of a mitzva, as Rambam writes (MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:15). Some, however, infer from the Gemara that any harvesting not meant to prepare grain for eating is permitted (Sefat Emet to Menaḥot 71a; AHS, Kodashim 116:8). According to this view, harvesting to create firebreaks would be permitted. By contrast, Be-ohalah Shel Torah 4:34 forbids harvesting for fire prevention, since it may involve a Torah prohibition. He adds that one should not rely on the minority view that the prohibition on harvesting ceased after the destruction of the Temple. He does, however, permit harvesting before the crop has reached one-third of its growth.

In that case, the harvest must be specifically for animal fodder, since the poskim write that the leniency before one-third growth applies only for animal use (Mahari Kurkus; Kesef Mishneh to MT, Laws of Temidin u-Musafin 7:15). This can be understood as follows: the harvest is directed not toward the grain kernels, but toward the ears, which are the animal fodder. Still, it seems that one may follow the rulings of Sefat Emet and AHS, because the Sages’ permission to harvest specifically for a mitzva applies only when the harvested grain will be eaten. When the harvest is not done for eating and the grain itself will not be eaten, the prohibition does not apply in the first place. This resembles melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufa – labor not performed for its essential purpose, and therefore not the primary form of that labor.

Nevertheless, ideally one should have a gentile do the harvesting. The Gemara states that the Sages were uncertain whether it is forbidden to instruct a gentile to perform a Torah prohibition that is not punishable by court-imposed death, and most authorities rule stringently and forbid it (Bava Metzia 90a; see Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 5, note 9). In the case of a positive mitzva, however, which carries no lashes, such as harvesting before the Omer, it appears that instructing a gentile is permitted. Indeed, Tosafot Ḥakhmei Anglia (Kiddushin 38b) permit telling a gentile to harvest ḥadash.

[4]. Authorities disagree about what qualifies as one-third growth. The main view is that it is the stage at which the fruit or grain becomes fit for consumption in pressing circumstances, similar to the halakhic stage known as ma’akhal ben Derusai. It is also the point at which the seed becomes viable and can be used for planting, as stated in Tosefta, Terumot, end of ch. 2; Yerushalmi, Ḥalla 1:3; and Yerushalmi, Shevi’it 2:7. Rambam codifies this (MT, Laws of Tithes 2:5; Laws of Terumot 2:10), as does SA YD 331:15. In grain, this stage is reached at the end of the milk stage, when the kernel’s contents begin to change from liquid to a waxy consistency. See Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 3, note 6.

5. Ḥadash in the Diaspora

Eretz Yisrael is the home of the Jewish people and the place best suited for fulfilling the Torah (Sifrei to Devarim 11:18; Ramban to Vayikra 18:25; below, 13:1). It is also easier to observe the mitzva of ḥadash in Eretz Yisrael, since grain is sown at the beginning of winter and ripens around Pesaḥ. As a result, the Omer permits all types of grain, and one need only refrain from harvesting or eating grain that ripened before Pesaḥ until the day of the Omer. By contrast, in countries where rain falls during the summer as well, sowing is sometimes delayed until after Pesaḥ, so that part of the crop remains forbidden as ḥadash until the Omer of the following year. It was often difficult to determine which grain had taken root before the Omer and was therefore permitted, and which had taken root afterward and remained forbidden until the next Omer. Because this created a pressing difficulty, authorities permitted grain sold in the markets on the basis of a safek sfeika, a double doubt: perhaps the grain was from the previous year; and even if it was from the current year, perhaps it had taken root before the Omer; or perhaps it came from a place where all grain had taken root before the Omer (Ra’avya; Rosh). Others maintain that the prohibition of ḥadash outside Eretz Yisrael is rabbinic, and therefore, in any case of doubt, the halakha follows the lenient view (Or Zaru’a).

When Jews migrated to the cold countries of northern Europe, however, it became far more difficult to avoid violating the prohibition of ḥadash. Since the winters there are severe, grain was sown only toward the end of winter, and often took root only after the day of the Omer. In addition, summer grain was sometimes grown, since in some countries rain falls even in the summer. As a result, there were times when nearly all local grain was ḥadash, yet many ate it without checking whether it would remain forbidden until the following Omer. This was especially problematic with barley and oats, from which beer was made, as it was often clear that they came from the new crop.

In practice, some rabbis urged the public to observe the prohibition despite the difficulty. When the hardship became too great, others refrained from rebuking the community, knowing that their words would not be heeded. They invoked the principle, “Better that they sin inadvertently than deliberately” (Rosh; Rema YD 293:3).

Other authorities, faced with great hardship, sought grounds for leniency. Some maintained that, according to the lenient view in the Mishna, ḥadash does not apply outside Eretz Yisrael at all, and that this view may be relied upon in pressing circumstances (Taz YD 293:4). Others maintained that, according to the lenient view in the Mishna, ḥadash outside Eretz Yisrael is rabbinic and applies only in lands near Eretz Yisrael; therefore, in pressing circumstances, one may permit ḥadash in Europe and other lands far from Eretz Yisrael (AHS YD 293:20, based on Rabbeinu Barukh). Still others maintained that although ḥadash applies throughout the Diaspora, it applies only to grain owned by Jews, not to grain owned by gentiles (Baḥ). The halakhic authorities who issued these rulings were aware that, according to the overwhelming majority of Rishonim, the halakha follows the Tanna’im who maintain that ḥadash outside Eretz Yisrael is prohibited by Torah law even when the grain belongs to a gentile. Nevertheless, because of the great hardship, they relied on minority views and ruled leniently. In those countries, people depended so heavily on beer that it seemed as though “a person’s life truly depends on it” (Taz YD 293:4).[5]


[5]. The Mishna and Gemara in Kiddushin 37a record a dispute about ḥadash outside Eretz Yisrael. The first view – that of R. Yishmael – maintains that the prohibition does not apply there by Torah law. This is also the view of R. Elazar, son of R. Shimon b. Yoḥai. By contrast, R. Eliezer, R. Akiva, and R. Shimon b. Yoḥai maintain that the prohibition of ḥadash applies by Torah law even outside Eretz Yisrael, as the verse states: “an everlasting statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Vayikra 23:14).

Tosafot to Menaḥot 68b explain, based on the statements of the Amoraim there, that all agree ḥadash applies in the Diaspora; the dispute is only whether it applies by Torah law or rabbinically. Sha’agat Aryeh, Ḥadash §1, writes similarly. Some, however, maintain that according to the first view, the prohibition of ḥadash does not apply outside Eretz Yisrael at all (Baḥ; Taz).

In practice, the overwhelming majority of Rishonim rule in accordance with R. Eliezer, maintaining that ḥadash applies by Torah law even outside Eretz Yisrael. First, this is the view of most Tanna’im. Second, this is the ruling of an anonymous Mishna, formulated as a practical halakhic ruling: “Ḥadash is prohibited by Torah law everywhere; orla is a received law; and kilayim is rabbinic” (Mishna, Orla 3:9). The same conclusion emerges from the practice of the later Amoraim – the sages of Rav Ashi’s academy and Ravina – who treated the prohibition of ḥadash in the Diaspora as Torah law (Menaḥot 68b).

This is the ruling of Rif, Rosh, Ramah (R. Meir Ha-Levi Abulafia), Meiri, Mordekhai, and Ritva in their comments to Kiddushin 37a. It is also the ruling of Rabbeinu Yona, Rokeaḥ, Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, Ra’avya, Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, Kol Bo, Semag, Semak, Rambam (MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:2), Tur, and SA YD 293:2.

In Europe, however, observing the prohibition proved very difficult, and authorities therefore sought grounds for leniency. A few Rishonim maintain that the prohibition of ḥadash outside Eretz Yisrael is rabbinic (Or Zaru’a; Maharam, Me’il Tzedek). Accordingly, in cases of doubt, one may be lenient in pressing circumstances. According to Rabbeinu Barukh, cited in Responsa Ha-Rosh 2:1, ḥadash in the Diaspora is rabbinic and applies only in lands near Eretz Yisrael; AHS YD 293:19–21 develops this lenient approach.

Taz YD 293:4 maintains that according to the first view recorded in the Mishna in Kiddushin 37a, there is no prohibition of ḥadash in the Diaspora at all. Although the Rishonim ruled in accordance with the stringent majority view among the Tanna’im and Amoraim, Taz maintains that their ruling was not absolute. Therefore, in a time of need, one may rely on the lenient minority view (see Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it Ve-yovel 7, note 2). Some were also lenient when buying grain from a gentile, since according to Riva, cited by R. Avigdor, there is no prohibition of ḥadash on grain owned by a gentile in the Diaspora. According to Baḥ, there is no prohibition of ḥadash on grain owned by a gentile even in Eretz Yisrael. Leḥem Mishneh to Mishna, Terumot 11:2 suggests that beverages produced from grain are not prohibited.

Although most Aḥaronim maintain that the halakha follows the overwhelming majority of Rishonim – that ḥadash in the Diaspora is prohibited by Torah law – and that one should therefore be stringent when possible (MB 489:45), many relied on the lenient minority opinions because of pressing circumstances (AHS).

6. Mixtures and Cases of Doubt

If there is doubt whether grain or grain-containing products are prohibited as ḥadash, they may not be eaten, since one must be stringent in cases of doubt involving Torah prohibitions. This is the practice in Eretz Yisrael: any grain with kosher certification from the Chief Rabbinate is presumed to be free of any concern for ḥadash.

In principle, this should be the practice in the Diaspora as well. Since old grain is now readily available, and the situation is no longer one of pressing need, one should be stringent in cases of doubt concerning ḥadash (see Igrot Moshe, YD 4:46:4). In practice, however, most kashrut agencies in the Diaspora are lenient in such cases, relying on arguments developed in earlier times, when old grain was very difficult to obtain. One who wishes to be lenient outside Eretz Yisrael has authorities upon whom to rely. The more difficult it is to obtain food without concern for ḥadash, the more room there is to rely on the lenient views.

In Eretz Yisrael, however, one should not be lenient, even though most grain is imported. The overwhelming majority of authorities rule stringently, and this has long been the accepted practice in Eretz Yisrael, where cases of doubt can be avoided without difficulty. Therefore, any grain-containing product bearing overseas kashrut certification but lacking Rabbinate approval may not be eaten unless it states explicitly that it was made from old grain or was supervised by a rabbi who is careful about the prohibition of ḥadash, since most Diaspora kashrut agencies are known to be lenient when ḥadash is in doubt.

If ḥadash flour became mixed with other flour, it is not nullified, even if the other flour is a thousand times its quantity. Since ḥadash will become permitted after the day of the Omer, it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin – something that will eventually become permitted – and such an item is not nullified when mixed with its own kind (Nedarim 58a; MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 15:10).

If, however, the mixture containing the ḥadash is ḥametz, it cannot be kept until the Omer, since the ḥametz must be destroyed before Pesaḥ. Therefore, if the mixture contains sixty times as much permitted food as ḥadash, the ḥadash is nullified and the mixture may be eaten (Ḥokhmat Adam 53; Binat Adam 28). The same applies if the mixture is a food that will spoil before the day of the Omer: the ḥadash is nullified in sixty (Ḥok Yaakov 489:24).

If ḥadash flour became mixed into a different kind of food, it is nullified in sixty, and one need not wait until the day of the Omer. Even a davar she-yesh lo matirin does not prohibit a food of a different kind unless it can impart flavor to it. Once there is sixty times as much permitted food, it can no longer impart flavor and is therefore nullified (SA YD 102:1).

1. The Mitzvot of Orla and Neta Reva’i

The Torah forbids deriving benefit from orla fruit, which grows during the first three years of a tree’s life. It also commands that fourth-year fruit be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there in sanctity, with praise to God. Through this mitzva, blessing extends to the fruit that grows from the fifth year onward. The Torah states: “When you come into the Land and plant any tree for food, you shall treat its fruit as closed off. For three years it shall be closed off to you; it may not be eaten. In the fourth year, all its fruit shall be sacred, for praise of the Lord. In the fifth year, you may eat its fruit, so that it may yield its increase to you. I am the Lord your God” (Vayikra 19:23–25).

The word orla means a blockage. Thus, an “uncircumcised heart” is a heart that is blocked; “uncircumcised ears” are ears blocked from hearing; and “uncircumcised lips” are lips unable to speak freely. From this we learn that the fruit of the first three years is forbidden to us: we may neither eat it nor derive benefit from it (Rashi and Rashbam on Vayikra 19:23).

When the Children of Israel crossed the Jordan in the time of Yehoshua bin Nun and entered the Land, the laws of orla took effect. This follows from the verse: “When you come into the Land and plant.” Even if a gentile planted a tree in his own field after that point, it became subject to orla, and one may not derive benefit from its fruit. The verse says, “any tree for food,” including a tree planted by a gentile (Sifra on Vayikra 19:23).

In the Diaspora, the law of orla applies by virtue of a halakha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai — a tradition that limits the prohibition to cases where the fruit is certainly orla. Thus, in the Diaspora, fruit is forbidden only when it is known with certainty to be orla; if its status is uncertain, it is permitted, even when there is strong reason to presume that it is orla. When it is uncertain whether fruit is orla, the fruit is forbidden in Eretz Yisrael but permitted in the Diaspora (Mishna, Orla 3:7; Yerushalmi, Orla 3:7; Kiddushin 39a; SA YD 294:8; see below, section 11). The boundaries of the Land for this mitzva are the boundaries of those who ascended from Egypt. Even according to those who maintain that the southern Arava lies outside those boundaries, since it is under the sovereignty of the State of Israel, the Torah obligation applies there as well (see below, chapter 12, section 2, note 2, and chapter 17).[1]
Whether one plants a seed or a cutting, the three years are counted from the time it takes root in the ground (as explained below, section 4).


[1]. The Mishna in Orla 1:2 teaches: “When our ancestors came to the Land, fruit from trees they found already planted was not subject to orla; fruit from trees they planted, even before they conquered the Land, was subject to orla.” The Yerushalmi explains that “when you come” means “as soon as you enter.” Rambam rules accordingly (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 10:9). Some Aḥaronim maintain that according to the view that the Land’s second sanctification, in the Second Temple period, lapsed with the Temple’s destruction, the law of orla today is rabbinic (Mishneh la-Melekh on MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:11). Others maintain that the Torah obligation of orla applies only when most of Israel lives in the Land, based on the phrase “when you come” (Tzlaḥ, Berakhot 36a). In practice, however, the accepted ruling is that orla in Eretz Yisrael applies by Torah law even today (SA YD 294:8; Radvaz; Mabit; Maharshdam; Maharit). In pressing circumstances, the lenient views may be combined as an additional basis for leniency (R. Herzog, Pesakim u-Ketavim 3:1; Yabi’a Omer 6, YD 24).Since fruit whose orla status is uncertain is permitted in the Diaspora, the Sages said: “Whoever rules leniently in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha follows his view in the Diaspora” (Berakhot 36b). Accordingly, the caper’s peel does not have the status of orla. The same applies to every dispute in the laws of orla: whenever a Tanna or Amora rules leniently, the Diaspora follows that lenient view (see SA YD 294:17). It also appears that in disputes among the Rishonim and Aḥaronim, one should incline toward leniency. Still, when the stringent position seems far more compelling, it is proper to be stringent.

2. The Reason for the Mitzva

This mitzva honors God with the first of the tree’s fruit: it is eaten in sanctity in Jerusalem, where one praises Him for all the good He has bestowed upon us. Usually, the fruit that grows during the first three years is not especially abundant or choice, and therefore would not bring fitting praise to God. The Torah prohibits that fruit so that the first time we eat from the tree will be an act of sanctity and praise in the fourth year, when the fruit is already plentiful and fine. This allows God’s goodness and blessing to rest upon the fruit of all the coming years. Eating it then remains joined to faith and becomes a source of vitality, goodness, and blessing in the world. The Torah gave similar commands regarding the firstborn of people, the firstborn of animals, and the first fruits. The same principle also underlies the mitzvot of ḥadash, teruma, ḥalla, and reishit ha-gez (see Ramban on Vayikra 19:23–25; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh 246–247).

This mitzva also teaches the value of self-discipline, a virtue of tremendous importance. The ability to restrain oneself and defer gratification is essential for success in this world and the next. A young person who studies diligently is likely to succeed later in his personal life and livelihood; yet many young people are unable to hold themselves back. Swept along by impulse, they waste their time on various diversions. Likewise, friendships between young men and women that are not directed toward marriage can harm their ability to marry and build a loving, faithful home; yet many people are unable to restrain themselves and form intense attachments that do not lead to a true covenant. The same applies to people who cannot restrain themselves from spending money on luxuries, such as buying a home beyond their means. Instead of saving enough to help their children learn a profession and marry, or to support themselves in old age, they spend what should have been set aside. Adam, the first man, too, was swept along by his inclination. He sinned because he did not restrain himself from eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and thereby brought death upon himself and his descendants. Through the mitzva of orla, a person learns to watch his fruit grow and refrain from deriving benefit from it. As he does so, he learns to overcome his inclination and develop self-discipline. This is what the Sages said: “Who will uncover the dust from your eyes, Adam? You could not stand by your command even for one hour, while your children wait three years for orla” (Vayikra Rabba 25:2; see Beitza 25b).

The Sages further said that the fruit of the first years reflects an urge to appear before its time, without proper restraint. It is therefore incomplete, and impurity clings to it. The fruit of the first three years corresponds to the three dense, impure husks that seal off and conceal the light. The fourth year corresponds to the thin shell in which good and evil are mixed together. Fourth-year fruit is rectified by bringing it to Jerusalem and eating it in sanctity (Zohar 3:87a; Sha’arei Orah, Gate 5; Pardes Rimmonim 25:7).

3. The Prohibition Against Deriving Benefit

One may neither eat nor derive benefit from fruit that grows during a tree’s first three years. For this reason, one may not light a lamp with oil extracted from orla fruit, nor may one fuel an oven with orla fruit. One may not place orla fruit in the ground as fertilizer, although one may throw it onto the ground if he does not intend to fertilize with it. One may not use orla fruit even for a mitzva; therefore, an orla etrog is invalid for the mitzva of the four species on Sukkot (Sukka 34b; SA YD 294:24; Peninei Halakha: Sukkot 4:12). It is likewise forbidden to benefit from the fragrance of orla fruit (SA YD 108:7).[2]

It is also forbidden to dye a garment with dye produced from orla fruit. A garment dyed with orla fruit may not be used; to prevent people from mistakenly benefiting from it, it must be burned (Yerushalmi, Orla 3:1; Kiddushin 56b). Whenever there is concern that people may derive benefit from orla fruit, there is a mitzva to burn it or destroy it in some other way that makes benefit impossible. When possible, it is good to remove the blossoms or fruit while they are still small, so that people will not mistakenly benefit from them. [3]

One may not derive benefit from anything that develops together with the fruit, including the pits, peel, and juice. By contrast, one may derive benefit from the tree itself, its leaves, and its blossoms. One may also derive benefit from semadar — fruit so small that it is not yet considered fruit. Once the fruit reaches the stage of boser — recognizable but still unripe fruit — it is considered fruit, even though it is still unfit to eat, and the prohibition of orla applies (Mishna, Orla 1:7–9; SA YD 294:1–2). [4]

It is forbidden to plant the pits of orla fruit. Nor may one place orla fruit in the ground in order to grow a tree from it. One may, however, plant a branch from an orla tree, since one may derive benefit from the wood itself (Mishna, Orla 1:9). If one transgressed and planted orla fruit, one may derive benefit from the tree that grows from it. This is based on the rule of zeh ve-zeh gorem mutar: when two factors together produce something, one forbidden and one permitted, the result is permitted. Here, the two causes are the forbidden fruit and the permitted soil. Therefore, one may derive benefit from the resulting tree (SA YD 294:12).

The prohibition of orla also applies to fruit from a tree owned by a gentile, and a Jew may not derive benefit from that fruit. Nevertheless, a gentile may benefit from orla fruit that grew on his own tree or on a tree owned by a Jew, because the prohibition of orla applies to Jews, not gentiles. Still, since a Jew may not derive benefit from the fruit, he may not sell his orla fruit to a gentile, give it as a gift, or even feed it to an animal, because in each of these cases he derives benefit from it (MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 8:16).

Before any orla fruit has begun to grow, however, one may sell a gentile the rights to the future crop. Since the Jew receives payment before the fruit exists, he is not deriving benefit from the fruit itself, but from the tree, from which benefit is permitted (SA YD 294:15; Nekudot ha-Kesef on MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 8:16). This leniency applies only when there is no concern that the gentile will later sell the orla fruit to Jews and cause them to transgress, such as when he sells it in a place where no Jews live.


[2]. According to the Yerushalmi, Orla 3:1, and Pesaḥim 21b, Ḥizkiya holds that wherever the Torah states, “it shall not be eaten,” as it does with orla, one may not derive benefit from the forbidden fruit. Otherwise, people could sell the fruit and use the money to buy food, so the prohibition would indirectly lead to eating. When the Torah says “you shall not eat,” as with neveila or tereifa, the food is forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit. Rosh writes likewise (Ḥullin 7:17). R. Abbahu holds that any formulation prohibiting eating also prohibits benefit, unless a separate source permits such benefit. Rambam rules this way too (MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 8:15). The Sages further derived from the threefold repetition of the term orla that all forms of benefit are included (Pesaḥim 22b). Regarding the permission to throw the fruit on the ground without intent to fertilize, see Tosafot on Avoda Zara 43b, s.v. amru lo, and Mishpetei Eretz 10:9.

[3]. The Mishna in Temura 7:4 states: “These are to be burned: ḥametz on Pesaḥ, impure teruma, orla, and kil’ei ha-kerem. Whatever is usually burned should be burned, and whatever is usually buried should be buried.” Tosafot imply that one must burn orla and kil’ei ha-kerem, based on the verse “lest it become consecrated,” which they read homiletically as “lest it be consumed by fire” (Kiddushin 56b). Ritva, by contrast, maintains that there is no obligation to burn them; rather, they must simply be destroyed. Binyan Tziyon 101 explains that the purpose is to prevent anyone from benefiting from them. Therefore, items better suited to burial should be buried, since there is no specific obligation to burn them. Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 294:3 rules similarly. Ḥatam Sofer, OḤ 180, writes that by burning orla one fulfills a mitzva, but burning it is not obligatory.

[4]. Fruit develops in three stages. The first is semadar, when the emerging fruit is not yet halakhically considered fruit. This stage begins when the blossom falls and the tiny fruit first appears and lasts until the fruit’s form is recognizable. The second is boser, recognizable but still unripe fruit. Once its form is recognizable, it has the status of fruit even though it is still unfit to eat. The third is hevi shelish, when the fruit has matured enough to be edible in pressing circumstances. From that point on, tithes must be separated from it. R. Yosi holds that the prohibition of orla begins already at semadar, while the Sages hold that it begins only at boser (Mishna, Orla 1:7; Tiferet Yisrael on Mishna, Orla 1:7). Berakhot 36b explains this based on Mishna, Shevi’it 4:10. There, Beit Hillel says that during the Shemita year, one may no longer cut branches from grapevines, olive trees, and carob trees once they reach the boser stage: for grapes, when the berries form; for olives, when they blossom; and for carobs, when they begin to form chains. Radvaz explains Rambam’s ruling this way (Responsa 1:44; MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:13), and the Vilna Gaon, YD 294:37, writes similarly. Date clusters are different, however, because people eat them even at the semadar stage (Radvaz).

Berakhot 36b states that, with other fruits, the Sages agree with R. Yosi that semadar is forbidden. Ḥazon Ish, Orla 3:5, takes this statement literally and concludes that only grapes, olives, and carobs remain permitted at the semadar stage, while other fruits are already forbidden. The Vilna Gaon, however, understands the Gemara’s statement as part of the give-and-take of the discussion, not its final conclusion. He therefore rules that for all fruits, semadar is permitted and boser is forbidden. That is the accepted halakha, since there is no compelling reason to distinguish among different types of fruit.

For further study: SA YD 294:4 writes that at the end of the third year, fruit that reached ḥanata after Tu Bishvat is permitted. R. Kook inclines toward this view in Mishpat Kohen 3. According to Rambam, SA, and most authorities, ḥanata is the stage at which the fruit reaches one-third of its growth, is fit to be eaten in pressing circumstances, and reaches the point at which one must separate tithes from it (Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 3, note 6). This creates a difficulty for SA’s view, since we learned here that fruit becomes prohibited as orla already at the boser stage. How, then, could such fruit suddenly become permitted once Tu Bishvat arrives? Rambam’s own wording is: “Everything the tree produces during this time is orla” (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:10), which implies that the prohibition begins once the fruit reaches boser. According to Tosafot, however, ḥanata begins at the semadar stage. It is therefore possible that when Rashi writes (Rosh Hashana 14a) that the years of orla are determined by ḥanata, he understands ḥanata as the semadar stage, as Tosafot do. This is how Mishpetei Eretz 2:2 rules. Alternatively, one can explain SA’s view as follows: from the first of Tishrei until Tu Bishvat of the final year, orla applies only to fruit that developed from the previous year’s rainfall. It therefore stands to reason that only fruit that reached ḥanata before Tu Bishvat developed from those rains. Fruit that had reached only the boser stage developed from the rains of the new year and is therefore not prohibited. Rambam, who does not state his position explicitly, may agree with this explanation.

4. Calculating the Years of Orla

When counting the years of orla, two dates are relevant: the first of Tishrei, which is the New Year for years and for plantings, and the 15th of Shevat, which is the New Year for trees. This is because fruit that reaches ḥanata by the 15th of Shevat is considered to have developed from the rains the tree received during the previous year. We also have another rule: 30 days in a year count as a year (Rosh Hashana 9b–10b).

The calculation works as follows: If the tree took root in the ground by the 29th of Av, then by the first of Tishrei, 30 days will have passed for it, and those 30 days count as a full year. One must then wait another two years to complete the three years. Since the New Year for trees is the 15th of Shevat, one must wait until the 15th of Shevat, because fruit that reaches ḥanata before the 15th of Shevat developed from the rains of the previous year, when the tree was still subject to orla. Thus, if the tree took root on the 29th of Av 5781, all fruit that reaches ḥanata on it before the 15th of Shevat 5784 is orla. Fruit that reaches ḥanata from the 15th of Shevat 5784 until the 15th of Shevat 5785 is neta reva’i. Fruit that reaches ḥanata from the 15th of Shevat 5785 onward is ordinary fruit. In practice, then, orla applies to the tree for two years and five and a half months.

The Sages estimated that a seed or cutting takes 14 days to take root in the ground. Therefore, for a tree to take root by the 29th of Av and have that year counted, it must be planted no later than the 15th of Av. If one plants a sapling together with its root ball, there is no need to wait 14 days, because from the moment it is placed in the ground, it is considered rooted there. Accordingly, if it is placed in the ground by the 29th of Av, that year counts for it.

However, if the tree took root in the ground on the 30th of Av 5781 or later, then since 30 days did not remain for it in 5781, its first year begins only on the first of Tishrei 5782. One must then wait three full years, until the first of Tishrei 5785. Since the New Year for trees is the 15th of Shevat, one must wait several more months, until the 15th of Shevat 5785. Only then does the tree leave its orla status. Thus, if the tree took root in the ground on the 30th of Av 5781, orla applies to it for three years and five and a half months. Some authorities are lenient and maintain that orla never lasts more than three years. However, since orla applies by Torah law, the halakha follows the stringent opinion.[5]


[5]. If a tree took root on the 29th of Av, the orla period ends after roughly two years and five and a half months. If it took root on the 30th of Av, the orla period ends after roughly three years and five and a half months.

The text above follows Ra’ah, Tosafot, Rashba, Ritva, Ran, and Tur, who hold that after the three orla years end, one must always wait until the 15th of Shevat, since fruit that reaches ḥanata before then draws its nourishment from the previous year’s rains. Nevertheless, the first year need not be complete. If it contained at least 30 days before the first of Tishrei, that is enough for it to count as one year.

However, Rashi, Rambam, Raavad (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:10–12), Ri Ha-zaken, Meiri, and Semag disagree. In their view, only when the initial calculation was lenient, counting part of a year as a full year, must one wait until the 15th of Shevat in the final year. But if the tree was planted less than 30 days before year’s end, one begins counting three years only from the first of Tishrei 5782. On the first of Tishrei 5785, the tree leaves its orla status entirely, as it has completed three full years, and one need not wait until the 15th of Shevat. In their view, even fruit that reaches ḥanata before then is permitted, despite having developed from rains that fell while the tree was still within its orla years. If the tree was planted between the first of Tishrei and the 15th of Shevat, many authorities who follow this approach maintain that the orla period ends on the 15th of Shevat, so that one must wait more than three complete years (Raavad, Radvaz, and others on Rambam).

Others maintain that three years are counted from the exact day the tree was planted (Rambam, according to Kesef Mishneh). Still others go further and argue that whether the tree was planted before Rosh Hashana or after, one never counts more than three exact years (R. Hai Gaon, cited in Eshkol, Hilkhot Orla 111a; R. Natronai Gaon, cited in Tamim De’im 120). Some are even more lenient, ruling that if the tree took root by the 29th of Av 5781, the orla years end on the first of Tishrei 5784, after only 25 months. If it took root later than the 29th of Av, they end on the 15th of Shevat 5784, after 29 and a half months (R. Ḥananel, Rosh Hashana 9b–10a; another view cited in Eshkol, Hilkhot Orla 111a).

In practice, the primary ruling of SA YD 294:4–5 follows Rambam, while the stringent view of Razah is cited only as a minority opinion. The Vilna Gaon rules similarly. Even so, I wrote according to the stringent view, because we are stringent in cases of doubt involving Torah law. Mahara Fulda, Levush, Sha’arei Tzedek, Adret, Rashash, and Kerem Tziyon 6:5 likewise write that it is proper to be stringent.

In the Diaspora, the halakha follows the lenient view, and in pressing circumstances one may rely even on R. Ḥananel. As for the 14 days needed for rooting, those must be full days. Therefore, for the first year to count, one must plant no later than the 15th of Av. That is the ruling of Rambam (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:10), Semag, Kaftor Va-Feraḥ, Tur, SA YD 294:4, Sha’arei Tzedek, and Arukh ha-Shulḥan. Some maintain that part of a day counts as a full day, and therefore one may plant even on the 16th of Av (Rabbeinu Yeroḥam and Meiri). In Eretz Yisrael one should be stringent, while in the Diaspora one may be lenient.

5. A Tree That Was Uprooted or Cut Down

If a tree was uprooted from its place, but one of its roots remained attached to the ground, and that root was at least as thick as a weaver’s needle used to stretch fabric, one may replant the tree without restarting the orla count. Since it can survive by means of that one root, even if only with difficulty, it can still be considered attached, and its original status does not change. However, if no such root remains, the tree becomes subject to orla anew when it is replanted (SA YD 294:20).

If the wind uprooted a tree, or a river swept it away, yet a clump of soil remained attached to its roots, and that clump can sustain it for at least 14 days, one may replant the tree without restarting the three-year count, even if none of its roots remained attached to the ground itself. If it cannot live from that clump for 14 days, then once replanted, the years of orla must be counted from the start. Therefore, one who needs to move a fruit tree from one place to another must be careful to uproot it together with enough soil to sustain it for 14 days, so that the orla count does not restart. It is also advisable to prune the tree substantially beforehand, thereby making it easier for the tree to survive that length of time.[6]

If a tree was cut down or broke, and any part of its trunk remains above ground, the orla count does not restart. If it was cut down completely and then regrew from its roots, it becomes subject to orla anew.[7]


[6]. The Mishna in Orla 1:3 states: “If a tree was uprooted and its soil remained with it… if it can survive, the orla count does not restart; if not, the count restarts.” SA YD 294:19 rules accordingly. Some maintain that the orla count does not restart only if the clump of soil could sustain the tree for three years. This is the view of Peraḥ Mateh Aharon 2:75, Birkei Yosef YD 294:11, PT YD 294:13, and Igrot Moshe YD 1:185. However, the halakhic authorities in Eretz Yisrael, led by R. Kook (Mishpat Kohen 8–9), ruled for farmers that it is enough if the clump can sustain the tree for 14 days, the normal rooting period. R. Herzog accepted this view in Pesakim u-Ketavim 3:9; see also Mishpetei Uziel, vol. 1, YD 20; Minḥat Shlomo 1:69. This assumes that the tree receives ordinary care, including watering and fertilizing. Even the stringent authorities may agree that if the clump can sustain the tree for 14 days with ordinary care, it likely could sustain it even for three years, especially if the tree is heavily pruned and continuously watered by drip irrigation.[7]. Yerushalmi, Shevi’it 1:6, explains that according to R. Eliezer ben Yaakov, if a tree was cut down to less than a tefaḥ above the ground, orla applies to it anew. According to the Sages, as long as any part of the trunk remains above ground, the orla count does not restart; only if it was cut flush with the soil does orla apply anew. Rambam (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 10:13), Rashba, Rabbeinu Yeroḥam, and SA YD 294:18 rule in accordance with the Sages. Rosh rules in accordance with R. Eliezer ben Yaakov. See Beit Yosef and Shakh YD 294:31 regarding the basis of their dispute. In practice, the halakha follows the lenient view, because the Yerushalmi indicates that the requirement to treat a cut tree as new is only rabbinic, due to marit ayin, and in cases of doubt involving rabbinic law, the ruling is lenient. Most authorities agree.

6. Layering and the Law of New Shoots

To create a havrakha, or layering, one bends a branch from an established tree, buries the middle section in the ground, and leaves the tip exposed at the place where he wants a new tree to grow. At first, the layered branch draws its nourishment from the original tree. Over time, the buried section develops roots that also nourish the new tree. For orla purposes, as long as the new tree continues to draw nourishment from the original tree, even if most of its nourishment now comes from the new roots formed through the layering, the new tree is considered an extension of the old tree, and the orla count does not begin anew. Even if one layers a third tree from the second, and a fourth from the third, the orla count does not begin for any of them as long as they remain connected to the first tree, since they are still considered extensions of it. If, however, the connecting branch is cut, or that section withers away, one must begin counting the three orla years anew for the layered tree.

If new shoots emerge from beneath the ground, even though they came from the root system of an old tree, then as long as their connection to the old tree is not apparent — for example, when they emerge some distance from it — they are treated as a new tree, and the orla count begins for them (Bava Metzia 119a; MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 10:19). If, however, the shoots grow close to the old tree, and it is apparent that they are part of it and emerged from the underground portion of its trunk, one could argue that they belong to the original tree and that the orla count should not begin anew. Nevertheless, since many authorities are stringent and treat even these shoots as a new tree, it is proper to be stringent.[8]


[8]. The Chief Rabbinate and various kashrut agencies generally rule that shoots emerging from below ground are treated as a new tree, and that the orla count begins for them anew, as stated in Bava Metzia 119a and MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 10:19: “A tree that emerges from the trunk does not require a new orla count; one that emerges from the roots does.” They issue this ruling even when the shoots grow right next to the main trunk. Accordingly, one must be careful with pomegranate trees, blueberry bushes, and the like, which often send up shoots that bear a large amount of fruit before their orla years have passed. In practice, this creates a constant challenge, and many people inadvertently transgress.

In principle, however, adjacent shoots should not be prohibited. A tree is defined by its root system and the base of its trunk; so long as additional shoots grow from that system, they should not require a new orla count. This appears from the law of the caper bush, which sometimes withers entirely in winter and regrows from its roots, yet after three years its fruit is not treated as orla (as explained in Shibbolei ha-Leket §160 in the name of Rabbeinu Ḥananel; see below, note 11). It would therefore seem that Rambam and the other authorities prohibit only sprouts that emerge at a distance from the trunk, from lateral roots rather than from the tree’s main growth axis. R. Yisraeli writes along similar lines (Amud ha-Yemini 28), as does Minḥat Shlomo 1:71:8. This also accords with Rashba, who states that the prohibition on such shoots is rabbinic and based on marit ayin. R. Shimshon of Shantz and Keren Orah maintain this as well. With shoots adjacent to the trunk, there is no concern for marit ayin, as it is evident that they belong to the main tree. Otherwise, it is very difficult to understand why many authorities, including Tur and SA, omit Rambam’s ruling entirely. Even those who cite Rambam do not spell out such a serious and common problem, despite the fact that many pomegranate growers would be likely to stumble in it. We may therefore conclude that adjacent shoots are not actually prohibited. Moreover, according to Or Zaru’a, based on his version of Bava Metzia 119a, shoots that emerge from roots do not require a new orla count at all, similar to a layered branch. For a rabbinic matter such as this, one may rely on that view. Still, since many contemporary authorities maintain that such shoots are forbidden, and some are even concerned that the prohibition may apply by Torah law, it is proper to be stringent out of consideration for their view (Mishpetei Eretz 6:4; see R. Yoel Friedman, Emunat Itekha 14).

7. Pots and Nurseries

Orla applies to a tree growing inside a house. Since orla depends on the tree being planted in the ground, having a roof above it does not prevent orla from applying. Likewise, orla applies to a tree planted on a rooftop. Even though the roof separates the tree from the earth, the roof itself is connected to the ground through the walls. It is therefore considered part of the ground, and the tree growing on it is considered planted in the earth (SA YD 294:26).

One who plants a sapling in a perforated pot is considered to have planted it in the ground, and the orla years are counted from then. If one plants a tree in an earthenware pot, even one without holes, the tree is also considered planted in the earth, and orla applies to it, because its roots can break through the earthenware. Even before they do so, they are considered to draw nourishment from the ground. Some maintain that orla applies even to a tree growing in a metal pot, despite the fact that its roots clearly cannot penetrate the metal.[9]

With modern advances in fertilization and irrigation, many trees are now capable of bearing abundant fruit already in their third year. Since one may not derive benefit from that fruit, and it is costly to leave valuable agricultural land unproductive, farmers developed a practical solution. They keep the trees for about two years in nurseries, in perforated plastic pots, where they occupy little space and cost less to maintain. In the third year, they transfer them to the ground, where they can take root more firmly and then produce abundant fruit in the fourth year, when the fruit is no longer orla.

In practice, because we are concerned for the view that the orla count may not begin in an unperforated plastic pot, two conditions must be met if time spent in nursery pots is to count toward the three orla years according to all opinions. First, the pot must have a hole large enough for a small root, so that it is considered connected to the ground. Accepted practice requires a hole at least 2.5 cm in diameter.[10] Second, when the sapling is transferred from the pot into the ground, one must take care that the soil clump around the roots does not fall apart. After the fact, even if most of it crumbled, as long as the roots still remain embedded in enough soil to sustain the tree, one need not restart the count. If, however, almost all the clump broke apart, so that even with watering and care the tree would likely not survive for 14 days unless it were replanted, then one must begin counting the three orla years anew.[11]


[9]. According to Rosh (Teshuvot Ha-Rosh 2:4) and Tur, as explained in Ḥavot Binyamin 2:4 and Minḥat Shlomo 1:70, orla applies only to a tree growing in an unperforated earthenware pot. If the tree grows in any other unperforated container, even one made of wood, the orla count does not begin. If the tree is later transplanted into the ground, one must begin the three-year count anew. Rambam, however, writes: “If one plants in an unperforated pot, orla applies. Although such a pot is not considered like the ground for seeds, it is considered like the ground for trees” (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 10:8). SA YD 294:26 rules likewise, and most authorities accept this view. Nevertheless, they disagree about which containers Rambam had in mind. Some say he referred only to wooden pots and the like, which roots can sometimes break through; containers that roots cannot penetrate do not start the orla count (R. Herzog, Pesakim u-Ketavim 3:10). Others say that orla applies to trees in every kind of pot, even metal, because tree roots are considered so powerful that no barrier fully cuts off their nourishment from the earth (Minḥat Shlomo 3:158:20). Some remain uncertain (Har Tzvi, Zera’im 2:15:3; Lehorot Natan 6:101). Since this is a doubt involving a Torah prohibition, one should be stringent with trees growing in unperforated metal or wooden pots. The stringency cuts both ways: while the sapling remains in such a pot, one observes orla; if it is later transplanted into the ground, one begins counting the three years again.

[10]. Saplings are generally grown in plastic bags with holes. If the bag is thick and has no hole at all, the roots of a small tree cannot penetrate it. According to Rosh, the orla count does not begin for a tree grown in such a bag. Some understand Rambam and those who follow him the same way, as explained above. Therefore, one should make a hole in the bag, so that the sapling is considered connected to the ground and the orla count can begin. We learn from other laws that the required opening is the size of a small root (Uktzin 2:10). Shabbat 95b teaches that this is larger than the opening that lets liquid enter, which is less than two millimeters, and smaller than an olive, which by our standard measure is about 1.5 cm. In practice, the accepted custom is to be stringent and equate a “small root” with a large kezayit, yielding a required opening of 2.5 cm (R. Goren, Teḥumin 1, p. 158; Mishpetei Eretz 3:7, note 1). After the fact, however, even a one-centimeter opening may suffice, since it is already larger than the size of a small root. In addition, Rambam maintains that orla applies even in an unperforated pot. Although some understand him to refer only to a wooden pot, which roots can break through, a plastic nursery bag may also be penetrated by roots, in which case most authorities would say no hole is needed at all. So writes R. Goren there. Moreover, even when there is only a tiny hole of one millimeter, because the bag is soft, any root that passes through can widen it beyond the size of an olive. The bag may therefore have the status of a perforated clay pot, which even according to Rosh counts as perforated. Furthermore, some maintain that even when a tree grows in a fully unperforated pot and the orla count does not begin there, the time spent in the pot still counts toward its three years, just as we count the years of a sapling brought from abroad (Beit David 2:1; Even ha-Ezel, cited in Kerem Tziyon). See also the extensive article by my colleague R. Azriel Ariel in Ha-Torah Ve-ha-Aretz 1.

[11]. When saplings are transported from the nursery to the field, they sit on a truck with a metal floor. Some were concerned that during that time they are considered disconnected from the ground, and that upon being replanted, the orla count must begin again. They therefore required that, ideally, they be transported in a truck whose bed is perforated (R. Ovadia Yosef; Shevet HaLevi 5:156:3–4). Strictly speaking, however, this is unnecessary. The sapling remains with its soil clump intact, which continues to sustain it as before. A brief interruption of a few hours does not make it a new planting (R. Yisraeli, Ḥavot Binyamin 1:1; Minḥat Shlomo 3:158:19; 1:70; Mishpetei Eretz 3:9, note 7). This is especially so according to those who, following Rambam and most authorities, maintain that orla applies even to a sapling in a metal pot, and according to the view of Beit David mentioned at the end of the previous note. See also R. Azriel Ariel’s article cited above.

8. Trees Subject to Orla

The mitzva of orla applies to fruit trees, not to vegetables. Orla does not apply even to vegetables that grow on perennial shrubs. The key difference between a tree and a perennial vegetable is this: the stem of a perennial vegetable withers each year and regrows from its roots the following year, whereas the trunk and root system of a tree remain in place and become more established from year to year. New branches and fruit then continue to grow from that same enduring structure. This distinction also determines the blessing over the fruit — whether ha-etz or ha-adama. For this reason, one recites ha-adama over bananas. Although the banana plant can grow to about four meters and looks like a tree, it is considered a vegetable because its “trunk” withers, its roots shrivel, and it regrows the following year only from its bulb (Berakhot 40a; following the Geonim; SA and Rema OḤ 203:2–3; Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 8:2).[12]

Eggplants and peppers require special consideration, because their stems remain intact from year to year. In practice, orla does not apply to them, as they differ fundamentally from trees. They bear fruit already in the first year; in the second year, their yield diminishes in both quantity and quality; and they generally do not continue producing beyond three years. By contrast, the Torah presents a tree as bearing fruit for at least five years; by observing orla, its fruit increases and improves in the fifth year, as it says: “When you come into the Land and plant any tree for food, you shall regard its fruit as closed off. For three years it shall be closed off to you; it may not be eaten. In the fourth year, all its fruit shall be sacred, for praise of the Lord. In the fifth year, you may eat its fruit, so that it may yield its increase to you. I am the Lord your God” (Vayikra 19:23–25). As the Sages said: “This mitzva that you keep will increase its yield for you, for I will bless the fruit you plant in its merit.” R. Akiva would say: “The Torah addressed the evil inclination, lest a person say, ‘I have worked in vain for four years.’ The verse therefore says, ‘so that it may yield its increase to you. I am the Lord’; I am the Lord Who guarantees this and is faithful to keep My promise” (Rashi, citing Torat Kohanim on Vayikra 19:25). Ramban likewise explains that the fruit grown in the third year is scant and poor, and only in the fourth year does it become good and fit to be brought before God as neta reva’i.

On that basis, orla does not apply to papaya and passion fruit either. They bear fruit already in the first year, and by the fifth year their yield has declined. Many of these plants do not even last five years. Some are stringent, but the accepted halakha follows the lenient opinion. For the same reason, orla does not apply to any variety of raspberry or blackberry, as explained in the note. [13]


[12]. The Tosefta in Kilayim 3:15 states: “This is the rule: anything that sends up its leaves from its base is a vegetable, and anything that does not is a tree.” That is, a vegetable sends up new leaves each year from its root or bulb, while a tree has a trunk and roots that become more established from year to year, and from that trunk new leaves emerge annually. Regarding the blessing of ha-adama or ha-etz, Berakhot 40b states: “If, when the fruit is removed, the goveza does not produce fruit again, one does not recite borei peri ha-etz but borei peri ha-adama.” Some authorities have understood that the Rishonim dispute the definition of goveza and, as a result, the definition of a “tree.” According to their reading, Rosh maintains that anything whose roots remain from year to year is considered a tree. The Geonim maintain that only a plant whose above-ground trunk remains is a tree. Some infer from Rashi that a plant is considered a tree only if its branches also remain from year to year. This understandably created many uncertainties regarding the laws of blessings and orla. More likely, however, the Rishonim are not actually disagreeing here. Rather, all agree that a tree is a plant whose trunk and roots endure and become more established from year to year, and because of that enduring structure, its fruit increases from year to year (as will be explained in the next footnote). Rashi was simply describing the common case, where the branches also remain from year to year. The Geonim were more precise in their formulation, in order to include trees whose branches wither. Rosh noted that in some cases even the above-ground trunk may wither, as sometimes happens with the caper bush. Yet because the plant has a single enduring trunk-and-root system that becomes more established from year to year, it is still considered a tree, as the Gemara concludes in Berakhot 36a. This definition of a tree accords with all the sugyot. Accordingly, the raspberry is not a tree, as explained in the next footnote.

[13]. Halakhic authorities discussed eggplants at length. Because their stems persist into the second year, they might seem, at first glance, to be subject to orla. This is indeed the view of Kaftor Va-Feraḥ (ch. 56). Nevertheless, the accepted practice everywhere has been to eat them even within the first three years. Birkei Yosef YD 294:4 cites his grandfather, R. Avraham Azulai, who testified that this was also the practice of the exceptionally pious, who were otherwise accustomed to personal stringencies, including R. Yosef Karo, the Ari, and R. Moshe Alsheikh. He explained: “Every tree that bears fruit year after year improves with time. The eggplant plant, by contrast, is good and sweet in its first year. In its second year, it declines somewhat and becomes a bit bitter. In its third year, it becomes very bitter and is fit for eating only in pressing circumstances. This shows that it is a vegetable.” Mishpetei Uziel, vol. 6, §80, rules similarly. Some add that it is inconceivable for there to be a fruit that is forever forbidden to eat (Pnei Moshe YD 294:4; Igrot Ha-Re’iya §468; Ḥazon Ish, Orla 12:3).

In practice, the halakhic authorities offered several identifying marks of a shrub to which orla does not apply. Many maintain that any plant that bears fruit in its first year is not a tree (Radvaz 3:531; Kol Eliyahu; Ma’amar Mordekhai; Peri ha-Adama; Rav Pe’alim OḤ 2:30). Others maintain that if its stem is hollow, it is not a tree but a stalk, even if the stalk is thick, because only a stalk can grow quickly, whereas woody trunks develop over years (Halakhot Ketanot 1:83; Rav Pe’alim OḤ 2:30). Others, as noted above, write that if its fruit declines from year to year, it is not a tree (Birkei Yosef; Tzitz Eliezer 2:15).

Based on these criteria, orla does not apply to papaya and passion fruit. To be sure, Mishpetei Eretz 1:4 is stringent regarding papaya because it bears fruit for more than three years. Some note that it can even survive for ten years or longer. Similarly, R. Yoel Friedman ruled stringently regarding passion fruit (Emunat Itekha 26), since its yield does not decline significantly and its stem is not truly hollow. Moreover, proper pruning can keep it productive for more than three years. Nevertheless, many halakhic authorities maintain that any plant that bears fruit in its first year is not a tree, and both papaya and passion fruit do so. Regarding papaya, this is also the ruling of Rav Pe’alim OḤ 2:30; Yayin ha-Tov, vol. 1, YD 14; R. Mordekhai Eliyahu, Ma’amar Mordekhai 3:10; and Yeḥaveh Da’at 4:52. In addition, the papaya’s stem is hollow, and the stem of the passion fruit has a small cavity as well (Ḥelkat ha-Sadeh 1:16–17). More fundamentally, a tree is by nature a long-term plant: its fruit increases in the fifth and sixth years, and it continues producing for many years. The papaya plant, by contrast, generally does not live beyond five years, and its yield declines from year to year. The same is true of passion fruit. Its peak yield is in the first and second years, and perhaps the third as well. After that, the yield steadily declines, and many of the plants naturally wither by the fifth year.

A raspberry bush appears to be a perennial shrub, as it lasts for many years. In fact, however, each cane emerges from the ground and bears fruit for two years, or only in its second year, and then withers. Meanwhile, new canes emerge from the ground. They too bear fruit for about two years and then wither. The raspberry canes are also somewhat hollow. Since each cane bears fruit for no more than two years, the raspberry is treated halakhically as a vegetable, and one recites ha-adama over it. The same applies to blackberries and all shrubs whose canes weaken by the third year.

True, a new raspberry cane sometimes grows out of the old one, and it may even draw a bit of nourishment from it. In reality, though, the new growth does not depend on the old cane. Canes attached to the old one do not grow better than those that sprout anew from the roots. This shows that even those attached to the old cane establish a root system of their own, suited to their growth. Thus, this is not a tree that becomes more established from year to year.

9. Planting a Tree for Purposes Other Than Fruit

If one plants a tree not for its fruit, but for its wood or as a fence, orla does not apply to the fruit that grows on it. Such a tree is not considered a “tree for food,” and the mitzva of orla applies only to a fruit tree, as it says: “When you plant any tree for food, you shall regard its fruit as orla” (Vayikra 19:23). However, the Sages limited this leniency to cases in which it is evident that the tree was planted not for its fruit. If the trees are planted very densely, for example, it is clear that they were meant for firewood. If one prunes the branches in a way that causes them to thicken, it is evident that the tree was planted for lumber. If the precise placement of the trees shows that they were planted as a fence around a yard, orla does not apply to them. If one intended one side of the tree to serve as a fence and the other side to produce fruit, orla does not apply to the fence side, but it does apply to the fruit side (Mishna, Orla 1:1; Yerushalmi, Orla 1:1; SA YD 294:23). If one wishes to eat fruit from the side to which orla does not apply, one must separate terumot and ma’aserot without a berakha (see Yerushalmi, Orla 1:1). If, however, the tree was planted both for fencing or lumber and for fruit, then orla applies to its fruit.

If trees, such as olive trees, are planted for ornamental purposes, orla does not apply to their fruit. However, there is some doubt about trees planted as ornamentals when their fruit also contributes to their appearance, such as pomegranates and date palms. Since orla applies by Torah law, one must be stringent in cases of doubt. Only when it is clear that the fruit itself was not intended to enhance the tree’s appearance does orla not apply to it.

10. Neta Reva’i

Fourth-year fruit has sanctity. There is a mitzva to eat it in a state of purity in Jerusalem, as with ma’aser sheni (see below, 7:9–10). If the owner wishes, he may redeem the fruit onto money, bring the money to Jerusalem, buy food with it, and eat that food there in purity. Since neta reva’i fruit has sanctity, one need not leave leket, shikḥa, or pe’a from it for the poor, nor must one separate terumot and ma’aserot from it (Mishna, Ma’aser Sheni 5:3–4; Yerushalmi, Ma’aser Sheni 5:3–4; MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:1–4).

Today, since we cannot bring fourth-year fruit to Jerusalem and eat it there in a state of purity, one redeems such fruit onto money or onto food of monetary value, thereby permitting the fruit to be eaten. Even if the fruit is abundant, since we may not eat it today while it retains its sanctity, it has no real value. Nevertheless, it may not be redeemed for less than a peruta. Therefore, one redeems all the fruit onto a coin worth at least a peruta, or onto food worth a peruta. Before redeeming it, one recites: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us regarding the redemption of fourth-year produce.” One then says: “All this fruit is hereby redeemed onto this peruta,” or “onto this food, which is worth a peruta.” The coin or food onto which the sanctity was transferred must then be destroyed, so that no one will mistakenly derive benefit from it (MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:16–17). The details of these laws are explained below, in the laws of redeeming ma’aser sheni (chapter 10, sections 6–8).[14]

The laws of orla and neta reva’i also apply to Shemita fruit. Fruit that grows during the tree’s first three years has the status of orla and may not be eaten. Fruit that grows in the fourth year may be picked by anyone, but it must be eaten in Jerusalem. Today, it must be redeemed onto a peruta. Field owners must mark such trees during the Shemita year, so that those who enter the field will know not to eat fruit that is orla and to redeem fruit that is neta reva’i. After it is redeemed, care must be taken to finish eating it by the time of bi’ur. If one did not do so, one must perform bi’ur for it, just as one does with all other Shemita produce (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 9:7; Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 4:5).

The halakhic authorities disagree about neta reva’i in the Diaspora. Some maintain that since a halakha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai establishes that orla applies outside Eretz Yisrael, neta reva’i applies there as well, because the two laws are linked (Rabbeinu Yona; R. Yitzḥak Ha-zaken). Others maintain that neta reva’i is like ma’aser sheni, which applies only in Eretz Yisrael (Rambam). Ideally, in order to satisfy all views, one should redeem neta reva’i in the Diaspora without reciting a berakha (Shakh YD 294:17). Nevertheless, one may rely on the lenient view and not redeem it. Just as fruit whose orla status is uncertain is permitted in the Diaspora, so too, when there is uncertainty about neta reva’i in the Diaspora, the halakha follows the lenient view.[15]


[14]. The halakhic authorities disagree about one who redeems his own neta reva’i fruit. Some maintain that he must add a fifth, just as with ma’aser sheni (Mishpetei Eretz 12:6). Others maintain that he need not add a fifth, because the Torah does not mention that requirement with regard to neta reva’i. Accordingly, today all such fruit is redeemed onto a single peruta (Kesef Mishneh on MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:17; SA YD 294:6). Even one who wishes to be stringent should take care: saying, ‘It and its fifth are redeemed onto this peruta,’ risks leaving the fruit redeemed onto less than a peruta. (Or Le-Tziyon, vol. 1, YD 25).

Fourth-year fruit may be redeemed only after it has been picked. In pressing circumstances, however, one may redeem it while it is still attached, provided that he stipulates that the redemption will take effect only after it is picked. One should not recite a berakha at that time, because the redemption has not yet taken effect. This stipulation works only if the fruit has already reached the stage at which one must separate tithes from it, meaning that it could be eaten in pressing circumstances, and only if the coin remains available until after the fruit is picked.

[15]. Some maintain that in the Diaspora, neta reva’i applies only to a vineyard, not to other plantings, and not even to an individual grapevine unless it is planted as part of a vineyard (see below, 4:3). This is because the Tanna’im disagree whether the law of fourth-year fruit applies to all trees or only to a vineyard. Although in Eretz Yisrael the halakha follows the view that it applies to all trees, in the Diaspora the halakha follows the lenient opinion, namely, that it applies only to a vineyard (Geonim; Rosh; Rema). In practice, ideally one should redeem fourth-year fruit from all trees in the Diaspora, in order to take all views into account. Strictly speaking, however, since when it is uncertain whether fruit is orla, the ruling in the Diaspora is lenient, one may likewise be lenient when it is uncertain whether kerem reva’i applies in the Diaspora, and all the more so when it is uncertain whether neta reva’i applies.

Some maintain that just as orla applies by Torah law today, so too neta reva’i applies by Torah law today (Mabit; see Minḥat Shlomo 1:71:13). Others maintain that neta reva’i follows the law of ma’aser sheni. According to Rambam and those who agree with him that terumot and ma’aserot today are rabbinic, neta reva’i is likewise rabbinic (Minḥat Ḥinukh 247:15; Yeshu’ot Malko).

The mitzva of eating ma’aser sheni fruit can apparently be fulfilled only when the Temple is standing and the altar is in its place. Rambam writes (MT, Laws of Second Tithe and Fourth-Year Fruit 2:1) that ma’aser sheni may not be eaten in Jerusalem today, because it is compared to the firstborn offering, which may be eaten only when the altar is in its place (Makkot 19a). Rambam further writes there (ibid. 9:1) that neta reva’i has the same law as ma’aser sheni, and the Vilna Gaon rules likewise (YD 294:17).

11. Cases of Uncertainty Concerning Orla

If orla fruit becomes mixed with permitted fruit of the same kind, the entire mixture is forbidden unless the permitted fruit is at least 200 times the amount of orla fruit. The Sages established this measure because teruma, which is forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit, is nullified in a ratio of one to 100, whereas orla and kil’ei ha-kerem, which are forbidden both to eat and to derive benefit from, are nullified in a ratio of one to 200 (Mishna, Orla 2:1).

The 1:200 rule applies when orla fruit itself became mixed with fruit that would otherwise be permitted. If, however, there is uncertainty about particular fruit that someone bought — whether it came from an orla tree or not — the ruling depends on where the uncertainty arose. If the fruit was bought from an orchard or near one, then even though most orchards and trees do not produce orla fruit, the fruit is forbidden. Because the tree or orchard has a fixed location, we apply the rule: kol kavu’a ke-meḥtza al meḥtza dami — anything fixed is treated as though the probabilities were evenly balanced. If, however, the fruit was bought only after it had been removed from its fixed place and brought to the market or to stores, this is an ordinary case of uncertainty, and we follow the majority. In that case, we apply the rule: kol de-parish me-ruba parish — anything separated from a group is presumed to have come from the majority.

This permission to rely on the majority applies only after the fact — for example, when someone already bought fruit and does not know its status, or when one is in a place with no stores that have kashrut certification and reaching such a store would involve considerable trouble. If, however, there is a store with kashrut certification, one must avoid the uncertainty and buy there. Even if the uncertainty is very remote, because the percentage of orla fruit in that produce or in that region is extremely low, one must avoid creating such uncertainty whenever possible. In addition, it is a mitzva to support those who are careful in matters of kashrut. Moreover, when fruit is sold under reliable certification, terumot and ma’aserot are also properly separated.[16]


[16]. If one bought fruit from an orchard, but it is uncertain whether there is any orla orchard in the area, or whether an orchard that is generally not orla contains young trees whose fruit is orla, some maintain that this too is treated as a case of kavu’a (Ran; MB 513:31 inclines this way). Others maintain that the rules of kavu’a apply only when it is plausible that orla fruit is actually present there (Petaḥ ha-Devir). Most Rishonim and Aḥaronim maintain, however, that when it is uncertain whether any prohibited fruit is present at all, one follows the majority (Roke’aḥ, Ritva, Radvaz, Magen Avraham, and Taz).

Moreover, according to most halakhic authorities, for an uncertainty to be considered kavu’a, the prohibited source must be identifiable in its place, and one must be able to determine with modest effort where the orla orchard or trees are located. Although some are stringent, the halakha follows the lenient opinion, because according to most halakhic authorities, whenever there is uncertainty whether the case should be treated as kavu’a or parish, one rules leniently and treats it as parish.

Once the fruit reaches the market, four situations are possible. In the first, the Jewish owner brought the fruit to market and knows whether it is orla. In that case, the uncertainty arose only in the market, so the case is treated as parish. In the second, a gentile brought it to market; since the fruit had already been removed for sale, it is clearly treated as parish. In the third, a non-observant Jew brought it from its fixed location in order to sell it to wholesalers or shopkeepers, without knowing its status. Some maintain that because he is obligated in the mitzvot, the uncertainty arose when he removed it from its fixed place, and one must therefore rule stringently, as in a case of kavu’a (Yad Yehuda; Minḥat Yitzḥak 7:96). Others maintain that since he is not personally careful about such matters, the uncertainty arose only for the observant Jew who later bought it from him, and the case is therefore treated as parish (Ḥemdat Shlomo; Minḥat Shlomo 1:71:12). In the fourth, a non-observant Jew sent an agent to buy fruit from orchards, and the agent bought it without knowing where it came from. Some maintain that this too is treated as kavu’a (Divrei Ḥayim, YD 2:53), while others maintain that it is treated as parish (R. Shlomo Kluger, Tuv Ta’am Ve-da’at III 2:14). Thus, in two of these cases the fruit is clearly treated as parish, while in the other two there is uncertainty whether it should be treated as kavu’a or parish. As noted above, when there is such uncertainty, one treats the case as parish — all the more so when that is the more likely possibility. Accordingly, many rule that fruit sold in the market is treated as parish and may be eaten.

All this, however, applies only after the fact — when one has already bought fruit from a store and there is uncertainty whether it is orla. Le-khatḥila, one must make an effort to avoid such uncertainty; if there is a nearby store known not to sell orla fruit, one must buy there (R. Eliyahu writes similarly in Ha-Torah Ve-ha-Aretz 1). This has also been the practice of the Chief Rabbinate since the days of R. Goren: it supervises orchards to ensure that orla fruit is not marketed through the systems under its supervision. For this purpose, even stores under various Badatz kashrut agencies rely on the Chief Rabbinate’s supervisory system. How much effort must one make in order to buy from a supervised store that does not sell orla? This can be derived from the laws of netilat yadayim and prayer with a minyan, for which one must exert oneself up to a distance of a mil, about a kilometer (see Peninei Halakha: Prayer 2:4).

  1. Elyashiv, however, took a more complex view. In his opinion, whenever there is a reasonable possibility that fruit came from an orla orchard — that is, if orla fruit makes up about five percent of all fruit in the country, so that every region is likely to contain an orla orchard — then even after the fruit has left the orchards and reached the market, it still has the status of rabbinic kavu’a. This follows the view of those halakhic authorities (Rosh, R. Yitzḥak, and Shakh) who maintain that the Sages extended the law of rabbinic kavu’a even to fruit that separated from its fixed source, lest one come to take from the fixed source itself. His view is explained at length in Mishpetei Eretz, vol. 2, Orla 14. Nevertheless, since whenever there is uncertainty about the law of kavu’a, the halakha follows the lenient opinion — all the more so in a case of rabbinic kavu’a — his view need not be followed, and one may rely on the other halakhic authorities cited above.

1. The Kilayim Prohibitions: General Principles and Rationale

God created distinct species in the world, and in several contexts commanded us not to mix them with one another. The Torah states: “You shall keep My statutes: You shall not breed your animal with a different species; you shall not sow your field with kilayim; and a garment of kilayim, sha’atnez, shall not come upon you” (Vayikra 19:19). It also says: “You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim, lest the entire yield become forbidden – the seed you sow and the produce of the vineyard. You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together. You shall not wear sha’atnez, wool and linen together” (Devarim 22:9–11). This category of prohibitions is generally called kilayim, a term meaning “mixture.” In other words, even when each species is permitted on its own, their combination is forbidden. Therefore, the prohibition against cooking meat with milk is also included among the prohibitions of kilayim.

There are seven prohibitions of kilayim: (a) animal kilayim – breeding two different animal species; (b) working two different animal species together; (c) tree kilayim – grafting two different plant species; (d) seed kilayim – sowing two types of seeds together; (e) vineyard kilayim – sowing grain or vegetables near grapevines; (f) garment kilayim – wearing clothing that contains wool and linen together; and (g) meat and milk.

The prohibition of kilayim applies to both plants and animals. In some forms of kilayim, only the act of mixing is prohibited. After the fact, however, one may eat or derive benefit from the result of the mixture. This is true of seed kilayim, tree kilayim, and animal kilayim, whether through breeding or labor. By contrast, in other forms of kilayim, the act of mixing is prohibited, and the resulting product is forbidden for consumption or benefit. This is true of vineyard kilayim and cooking meat with milk. In the case of garment kilayim (sha’atnez), the prohibition is only to wear such a mixture; there is no prohibition against making it for a gentile or for a purpose other than wearing.

Mitzvot dependent on the Land, such as seed kilayim and vineyard kilayim, apply by Torah law only in Eretz Yisrael, within the territory settled by those who came up from Egypt (below, chapter 12, note 2). By contrast, mitzvot that are not dependent on the Land, such as garment kilayim, meat and milk, and animal kilayim, apply in the Diaspora as well. The prohibition of tree kilayim – grafting one species onto another – also applies in the Diaspora. Although this prohibition appears to be dependent on the Land, the prohibited act takes place above ground, not in the ground itself (below, section 5). Since the law of vineyard kilayim is especially stringent, as the mixture is forbidden both for consumption and benefit, the Sages decreed that it is prohibited in the Diaspora as well (below, chapter 4, section 4).

Although we cannot grasp the full depth of the mitzvot, which are divine in origin and rooted far beyond human understanding, some mitzvot have reasons that are more readily understood. These are called mishpatim, or ordinances. Others have reasons that are less understandable to us; these are called ḥukim, or statutes. The mitzva of kilayim belongs to the category of ḥukim, as the verse says: “You shall keep My statutes” (Vayikra 19:19). Rashi likewise explains that these are decrees of the King whose reasons are not revealed. We may suggest that these ḥukim reflect the unique qualities that God implanted within all created beings, qualities that point to the distinct identity and purpose of each creation. The divine statute, whose secret we cannot fully fathom, concerns the meaning and unique purpose of every species God created. Through the prohibition of kilayim, we are commanded to preserve the special and dignified place of every species, not to blur its uniqueness by mixing it with another species (Ramban and Maharal to Vayikra 19:19; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh 244). Similarly, the Sages said: “‘You shall keep My statutes’ – the statutes that I already engraved for you in the nature of creation, you must now observe” (Kiddushin 39a).

The word kilayim is related to kele, which means prison. The mixture imprisons the distinctive qualities of the species, preventing them from being expressed properly once they have been mixed with another species (Zohar III 86a; Rabbeinu Baḥya). With seed kilayim and vineyard kilayim, the prohibition applies even when the species merely grow near one another, even though the species themselves do not actually mix or merge. These prohibitions apply specifically in Eretz Yisrael because in the Land, the sanctity of creation is more fully revealed. As a result, the uniqueness of each species is more apparent there, and its special and dignified place must be preserved.[1]


[1]. Rashi to Vayikra 19:19 emphasizes that the mitzva of kilayim is a ḥok, a statute whose reason is not revealed. By contrast, Ramban writes there that kilayim has an important rationale: God commanded us to preserve each species in the form in which He created it, “so that they never change.” One who grafts species together undermines and damages the quality of the species and diminishes the honor of the Creator, as though implying that the Creator did not complete His world properly. The Sages similarly said: “There is no blade of grass that does not have a mazal, a heavenly force, striking it and saying to it, ‘Grow’” (Bereishit Rabba 10:6). One who mixes species damages the root of their mazal. Additionally, such hybrids do not reproduce.

Maharal challenges this explanation (Gur Aryeh to Vayikra 19:19). After all, the Sages said that everything God created during the six days of creation requires improvement, such as wheat, which must be ground and baked; yet we do not say in such cases that God left His world incomplete (Bereishit Rabba 11:6). Similarly, the Sages said regarding brit mila that a person is born uncircumcised, and his completion comes through the one who fulfills the covenant (Tanḥuma, Tazri’a 5). Nevertheless, regarding crossbreeding animals and grafting trees, Maharal agrees with Ramban. In these cases, one changes the statutes of the world by joining separate species together. Ramban may also agree that human beings were created to develop and perfect creation. It may even be permitted to create different species through hybridization, as explained below, section 5. However, one who cultivates different species must give each species its proper place and not damage it by mixing it with another species. This may also be the intention of the Sages and Rashi, as explained above.

2. The Prohibition Against Animal Kilayim

One may not breed a male of one species with a female of another, as the verse states: “You shall keep My statutes; you shall not breed your animal with a different species” (Vayikra 19:19). Although the verse says “your animal,” it refers to all living creatures, including birds and sea creatures. The Torah mentions animals by way of example because domesticated animals are commonly kept by people (Bava Kama 54b). By Torah law, one may not perform the mating directly, meaning actual insertion of the male’s organ into the female. The Sages further prohibited bringing about mating indirectly, such as by positioning the male atop the female in a way that leads them to mate. However, one may place different species together in the same enclosure. If they mate on their own, one need not separate them, since placing them in the same enclosure is not considered an act that caused the mating (SA YD 297:2–3).

One may not breed two species of domesticated or wild animals. If one transgressed and did so, however, one may derive benefit from the offspring. The best-known hybrid is the mule, born of a male donkey and a mare. Mules have long been prized for carrying loads and plowing. Since the prohibition is only to bring mules into being, one may purchase and use them.

Breeding two different species is prohibited, but breeding two breeds of the same species is permitted. Therefore, one may breed bulls and cows of different breeds with one another. Similarly, one may breed different breeds of sheep, cats, or dogs. However, one may not breed two different species, even if they are relatively similar to one another. The definition of a species is determined by the overall traits and form of each species, as explained below, section 4. As a general rule, the inability to produce fertile offspring is a sign that two animals are different species. Usually, breeding two different species produces no offspring at all. In the rare cases where offspring are born, as with a donkey and a mare, the offspring is sterile. If two types can produce fertile offspring, it appears that they are not two separate species, but two varieties within a single species. In that case, there is no prohibition against breeding them together.[2]


[2]. Today, it is common to breed domesticated animals through artificial insemination, by collecting semen from a male and injecting it into a female’s uterus. Usually, this is done with two breeds of the same species. According to many Aḥaronim, however, even when two different species are involved, this is not prohibited, because the prohibition is to breed two species through direct physical action (Minḥat Shlomo 2:97, 27; R. Yisraeli, Kerem Shlomo 2, Kilayim 2). Genetic engineering is even further removed from the prohibition, since it involves taking genes from one species and inserting them into the genetic material of another in order to confer new traits. This accords with Maharal’s reasoning cited above.

3. Working Two Animal Species Together

In addition to the prohibition against breeding two species with one another, the Torah forbids working with two different species together. For example, one may not plow with an ox and a donkey together or harness a horse and a donkey to the same wagon. The verse states: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Devarim 22:10). The Torah uses the example of an ox and a donkey because these are domesticated species commonly put to work together. However, the prohibition applies to any combination of two animal species used together for labor. The prohibition is not limited to the driver who harnesses the horse and donkey to the wagon and directs them; anyone who assists in the work violates it as well. Even one who only calls out to drive them forward violates a Torah prohibition, since he causes them to continue pulling the wagon or plow (SA YD 297:11, 13–14).[3]

Jews alone are bound by this prohibition. If a Jew hires a gentile to transport merchandise to another city, and the gentile chooses to use a wagon harnessed to a horse and a donkey, the Jew violates no prohibition, since he has no stake in that arrangement (Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 297:21). However, a Jew may not sit in a wagon that a gentile drives with a horse and donkey, because the passenger becomes a partner in the labor. If he were not sitting in the wagon, the driver would not command the animals to pull it (SA YD 297:12).

The prohibition of kilayim applies only when the two species are tied together. Therefore, one riding a horse may hold a rope attached to a dog. However, he may not tie the dog’s leash to the horse’s saddle, since doing so connects the two animals. At times, the dog may move ahead of the horse and pull it forward, causing the rider to violate the prohibition of animal kilayim (Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 297:19).

Although we cannot fully grasp the depth of the mitzvot, especially the ḥukim, the Sages nevertheless sought to understand their reasons. Rambam explains that this prohibition is meant to keep different species apart, so that people will not be led to breed one species with another (Moreh Nevukhim 3:49). Sefer ha-Ḥinukh explains that the prohibition prevents animal suffering. Each species naturally prefers the company of its own kind and suffers when paired with another species. This is especially true during labor, because animals of different species do not have equal strength; when they do not pull the wagon or plow evenly, they suffer (Sefer ha-Ḥinukh 550).


[3]. According to Rambam, when one species is kosher and the other is non-kosher, as in the case of an ox and a donkey, one who works them together violates a Torah prohibition and is liable to lashes. However, if both species are kosher or both are non-kosher, the prohibition is rabbinic. According to Rosh and many other Rishonim and Aḥaronim, working any two different species together violates a Torah prohibition for which one is liable to lashes, whether both species are non-kosher, like a horse and a donkey, or both are kosher. This dispute concerns only the labor prohibition of animal kilayim. Regarding the prohibition against breeding animals, however, even Rambam agrees that the Torah prohibition applies to any two different species, whether kosher or non-kosher.

4. The Prohibition Against Grafting Trees

One may not graft two species of trees onto one another, as the verse states: “You shall keep My statutes; you shall not breed your animal with a different species; you shall not sow your field with kilayim” (Vayikra 19:19). Just as the first clause prohibits breeding two animal species with one another, so too “you shall not sow your field with kilayim” prohibits grafting two plant species onto one another. This includes grafting different species of trees or vegetables, as well as grafting a tree onto a vegetable or a vegetable onto a tree. All non-fruit-bearing trees are considered one species. Therefore, one may not graft a fruit tree onto a non-fruit-bearing tree. One may, however, graft one non-fruit-bearing tree onto another, since for this law they are all considered one species. Their defining feature is that they do not produce fruit, and that feature classifies them together as a single species (SA YD 295:1–3; Rema YD 295:6).

This prohibition applies in the Diaspora as well. Although at first glance grafting appears to be dependent on the Land, the prohibited act itself is performed above the ground. It therefore resembles the prohibition of animal kilayim, which is mentioned next to it in the verse (Kiddushin 39a). The two laws are similar in another respect as well: although one may not breed animals or graft trees, the resulting offspring or produce may be eaten or used even from the outset.

Grafting is used to combine the desirable traits of two species or varieties of trees. Trees that bear abundant, flavorful fruit often have weaker root systems and are more susceptible to disease and death. Hardy, resilient trees, by contrast, generally bear little fruit, and their fruit is less flavorful. To address this, growers graft one onto the other. They plant a cutting from a hardy tree in the ground; this is called the rootstock. The rootstock is cut in a particular way, and a branch from a tree that bears high-quality fruit, called the scion, is attached to it. The two parts are bound together until they fuse and then continue growing as a single tree. The roots and lower trunk belong to the hardy species, while the upper trunk, branches, and fruit belong to the species that bears abundant, flavorful fruit. Thus, even though the two trees have been grafted and joined, each part continues to function according to its own nature: the rootstock draws nourishment from the ground through its roots, while the scion produces fruit according to its own nature. As a result, there is almost no difference between fruit that grows on a scion grafted onto another species and fruit that grows on a scion rooted naturally in the ground.

If the rootstock and scion are from two different species, grafting them is a Torah prohibition for which one is liable to lashes. If they are different varieties of the same species, grafting them onto one another is permitted. Therefore, one may graft a large, red, sweet apple variety onto a small, green, sour apple variety, since both are apple varieties. However, one may not graft a peach tree onto an almond tree, because they are two different species. For the laws of kilayim, species are defined broadly. Classification depends on the tree’s full range of visible characteristics: the fruit’s form and taste, the branches and leaves, and the growth pattern. Therefore, trees classified by common usage or by scientific taxonomy as two species may nevertheless be considered one species according to halakha. When the Jewish people lived in the Land, and the Great Sanhedrin resolved every question and uncertainty, the traditional classification of species for the laws of kilayim was known and clear. Over time, however, the many exiles eroded that knowledge, and doubts arose about the status of various trees that are now difficult to resolve.[4]


[4]. The prohibition of kilayim applies only to two different species. Two varieties of the same species, however, are not considered kilayim with one another. As the Sages said: “Lettuce and wild lettuce, endives and field endives, leeks and field leeks, coriander and field coriander, mustard and Egyptian mustard… are not kilayim with one another” (Mishna, Kilayim 1:2). A further principle is that even when two kinds have separate names, if they resemble each other closely enough to appear to be varieties of a single species, they are treated as one species for the laws of kilayim. Thus, for example, certain types among the five species of grain are not considered kilayim with one another. As the Mishna states: “Barley and oats, spelt and rye… are not kilayim with one another” (Mishna, Kilayim 1:1). Rambam likewise writes that in the laws of kilayim, we follow outward appearance (MT, Laws of Kilayim 3:5). Still, one must determine which features are determinative in classifying species. The Yerushalmi explains that sometimes the fruit is decisive, and sometimes the leaves are. However, when the taste of the fruit is clearly different, then despite similarity in form, they are considered two species (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 1:5). Rambam rules accordingly (MT, Laws of Kilayim 3:5–6). Some understood from the Yerushalmi that the fruit and leaves must both be similar (Rash; R. Yitzḥak b. Malki-Tzedek).

Aḥaronim offered several approaches to species classification, each identifying a different feature as decisive. From the overall teaching of the Sages, however, it seems that the definition of species for kilayim does not depend on a name or on one particular trait, but on the totality of its characteristics. Rav Kook wrote similarly (Mishpat Kohen 25). Over the generations, doubts arose regarding various trees. The Sages’ formulations indicate that species categories are defined broadly. Therefore, two kinds that appear to be one species are treated as one species (Mishna, Kilayim 1:1; MT, Laws of Kilayim 3:5). Even so, some were inclined to be stringent in every case of doubt (Rema YD 295:6; Sha’arei Tzedek), while others maintained that the halakhic authorities of each generation have the authority to decide such matters (Ḥazon Ish, Kilayim 3:6).

Citrus species became a major area of uncertainty. Some maintain that grapefruit and orange are one species (Mishpetei Uziel 1, YD 24), whereas Rav Kook was stringent (Mishpat Kohen 25). Many authorities were left in doubt and therefore tended to forbid a Jew from grafting them, while permitting a gentile to perform the graft.

In practice, it appears that when uncertainty remains even after examining the full range of characteristics, the doubt may be resolved by looking at natural fertilization. If pollen from one species can, under natural conditions, fertilize the ovules of the other species, they are one species, as I wrote above regarding animal kilayim (section 2). R. Elḥanan Ben-Nun writes similarly (Teḥumin 1). The Sages gave various identifying signs because fertilization was difficult to test. In addition, the basic principle in distinguishing species is that we follow how people understand and perceive the species before them. Since today our understanding of species classification is closely tied to reproductive compatibility, doubtful cases for Jews should be resolved on that basis. This does not, however, necessarily settle the question for Bnei Noaḥ. If doubt remains because of some other characteristic, they may be lenient, as explained below in section 6, note 5.

5. Grafting and Hybridization

Prohibited tree grafting consists of joining two tree species to one another in such a way that each part retains its own qualities, with no genetic merging between the two parts. By contrast, cross-pollinating two species is permitted. Every fruit-bearing plant produces flowers, and in the flower are male stamens and a female ovary. Through insects, butterflies, and wind, pollen from the male stamens reaches the ovary and the female ovules within it. Through this process, fruit is formed, containing the seed from which another tree can grow. If pollen from the male stamens is taken from a tree of one species and brought together with the female ovary of another species, a hybrid of two different species is created, and the fruit that grows will have genetic traits shared by its two “parents.” Yet each hybridization will yield a somewhat different type of fruit, because each time different components of each species’ genetic sequence are expressed, creating a new blend.

Usually, cross-pollinating two species does not succeed: pollen from the male stamens does not fertilize the ovules in the ovary, and even when fertilization occurs, the fruit produced is usually poor. Sometimes, however, the union succeeds and produces fruit with a distinctive taste, or a tree with special qualities, such as the ability to grow in a climate in which it previously could not survive. To this end, many scientists work to create numerous hybrids. Some rabbis maintain that just as one may not graft two tree species onto one another, one may not cross-pollinate them with one another (Shevet HaLevi 9:224). The primary halakhic position, however, is that the Torah forbade only the act of grafting two different trees onto one another, where they live together contrary to their natural order; it did not forbid cross-pollination, which occurs before the tree itself comes into being. Furthermore, a stamen on its own is not a species, since it cannot grow by its own power; likewise, the ovule in the ovary is not a species. Their hybridization is therefore not prohibited. All the more so, there is no prohibition of grafting in genetic engineering, which joins genetic material from one species with that of another (see also R. Yisraeli, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Aretz 3; Kerem Shlomo 2:1; R. Ariel, Teḥumin 33).

6. Bnei Noaḥ and the Laws of Kilayim

According to most Rishonim and Aḥaronim, the prohibitions against grafting trees and breeding animals of different species apply to Bnei Noaḥ as well, although they are not among the Seven Laws of Bnei Noaḥ. The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes” (Vayikra 19:19), and the Sages derive from this: “The statutes that I already engraved for you” – even before the giving of the Torah – “you must now keep.” Similarly, the Torah states: “The earth brought forth vegetation: seed-bearing plants of every kind, and trees of every kind bearing fruit with the seed in it. And God saw that it was good” (Bereishit 1:12). From here we learn that these statutes are binding on Bnei Noaḥ as well (Sanhedrin 60a; She’iltot; Behag; Rambam; Riaz; Vilna Gaon; Arukh ha-Shulḥan; Rav Kook).

Others disagree and maintain that Bnei Noaḥ are not prohibited from grafting trees or breeding different animal species (Ritva, Rosh, and Radbaz). Even according to this view, however, a Jew may not ask a gentile to graft his tree or breed his animal. Just as a Jew may not ask a gentile to violate Shabbat on his behalf, he likewise may not ask him to perform other Torah prohibitions involving his property.

Even according to the stringent view, the prohibition may apply to Bnei Noaḥ only when the grafting is certainly prohibited. However, when there is uncertainty about the graft’s halakhic status – for example, when the rootstock and scion may be two varieties of the same species – Bnei Noaḥ are not prohibited from performing the graft (see Mishpat Kohen 13).[5]


[5]. Sanhedrin 56a–b states: “The Sages taught: Bnei Noaḥ were commanded in seven mitzvot: establishing courts, blasphemy, idolatry, sexual immorality, bloodshed, theft, and eating a limb from a living animal… R. Elazar says: They were also commanded regarding kilayim. Bnei Noaḥ may wear kilayim and sow kilayim. They are prohibited only from breeding animals and grafting trees.” Rambam writes that these forms of kilayim are prohibited to them by received tradition (MT, Laws of Kings 10:6). Some explain that Rambam rules in accordance with the Sages. In their view, the Sages too agree that a gentile may not graft a tree. They merely maintain that he is not punished for this as he would be for violating one of the Seven Laws of Bnei Noaḥ (Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 295:7). Others explain that Rambam rules in accordance with R. Elazar (Ran, Sanhedrin 56b; Vilna Gaon YD 295:4), since the derivation from “the statutes that I already engraved for you” is cited in Kiddushin 39a as a settled teaching. Either way, most Rishonim and Aḥaronim maintain that by Torah law Bnei Noaḥ may not graft trees or breed animals of different species. These include Behag, Laws of Kilayim §4; She’iltot §99; Hagahot Mordekhai, Gittin 6:464; Riaz; Me’iri; Mishneh la-Melekh to MT, Laws of Kilayim 1:6; Vilna Gaon YD 295:4; R. Akiva Eiger; Arukh ha-Shulḥan; Ḥukot Sadeh; and Rav Kook, Ḥukot Ha-aretz 1:6.

By contrast, Ritva (Kiddushin 39a), Rosh, Radbaz, and Shakh (YD 297, second §3) maintain that the halakha follows the Sages and that a Ben Noaḥ is not prohibited from grafting a tree. Nevertheless, even according to them, the Sages prohibited a Jew from telling a gentile to graft a Jew’s tree, based on the law of amira le-goy, instructing a gentile to perform a prohibited act. This is also called shevut be-sh’ar issurim, a rabbinic restriction against asking a gentile to perform other Torah prohibitions. We have learned that a Jew may not ask a gentile to do for him an act that the Torah forbids the Jew himself to perform. In Bava Metzia 90a, the Sages were uncertain whether amira le-goy applies even to a Torah prohibition that does not carry the death penalty. Because of this doubt, most Rishonim ruled stringently, as explained in Peninei Halakha: Shevi’it 5, note 9. Based on this, Radbaz writes that one may ask a gentile to graft a tree if the intention is that afterward the Jew will buy the grafted tree from him and plant it (Radbaz on MT, Laws of Kilayim 1:6). As explained in the next note, according to Ritva and Radbaz, one may plant it even before the graft has fused. According to most poskim, this is permitted only after it has fused, while some are stringent and prohibit it.

However, according to most poskim, one may not ask a Ben Noaḥ to perform an act of grafting that is prohibited even when he is grafting his own trees, because asking him to do so causes him to violate a prohibition. When the grafting itself is doubtful, however, one may be lenient. First, it seems likely that for Bnei Noaḥ the prohibition applies only when the grafting is clearly prohibited, with no uncertainty. Even if we do not accept this, in a case of doubt there is effectively a safek sefeka, a double doubt, since we may also include the view that Bnei Noaḥ are permitted to graft trees altogether (Ḥazon Ish, Kilayim 1:1). For trees about which there is no such doubt, there would seem to be no solution. Nevertheless, it appears that one may be lenient with bench grafting – grafting dormant cuttings while they are detached from the ground. Only after they have been joined is the rootstock placed where it can take root. Since this form of grafting resembles hybridization and artificial insemination, it may not be prohibited, because it is performed while detached from the ground (see R. Yoel Friedman’s article in Emunat Itekha 92). Even if we are concerned that bench grafting is prohibited for Jews, it is permitted for Bnei Noaḥ on the basis of a safek sefeka. After the sapling has fully fused, it may be planted according to most poskim, as explained in the next section.

7. May One Plant or Maintain a Grafted Tree?

As noted, although one may not graft two tree species together, the fruit produced by such grafting is permitted from the outset. The practical question is what may be done after a prohibited act of grafting has already been performed. May one care for the grafted sapling and water it so that it continues to grow? This question arises frequently. Most pear trees, for example, are grafted in a prohibited fashion, and prohibited grafting is also common among plum and peach trees. The question, then, is whether one may plant a sapling that was produced through prohibited grafting in a nursery. If it has already been planted, may one continue caring for it, or must it be uprooted?

Some maintain that the prohibition is limited to grafting two different species together. Once the graft has been made, however, there is no further prohibition against maintaining the grafted tree. Therefore, if a sapling was grafted in a nursery, one may even plant it in the field and tend to its growth. According to this view, tree grafting is similar to animal kilayim: the prohibition is only to breed an animal of one species with an animal of another. Afterward, however, one may raise and use the offspring.

Many poskim, however, rule that one may not maintain a grafted tree (SA YD 295:7). They disagree, though, about the scope of this prohibition. According to one view, one who has a grafted tree in his field must uproot it. According to another, one may not weed around it or prune it to improve its growth but may leave it in the field untended. A third view maintains that the prohibition applies only until the rootstock and scion have fused. Once they have fused, one may maintain the grafted tree and even plant it.

In practice, some rely on the lenient view that the entire prohibition is limited to the act of grafting. According to this position, even before the graft has fully fused, one may plant the grafted sapling and tend to its growth. The halakha, however, follows most poskim: one may not maintain the grafted sapling until the graft has fused. After that point, one may plant it and care for it. Ideally, one follows the stringent view and refrains from maintaining a grafted tree even after the graft has fused. When there is uncertainty whether the grafting was prohibited – that is, whether it involved two distinct species, or was permitted because it involved two varieties of the same species – one may be lenient and maintain it.

When purchasing a fruit tree, one must verify that it was not grafted in a prohibited manner. Even according to the lenient authorities who permit planting a grafted sapling, buying from someone who performs prohibited grafting assists those who violate the prohibition. Since these laws are complex, one may rely only on a seller who is both knowledgeable in these laws and God-fearing, or on a nursery under reliable kilayim supervision.[6]


[6]. According to the lenient authorities, maintaining a grafted tree is not prohibited. This is the view of Ritva (Kiddushin 39a), Orḥot Ḥayim, and Radbaz. Many understand Rambam similarly. R. Herzog writes that this is the view of most Rishonim, and therefore one may rely on this view in pressing circumstances (Teḥumin 5; see also Shema Shlomo 3, YD 11). Some ruled that ideally, such trees should be cared for by a gentile until the graft has fully fused (Yabi’a Omer 10, YD 36).

By contrast, some prohibit maintaining a grafted tree. This is the view of Rosh, Laws of Kilayim §3; Rabbeinu Yeruḥam; Tur; and SA YD 295:7. However, there are three views regarding the scope of this prohibition: 1) According to many, the prohibition against maintaining the tree continues only until the graft has fused. Afterward, there is no prohibition against maintaining the tree. This is the view of Ḥatam Sofer 6:25; Arugot ha-Bosem YD 233; Maharsham 1:179; and Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 295:18. R. Herzog writes that according to this view, one may also plant a sapling that was grafted in violation of the prohibition in the ground once it has fused. Rav Kook inclined toward this view as well (Mishpat Kohen 14–15). This is also the view of most halakhic decisors (R. Goldberg, Teḥumin 5). 2) According to another view, one may not care for a grafted tree, but if it has already been planted, one may leave it in the field. This is how R. Z. Guta and Mishnat R. Eliezer 2, YD 51, explain this view, though they themselves inclined toward the lenient position of Ritva and those who agree with him. 3) According to a third view, one must uproot the grafted tree. This is the view of Ḥida in Birkei Yosef 295:7 and Divrei Yosef 24, and many authorities mention this position. This is also the view of Ḥazon Ish (2:9). He adds that when there is uncertainty whether the grafting was prohibited, one may be lenient and care for it on the basis of a safek sefeka, a double doubt (Kilayim 1:1; 2:9; 3:3). If we follow Levush, who maintains that even the prohibition against maintaining a grafted tree is Torah law, this is a Torah-level doubt, and one may not be lenient without a safek sefeka. By contrast, R. Herzog writes that even according to those who prohibit maintaining the tree, many maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic. Accordingly, the halakha follows the lenient view.

In practice, one should ideally not maintain a grafted tree. In cases of need, however, the ruling follows Ḥatam Sofer and those who agree with him: once the graft has fused, there is no further prohibition. If possible, it is preferable for a gentile to plant it (Hilkhot ha-Aretz, Kilayim 8:11–13; Kedushat ha-Aretz 18:25–28).

01. The Prohibition Against Seed Kilayim

The Torah prohibits sowing two types of seed together in a field in Eretz Yisrael. Each type must be sown on its own, as it says: “You shall keep My statutes… You shall not sow your field with kilayim” (Vayikra 19:19). The word kilayim means “mixture.” This prohibition includes edible grains, legumes, and vegetables. Plant species grown for ornamentation or medicine, however, are not included.

The prohibition against seed kilayim applies to annual crops: grain, legumes, and vegetables. There is no prohibition against planting different species of trees together, nor against planting trees together with an annual crop. Even when trees are intermingled, their size makes it clear that each tree has its own distinct place. The annual crops planted among them likewise have their own place, since trees grow upward and their roots spread far outward, leaving room for the annual crop to grow among them.

One who waters, fertilizes, weeds, or otherwise assists the growth of kilayim violates a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes. Even when kilayim grew on its own in his field, as long as he wants them there – or it appears as though he wants them there – he must uproot them, for one may not maintain kilayim in one’s field (MT, Laws of Kilayim 1:1–3).

If one deliberately sowed kilayim, the produce may nevertheless be eaten. The prohibition is against sowing and cultivating kilayim; eating what grows from them is not prohibited (MT, Laws of Kilayim 1:7). Only with vineyard kilayim does the resulting produce become forbidden to eat.

The prohibition against seed kilayim applies in Eretz Yisrael. Even on land owned by a gentile, a Jew may not sow kilayim. In the Diaspora, however, a Jew may sow seed kilayim, because the verse speaks of “your field,” and only Eretz Yisrael is considered “your field” for this purpose. The Sages did not prohibit seed kilayim there either; they prohibited only vineyard kilayim in the Diaspora, because it is more severe: one may neither eat its produce nor derive benefit from it (see below, section 7).

In Eretz Yisrael, it is also prohibited to sow two species together in a pot. If the pot is perforated, it is considered connected to the ground, and the prohibition applies by Torah law. If it is not perforated, it is detached from the ground, and the prohibition is rabbinic.[1]


[1]. One who sows kilayim or performs an act that promotes their growth is liable to lashes. If the plants grew on their own and he wants them to remain, then for as long as he leaves them in place without uprooting them, he violates a Torah prohibition; however, he is not liable to lashes, because lashes are imposed only when a prohibition is violated through an action (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 8:1). This is the view of almost all Rishonim and most Aḥaronim. Some maintain that even this case is prohibited only rabbinically (Vilna Gaon; Ḥazon Ish).

According to most authorities, the Torah prohibition applies when the seeds are sown be-mapolat yad, meaning that the two types of seed are cast by hand together. This includes any act that promotes their joint growth, such as covering them with soil, watering, fertilizing, or weeding (Tosafot; Rash; Vilna Gaon; and others). Some are stricter and maintain that one who sows one species beside another violates a Torah prohibition even if he does not later tend them together (Kaftor Va-Feraḥ; Mishna Rishona). Even today, kilayim is prohibited by Torah law within the territory settled by those who came up from Egypt (see below, 12:2, note 2).

Crops grown as animal fodder together with crops grown for human consumption constitute kilayim. However, all types of animal fodder are treated as a single species, so sowing different kinds of fodder together is not kilayim (Kesef Mishneh; Taz; and others). Some maintain that animal fodder is not subject to the prohibition against kilayim at all, even when sown together with crops grown for human consumption (Radbaz; Mishpat Kohen 26). Others maintain that any plant grown as a full field crop, such as cotton, is subject to kilayim when sown together with food crops, even though it is not itself grown for human consumption (Mabit). Some maintain that the prohibition against kilayim applies by Torah law even indoors (Yeshu’ot Malko 1:1; Ḥazon Ish), while others hold that it applies only rabbinically (Mishpat Kohen 49; Eretz Ḥemda, pp. 21–22). In a greenhouse, however, it appears to apply by Torah law, since that is a standard way to grow such plants.

02. The Concern of Marit Ayin in Seed Kilayim

By Torah law, seed kilayim is prohibited when a person sows two species together or willingly maintains them together. If they grew in his field without his wanting them, he has not violated a Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, because of marit ayin, the appearance of wrongdoing, the Sages prohibited a field owner from leaving kilayim in his field even when he does not want them there. Since the field is open and visible to all, passersby may think that the owner does not care about observing the mitzvot, and this would desecrate God’s name.

Therefore, if one wants to sow his field with wheat and finds that barley seeds have become mixed in with the wheat, he may do so only if the barley remains below a certain threshold. If the barley is not enough to produce one twenty-fourth of the field’s yield – 1/24, or 4.16% – he may sow the mixture as it is. With such a small amount, there is no concern for marit ayin, since anyone who sees the field will understand that the barley is growing there against the owner’s will.

Although one may not intentionally sow even a single barley seed in a wheat field, this applies only when the barley was deliberately added. If one intentionally mixed even one barley seed into the wheat, he may not sow the wheat unless he first removes the barley seed. If, however, the barley became mixed in unintentionally, he does not want it there, and removing it would be burdensome, he may sow the mixture as it is, provided the barley is less than one twenty-fourth of what will grow in the field. At such a small proportion, there is no concern for marit ayin, since anyone who sees the field will understand that the barley is growing there against the owner’s will. If the barley is enough to produce one twenty-fourth of the field’s yield, he must either reduce the barley or add wheat until he is certain that the barley will produce less than one twenty-fourth of the growth in the field.

The same rule governs a field that was sown with one species and later has another species growing alongside it. The determining factor is whether he wants the second species to remain. If he does, the mixture is kilayim, and he must uproot the second species entirely. If he does not want it there, and it makes up less than one twenty-fourth of the field’s growth, he need not reduce it. If it reaches one twenty-fourth, he must reduce it until it is less than that amount.[2]

Because this mitzva is important and those who violate it cause a grave desecration of God’s name, every year on Rosh Ḥodesh Adar, when grain and vegetables were beginning to sprout, the agents of the beit din would urge the Jewish people to be careful about kilayim (Mishna, Shekalim 1:1).

On the fifteenth of Adar, the agents of the beit din would inspect the fields. If they found kilayim, they would uproot the minority species and place it before the owner’s animals. The field owners benefited twice: their fields were weeded, and their animals were fed. They therefore stopped bothering to remove the kilayim themselves. The Sages then enacted that the agents would uproot the kilayim and leave it on the roads, where any animal could eat it. Still, because the field owners were happy that their fields had been weeded, they did not bother to uproot the kilayim. When even this did not solve the problem, since owners still benefited from the weeding, the Sages enacted that the agents of the beit din would declare everything growing in any field where kilayim was found ownerless. From then on, field owners took care to avoid kilayim (Mo’ed Katan 6b). Once the agents of the beit din declared the kilayim ownerless, the field owner no longer violated the prohibition because of it, since the prohibition against maintaining kilayim does not apply to ownerless growth.


[2]. Mishna, Kilayim 2:1; MT, Laws of Kilayim 2:1–10. Some maintain that because the field owner does not want the minority species to remain, it is nullified in the majority by Torah law. Nevertheless, because of marit ayin, the Sages prohibited sowing or maintaining the minority species once it amounts to 1/24, as observers may think that he mixed it in intentionally. When the minority species is less than 1/24, however, there is no concern for marit ayin. People do not normally mix in such a small amount intentionally; on the contrary, an amount that small is generally understood to have become mixed in by accident (Rash; Rosh; R. Ovadia of Bartenura; R. Shlomo Sirilio).

Others maintain that once the minority species amounts to 1/24, maintaining the mixed planting is prohibited by Torah law even when the owner does not want the minority species there. In their view, the Torah prohibition itself is appearance-based: at that proportion, it looks as though he wants kilayim in his field. This is how most commentators understand Rambam’s view. Nor do we say that the minority species is nullified in the majority, for nullification applies only when one component stands in halakhic opposition to the other, such as forbidden food mixed with permitted food. Here, by contrast, both species are permitted in themselves, so one is not nullified in the other. Moreover, a recognizable minority is not nullified. When it is clear to all that he does not want the second species to remain, such as when it is known to be harmful, he need not reduce it even if it reaches 1/24.

03. The Required Separations for Seed Kilayim

The basic principle in the laws of seed kilayim is that two species may be planted near one another when they remain visibly distinct, but not when they appear mixed together. The larger the field, the greater the required separation, so that the distinction between the species remains recognizable. The required separation also depends on the density, size, and length of the plants’ leaves: grain, whose stalks grow tall, requires a greater separation, while vegetables generally require a smaller one, except for vegetables with especially large leaves.

Vegetables: By Torah law, one must leave one tefaḥ – approximately 8 cm – between one vegetable species and another. The Sages extended the required separation to one and a half tefaḥim – approximately 12 cm. If that distance was left between the two species, there is no prohibition against kilayim even if their branches later grow until they touch, since the stems emerging from the ground remain properly separated. There are a few exceptions, such as gourds, whose leaves are especially large and tend to intertwine with neighboring species. In such cases, one must ensure that the leaves of the two species do not touch. These rules apply to beds in a garden. Two vegetable fields, however, must be separated by a square area one ama by one ama – approximately half a meter by half a meter. Along the rest of the boundary between the fields, it is proper to leave a gap of one tefaḥ.[3]

Grain: Since grain is normally sown over large areas, greater separation is required. By Torah law, the required distance is one ama. The Sages, however, ruled that this distance is adequate only for small plantings less than one ama wide. For grain sown in medium-sized plots, known as a meishar, whose width is at least one ama, the separating area must begin with a square of two amot by two amot – approximately one meter by one meter – and may then taper diagonally, as illustrated below, until only a minimal gap remains between the fields.

 

 

When grain is sown in large fields, as is usual, the required separation is a beit rova, a square of about five meters by five meters. Along the rest of the boundary, it is proper to leave a one-ama gap running the length of the two fields.[4]

Authorities disagree whether legumes are treated like grain or like vegetables. Therefore, one must leave one ama between the two plantings, regardless of the field’s size.[5] When grain is sown next to vegetables or legumes, or vegetables are sown next to legumes, the required separations are more complex and depend on the size of the field. In any case, the requirement is no stricter than for grain.

If a partition ten tefaḥim high – approximately 80 cm – stands between two fields, no further separation is needed. This is true even of a reed partition, provided that no gap between reeds exceeds three tefaḥim; the partition itself separates the fields. Even if the roots of the two species are known to intertwine underground, there is no kilayim prohibition so long as the partition creates a visible separation. Similarly, a road four amot wide – about 1.84 meters – or a plowed strip of the same width separates the fields, so the large five-by-five-meter beit rova separation is not required.


[3]. According to most Rishonim and Aḥaronim, one tefaḥ suffices by Torah law to separate vegetables, but the rabbinic requirement is one and a half tefaḥim. This is the view of R. Ḥananel, Rambam, Rash, Rosh, R. Ovadia of Bartenura, Kaftor Va-Feraḥ, SA YD 297:34, and others. Others maintain that the rabbinic requirement is three tefaḥim (Rashi; Rabbeinu Tam; Ritva). According to the Vilna Gaon, it is six tefaḥim. Still others maintain that even rabbinically, one tefaḥ suffices (Geonim; R. Sa’adia Gaon).

A garden bed for which a separation of one and a half tefaḥim suffices is one that is no more than one ama long – six tefaḥim, or about half a meter. A field, by contrast, requires a separation of one square ama. According to Ḥazon Ish, this category begins with an area of a beit rova, about 22 square meters – 10.2 amot by 10.2 amot. According to R. Yisraeli, it begins only with a beit tish’a kabin, about 780 square meters. If the planted area is larger than a garden bed but smaller than a field, Ḥazon Ish requires either a separation of one and a half tefaḥim or a furrow one tefaḥ deep and one tefaḥ wide. According to R. Yisraeli, however, a furrow is always required. According to Rash, the furrow must run along the entire planted area. According to Rambam, the furrow need only run for six tefaḥim; after that, a gap of one tefaḥ is sufficient.

The precise measurements are as follows: one tefaḥ is 7.6 cm; one ama – six tefaḥim – is 45.6 cm; and a beit rova is ten and one-fifth amot by ten and one-fifth amot, or 4.65 meters by 4.65 meters (Peninei Halakha: Sukkot 2, note 1). SA YD 296:68 explains that with respect to kilayim, these measurements should be expanded and calculated as generous measures of tefaḥ and ama. Therefore, in the practical measurements given above, we rounded upward: a tefaḥ to 8 cm, following R. Ḥayim Na’eh’s measure, and an ama to half a meter.

[4]. Field: As explained in the previous note regarding vegetables, the minimum size of a “field” is about 22 square meters according to Ḥazon Ish, and about 780 square meters according to R. Yisraeli; the latter view appears correct. The Yerushalmi states (Kilayim 2:4) that for a meishar – a small grain field more than one ama wide – the separation between two meisharim is a square of two amot by two amot, after which it tapers diagonally until only the smallest gap remains.

Ḥazon Ish and Tiferet Yisrael disagree over whether this same diagonal tapering is required after the other square separations as well: the one-ama square between vegetable fields, and the beit rova – roughly ten amot by ten amot – between grain fields. According to Ḥazon Ish (Kilayim 6:1:1), after the square, the separation must continue diagonally until it narrows to a minimal gap; beyond that, no further separation is needed. According to Tiferet Yisrael (Kilayim 2:73), the square separation itself is sufficient, and once it ends, the two species may be planted immediately next to one another.

My teacher, R. Yisraeli, held that Tiferet Yisrael’s view is the primary law. Nevertheless, in practice, it is proper to leave the separation required by Torah law along the entire length of the field: one tefaḥ between vegetable species and one ama between grain species. This also appears correct in practice, since the basic principle of seed kilayim is that the species must remain visibly separated from one another.

[5]. According to my teacher, R. Yisraeli, legumes are governed by the laws of vegetables, but even where vegetables require only one and a half tefaḥim, legumes require a furrow (Eretz Ḥemda, pp. 85, 144–149). According to Ḥazon Ish, legumes are governed by the laws of grain (Kilayim 6:2; 8:2), so out of concern for the Torah-law requirement, one must be stringent and leave one ama even in small areas. In large fields, however, one ama suffices: this is the Torah-law separation, and doubts about the additional rabbinic separation are ruled leniently (Hilkhot ha-Aretz, Kilayim 5:14).

04. Vineyard Kilayim: A Distinct and Stricter Prohibition

Although vineyard kilayim can be viewed as a particular case of seed kilayim, in practice it has halakhot of its own. This shows most vividly in the produce. Seed kilayim prohibits the sowing, but the crops that grow may still be eaten and used; what grows from vineyard kilayim, by contrast, is forbidden to eat and even to derive benefit from.

One may not sow grain or vegetables alongside grapevines, nor may one plant a grapevine alongside grain or vegetables. If one did so, both crops become forbidden; one may neither eat them nor derive benefit from them, as it says: “You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim, lest the full yield – the seed you sow and the produce of the vineyard – become consecrated” (Devarim 22:9). In this context, tikdash means that the produce is consecrated for destruction – forbidden for any benefit. “The full yield of the seed you sow” refers to the grain or vegetable, while “the produce of the vineyard” refers to the grapes. Even the grain’s straw and the vines’ wood become forbidden; they must be burned or otherwise destroyed so that no one mistakenly benefits from them (see above, chapter 2, note 3). Because one may not derive benefit from them even as they are being destroyed, one may not burn them to heat an oven or stove (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:7). The prohibition of vineyard kilayim applies by Torah law in Eretz Yisrael and by rabbinic law in the Diaspora (see below, section 7).

By Torah law, the prohibition of vineyard kilayim applies when grapevines grow alongside the five grain species, legumes, or vegetables. It does not apply, however, to tree species, even small ones. As a rule, any plant whose berakha is ha-etz is not included in the prohibition of vineyard kilayim, while any plant whose berakha is ha-adama is included (see above, 2:8).

This includes spices over which ha-adama is not recited in practice, since they are not eaten on their own (Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 8:14). If they are plant species whose berakha would be ha-adama if they were eaten on their own, they are included in the prohibition of vineyard kilayim.

The Sages also extended the prohibition to grasses and vegetables commonly used as animal fodder. Plants that are not commonly fed even to animals are not included in the prohibition (Levush YD 296:2).

Authorities disagree about plants grown for fragrance. Some authorities prohibit them rabbinically, while others permit them. In practice, it is best to be stringent, but one who wishes to be lenient may do so. Ornamental plants, by contrast, are not prohibited. Therefore, one may plant grass and flowers beneath a grapevine, provided they are not commonly fed to animals, even if they also have medicinal uses.[6]


[6]. Regarding liability for lashes, the Amora’im disagree (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 8:1). According to R. Yonatan, one who sows a single species of grain or vegetables in a vineyard is liable for lashes. According to R. Yoshiya, since the verse says, “You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim” (Devarim 22:9), the Torah refers specifically to seeds that would already constitute kilayim even without the vineyard. In the Bavli (Berakhot 22a; Kiddushin 39a), only R. Yoshiya’s view is cited: one is liable for lashes when he sows wheat and barley together with a grape seed that will grow into a vine, or even when he merely covers them with earth. He is therefore liable twice: once for seed kilayim and once for vineyard kilayim.

Rambam rules accordingly with regard to liability for lashes (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:1–2). At the same time, he maintains that the Torah prohibition itself is broader: one may not sow even one species of grain or vegetables next to a grapevine, nor may one plant a grapevine next to grain or vegetables. For that act, one is not liable for lashes; nevertheless, the produce that grows from it is forbidden by Torah law, and one who eats an olive-bulk of it is liable for lashes (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:7; MT, Laws of Forbidden Foods 10:6). This is also the view of Yere’im and Radvaz to MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:7.

According to Ramban and Ran, the Torah prohibition applies when one sows two species beside an already planted grapevine; sowing only one species there is permitted. According to Ramah and Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, sowing even one species beside a grapevine is rabbinically prohibited. Rabbeinu Tam and Ri are more lenient: once the grapevine has already been planted, one may sow even two or more species beside it. In their view, R. Yoshiya’s statement does not merely define when one is liable for lashes; it defines the prohibition itself. Thus, vineyard kilayim is prohibited only when two seed species are sown together with a grape seed. The halakha follows Rambam, as ruled in SA YD 296:3, Levush, and Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 296:13.

All types of grain, legumes, and vegetables grown for human consumption are prohibited in a vineyard by Torah law. Plants grown as animal fodder are prohibited rabbinically. As the Mishna explains (Mishna, Kilayim 5:8), one who maintains in a vineyard thorns that are commonly fed to animals renders the vineyard forbidden. By contrast, iris, ivy, and king’s lily, which are not commonly fed to animals, do not constitute vineyard kilayim. This is how Levush summarizes the law (YD 296:2), and this is also a possible reading of Rambam (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:3, 6, 19; Kesef Mishneh to MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:3).

A different view maintains that, by Torah law, only grain, hemp, and luf are prohibited in a vineyard, because only these species are mentioned in the Talmud: grain because of its importance, and hemp and luf because they resemble vines or grow alongside vines for three years. According to this view, other legumes and vegetables eaten by people or animals are prohibited rabbinically (Rabbeinu Tam; Tosafot, Yevamot 83a, s.v. R. Yosi; Smag; Rashba). Even within this approach, there are further distinctions. For example, some authorities maintain that since legumes resemble grain, they too have the status of grain and are prohibited by Torah law (Maharitatz, in his understanding of Rambam; similarly, the commentary attributed to Rashba, Menaḥot 15b). Since the prohibition applies to vegetables grown for food, it also includes vegetables used as spices.

Authorities disagree about plants whose berakha is borei isvei vesamim. Some authorities permit planting them near grapevines (Ḥazon Ish, Kilayim 1:14; Mishpetei Eretz 2:1). This permissive view may be supported further by Rabbeinu Tam and Ri, who maintain that there is no prohibition at all unless two species are sown together with a grape seed in a single act of sowing. Moreover, if only one species is planted near the vine, even Ramban and Ran agree that there is no prohibition. Still, many authorities imply that planting fragrant plants near grapevines is rabbinically prohibited, and SA YD 108:7 rules this way (see Kedushat ha-Aretz 5:7). As for ornamental plants, such as flowers and grass, some authorities are stringent and prohibit them rabbinically because they are fit for animals (R. Eliyahu). The overwhelming majority of authorities, however, permit them.

05. When the Produce Becomes Forbidden

The prohibition of vineyard kilayim includes not only sowing the forbidden mixture but also maintaining it (Mishna, Kilayim 8:1). Thus, even if a person did not sow grain in his vineyard, if even a single grain stalk grows there, he must act quickly to destroy it, because one may not maintain kilayim in a vineyard.

Sowing and maintaining differ, however, in when the produce becomes forbidden. If one sows a grain stalk in his vineyard, the stalk and the surrounding vines become forbidden for benefit as soon as it takes root. If, however, one merely finds a grain stalk that grew in his vineyard, it and the vines become forbidden for benefit only if it continues to grow by one part in two hundred. Nevertheless, he must destroy it immediately, because even one who is negligent and maintains it for even a moment violates the prohibition (Mishna, Kilayim 5:6; Pesaḥim 25a; MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:21–22; 6:1).[7]

When do the vines become forbidden for benefit? Only when grapes are present on the vines and are still growing and ripening. This period begins when the grapes reach the boser stage, meaning that their form is recognizable and they are at least the size of a white bean, and it continues until the grapes are fully ripe. If there are no grapes in the vineyard, or if the grapes have either not yet reached the size of a white bean or have already fully ripened, grain or vegetables growing nearby do not render the vines forbidden for benefit. The grain or vegetables themselves, however, do become forbidden.

When does the grain become forbidden? From the time it takes root in the ground until the kernels fully ripen. Therefore, if the grain has already finished ripening and a vine bearing grapes at the forbidden stage is bent over it, the entire vine becomes forbidden, but the grain does not become forbidden (Mishna, Kilayim 7:7).[8]

If the wind bent a person’s vine over his grain, he must separate them immediately. If there is concern that they will become mixed again, he must cut the vine branches or erect a fence to prevent it from happening again. If he was negligent and they remained mixed until one of the two increased by one part in two hundred, they become forbidden. If, however, circumstances beyond his control kept him from separating them in time, they do not become forbidden (Mishna, Kilayim 7:7; R. Yitzḥak b. Malki Tzedek and R. Shimshon to Mishna, Kilayim 7:7; MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:11; Kesef Mishneh and Mahari Kurkus to MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:11).

A person cannot render someone else’s property forbidden. Therefore, if one caused his vine to spread over another person’s grain, his vine becomes forbidden, but the other person’s grain remains permitted. If he caused another person’s vine to spread over his own grain, his grain becomes forbidden, but the other person’s vine remains permitted. If he caused one person’s vine to spread over another person’s grain, both remain permitted. However, as soon as the owner of either the vine or the grain becomes aware of the kilayim, he must act quickly to separate them. If he is negligent until one of them increases by one part in two hundred, his own portion also becomes forbidden.

The person who actively mixed the kilayim by hand is treated more stringently: for him, even property that is not his becomes forbidden. Moreover, if a person passes by another person’s vineyard, sees grain stalks growing there, and knows that the owner wants them to remain, he must uproot them. Similarly, a worker employed there must uproot the kilayim. If they do not do so, the vine and grain that grew there become forbidden to them for benefit. The vineyard owner, however, has not violated the prohibition. Only once he learns of the kilayim must he act quickly to uproot the grain stalks. If he is then negligent and they continue growing by one part in two hundred, they become forbidden to him and to all Jews (Mishna, Kilayim 7:4; MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:8–9, 21; Taz YD 296:3).


[7]. Maran Rav Kook explains that, according to Rambam, once vineyard kilayim grows by one part in two hundred, the resulting prohibition is by Torah law. The Torah forbade cultivating vineyard kilayim but left it to the Sages to define how much growth gives that mixture halakhic significance. They established the measure at one part in two hundred (Mishpat Kohen 24). Yere’im §389 writes similarly, and this also seems to be the view of Sefer ha-Ḥinukh §549.

Other authorities disagree. In their view, Torah law forbids the produce only when most of its growth occurred as kilayim. The Sages then prohibited it once it had increased by one part in two hundred (Kiryat Sefer, Laws of Kilayim ch. 5; Minḥat Ḥinukh §549; Derekh Emuna 5:146). In any event, when the vineyard owner does not want the kilayim to remain, the prohibition appears to be rabbinic and based on marit ayin. This is similar to the law of seed kilayim discussed above, 4:2, where a minority species of less than 1/24 does not create a prohibition (Derekh Emuna 5:141).

In earlier times, one would destroy grain or vegetables that grew in a vineyard by uprooting them. It seems that today one may also destroy them by spraying them with herbicide. Even if several days pass before they die, since they are already in the process of being destroyed, leaving them during that time does not involve a prohibition.

At times, wild plants grow in a vineyard, including wild grain stalks. Ideally, the owner should clear them once, either by mowing or by spraying. This both removes them and demonstrates that he does not want them there, even if they later grow back. Strictly speaking, however, he is not required to do so. At most, these plants have the status of animal fodder, which is prohibited only rabbinically, and in this case the vineyard owner does not want them.

If, however, he wants grasses to grow in his vineyard for the sake of the soil – to aerate and improve it – he is not required to mow or spray them. Since he is maintaining them for soil improvement rather than as animal fodder, they are not included in the Sages’ prohibition, which applies only to plants intended as animal feed.

[8]. This law applies to legumes as well. Vegetables, however, may continue producing new fruit even after some of their fruit has fully ripened. Therefore, vegetables remain subject to the prohibition until their final fruits have ripened.

According to R. Shimshon and Rosh, in their commentaries to Mishna, Kilayim 7:7, the prohibition of benefit does not depend on the grain and the vines reaching their forbidden stages at the same time. Each becomes forbidden by Torah law once it reaches its own forbidden stage, even if the other has not yet reached that stage. According to Rambam (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:14), however, the Torah prohibition takes effect only when both the grain and the grapes are at stages in which they can become forbidden. Rabbinically, though, even if only one of them has reached that stage, that species becomes forbidden. This is also the view of the later authorities (Levush YD 296:9–10; Tiferet Yisrael; Sha’arei Tzedek).

If one transgressed and sowed grain or vegetables in a vineyard, the grain or vegetables become forbidden as soon as they take root. The law is different when the plants were not sown directly in the vineyard: for example, if one carried a perforated pot containing grain or vegetables through a vineyard, or if such plants grew there on their own. According to Rambam (MT, Laws of Kilayim 5:23), the plants become forbidden once they increase by one part in two hundred. According to R. Shimshon and Rosh (Mishna, Kilayim 7:7–8), they become forbidden only after reaching one-third growth and then increasing by one part in two hundred. Since this dispute concerns Torah law, one must be stringent. This is also the ruling of SA YD 296:16–17, Levush, Sha’arei Tzedek, and Arukh ha-Shulḥan YD 296:29.

06. Required Distances for Vineyard Kilayim

The mitzva of kilayim requires that grain and vegetable species remain separate from grapevines. The Torah gave the Sages authority to determine, according to their judgment, what is considered mixed and what is not. What the Sages define as a prohibited mixture is therefore included in the Torah prohibition. There are three main situations in the laws of vineyard kilayim, listed here in ascending order of severity: 1) near a single vine; 2) near a vineyard; and 3) inside a vineyard.

A single vine: One who wishes to sow grain or vegetables near a single vine must keep them six generous tefaḥim away, approximately 47 cm. This is the area needed for the vine’s bed and the workspace around it. Grain or vegetables may not grow beneath the vine’s canes either. Thus, if a grain stalk grew beneath one of the canes, leaves, or clusters growing from the vine – even one hundred amot from the vine’s trunk – and the owner was negligent and did not uproot it, the stalk and the entire vine become forbidden for benefit, as explained above in section 2. If there is doubt whether the stalk is beneath the vine, its position is determined by a plumb line. Since vine canes often extend over a large area, one must ensure that no grain or vegetables grow beneath them at any point along their length.

Vines are commonly trained along poles or cords, with the canes expected to grow along them. The Sages therefore decreed that grain or vegetables may not grow even beneath the part of a pole or cord that the cane has not yet reached, since the cane is expected to extend there. After the fact, however, as long as the grain or vegetables were not actually beneath the vine itself, they do not become forbidden (MT, Laws of Kilayim 6:11–12, 15).

A vineyard is a grapevine planting arranged precisely according to the accepted method of cultivation. Since a vineyard has halakhic significance, one who sows grain or vegetables within four amot of it is considered to have sown them together with the vineyard, thereby violating the prohibition of kilayim. This distance was set at four amot, approximately 188 cm, because that was the space needed for vineyard work in earlier times. Vineyards were plowed with oxen, and at harvest time the grapes were brought from the vineyard to market by cart; both the oxen and the carts required this working space.

For vines to be considered a vineyard, they must form at least one of the following arrangements: two facing rows, with three vines in each row, as follows:

6 נקודות

or five vines arranged as “two opposite two, with one extending like a tail.” Rambam illustrates this second arrangement as follows:

R. Shimshon illustrates it this way:

If the vines do not form straight rows, even if there are many of them, they are treated a

individual vines.[9]

If one sows grain or vegetables within four amot of a vineyard, the portion of the vineyard equivalent to a small vineyard becomes forbidden – that is, the five vines closest to the kilayim, arranged in vineyard formation. If there are additional vines within four amot of the kilayim in any direction, they too become forbidden. One must also be careful with any vine cane that extends beyond the four-ama zone surrounding the vineyard. It is treated like a single vine, so grain or vegetables may not grow beneath it; if they do, both that vine and everything growing beneath the cane become forbidden.

An aris has the same status as a vineyard. An aris is formed by at least five vines planted in a straight row and trained along poles or wires, allowing them to receive more sun and air and produce more abundant, higher-quality grapes. If the kilayim are within four amot of the aris – whether near the vine trunks or near the poles or wires on which the vines are trained – the five vines facing the kilayim become forbidden.

A fence ten tefaḥim high, approximately 80 cm, separates the vineyard from the field. Once such a fence stands between them, one may sow grain or vegetables on the other side without any additional distance (MT, Laws of Kilayim 7:15). This is true even if the vine’s roots extend beneath the grain, because vineyard kilayim is defined by the visible appearance of mixture, not by the underground spread of roots. Since the fence makes the vineyard and field appear separate, the plants are not considered mixed.

Inside the vineyard: If one sowed kilayim inside a vineyard, or if kilayim grew there on its own and the owner was negligent and did not uproot it, the mixture is more apparent because it is inside the vineyard itself, and its laws are therefore far more severe. The affected area is measured by the reach of the roots’ nourishment: sixteen amot in every direction, plus an additional four amot for the vineyard’s work area. Thus, every vine within less than twenty amot of the kilayim becomes forbidden for benefit (MT, Laws of Kilayim 6:1–2).


[9]. It is clear that the Torah intended the Sages to define the parameters of the prohibition. The requirement to distance grain or vegetables four amot from a vineyard, which has the status of Torah law, was established by the Sages because vineyard work – including plowing with cattle and transporting the crop by cart – required four amot. The additional stringency regarding grain that grows inside a vineyard or within the empty space surrounding a vineyard, however, is rabbinic.

Regarding a single vine, Sifrei, Ki Tetze §230, Ramban, and Ran explain that the requirement to distance grain or vegetables six tefaḥim from a single vine is by Torah law. In other words, the measure established by the Sages for the work area of a single vine is binding by Torah law. By contrast, several Rishonim imply that the prohibition of vineyard kilayim applies only in an actual vineyard, and that the entire requirement to distance grain or vegetables from a single vine is rabbinic (She’iltot; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh §548). See the Herḥavot.

All measures of kilayim stated in tefaḥim use generous tefaḥim, as explained in SA YD 296:68. In the Herḥavot to Peninei Halakha: Sukkot 2:1, note 11, it is explained that we follow the view of Rashba, cited in SHT 363:60, that a generous tefaḥ adds approximately 1/48. Thus, an ama of six tefaḥim, normally 45.6 cm, is in practice 46.55 cm, which we rounded to 47 cm. Four amot were therefore rounded to 188 cm.

The Sages said that the distance between vineyard rows is between four and eight amot. Rambam implies that the same applies between one vine and another in the same row. Today, the accepted practice is to leave slightly more than four amot between vine rows, but only about three amot between vines in the same row. It seems that since this is now the optimal method of cultivation, such a planting is considered a vineyard. My teacher, R. Yisraeli, writes similarly. He adds that according to Rosh, even in the past there was no objection to planting the vines within a row at a distance of less than four amot from one another (Eretz Ḥemda, vol. 2, 7:1–3).

07. The Diaspora and Kilayim of Non-Jews

The Torah prohibition of seed kilayim and vineyard kilayim applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Regarding seed kilayim, the verse states: “You shall keep My statutes… You shall not sow your field with kilayim…” (Vayikra 19:19). Regarding vineyard kilayim, it states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim” (Devarim 22:9). The terms “your field” and “your vineyard” refer to the field and vineyard of the Jewish people, which are in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, because vineyard kilayim is especially severe – its produce is forbidden both to eat and to derive benefit from – the Sages extended the prohibition to the Diaspora as well. They established, however, that in the Diaspora the prohibition applies only to cases that all authorities agree are forbidden by Torah law in Eretz Yisrael, both with respect to sowing and with respect to benefit (Kiddushin 39a).

Therefore, in the Diaspora, vineyard kilayim is prohibited only when one sows at one time a grape seed together with two other seed species that are themselves kilayim with one another – for example, two types of grain, two types of vegetables, or one vegetable species together with one grain species.

Although in Eretz Yisrael the Torah prohibition of vineyard kilayim applies even when one sows a single grain stalk next to a grapevine, and one who knowingly eats what grows there is liable for lashes, one is liable for sowing vineyard kilayim only in the narrower case: when he sows a grape seed together with two seed species that are kilayim with one another. Therefore, in the Diaspora, both the prohibition of sowing vineyard kilayim and the prohibition of deriving benefit from what grows apply only in that case. One may, however, sow grain in his vineyard in the Diaspora and eat what grows there (Rema YD 296:69).[10]

Although a non-Jew may sow kilayim in his vineyard in Eretz Yisrael, a Jew may not instruct him to do so (MT, Laws of Kilayim 8:13). Furthermore, by Torah law, a Jew may not derive benefit from grapes, grain, or vegetables that grew as kilayim in a non-Jew’s vineyard (Tosafot, Kiddushin 36b, s.v. kol; Rosh). Therefore, one may not buy grapes or vegetables from non-Jews near the vineyards where they were grown, since they may have been grown in violation of the prohibition. If one transgressed and bought them, he may not derive benefit from the produce. Since the doubt arose while the produce was still near its fixed place of origin, it is forbidden both to eat and to derive benefit from.

If, however, one buys in the market or in stores grapes or vegetables grown by non-Jews, then the doubt arose only after the produce had already separated from its fixed place. We therefore follow the majority, and the produce may be eaten. This ruling applies be-di’avad – for example, when one has already bought the produce and does not know its status, or when one is in a place with no kashrut-certified stores, and reaching such a store would require significant effort. If, however, there is a kashrut-certified store, one must avoid the doubt and buy there. Even when the concern is very remote, one must avoid entering a doubtful situation whenever possible. In addition, it is a mitzva to strengthen those who are careful in matters of kashrut. Moreover, when produce bears kashrut certification, terumot and ma’asrot will also have been separated properly, as explained above, 2:11.[11]


[10]. As we learned in note 1, authorities disagree about when one is liable for lashes for sowing vineyard kilayim in Eretz Yisrael. Rambam rules in accordance with R. Yoshiya: one is liable twice only if he sows a grape seed together with two seed species be-mapolat yad, in a single act of sowing. Regarding the Diaspora, the Sages said that practice follows R. Yoshiya’s view (Berakhot 22a; Kiddushin 39a).

According to Rambam (MT, Laws of Kilayim 8:13–14), there is no prohibition against sowing grain or vegetables in a vineyard in the Diaspora, but the produce that grows there is nevertheless forbidden for benefit. His reasoning is that since such produce is forbidden for benefit by Torah law in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden for benefit in the Diaspora as well. Rosh, Raavad, and Terumat ha-Deshen §194 disagree. In their view, whatever may be sown in a vineyard in the Diaspora may also be used if it grows there. Rema YD 296:69 rules this way. Since the dispute concerns rabbinic law, the halakha follows the lenient authorities.

According to Rosh, even Rambam agrees in principle. Rambam prohibited the produce only when one bought a vineyard that already contained vegetables, out of concern that they may have been sown be-mapolat yad.

[11]. The authorities permitted buying grapes and cucumbers from non-Jews despite the concern that they had been grown as prohibited kilayim, because most grapes and cucumbers are not grown that way. Since the doubt arose only after the produce had already left the non-Jew’s field, the rule of kol de-parish me-ruba parish applies: anything separated from a group is presumed to have come from the majority.

The authorities also allowed the produce on the basis of a safek sfeika, a double doubt. First, perhaps these grapes or vegetables were not grown in violation of kilayim at all. Second, even if they were grown near a vineyard, perhaps the halakha follows R. Yoshiya as understood by Rabbeinu Tam and Ri, discussed above in note 1. According to that view, unless the seeds were sown be-mapolat yad, there is no prohibition against eating the produce. Additional doubts were combined as well (Mabit 3:127; Maharitatz, Ḥadashot §31; Maharshdam; Keneset ha-Gedola; Birkei Yosef YD 296:1).

It seems to me that these leniencies may have applied specifically when the markets served primarily non-Jewish buyers, who formed the majority. Today, however, if it is known that non-Jews grow kilayim for sale in markets intended primarily for Jewish buyers, the kilayim may have the status of kavu’a – a fixed source – which is not nullified by the majority. When the prohibited produce became mixed in only incidentally, there is room to be lenient. But if kilayim produce is sold regularly in specific places, one may not buy produce there as long as there is doubt whether it is kilayim. Certainly, kashrut agencies that seek a higher standard must be careful about this.

08. The Reason for the Mitzva

The prohibition of vineyard kilayim is unique. In addition to the prohibition against mixing grain or vegetables with a grapevine, the produce that grows from such a mixture is itself forbidden, both to eat and to derive benefit from, as it says: “You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim, lest the full yield – the seed you sow and the produce of the vineyard – become consecrated” (Devarim 22:9). Here, “become consecrated” does not refer to positive holiness. It means that the produce has been designated and set aside for a particular purpose. Usually, such designation is holy and exalted; at times, however, people dedicate themselves to sin, as in the case of a prostitute, who is called a kedesha (Bereishit 38:21). So too, the fruit of vineyard kilayim, having been set apart through sin, becomes consecrated to impurity and is forbidden to the entire Jewish people.

Vineyard kilayim may be treated so severely because it involves the vineyard, and wine has extraordinary power – for good and for harm. On the one hand, song and blessing are recited over wine. On the other hand, it can degrade a person and cast him into the depths of sin. For this reason, a special mitzva of nezirut was established in relation to wine: one who fears that wine may pull his heart toward evil, or hinder his growth in holiness, takes a vow to abstain from it. Indeed, an entire tractate of the Talmud is devoted to this subject: Nazir.

Since wine can sway a person’s judgment, the Torah forbids kohanim to drink wine while serving in the Temple. Similarly, one who has drunk wine may not pray (Peninei Halakha: Prayer 5:11). This same concern helps explain why the Torah treated vineyard kilayim more severely than other forms of kilayim: anything connected to wine requires special care. Wine should be used for the joy of a mitzva, not for unrestrained indulgence or escape from responsibility (see Peninei Halakha: Berakhot 7:1–2).

There is another dimension as well: grain, legumes, and vegetables are essential to human survival. Although eating them does not involve especially intense desire, a person cannot live without them. Therefore, one must work diligently to cultivate them and eat them regularly. Wine, by contrast, is not necessary for survival, but it brings great joy and is meant to serve the joy of a mitzva. This helps explain why blurring the boundary between these two categories is dangerous. If a person treats wine like grain, drinking it as a regular staple, he may become enslaved to his desire and fall into alcoholism. Even if he does not become addicted, excessive daily drinking causes wine to lose its special role in the joy of a mitzva. Conversely, if a person treats grain like a vine, as though it were not essential, he will become lazy, and thorns will grow in his field instead of grain (see Shemen Ra’anan, p. 333, citing Maran Rav Kook).

01. The Mitzva

The Torah commands us not to wear a garment made of wool and linen, as it states: “You shall observe My statutes: you shall not mate your animal with a different species, you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed, and a garment of mixed kinds, sha’atnez, shall not come upon you” (Vayikra 19:19). It also states: “You shall not wear sha’atnez, wool and linen together” (Devarim 22:11).

The wool included in this prohibition is sheep’s wool. Male sheep are called rams, and females are called ewes. The fleece of other animals is not included, because it is not called simply “wool” but is identified by a qualifying term. Thus, the prohibition does not apply to camel wool, goat wool (such as cashmere), rabbit wool (such as angora), or alpaca wool. In practice, from antiquity to the present, most of the world’s wool has come from sheep, which naturally produce abundant, high-quality fleece and are readily domesticated.

Flax is a plant with a single long stalk containing fibers that can be made into strong thread. With special processing, these fibers can be spun into fine thread and woven into attractive white garments. The prohibition of sha’atnez applies specifically to flax and not to fibers derived from other plants, such as hemp or cotton. In earlier times, most clothing was made of wool or linen; some therefore maintain that when the Torah uses the word “garment” without qualification, it refers to a garment made of wool or linen (Menaḥot 39b).

The prohibition of sha’atnez applies to wearing a garment containing both wool and linen. It does not prohibit wearing two separate garments, one made of wool and the other of linen. One may therefore wear wool pants with a linen shirt, or a wool robe fastened with a linen belt. As long as the wool and linen garments are not joined by sewing or a permanent knot, there is no prohibition (below, 6).

The prohibition applies to wearing garments containing wool and linen, not to making sha’atnez fabric for other purposes. It may therefore be used as a decorative wall hanging, as a parokhet for an ark, or to make a cloth purse or tent. It may also be used for burial shrouds, since the deceased are exempt from mitzvot. Likewise, one may manufacture sha’atnez garments for non-Jews, provided there is no concern that they will come into the possession of a Jew who might mistakenly wear them.

02. The Prohibition of Wearing and Draping

Clothing is intended to protect the body from cold, heat, and rain, and to provide adornment, dignity, and modesty. One who wears a sha’atnez garment for any of these purposes violates the prohibition, as the Torah states: “You shall not wear sha’atnez” (Devarim 22:11). The prohibition applies to shirts, pants, dresses, skirts, undergarments, socks, hats, cloth shoes, gloves, ties, decorative ribbons, and all other garments ordinarily worn. Even if only the garment’s hanging loop or attached label is sha’atnez, the garment may not be worn (SA YD 301:15).

The prohibition also applies when sha’atnez fabric is draped over the body for warmth, protection from heat, or modesty, even though it is not worn in the usual manner of a garment. The Torah states: “A garment of mixed kinds, sha’atnez, shall not come upon you” (Vayikra 19:19). Thus, any use of sha’atnez that provides a benefit ordinarily associated with clothing is prohibited. One may not cover oneself with a sha’atnez blanket or dry oneself with a sha’atnez towel, since both provide warmth. The Sages also prohibited using sha’atnez as a tablecloth, out of concern that someone might occasionally pull it over their legs for warmth (SA YD 301:9). For the same reason, they prohibited hanging a sha’atnez curtain, since adults or children might use it for warmth. It may, however, be hung above head height or made of stiff fabric, since it cannot then be used for warmth (ibid. 11). Nor may one use sha’atnez fabric to handle a hot pot or frozen object, since it protects the hand from heat or cold and thus provides a benefit ordinarily associated with clothing (ibid. 12).

One may, however, benefit from sha’atnez fabric in ways unrelated to clothing. Thus, it may be used for a tent or umbrella.

Moreover, according to many authorities, one may wear a sha’atnez garment when doing so serves a purpose entirely unrelated to clothing. Thus, if customs duty is imposed only on garments packed in luggage, a Jew transporting sha’atnez garments belonging to non-Jews may wear them over his clothes while crossing the border, provided he does not intend to benefit from them as clothing. Likewise, a clothing seller may put on a garment solely to display it to customers, provided he does not intend to derive any benefit from wearing it (Rosh; Ramban; Ran; Rema YD 301:6; Yam Shel Shlomo). Other authorities are stringent and prohibit wearing sha’atnez even for these purposes, whether to avoid customs duty or to display a garment to customers (Rambam, as understood by Beit Yosef; SA YD 301:5–6).[1]


[1]. The words “shall not come upon you” teach that sha’atnez is prohibited even when it is not worn in the ordinary manner. From the words “you shall not wear,” however, the Sages derived that the prohibition applies only when the fabric provides a benefit ordinarily associated with clothing (Yevamot 4b; Yerushalmi, Kilayim 9:1). Such benefits include warming the body and protecting it from the sun, rain, or dirt (Mishna, Kilayim 9:4; Meiri, Yevamot 4b), as well as adornment, dignity, and modesty (Ritva, Shabbat 29b; Pesaḥim 26b).

Some have suggested that the authorities disagree as to whether adornment and modesty are independently considered benefits of clothing (see Ha-sha’atnez Le-halakha 4:2–4). In fact, there is no substantive disagreement, since a garment worn for adornment or modesty is generally also capable of providing warmth. The more precise definition of a garment, then, is an item capable of warming the body, even if it is worn primarily, or even exclusively, for adornment or modesty. A tie, for example, is worn for appearance but can still provide some warmth. Similarly, a woman may wear a base-layer shirt solely for modesty, but it is nevertheless considered a garment because it can provide warmth. By contrast, a sha’atnez pendant designed solely as an ornament is not considered a garment and may be worn on a chain.

The Mishna states: “One may not wear kilayim, even over ten garments, even to ‘evade’ customs duty” – that is, to qualify legally for an exemption from the tax, as explained above (Mishna, Kilayim 9:2). Later, the Mishna states: “Clothing merchants may sell in their ordinary manner,” meaning that they may model the garments on their bodies, “provided they do not intend to protect themselves from the sun in hot weather or from the rain in wet weather; the scrupulous carry the garments on a pole” (Mishna, Kilayim 9:5). Rosh and the authorities who follow his view understand these two rulings to disagree, and they rule in accordance with the latter: one may wear a garment in the ordinary manner when the sole purpose is to display it, provided one does not intend to benefit from wearing it. The same reasoning permits wearing a garment to avoid customs duty, although the scrupulous refrain from doing so. This is also the view of Yere’im, Or Zaru’a, Ramban, Ran, R. Yeruḥam, and Semag. This is not considered a case of pesik reisha, in which the prohibited benefit is inevitable, because the wearer may derive no benefit from the garment at all, as when he is already sufficiently warm. Ran further maintains that when the prohibition itself is against deriving benefit, intent to benefit is a necessary condition. The act therefore remains permitted even if some benefit is inevitable.

Rambam, by contrast, rules in accordance with both passages, indicating that he does not understand them to disagree. In his view, clothing merchants were permitted to drape garments over themselves only in a manner unlike ordinary dress, such as without putting their arms through the sleeves. Since the garment is not worn normally, the absence of intent to benefit makes the act permissible. Wearing it in the ordinary manner, however, is always prohibited (R. Avraham b. Rambam; Mahari Kurkus; Beit Yosef; among others). Other authorities understand Rambam differently. In their view, a merchant may put on a suit in the ordinary manner in order to model it, since his sole interest is in displaying the garment and he derives no benefit from wearing it. A person seeking to avoid customs duty, however, specifically needs to wear the garment in order to obtain the exemption. Although his ultimate purpose is to avoid the tax, that purpose is achieved through wearing the garment itself (Taz; Shakh).

Some maintain that one may try on a sha’atnez garment to determine whether it fits, intending to buy it and then have the sha’atnez removed, since trying it on is not intended to provide the benefits of clothing (Riaz, cited in Shiltei Giborim, following Rosh and most Rishonim). Others prohibit this because the person intends to wear the garment as part of trying it on (Ḥokhmat Adam 106:20). When a garment merely might contain sha’atnez, one may try it on and then send it for testing (Yabi’a Omer 6:27; Ḥeshev ha-Efod 1:137; see also Ha-sha’atnez Le-halakha 4:26).

03. Sitting or Lying on Sha’atnez

By Torah law, one may sit or lie on sha’atnez fabric, even though it provides warmth. The Torah prohibition applies only when the sha’atnez is above or alongside the body in the manner of clothing, not when it is beneath the body, as the verse states: “A garment of mixed kinds, sha’atnez, shall not come upon you” (Vayikra 19:19). The Sages, however, prohibited sitting or lying on sha’atnez fabric, lest a loose thread wind around one’s skin or one mistakenly use the fabric as a covering. To prevent such errors, they extended the prohibition even when the sha’atnez is covered by ten layers of permitted fabric (Beitza 14b; SA YD 301:1).

If the sha’atnez fabric is too stiff to be used as clothing and lies on a firm floor or chair into which the person does not sink, however, the Sages did not prohibit sitting or lying on it. A layer must separate the fabric from the body, so that any loose thread cannot wind around the skin (SA YD 301:1). One may therefore lie on a stiff sha’atnez rug when another fabric is spread over it, or sit on a chair upholstered with sha’atnez when pants or a dress separate the body from the chair. Even if the upholstery itself is soft, it is treated as stiff fabric as long as it is stretched taut over the chair with nails or glue (Panim Me’irot 2:113).[2]


[2]. The Sages prohibited sitting or lying on sha’atnez fabric, lest a loose thread wind around one’s skin. They extended this decree even to a case in which ten layers of bedding separate the person from the sha’atnez (Beitza 14b). Some maintain that this extension applies only to fabric commonly used for clothing. If the fabric is not ordinarily worn, one may lie on it as long as it is covered (Rid; Riaz; Ran; Maharshal). Most authorities, however, maintain that the decree applies even to fabric not ordinarily used for clothing (Rashi; Rambam; Meiri; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh; Rosh; SA YD 301:1; Levush; Baḥ).

If the sha’atnez fabric is stiff, however, one may sit on it (Beitza 14b). According to most authorities, it must also be covered, so that no loose thread can reach the skin and wind around it (Rambam; R. Shimshon of Sens; SA YD 301:1; Shakh YD 301:4; and others). Some permit sitting on stiff fabric even without an intervening layer (Rid; Riaz; Ritva), while others permit this only when the fabric is extremely stiff, like a donkey’s saddlecloth (Rosh; R. Yeruḥam).

A further rule applies to sha’atnez cushions and pillows. The Mishna permits sitting on them “provided one’s flesh does not touch them” (Mishna, Kilayim 9:2). The Yerushalmi explains that this applies only when they are empty and spread flat over a hard surface. If they are stuffed or placed on a soft surface, so that they bend upward around the person sitting on them, one may not sit on them even with an intervening layer (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 9:2; SA YD 301:1). Many explain that this is another application of the prohibition against lying on soft sha’atnez even beneath ten layers of bedding: when the cushions can bend upward, a loose thread may once again wind around the body. Others maintain that the cushions’ bending around the body is itself rabbinically prohibited because it is considered placing sha’atnez upon oneself. Ginat Veradim maintains that this is prohibited by Torah law, as does R. Shlomo Kluger (Tuv Ta’am Va-da’at, 3rd series 2:121). It seems to me that this prohibition applies only when the person sinks into the cushion deeply enough that the sha’atnez fabric at the sides becomes more vertical than horizontal, at which point it can be considered a form of wearing.

Soft sha’atnez upholstery that is stretched tightly over a chair, so that it cannot bend upward around the person sitting on it, is treated like a stiff surface. According to most authorities, one may sit on it as long as clothing or another layer separates it from the skin (Panim Me’irot 2:113; PT YD 301:1; AHS YD 301:9).

The Gemara indicates that a sha’atnez curtain is prohibited because a servant might occasionally wrap himself in it for warmth (Beitza 14b; Rashi). A stiff curtain is permitted, however, since there is no concern that anyone will wrap himself in it (Rambam; Tur; SA YD 301:11). Taz infers from this that one may not lean against the sha’atnez-covered side of a wagon, and Ḥokhmat Adam rules likewise (Taz YD 301:2; Ḥokhmat Adam 106:21). Panim Me’irot, however, permits leaning against sha’atnez fabric that is fixed in place so that it cannot be wrapped around the body. This is also the ruling of PT, Birkei Yosef, Kaf ha-Ḥayim, and Malbushei Yesha (Panim Me’irot 2:113; PT YD 301:1; Birkei Yosef YD 301:6–7; Kaf ha-Ḥayim OḤ 638:52; Malbushei Yesha 5:16).

Even stiff sha’atnez fabric may not be placed upon the body for protection, since protection is one of the functions of clothing. Thus, one may not place a donkey’s sha’atnez saddlecloth on one’s back in order to carry manure on it (SA YD 301:8).

04. What Is Sha’atnez?

To make a garment of wool or linen, the raw materials must undergo three stages alluded to in the word sha’atnez, as the Mishna explains: “Sha’atnez: something that is shua, tavui, and nuz” (Mishna, Kilayim 9:8). First, shua: smoothing the wool or flax by combing. Second, tavui: spinning the fibers into thread. Third, nuz: intertwining, whether by weaving wool and linen threads together as warp and weft to form cloth, or by joining linen thread to a wool garment through tying or sewing.

In practice, wool and linen form prohibited sha’atnez in four principal ways: when raw wool and flax fibers are blended, combed, spun together into thread, and woven into cloth; when wool and linen threads are produced separately and then woven into a single fabric, such as linen warp and wool weft; when wool fabric is sewn or tied with linen thread, or linen fabric with wool thread; and when wool and linen fabrics are sewn together.

What these cases have in common is that the wool and linen underwent all three stages of shua, tavui, and nuz. If they did not undergo all three stages, however, as with felt made by compressing raw wool or flax without spinning or weaving, the overwhelming majority of Rishonim maintain that joining them is not prohibited by Torah law. Rambam disagrees and maintains that even wool and flax that underwent only the first stage of smoothing and combing before being made into felt are prohibited by Torah law when joined.[3]


[3]. There are four approaches to defining the Torah prohibition of sha’atnez.

  1. a) According to Rashi, the Torah prohibition applies only when the wool and flax undergo all three stages together: shua, tavui, and nuz – smoothing, spinning, and weaving. This is also the view of Rivan, Ra’avan, Shibolei ha-Leket, and others. This view appears difficult in light of the Gemara’s statement that tying woolen tzitzit to a linen garment constitutes sha’atnez by Torah law (Yevamot 4a), even though the wool and linen were not processed together. R. Eliyahu Mizraḥi explains that all three stages must be performed together only when wool and flax are woven into a single fabric and can no longer be distinguished from one another. When each material remains distinct – as in a wool fabric joined to a linen fabric, or woolen tzitzit tied to a linen garment – sewing or tying them together violates Torah law. Meiri offers another explanation: because a knot creates a particularly strong bond, it joins the wool and flax even though they did not undergo the three stages together.
  2. b) According to Rabbeinu Tam, Ramban, Rosh, Rashba, Ritva, Semag, Semak, Yere’im, Ran, Peraḥ Shoshan, and others, even if the wool and linen threads were produced separately, weaving them together or joining them by sewing or tying is prohibited by Torah law. This applies only if each thread is plied, meaning that it consists of at least two strands twisted together, since they understand nuz to mean plying. If the threads are unplied, the prohibition is rabbinic. Whether the modern process of roving (mezira) qualifies as plying requires further study.
  3. c) R. Shimshon of Sens accepts all the cases prohibited by Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam but extends the Torah prohibition further: even unplied wool and linen threads are prohibited by Torah law when woven together, sewn together, or tied to one another. In his view, nuz includes any winding together of the materials – thread around thread or thread around fabric. R. Yeruḥam cites this view in the name of Ramah, and it is also the position of Or Zaru’a and Tashbetz. Many Aḥaronim take this view into account (Sefer ha-Zikhronot 3; Ginat Veradim, YD 6:13; Tzemaḥ Tzedek, YD §353). This is the approach presented above.
  4. d) According to Rambam, combining wool and flax that have undergone only smoothing, without spinning or weaving, is prohibited by Torah law. This is also the view of R. Ḥananel, following Rav Ashi (Nidda 61b). Most Rishonim, however, maintain that combining wool and linen felt is prohibited only rabbinically, since the fibers have not undergone all three stages of smoothing, spinning, and intertwining, following Mar Zutra in the same passage. This is the view of Rav Hai Gaon, Rav Sherira Gaon, and all the Rishonim cited in the preceding approaches. There are also several other explanations of Rambam’s position.

05. Threads Composed of Two Species

When a thread is made from sheep’s wool together with another material, such as cotton, its status follows the majority. If it is mostly cotton, the small amount of wool is disregarded, and the thread is considered cotton and may be joined to linen. Likewise, a thread made from hemp and flax may be joined to wool if it is mostly hemp. This principle applies even when raw wool and raw flax have already been mixed together: another material, such as cotton, may be added until it exceeds either the wool or the flax, thereby nullifying that component, and threads made from the resulting mixture are permitted. If the third material does not exceed either the wool or the flax, however, a garment woven from the resulting threads is prohibited by Torah law (Yerushalmi, Kilayim 9:1; SA YD 299:1).

Raw wool and flax can be nullified in a majority, but once they have been spun into thread, they acquire significance and are not nullified even in a thousand times their volume. Thus, a cotton garment sewn with a plied wool-and-linen thread is prohibited by Torah law even if the cotton is a thousand times greater. Likewise, a single wool thread mixed into a large linen garment – or a linen thread into a wool garment – renders the entire garment prohibited. Even if the thread can no longer be located, the garment remains prohibited until it is removed (SA and Rema YD 299:1).[4]


[4]. Raw wool or flax is nullified in a majority because it has not yet acquired independent significance; it still requires processing that will alter its form. Once wool or flax has been spun into thread, however, it acquires significance and is not nullified even when mixed with other threads, such as cotton. Nullification applies only where there is a halakhic conflict between a prohibited substance and a permitted one, and no such conflict exists between a wool or linen thread and other fibers with which it may permissibly be combined. A wool or linen thread is certainly not nullified when combined with the other component of sha’atnez, such as a wool thread in linen fabric or a linen thread in wool fabric, since that combination constitutes the prohibition itself (Tosafot, Nidda 61b, s.v. beged). Thus, even if one end of a long piece of wool fabric is sewn with a single linen thread, the entire fabric may not be worn. This remains true even if most of the fabric lies on the floor and only the other end is wrapped around the body, since the presence of sha’atnez at one end renders the entire garment prohibited for wearing (see SA YD 301:3).

Recycled thread made from shredded worn-out garments is permitted. Although the worn-out garments may include both wool and linen fabrics, once they have been shredded and returned to the state of raw material, any wool or linen present is nullified in the majority. If most of the raw material were wool, the resulting thread would be considered wool, but in practice the likelihood of this is negligible (see Ha-sha’atnez Le-halakha 2, notes 28 and 46; 2:29).

Cushions and linings filled with scraps of worn-out garments are also permitted, even though the scraps were not shredded and may contain intact threads. This is based on a sfek sfeka, a double uncertainty: it is uncertain whether the filling contains both wool and linen – in practice, the likelihood is very low – and even if both are present, it is uncertain whether the sewing thread joins them. If it does not, most authorities maintain that no prohibition applies, even though the wool and linen are enclosed together in a single casing sewn shut on all sides, as explained in SA YD 300:5. Rema records that the accepted custom follows the lenient authorities, as discussed in note 5 (Tiferet Yisrael, Batei Kilayim §118; Ḥeshev ha-Efod 1:64).

Because of marit ayin – concern for appearances – the Sages prohibited threads known as shirayim and kalakh, which resembled wool and linen (Mishna, Kilayim 9:2). Today, however, only actual wool and linen are prohibited, since there is no concern that these other fibers will be mistaken for them. Those familiar with textiles can distinguish them, while those unfamiliar with textiles would not identify them as wool or linen in the first place (see SA YD 298:1; AHS YD 298:5–6).

06. Joining Wool and Linen; Wearing Them Together

Whenever wool and linen are joined directly and securely, the garment is prohibited by Torah law as sha’atnez. Thus, a skirt in which wool and linen fabrics are sewn together, or a wool coat with a linen hanging loop or linen loops, is prohibited by Torah law.

If the wool and linen are not joined to one another, however, most authorities permit the garment. Thus, if wool fabric is sewn to one side of a cotton garment and linen fabric to the other, there is no prohibition, since the wool and linen are not connected. The same applies when pieces of wool and linen are placed inside a lining without being joined to one another (R. Shimshon of Sens; Ramban; Rosh; Rashba). Rambam, by contrast, maintains that once both materials are attached to a single garment, the entire garment is prohibited by Torah law. In practice, the accepted custom follows the lenient view, although the scrupulous are stringent (Rema YD 300:5).[5]

Sha’atnez is prohibited only when wool and linen are joined. When they remain separate, they may be worn together. One may therefore wear a wool shirt over a linen shirt and fasten a belt around both, wear a wool belt with linen pants, or fasten a wool garment to a linen garment with buttons that open easily or with Velcro. In each case, the garments are held together only temporarily and are not permanently joined (SA and Rema YD 300:3–4).[6]

Some maintain that one should not wear wool socks over linen socks, since the linen socks cannot be removed without first removing the wool socks and the two are therefore considered firmly joined (Rema YD 300:4). Most authorities permit this, however, because there is no permanent attachment. This is the accepted practice (SA YD 300:4; Levush; Shakh YD 300:8; AHS YD 300:24).


[5]. The Rishonim disagree whether wool and linen may be joined through an intervening material. The case they discuss concerns a wool garment reinforced and thickened with a leather covering. The leather was sewn to the garment with hemp thread, while the hem along its edge was sewn with linen thread. Rambam rules that “once the wool and linen have been joined in any manner whatsoever, it is kilayim by Torah law” (MT, Laws of Kilayim 10:2). Ra’avad and Orḥot Ḥayim agree, and several Aḥaronim take their stringent view into account (Mishkenot Ya’akov §70; Devar Shmuel §169; Minḥat Yitzḥak 8:117). Others maintain that joining them through an intervening material is prohibited only rabbinically because of marit ayin (Rav Hai Gaon; Ha-Eshkol).

Most Rishonim, however, permit this arrangement as long as the wool and linen are not attached directly to one another, even if the linen thread along the edge of the leather touches the wool. This is the view of R. Shimshon of Sens, Rivmatz, Ramban, Semag, Rashba, Rosh, and others. Rema records that the accepted custom follows the lenient view (Rema YD 300:5). This is also the ruling of Magen Avraham OḤ 9:8, Eliya Rabba OḤ 9:6, MB 9:19, and AHS YD 300:14.

[6]. Sewing wool fabric to linen fabric with hemp thread is prohibited by Torah law whenever the stitching creates a secure attachment. Thus, passing a needle through both fabrics three times is prohibited even without a knot, as is passing it through twice and tying a knot (Rosh; Rema YD 300:2). The same applies when the needle is passed once through the edges of the fabrics and the two ends of the thread are tied together with a double knot (Magen Avraham OḤ 11:13; Ḥavot Ya’ir §143, cited in PT YD 300:2). Some authorities are stringent even when the needle is passed through twice without a knot (MT, Laws of Kilayim 10:24; SA YD 300:2). The Aḥaronim disagree whether fastening wool and linen fabrics together with a safety pin constitutes prohibited sewing or is comparable to fastening them with a button and is therefore permitted (see Malbushei Yesha 3, note 38; Torat ha-Sha’atnez 300:32).

07. Wool and Linen Garments, Past and Present

In the past, most garments were made of wool or linen. Wool is an excellent insulator and keeps the body warm in winter. It also absorbs relatively little dirt, and rain tends to run off it; these qualities made it the standard material for coats. Wool takes dye readily and retains its color, and because it tends to return to its original shape, wrinkles often smooth out on their own. For these reasons, wool garments remain looking new for a relatively long time.

Linen was considered a comfortable, high-quality fabric. Flax fibers are strong, and when spun into fine threads, they can be woven into especially attractive white garments. The natural variations in the thread’s thickness also give linen a distinctive appearance. Linen was so prized that the Sages taught that men in Eretz Yisrael should bring joy to their wives on the festival by giving them pressed linen garments, which women especially appreciated (Pesaḥim 109a). Linen is light and does not insulate, making it well suited to summer clothing through which air can circulate and cool the wearer. Its disadvantages are that it wrinkles easily, absorbs dirt, and is relatively difficult to clean. Once a suitable substitute became available, linen’s status declined sharply.

Cotton, whose production became widespread several centuries ago, is linen’s natural substitute. Although cotton is slightly warmer, it offers several advantages: it is easier to grow and spin, and cotton garments wrinkle less and are easier to wash. Today, the world produces approximately 80 times as much cotton as flax, while most flax is used to make strong thread and for other non-clothing purposes. Because cotton can also be woven into thick winter garments, it has largely replaced wool as well; global cotton production is now approximately 25 times that of wool. Other plant- and animal-based fibers have further reduced wool and linen’s share of the clothing industry.

About three generations ago, manufacturers learned to produce synthetic materials from petroleum byproducts, including plastic, nylon, and synthetic fibers such as polyester and acrylic, from which fabrics can be made. Early synthetic garments were neither breathable nor insulating, causing wearers to suffer from both perspiration and cold; only their low cost allowed them to compete with natural fabrics. As the technology improved, synthetic fabrics became more breathable and insulating. Because they are also less expensive and easier to clean and iron, they became extremely common. By 2018, manufactured fibers accounted for more than 70 percent of global fiber production, up from 60 percent a decade earlier. Wool and linen together accounted for only about 1 percent of the clothing industry, and their share appeared likely to continue declining[7]

In practice, little linen clothing remains apart from a small number of luxury shirts and suits. Because linen thread and fabric are strong, however, they are sometimes used to reinforce parts of coats and suits, such as collars and the areas where buttons and buttonholes are sewn.

Wool garments have also become less common for the reasons discussed above. Nevertheless, wool’s warmth and resistance to rain and dirt make wool sweaters attractive to those who prefer a natural, breathable material, while its prestigious appearance and durability lead many to choose wool suits and coats.


[7]. According to data from DNPI, global fiber production reached approximately 111 million metric tons in 2018. Of this total, only 29 percent – about 32 million tons – consisted of natural fibers derived from plants or animals, such as cotton, jute, wool, linen, ramie, and silk; the remaining 71 percent consisted of manufactured fibers. Cotton accounted for 23.5 percent of global production, or 26.1 million tons; wool accounted for 1 percent, or 1.08 million tons; and linen for approximately 0.3 percent, or 310,000 tons. Wool and linen together thus represented only slightly more than 1 percent of all fibers produced, approximately 1.3 percent. The overall trend is toward a declining share of natural fibers relative to manufactured ones.

Chapter Contents

Peninei Halakha We use cookies to ensure the website functions properly and improve user experience. You can choose which types of cookies to enable.
Cookie Selection