10. Dishwashers

A dishwasher may not be activated on Shabbat. This is because one may not use electricity, and additionally because the dishwasher heats water to wash the dishes. This heating is a transgression of Bishul.

One who always clears off dirty dishes from the table and places them directly in the dishwasher may do so on Shabbat as well. Then after Shabbat he can run the dishwasher. However, if he does not generally do this, then he may not do so on Shabbat, as it would amount to preparing on Shabbat for the weekdays, which is forbidden.

One may not even turn on a dishwasher via a timer, because the dishwasher is designed so that it will not go on unless the door is closed. This means that the person who closes the door to the dishwasher after the dishes have been loaded causes it to turn on (SSK 12:37). However, in times of need, when there will be a great need to wash many dishes on Shabbat and it would be extremely difficult to wash them by hand, one may set the dishwasher with a timer. This is because causing it to turn on by closing the door is considered grama. Since an action performed via grama is not a true melakha, in times of need it is permitted (above 9:9; Responsa Me-rosh Tzurim §30).

If one can disable the system that makes the dishwasher’s activation dependent on closing the door, so that the dishwasher will go on at the set time even if the door is not shut, then even in ordinary circumstances one may load the dirty dishes and have the dishwasher wash them during Shabbat (R. Yeĥiel Faust, Le-ohavai Yesh 1).

11. Automatic Doors

One may not approach a door that automatically opens when it senses someone near it. One who does so is viewed as directly triggering the electricity that opens the door. It is immaterial whether the system works through floor sensors, an electric eye, a motion detector, or the like. As we have seen (section 2), according to many, including Rav Kook, turning on an electrical appliance is prohibited by Torah law.

One who finds himself in a hotel or hospital with automatic doors must find an alternative way to enter that does not involve using electricity. If a non-Jew approaches the door in order to enter, a Jew may follow him in (below 25:1-2). But if the person approaching the door is a Jew who does not observe Shabbat, a Shabbat observer may not follow him in, because the Shabbat observer may not benefit from the Shabbat desecration of a fellow Jew. Furthermore, when an observant Jew takes advantage of Shabbat desecration and benefits from it, it is considered a desecration of God’s name. Even though some are lenient in this case, it is proper to be stringent. Only under pressing circumstances, when there is no alternative, may one rely on those who are lenient.^[11]

Doctors and nurses may enter a hospital through an automatic door, as their work entails saving lives. Others may then follow them through the door. Ideally, the hospital administration should try to minimize the need for Shabbat desecration and arrange alternative entrances for visitors and staff to enter without activating any electrical devices.

Some say that if one unintentionally came too close to an automatic door, thus causing it to open, he must remain in place, because moving away will cause the door to close. They maintain that he should wait until a non-Jew arrives and ask the non-Jew to stand near him, at which point he can leave. Afterward, when the non-Jew leaves as well, the non-Jew will be the one who causes the door to close. However, if remaining in place causes the Jew anguish, he may simply leave, as he is just walking normally and does not care if the door is open or closed. His act of leaving is a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei brought about via grama, which is not forbidden. Even if the person who mistakenly caused the automatic door to open did in fact want to enter, in a time of need he may still enter, since the melakha was unintentional. In contrast, if he intended for the door to open but forgot, and only later remembered, that it is forbidden, he should not enter, because one may not benefit from a melakha that was unknowingly  (albeit intentionally) performed on Shabbat (SA 318:1; see n. 11 above and 26:4 below).

12. When Entering a Room Causes the Lights to Turn On

One may not enter a room where doing so automatically turns on the lights or air conditioning. While one might claim that he did not intend to turn on the lights or air conditioning by entering the room, the fact is that everyone knows how the system works in such places.

This problem is common in hotel rooms and bathrooms. One who stays in such a hotel must make sure that the system is switched off before Shabbat. If he did not take care of this in advance and is outside his room when Shabbat begins, he may ask a non-Jew to open the door for him. He should further ask the non-Jew to stay for a bit so that the non-Jew will benefit from the lights or air conditioning, since he is then viewed as having turned them on for his own sake, and the Jew may then benefit from them (below, 25:2).

What if the hotel guest is inside such a room when Shabbat begins, and he knows that if he leaves he will cause the lights or air conditioning to shut off? If he can easily stay inside until after Shabbat, or if a non-Jew is due to come shortly to disable the system, it is preferable to wait inside. However, if doing so causes him anguish, he may leave the room or bathroom because the purpose of this system is to save the hotel money by conserving electricity. The hotel guest does not care about that, so it is a case of psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei regarding a rabbinic prohibition (since all agree that the prohibition of turning off the lights or air conditioning is rabbinic). When necessary, in such a case, one may be lenient (above, ch. 9 n. 2).

However, as we saw earlier, once the guest has left his room he will not be able to return to it, because doing so will turn on the lights and air conditioning. The only way for him to re-enter would be with the help of a non-Jew. Therefore, the proper course of action in this case is to ask a non-Jew to disable the system. Then the guest will be able to enter and exit the room as needed.^[12]

13. Intercoms, Security Monitors, and Doorbells at Building Entrances

Some buildings use closed-circuit television (CCTV), in which surveillance cameras transmit images to monitors. A non-Jewish security guard stationed at the entrance keeps an eye on the people who come and go by watching the monitors. When people whom the guard recognizes as residents of the building or their guests arrive at the front door, he pushes an electric button that unlocks the door, allowing them to enter. Since this system is beneficial to the Jewish residents and guests of the building, a Jew may not stand where his image will be captured on the monitor. Similarly, if a Jew wishes to enter the building, he may not press the intercom button to request that the guard unlock the door for him, since using electricity is prohibited.^[13]

Therefore, one should make certain that the place where the guard sits is not far from the front door. Then, when a Jew wishes to enter, he can knock on the door while standing out of camera range, so that the guard can see him and unlock the door for him. If the non-Jew elects to open it using the electric release button, the Jew may still enter, since it is also possible for the non-Jew to open the door manually. If the non-Jew prefers to use the door release button, he is doing so for his own convenience, and not for the benefit of the Jew.

If there is a non-Jew entering the building at the same time as the Jew, even if the non-Jew makes use of the electricity, the Jew can follow him in, since the non-Jew is doing this for his own benefit. If it is a non-observant Jew who makes use of the electricity in order to enter, one may not follow him in, since he may not benefit from melakha done by a fellow Jew on Shabbat. Additionally, this constitutes a desecration of God’s name. Although some are lenient in this regard, it is proper to be stringent. Only under pressing circumstances, when there is no alternative, may one rely on those who are lenient (as explained above, ch. 11 n. 11).

If one wishes to enter a building, but no one inside the building hears him knocking and calling out, may he ring an electric doorbell to gain admission? Some maintain that under pressing circumstances one may ring the bell using a shinui, while others forbid this. Under pressing circumstances, when there is no other solution, one who wishes to may rely on the lenient opinion provided that this leniency is not used regularly, as doing so regularly belittles Shabbat.^[14]

14. Motion Detectors in Public Domains and in the Home

One may walk where security cameras record images of passersby. Since the pedestrian has no interest in being videoed, he is not held responsible for his image being recorded, and there is no prohibition. Similarly, one may pass through a metal detector, since one who goes through is not interested in its electrical activity. One may also walk on a street where there are motion detectors that detect the movements of passersby. Even if a security system turns a light on when it senses movement, one may walk past it, because he is innocently walking through and is not interested in turning on the light. However, if it is not difficult, it is preferable to use an alternate route, since indirectly causing an electric light to go on is not properly respectful of Shabbat.

A private home might have a security system in which the burglar alarm has been disarmed, but the sensors continue working. Consequently, whenever one passes by certain places, LED security lights go on, or images are recorded. Some forbid walking around in such a house on Shabbat since doing so will cause electrical activity. They maintain that if one wishes to walk there, he must either disable the entire system or cover all the sensors so they will not detect a person’s movements. (See R. Mordechai Eliyahu, She’elot U-teshuvot Ha-Rav Ha-Rashi, 5750-5753, p. 174.)

Others permit walking there. This is because one simply wishes to walk, and has no interest in triggering sensors or having his image captured; the only reason he does not deactivate them is because it is so difficult to do (Si’aĥ Naĥum §25). This is the primary position. Nevertheless, if possible, it is preferable to disable the sensors.

One must disable a light that automatically turns on when one approaches the entrance to one’s house, because he benefits from the light in this case. Even if he does not benefit, it is not properly respectful to Shabbat to cause the light to go on. In a case of need, when the system is activated and there is no other way to enter the house, one can crawl through in such a way that the light might not turn on. Even if it is almost certain that the light will still turn on, turning it on by crawling constitutes a shinui. Additionally, he should keep his eyes closed so that he will not benefit from the light when it goes on.

15. Security Systems

When a home security system is necessary for protection against thieves, there are two possible ways to set it up in a halakhically acceptable fashion. The best way is to use a timer. One may set the timer to arm the system during the hours when people are in bed or out of the house and disarm the system during the hours when people are awake and going in and out of the house. The problem with this is that if schedules change, the system needs to be changed, and if doing this involves using electricity, it is absolutely forbidden on Shabbat. If the system has an external timer, one may extend the current state, as explained above (section 6; under pressing circumstances one may also shorten the time, as explained in n. 7).

The second possibility is to use a special key that works via grama. Such a key disarms the security system when turned in one direction and arms it when turned in the other direction. To avoid transgression, the key must not cause any immediate electrical activity. Rather, it activates a mechanism that will eventually activate or disconnect electricity powering the alarm. Even though performing melakha through grama is normally prohibited le-khatĥila, when the only alternative will result in loss, one may be lenient.^[15]

Another question regarding security systems relates to monitoring services. In many cases, if a burglar alarms for a home or a car is triggered, the system signals a central monitoring station. Operators at the station see the signal and contact the owner to find out what happened. If the owner does not answer, the operators dispatch security personnel to apprehend the thieves. May one maintain a security system that involves such a service?

Some are stringent and require the owner to demand that the monitoring service refrain from desecrating Shabbat on his behalf. This approach would require the service to use non-Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. Others permit using a monitoring service even if it is staffed by Jews, maintaining that every theft nowadays involves an element of danger to human life. Therefore one may hire a service that employs and sends out Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. In practice, it is proper to use a company that tries to use non-Jewish security personnel on Shabbat. If that is not an option, one may use a company that is not particular in this regard. If the alarm goes off and the service calls to find out if a dispatch is necessary, even if the personnel are non-Jews, one should answer the phone, in order to prevent them from making an unnecessary trip.^[16]

16. Turning Off an Alarm That Went Off on Shabbat

If an alarm goes off on Shabbat because one touched one’s car or entered one’s house carelessly, what should be done? If the alarm goes off during the day and will stop relatively soon, one may not take any action to turn it off. However, what if it will continue to make noise for an extended period during the day or for even a short period at night? If the alarm disturbs people and causes them anguish because it prevents them from sleeping, sets them on edge, and ruins their enjoyment of Shabbat, one may turn it off, as long as one does so via a shvut di-shvut (above 9:11). This is because turning off the alarm is only prohibited rabbinically (see section 1 above), so if one turns it off with a shinui such as by pressing the appropriate button on the remote control with a spoon or the back of his finger, then the action taken is considered a shvut di-shvut. Even if turning off the alarm will make a light go on temporarily, since he does not need this light, it is considered a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei (above 9:5).

It is true that some forbid this, only allowing one to be lenient if a non-Jew is available to turn off the alarm. For one who follows this position, if his non-observant Jewish neighbors threaten to call the police (which will lead to additional Shabbat desecration), he should tell the neighbors where the remote control is. Then the neighbors can choose to turn the alarm off themselves rather than call the police (Melakhim Omnayikh 10:6).

However, in practice, since this is a case of great necessity for the sake of a mitzva, one may turn off the alarm via a shvut di-shvut (see Be-ohalah shel Torah, OĤ §23; R. Dov Lior in R. Moshe Harari’s Kedushat Ha-Shabbat vol. 1, p. 303).

17. Alarm Clocks, Watches, and Digital Photo Frames

If an electric alarm clock goes off on Shabbat, one may not turn it off, because doing so involves the use of electricity. If the noise is disturbing, the clock may be wrapped in blankets and moved where it will not be heard. If there is no way to minimize the noise, and the ringing is so loud that it is difficult to rest, one may turn off the alarm using a shinui. This follows the principle that a shvut di-shvut is permitted for the sake of a mitzva (as explained in the previous section).

Before the alarm actually goes off, one may press a button to deactivate it. Similarly, one may move an analog clock’s hands in order to delay the time that the alarm will go off. However, one may change the time to an earlier time only for the sake of a mitzva or when there is a great need (above, 6:7). One may not change the time if it involves typing words or digits or any other use of electricity.

One may wear an electronic watch that displays the time. Even if there is a computer inside, one may wear it, since its primary purpose – displaying the time – is permitted (below, 22:8). However, if one knows that he is likely to end up using the computer, he may not wear this watch on Shabbat. Of course, one may not wear a watch that requires him to press a button to see the time, as it is muktzeh.

One may not wear a watch that measures the room temperature and displays it, because the movements of the wearer cause the watch to work. The claim that one is not interested in this feature is patently false; if this were the case such watches would not be made, and if they were made, no one would buy them. However, if the watch detects the temperature but does not display it unless one presses the appropriate button, one may wear the watch. The reason is that the measurement is done via grama, and it is a case of a psik reisha where the person is indifferent toward the result (see above, ch. 9 n. 3).^[17]

Some are stringent and avoid wearing a solar-powered watch or an automatic quartz watch that is powered by movement. They are concerned that whenever the wearer moves his hand or enters a well-lit place, he causes the watch to recharge. Others are lenient on condition that the watch would be able to function for a few days without being charged, so that the charging that takes place on Shabbat is not really necessary. One who wishes may be lenient, and one who is stringent should be commended.^[18]

A digital photo frame, which stays on all week and cycles through a slideshow of family pictures or scenic views, does not need to be turned off before Shabbat. This is because everyone knows that it is automatic and is on nonstop throughout the week.

18. Grama Solutions to Halakhic Problems on Shabbat

Several organizations specialize in halakha and technology, devoting themselves to engineering electrical appliances to turn on via grama so that they may be used in cases of need. One such method is called “removing an impediment” (hasarat ha-mone’a). A second method uses a type of scanner that performs a scan every few seconds and turns an appliance on if it determines that a switch has been flipped. Thus, flipping the switch does not turn on the appliance but only causes it to be turned on indirectly. A third method is based on the principle that one may extend the present state: the appliance is set to turn on for one second every few seconds. When the switch is flipped, the next time the appliance turns on, it will not turn off after a second but will remain activated.

Others maintain that one may not use any of these clever stratagems. If an appliance is set to be activated electronically, causing its activation is not considered grama but the normal way of activating it.

In practice, it would seem that if one’s action causes an appliance to turn on within a short time, like it would be turned on during the week, then even if the appliance has been programmed to turn on in a grama-like way, one may not turn it on. The internal workings of the machine are not important; if it turns on in a way that looks normal, then that is not considered grama. Therefore, elevators and automatic doors may not be turned on via grama; since the goal is for them to function in their normal way soon after being turned on, it would not be considered grama. Similarly, one may not travel using a “kalno’it” (an electrical wheelchair or gold cart specially designed for use by the sick, disabled, and elderly on Shabbat), since it operates in the way that one would operate a similar device during the week.

In contrast, when one’s action causes an appliance to turn on only with a significant delay, then if it is brought about indirectly – whether by hasarat ha-mone’a, scanning, or extending the present state – it is considered grama, and such a system may be used when needed. This is the practice regarding arming a security system: if turning a key will cause the system to work via grama, and it will only actually arm itself ten minutes after the key is turned, it is considered grama, and one may do so in cases of great need.^[19]

01. Kotev and Moĥek

Kotev is the melakha of expressing ideas precisely using letters, numbers, or meaningful pictures in a manner that allows the idea to last a long time. In the Mishkan, letters were written on the posts that formed its walls so that the order, position, and orientation of each post would always be clear. Sometimes mistakes would be made, so there was a need to erase the letters and replace them with the correct ones. This is the melakha of Moĥek, erasing in order to write other letters (Shabbat 103a; Rashi on Shabbat 73a).

At first glance, Kotev seems to be a trivial and insubstantial melakha that should not have been included on the list of serious melakhot prohibited on Shabbat. However, in truth, writing is the basis for human activity. No matter how smart one was or how good a memory one had, he would still have had difficulty remembering exactly where to place each individual post in the Mishkan. This is the case with all complex matters: if one does not write them down, he will not remember them precisely and he will lose the ability to reconstruct the knowledge he has accumulated and the achievements he has already attained. Through writing, mankind was able to develop scientifically and improve human life.

In order to ensure that information is precise, sometimes it is necessary to erase a mistake in order to replace it with accurate information. Even if a piece of paper has a stain on it and one erases it so he can write letters instead, he transgresses Moĥek, as his erasure prepares the writing surface (SA 340:3).

Sometimes erasing is considered a melakha even if one does not plan to write in the place of the erasure; for example, if there is an extra letter in a Torah scroll which must be erased in order to render the Torah kosher (Shabbat 104b; BHL 340:3, s.v. “ha-moĥek”).

Using a rubber stamp is also considered Kotev. It makes no difference whether the stamp is held with the right or left hand, because the stamp can be easily used with either hand. Similarly, using a printer, photocopier, or fax machine is prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, since doing so commits meaningful symbols or letters to writing (see MA, OĤ 32:57; Taz, YD 271:8; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 4:40:10).

One may not type letters or characters on a computer or save them to a computer’s memory. It is also forbidden to take photographs, or to record voices or sounds. However, since these actions do not produce stable forms or letters, many maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic.^[1]

02. Defining the Prohibition of Writing and Exploring Leniencies for Life-Threatening Situations

It is critically important to define each melakha precisely and establish what is rabbinically prohibited and what is prohibited by Torah law, and moreover these determinations have practical consequences. For example, when writing is necessary in a hospital or in the army in order to save lives, le-khatĥila one should minimize the prohibitions one violates and write in a manner that is only rabbinically prohibited. We shall first clarify what is prohibited by Torah law and what is rabbinically prohibited, and then detail how one should write in cases where there is danger to human life.

The Torah prohibition of Kotev refers to writing normally with the right hand, though one who writes irregularly with the left hand violates a rabbinic prohibition. A lefty who writes with his left hand violates Torah law, and if he uses his right hand he violates rabbinic law. One who is ambidextrous violates Torah law by writing with either hand (Shabbat 103a).

If one holds the pen with a shinui – in his mouth, with his foot, or with the back of his hand – he violates a rabbinic prohibition (MT 11:14).

The Torah prohibition of Kotev also refers to writing that lasts for a significant amount of time. Therefore, if one writes with a pencil or pen on paper, he violates Torah law. However, if he writes using fruit juice, which will quickly fade, or with a regular pen but on a leaf that will dry out and crumble, he violates a rabbinic prohibition.

According to the vast majority of poskim, the Torah prohibition of Kotev applies to all languages (MT 11:10; BHL 306:11). A few poskim maintain that the Torah prohibition applies only to letters that may appear in a Torah scroll, but writing in any other script, in a foreign language, or in cursive Hebrew, constitutes a rabbinic transgression (Or Zaru’a).

If writing is necessary to save lives, and it is clear that a slight delay will not cause any further danger, the prohibition should be minimized by writing with a shinui, using the left hand. If one is ambidextrous, he should grasp the writing utensil with the back of his hand or between his little finger and ring finger. Ideally, a medical professional should buy a “Shabbat pen” whose ink disappears within a few days and with which writing is only rabbinically forbidden. If something must be typed on a computer, a shinui should be used if possible, such as typing with the knuckles, with a teaspoon, or the like. It is also preferable to write in cursive rather than in block letters.

To summarize, if one must write because of a life-threatening situation, it is preferable to use a Shabbat pen, since everyone agrees this is only rabbinically prohibited. Even with a Shabbat pen, it is proper to write using a shinui if possible. When a Shabbat pen is not available, one may write or type as needed, but in cursive and using a shinui when possible.

03. Incidental Writing and Erasing

One may not cut through letters that are written on a cake in frosting, candy, or the like. Similarly, if a cake is decorated with a meaningful picture, like a tree or a house, one may not cut through the picture. Even though one’s intention in cutting the cake is to eat it, since the letters or pictures have meaning and it is very clear that they are being “erased” when the cake is cut, it is rabbinically prohibited (Mordechai; Rema 340:3). However, one may cut between the letters. Even though this separates a word into its component parts, one does not violate Moĥek as long as each letter remains whole. Therefore, if a cake that one plans to serve on Shabbat is being decorated, it should be done in such a way that one will be able to cut between the letters and pictures. Afterward, the slices of cake may be eaten even though eating them will destroy the letters. Since one is engaged in the process of eating, it is not considered Moĥek.

When letters or pictures appear on cookies as a result of having been stamped into the cookie dough, as with petits beurres cookies, there is no prohibition against cutting or breaking them. Since these letters have no significance, erasing them incidentally is not prohibited (MB 340:15).

Some maintain that it is rabbinically prohibited to read a book that has letters stamped or written on the edges of the pages (such as a library stamp) because when one opens the book the letters break apart, and when it is closed they are reconstructed (Levush; MA). In practice, if no other book is available, one may read such a book, because many maintain that bringing the different parts of a letter together is not considered Kotev, nor is separating them considered Moĥek. Additionally, since a book is meant to be opened and closed repeatedly, this is not considered even short-term Kotev and Moĥek, and thus involves no prohibition (Rema 340:3; Taz; MB ad loc. 17).

Some rule that if opening a package of food will definitely tear letters or pictures, it may not be opened on Shabbat. They permit opening the package only if it is possible that the letters or pictures will not be torn in the process (based on Taz). Others maintain that one may open such a package, since all parts of the letters actually remain, but have simply been separated from each other (based on Rema). Le-khatĥila it is proper to be stringent, but when there is no way to open a package without tearing letters, one may be lenient. One who opens the package has no interest in “erasing” the letters, and the action is not constructive but destructive.

One may wear shoes whose soles are stamped with letters or pictures, even though walking in these shoes may leave impressions of these letters or pictures on mud or similar surfaces.^[2]

One who wrote on himself with a pen may still wash his hands and dry them in the usual way, since ink generally does not come off as a result of washing and drying one’s hands one time. However, if he would like the letters to come off, he must be careful to wash and dry his hands gently, so that he does not assist in the removal of the letters.

04. Temporary Writing, Word Games, and Jigsaw Puzzles

As we have seen, temporary writing is rabbinically prohibited. Erasing something when one does not plan to write something else in its place is rabbinically prohibited as well. Therefore, one may not write in the condensation on a window or erase such writing. Similarly, one may not form letters in the sand or erase them (MB 340:20-21).

One may not mark a page using his fingernail to remind oneself that the page contains something notable or something that needs to be corrected. Since he is creating a lasting mark, it is rabbinically prohibited (MB 340:25; Kaf Ha-ĥayim ad loc. 51). However, one may dog-ear the page, because there his goal is not to “engrave” a mark in the paper. Rather, the fold itself is the mark.

Some allow a sick person to use a thermometer strip. They maintain that it is not really writing since the numbers are already imprinted on the strip, and the temperature only makes them visible for a short time, after which they disappear (Yeĥaveh Da’at 4:29). Others forbid this, considering it temporary writing (SSK 40:2). Since the issue is rabbinic, one may be lenient in times of need (Tzitz Eliezer 14:30; below 28:11). Similarly, le-khatĥila one should not perform any medical tests that cause colors to appear, but in times of need, one may be lenient (ibid.).

Colorful blocks may be put next to each other to form a letter, and thread may be laid down in the shape of a letter. This is because the blocks or thread already exist; one is simply arranging them. Similarly, he may juxtapose two cards that together form a picture, letter, or word. This is because all the forms already exist; they are simply being brought together.

This applies when the different parts do not connect to each other or to a board. However, if they do connect, most contemporary poskim maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to put them together and that therefore one may not pin parts of letters to a board to form a whole letter, on account of Kotev. Similarly, one may not assemble a jigsaw puzzle, since creating meaningful pictures also constitutes Kotev. Others permit these activities, maintaining that they are not considered writing since all the writing already exists, and the activity merely brings the letters or puzzle pieces into proximity. However, even according to the lenient position, one may not complete a jigsaw puzzle in order to preserve it as a portrait.

In practice, those who wish may be lenient and allow their children to engage in these activities, but it is proper for adults to be stringent, as most poskim are stringent here. More generally, it is important to realize that Shabbat is meant to be dedicated to Torah, and some therefore say that adults may not play games on Shabbat at all (below 22:13, 24:7; and Harĥavot).^[3]

One may use a multiple-dial combination lock on Shabbat, because turning the discs to align the numbers is not considered writing. The numbers are already there; one is merely realigning them temporarily to form the correct combination and open the lock (Tzitz Eliezer 13:44).

05. Dyeing

Tzove’a is a melakha with the objective of making something more beautiful. In the Mishkan, the woolen threads of the curtains were dyed indigo, royal purple, and scarlet. Even though the melakha of Kotev can be described as “dyeing” a page with letters, there is a difference between Kotev and Tzove’a. The goal of writing is to express an idea. Even when the “writing” is a picture of a house or a tree, the goal is still to express an idea, and that is how one transgresses Kotev. In contrast, the goal of dyeing is not to express an idea, but to beautify an item. Therefore, one who creates a meaningful image on paper or on a wall transgresses Kotev, and if he then colors it to beautify it he transgresses Tzove’a (y. Shabbat 7:2).

Therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law to paint, color, or dye walls, cabinets, utensils, fabric, or clothing on Shabbat. The specific color is irrelevant; any color that beautifies is prohibited by Torah law. Even if the paint is colorless and merely adds glaze or shine, it is prohibited, because shine is considered color. It is prohibited by Torah law to paint a wall even if it was previously painted with the same or a different color.

It is also prohibited by Torah law to polish shoes. Even if the polish is neutral or colorless, it is prohibited by Torah law, because it makes the shoes shine. If the polish is a cream that is spread on the shoes, then one who applies it also transgresses Memare’aĥ (section 6 below). If the polish improves the leather, then one transgresses Me’abed as well (MB 327:12, 16; see section 6 below). Even if the polish was applied before Shabbat, one may not buff the shoes on Shabbat to make them shine, because shine is considered color. However, if there is dust on the shoes, one may gently remove it with a rag (SSK 15:40).

The Torah prohibition of Tzove’a is limited to permanent dyes. If the color will come off by itself within a short time, the prohibition is rabbinic (MT 9:13).

If one’s hands become stained with fruit, blood, or any other substance, le-khatĥila he should first wash his hands and only afterward dry them with a towel, to avoid “dyeing” the towel. Similarly, if juice spills on a tablecloth, the one who wipes it off should be careful not to drag the juice along the cloth as that will dye the tablecloth. Even though such “dyeing” dirties the tablecloth rather than beautifying it, those who are stringent maintain that since it is normal to dye such a cloth, it is rabbinically prohibited (SA 320:20). In times of need one may be lenient, since many poskim say that adding color in a way that dirties the object is not prohibited (MB 320:59; Kaf Ha-ĥayim ad loc. 122).

Since bandages or tissues are not normally dyed, they may be used to clean up blood or other colored substances. Since the color added dirties material that is not normally dyed, there is no prohibition (SAH §302, Kuntres Aĥaron).

Everyone agrees that there is no issue of staining the hands or mouth when eating strawberries or other brightly colored foods, because this is not the normal way to color skin, and any such coloring is actually dirtying the skin (MB 320:58). However, one may not put on makeup, as we explained earlier (14:4).

If a toilet has an automatic toilet bowl cleaner that colors the water with every flush, poskim disagree whether one may flush the toilet on Shabbat. Some maintain that since people are interested in the water being colored, it is rabbinically prohibited even though the color is present only briefly. Others maintain that since the primary goal is to clean the toilet, and the color is just incidental, one may flush the toilet. In practice, it is preferable to use a clear toilet bowl cleaner. However, if one finds himself in a place where the cleaning material is colored, he may flush the toilet. Those who wish to be lenient and use a colored toilet bowl cleaner have an opinion to rely upon.^[4]

06. Mafshit, Me’abed, Memaĥek, and Mesartet

There are four melakhot that relate to preparing animal skins for writing: Mafshit, Me’abed, Memaĥek, and Mesartet (as explained below). When parchment was the standard writing surface, everyday things were written on it. Nowadays, however, only Torah scrolls, tefilin, and mezuzot are written on parchment. Additionally, nowadays, animal skins are used to make leather clothing, shoes, satchels, and upholstery. In the Mishkan, skins were prepared to be used as curtains as well. Mesartet was performed not only on skins, but on wood as well – to designate a place on the boards for writing.

Mafshit refers to removing the skin from an animal that was slaughtered. This skin has two layers. The outer layer, or klaf, is the material upon which Torah scrolls, tefilin, and mezuzot are written. The inner layer, or dokhsostos, may only be used for mezuzot. One who separates the two layers transgresses a tolada of Mafshit. Although one may not remove an animal’s skin, one may skin a cooked chicken, because the prohibition of Mafshit does not apply to edible meat.

Me’abed refers to placing the skin in salt, lime, or other substances that draw out the skin’s juices and acids. This allows the skin to last for hundreds of years. Any action that prepares skins for use is included in this melakha. Therefore, one may not to stomp on skins to harden them, use one’s hands to soften them, or spread oil on them to make them soft and pliant (MT 11:6). We explained above the laws of Me’abed as they pertain to food (12:9).

Memaĥek refers to smoothing the skins by removing hairs and irregularities. This melakha also includes smoothing any rough surface, such as wood or stone, by means of sandpaper or a file (Shabbat 75b). It is also forbidden to scour silver items with a material that smooths their surface (SA 323:9). One may not scour metal with steel wool or sharpen knives (MB 323:40).

The melakha of Memaĥek has a tolada called Memare’aĥ, which refers both to spreading a substance evenly upon an object and to spreading a substance on an object in order to smooth out the object. Therefore, one who spreads ointment on a poultice transgresses Torah law (Shabbat 75b; see below 28:8). It is also forbidden to spread lotions and creams on one’s body, as explained above (14:5). Similarly, one may not polish shoes by spreading cream on them. Even without a cream, one may not rub leather shoes in order to shine them (see AHS 327:4; SSK 15:40). As we explained above (12:11), according to most poskim, the prohibition of Memaĥek does not apply to foods.

Mesartet refers to scoring a line to facilitate writing in a straight line. This melakha also includes drawing a straight line on leather, wood, or stone in order to mark where to cut these materials. However, one may use a knife to draw lines on a cake or to score an orange, to help one cut with precision. Since the prohibition of Meĥatekh does not apply to food (as explained above in 15:10), Mesartet does not apply to food either (MB 322:12, 18; SSK 11:15).

01. Ĥoresh

The melakha of Ĥoresh refers to preparing ground for sowing or planting, by making furrows or holes in the soil in order to plant seeds or seedlings. Plowing also loosens and softens the soil, making it easier for roots to spread out and absorb nutrients.

Thus, one who levels the surface of the ground violates Ĥoresh, because doing so softens the soil and makes it easier to prepare for sowing and planting. Making even a small hole is a transgression of Ĥoresh because a seed can be planted in it. Similarly, clearing rocks from a field, fertilizing it, and weeding are all toladot of Ĥoresh, since these actions improve the soil and make it easier to sow and plant. Anyone who undertakes any activity in order to improve the ground prior to sowing or planting violates Torah law (Shabbat 103a; y. Shabbat 7:2). Even if he does not intend to sow or plant there, he has still violated Ĥoresh, since in fact he has improved the land for sowing or planting (Eglei Tal, Ĥoresh 16).

One may not make a hole in the dirt of a flowerpot or even stake something into the dirt of a flowerpot, thereby making a hole in which one can plant, as these violate the melakha of Ĥoresh (MB 498:91; see n. 4 below).

The Sages prohibited sweeping the ground in the yard, out of concern that one would end up leveling the ground, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. If it is arable land, he violates Ĥoresh. If it is land that serves simply as a yard, he transgresses Boneh. However, one may sweep a part of the yard that has a hard, paved floor.^[1]

One may not kick dirt and sand, or move it around with one’s foot, because this both loosens soil and levels the ground. Saliva that is on the ground should not be rubbed into the dirt with one’s shoes, to avoid leveling the ground. However, if one finds the saliva disgusting, he may step on it in the natural course of his walking, as long as his intention is not to spread it and level the ground (SA 316:11).

One who has mud stuck to his shoes should not try to rub it off against the ground, because he may end up leveling the ground (SA 302:6). Some are not concerned about this possibility, and allow rubbing off the mud (Rema, Taz). One who wishes may be lenient, but le-khatĥila it is preferable to be stringent. In contrast one may rub off the mud against a grate, tiles, or stones even le-khatĥila (MB 302:28; also see above 15:2).

02. Dragging Objects and Pushing a Baby Carriage

One may drag a bed, chair, or bench on the ground, since it is not certain that doing so will make a furrow. Even if the item could easily be lifted off the ground, thus avoiding the possibility of creating a furrow, it may still be dragged on the ground. As long as the person dragging the item does not intend to make a furrow, and there is no certainty that one will be formed, this is permitted, as it is considered a davar she-eino mitkaven (SA 337:1). However, if it is certain that a furrow will be made, one may not drag the item, as it constitutes Ĥoresh. Even if one does not intend to plant there, making the land cultivatable is in fact an act of Ĥoresh (via the principle of psik reisha; see above 9:5).^[2]

In an area with an eruv, one may push a baby carriage or stroller even if it is clear that the wheels will make grooves in the dirt. This is because the wheels do not dig in and loosen the earth as a plow does. Rather, they pack down the earth, which actually does not effectively prepare it for sowing or planting. One may even pivot in the dirt with the carriage, because even then it is not certain that earth will be turned over and prepared for planting (SSK 28:48; Yeĥaveh Da’at 2:52).

03. Zore’a

The melakha of Zore’a refers to causing plants or trees to grow by, for example, planting seeds or saplings or by grafting trees. All actions that improve the growth of branches or fruit are forbidden by Torah law as well. Thus, pruning and weeding are forbidden, because these actions promote plant growth. Similarly, one may not water plants or fertilize the soil surrounding them. It is also forbidden to apply dressings (such as tar or paint) to a tree’s wounds in order to heal it (Shabbat 73b; MT 7:3, 8:2).^[3]

One may not leave an avocado pit in a dish of water so that it will take root and begin to grow. Likewise, one may not put a branch in water so that it will take root and start growing.

Included in the prohibition is germinating seeds in water so that the sprouts can then either be eaten or transferred to soil. It is also forbidden to soak seeds in water to soften them, preparing them to take root and grow (SA 336:11).^[4] However, one may soak barley to soften it before feeding it to animals. This is because one does not desire for the barley to grow; besides, the barley is removed from the water and fed to the animals before the roots emerge (MB 336:51).

One should not toss seeds onto damp ground. Since they could start growing, one who tossed them would be guilty of planting on Shabbat. However, one may throw seeds somewhere they probably will not grow. Therefore, one may throw seeds in a place where people walk regularly, or in front of animals who will eat them within a day or two (SA 336:4).

One may not open or close the windows or doors of a greenhouse in order to encourage the growth of the plants inside. However, if there is a houseplant in the room, one may still open the shades and the windows for one’s own sake, even though the sunlight and air that enter will indirectly help the potted plant grow. Since he did not open the shades and windows for this purpose, and the benefit to the plant is remote, it is not prohibited (as it is a psik reisha in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition, since the melakha is done both with a shinui and via grama; Har Tzvi, OĤ §133 and Yeĥaveh Da’at 5:29).

04. Irrigation

One may not water plants, as it helps them grow and thus constitutes Zore’a. However, one may open irrigation pipes or turn on sprinklers before Shabbat even if they will water plants during Shabbat. Similarly, one may program a computer before Shabbat to activate sprinklers on Shabbat, as on Shabbat no action will be done by a Jew. One who opened irrigation pipes before Shabbat may close them on Shabbat, as this involves no melakha (see above 2:9).

One who eats in a yard must be careful not to wash his hands over plants or their roots (SA 336:3). If the plants are small and their roots are short, the prohibition applies only in the immediate vicinity of the plants, but if the plants are large, the prohibition applies to the entire garden bed around them.

One may pour water on the ground if there are no plants or roots nearby. Even though it is possible that eventually the water will reach roots or that wild flowers will subsequently grow there, this is not prohibited since one does not intend this to happen (Kaf Ha-ĥayim 336:27).

One may not pour water on his own soil if it is suitable for planting. Since this softens the ground, preparing it for planting, it is considered Ĥoresh (MB 336:26; SHT ad loc. 18).

05. Using a Sink Whose Water Drains into the Yard

If a sink’s drainpipe empties onto soil where plants grow, it may not be used on Shabbat by anyone who has an interest in the plants being watered. It goes without saying that one may not use this sink on Shabbat if it was intentionally set up to water the plants.

Nevertheless, many poskim maintain that one who does not care about watering the plants may use such a sink on Shabbat – for example, if the plants do not belong to him and he has no interest in their growth. In a time of need, one may rely on these poskim. To be sure, one who pours water directly onto plants violates a prohibition, even if he does not intend to water them, because he is helping them grow. In contrast, here the water is poured indirectly and is therefore a case of grama and permitted (SSK 12:19). If the water from the sink reaches plants that have already been adequately watered, whether through heavy rains or water that drained from the sink before Shabbat, then even one who is interested in the plants growing may use the sink on Shabbat, since he is not helping them at all.

Rain sometimes falls on Sukkot, and in order to prevent one’s sukka from getting wet one might extend a sliding roof over it. When the rain stops, he will want to retract the roof, but he knows that if he does so, water that accumulated on the rooftop will spill onto the nearby plants. May he retract the roof anyway on Shabbat and Yom Tov? It depends: If the rain was hard enough and long enough to saturate the ground, one may retract the roof, because the extra water serves no purpose. However, if there was only a little rain, the roof may not be retracted, because this will water the plants and violate Zore’a.^[5]

06. Kotzer

Kotzer refers to cutting something off from its source of growth, and it includes harvesting grain, picking grapes, dates, olives, or figs, and pulling off any other fruit or branch from a tree. Cutting down trees to use for heating or building is included in this prohibition as well. It is also forbidden to pull grass out of a crevice in a wall or to remove fungi from bucket handles (Shabbat 73b and 107b). Taking an avocado pit or a branch out of water is forbidden as well, if it has started growing roots.

According to Torah law, there is no prohibition on picking fruits, branches, or leaves from a tree that has completely dried out. Since the tree is not absorbing nourishment from the soil, one who pulls off a part of it is not detaching it from the source of its growth. However, since this resembles harvesting, the Sages forbade it. (See SA 336:12.)

In contrast, if a branch was cut off a tree before Shabbat, since it is clear that the branch has already been detached from its source of nourishment, the prohibition of Kotzer no longer applies to it, and one may pull off its fruits on Shabbat. If it is a fragrant branch, one may pick twigs or leaves from it in order to smell them (Rema 336:8).

07. Using a Tree

As a precaution, the Sages prohibited using a tree on Shabbat, out of concern that one may end up breaking off a branch or leaf. Therefore, one may not climb or lean against a tree^[6] and may not place items on trees or remove items from them. If the wind blows an item of clothing into a tree on Shabbat, one may not remove it. Similarly, one may not recover a ball that fell into a tree nor shake the tree so that the ball will fall out (SA 336:1; MB ad loc. 3). One should take care not to place things on a tree before Shabbat if they will be needed on Shabbat (MB 336:12). However, one may touch a tree if he is not using or moving it (Rema 336:13).

Not only is using a tree prohibited, it is also prohibited to use items resting directly on a tree. For example, one may not use a swing that is attached to a tree, even if only one side is attached. One may not remove an item of clothing from a clothesline that is tied to a tree. Similarly, one may not climb a ladder that is resting against a tree, and one may not remove things from a basket hanging from a tree.

However, if a peg was driven into a tree and a swing was hung from the peg, one may use the swing. This is because only the peg is considered resting on the tree, while the swing is resting on the peg. Since the swing is two steps removed from the tree, this was not included in the rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, one may remove an item of clothing from a clothesline that is tied to a peg stuck into a tree, because the clothesline is two steps removed from the tree. If before Shabbat one rested a ladder against a peg embedded in a tree, one may climb the ladder on Shabbat, because the ladder is two steps removed from the tree. If before Shabbat items were placed in a basket hanging from a hook stuck in a tree, one may put items into it and remove them on Shabbat, because this too is two steps removed from the tree. However, on Shabbat one may not rest the ladder against the peg or hang the basket on the hook, because that would be making use of an item resting directly on a tree (SA 336:13; MB ad loc. 63).

Regarding the roots of an old tree that protrude above the ground, if they protrude less than three tefaĥim from the ground (about 23 cm), then they are considered equivalent to the ground, and one may sit upon them. However, if the roots protrude above this height, they are considered equivalent to a tree, and one may not sit upon them (SA 336:2).

08. Additional Laws

The Sages’ enactment against using trees applies to shrubs and vines that have hard branches or yield hard fruit, like pumpkins. However, the enactment does not include soft weeds, bushes, or branches. Therefore, one may sit on a lawn on Shabbat, even if it moves the grass slightly.

One may not smell an edible fruit while it is attached to its tree, lest one end up plucking the fruit in order to eat it. However, one may smell fragrant flowers where they grow. This is because he has no reason to pick them, as they can be smelled while still attached to the ground. If tree branches themselves are fragrant, one may not grasp them and move them closer to smell them, because one may not move them, just as one may not move a tree. If the branches are soft and pliant, as are myrtle branches, one may grasp them and move them closer to smell them. One must, of course, be careful not to pluck the branches.^[7]

One may walk on a lawn even though walking on it may uproot some grass. This is because he does not intend to do this, and it is not necessarily going to happen. But if the grass is high and it is certain that walking on it will cause some of it to be torn up, one may not walk on it (SA 336:3; BHL ad loc.).

Not only did the Sages prohibit using a tree, they also prohibited riding on an animal, lest the rider break a branch to use as a riding crop to direct the animal. The Sages also prohibited extracting honey from honeycombs, because this resembles picking produce (SA 321:13).

One may bring his animals to a grassy area so that they may graze. This is not considered Kotzer because the animals are eating for themselves. We are not commanded to ensure that animals keep Shabbat; we simply must ensure that they do not perform melakhot on our behalf (Shabbat 122a; SA 324:13).

09. Flowers and Branches in a Vase

Flowers, branches, or stems that were picked before Shabbat for their beauty or fragrance, are not muktzeh on Shabbat. Therefore, a vase containing branches that are used for their beauty or fragrance may be moved. Similarly, they may be removed from the water for viewing or smelling. There is no problem of Kotzer, since there are no roots. One may also return stems to the water if they do not have flowers, or if they have fully-developed flowers. There is no problem of Zore’a, since the water will not cause any further growth but will only preserve their freshness so they do not wither.

However, one may not place in water any stems with flowers that are budding or that have not yet fully opened, because placing them in the water causes further growth. Nevertheless, one may remove them from the water. This is not considered Kotzer, because they have not put down roots in the water. Once removed, though, one may not replace them. Therefore, if one receives a bouquet of flowers as a gift on Shabbat and it contains flowers that have not yet fully opened, one may not place them in water, as this will cause the flowers to grow and open. Rather, one should put the bouquet in a vase that does not contain water.^[8]

10. A Flowerpot

Just as one may not break off a branch or leaf from a plant growing in soil, so too one may not break off anything from a potted plant. If the flowerpot has holes in the bottom, it is considered connected to the ground. Thus one who plucks anything from it transgresses Kotzer by Torah law. If the flower pot does not have holes in the bottom, it is not considered connected to the ground, as this is not the way plants normally grow. Thus one who plucks anything from it transgresses only rabbinically (SA 336:7; MB ad loc. 42). Similarly, one may not water potted plants (MB 336:41; see n. 4 above).

One may not move a potted plant from its place on Shabbat, because it is muktzeh. It is considered a kli she-melakhto le-isur (see ch. 23) since watering its contents or picking them is prohibited. However, one may move it if he needs the space it occupies (below 23:8). If the potted plant is frequently moved from place to place for aesthetic reasons or so that it can be smelled, it is not muktzeh, since its primary use is a permissible one.

Sometimes moving a potted plant is prohibited on account of Zore’a or Kotzer. For example, if the flowerpot has a hole in the bottom the size of a small root and it is resting on the ground, the hole allows the plant to draw sustenance from the ground, and thus it is considered connected to the ground. Thus, one may not move the pot from the ground and place it on a hard plastic surface, because that would violate Kotzer. Conversely, if the plant is on a hard plastic saucer, it may not be moved from there and placed on the ground, because that would violate Zore’a. Thus, if one needs to move the flower pot to use the space it is occupying, he must be careful to move it together with the saucer underneath it.^[9]

If a flower pot tipped over and some of its dirt spilled out, one may not put the dirt back in the pot, because doing so helps the plant grow and thus transgresses both Ĥoresh and Zore’a. Additionally, soil is muktzeh and may not be moved. Even if no dirt spilled, but the flowerpot’s fall exposed the roots of the plant and they will be covered back up if the plant is restored to a standing state, one may not do so even using one’s foot (such that muktzeh is not an issue), because covering the roots violates both Ĥoresh and Zore’a. (One may open a window in a room containing a plant, as explained above at the end of section 3.)

11. Me’amer

Me’amer refers to gathering harvested grain into sheaves or piles. Similarly, one who gathers picked fruit and places them in boxes or piles transgresses Me’amer, as does one who gathers cut branches or reeds to use as fuel.

This melakha, as a rule, relates to objects that grow in the ground and are still located in the area where they grew. This is because the harvest is generally gathered where it grows. However, some types of produce are gathered in two stages. For such produce, both stages are prohibited by Torah law, even if the second stage does not take place in the field. This is the case, for example, when producing a pressed fig cake. The first stage in this process involves gathering figs from the field, which is prohibited on Shabbat on account of Me’amer. The second stage involves pressing them together to produce a cake. Doing this even at home is prohibited by Torah law as a tolada of Me’amer, since this is the standard way to form these cakes (SA 340:10; MB ad loc. 38; see Menuĥat Ahava 2:5:2).

Gathering fruit scattered in a yard is not prohibited by Torah law, because they are not located where they grew, yet the Sages nevertheless prohibited gathering them because it resembles a weekday activity. However, one may collect a few pieces of fruit and eat them. If the fruit fell in one place and did not scatter very much, one may collect them and put them in a basket. If they fell into gravel or dirt, even if they are all in one place, one may not gather them and place them in a basket, because doing so resembles Borer. However, one may pick them up one at a time and eat them (SA 335:5).

One may collect fruit that is scattered inside one’s home, because gathering items inside does not resemble Me’amer (MB 340:37).^[10]

Although according to Torah law, Me’amer applies only to things that grow in the ground, the Sages forbade collecting salt from salt mines. Since this salt looks like it grows from the ground, collecting it resembles Me’amer (SA 340:9). Based on this, several Aĥaronim rule that one may not gather eggs that were laid before Shabbat (Ketzot Ha-shulĥan; however, Shevet Ha-Levi 4:39 is lenient). Eggs that were laid on Shabbat are muktzeh, and therefore one may not pick up even one egg.

Me’amer does not apply to items that have undergone major transformations. Thus, one may gather cooked fruits together. Similarly, gathering clothing made from natural fibers is not a problem, since they have been transformed from their original state (AHS 340:3).

01. Rest for Animals

Just as a Jew is commanded to rest on Shabbat, so too, he is commanded to allow his animals to rest. There are two commandments that address this issue, one positive (aseh), as the Torah states (Shemot 23:12): “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease, so that your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the stranger may be refreshed.” And one negative (lo ta’aseh), as the Torah states (Shemot 20:10): “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter, your male or female slave, or your beast, or the stranger who is within your settlements.” The mitzva of allowing animals to rest is not one of the 39 melakhot but a mitzva in its own right; its violation is not punishable by death or lashes (Shabbat 154a; MT 20:1-2).

Even though the Torah in those verses mentions beasts, oxen, and donkeys, the prohibition applies to all animals, including birds and fish (MB 305:1). Therefore, one may not release carrier pigeons on Shabbat, and one may not use trained dolphins to pull a boat. The Torah specifies the ox and the donkey because they are the beasts of burden most commonly used for plowing and carrying heavy loads.

One who causes an animal carrying a load to move from one place to another on Shabbat, whether by striking, pulling, or ordering it, transgresses Torah law. This prohibition is referred to as Meĥamer. Even if the animal belongs to a non-Jew or is ownerless, one may not cause it to walk with a burden. If one causes his own animal to do so, then in addition to transgressing the lo ta’aseh against doing work, he has also violated the aseh of allowing animals to rest (SA 266:1-2; MB ad loc. 7-8). The latter commandment applies on Yom Kippur as well (there is disagreement about whether it applies on Yom Tov; see MB 246:19).

A Jew may not rent his animal to a non-Jew who will use it to do work like plowing or carrying burdens in the public domain on Shabbat. If a Jew rents out an animal with the understanding that it will be returned before Shabbat, but it is not, he should declare the animal ownerless before Shabbat to avoid violating Torah law (SA 246:3). If a Jew and a non-Jew are co-owners of an animal, the Jew may not permit the non-Jew to work the animal on Shabbat. However, if when they first bought the animal they specified that the non-Jew would be the sole owner on Shabbat, while the Jew would be the sole owner on a different day of the week, then the non-Jew may work the animal on Shabbat, because on Shabbat it is his alone (SA 246:5).

A Jew may allow a non-Jew to ride his horse or other animal on Shabbat, in accordance with the principle that “a living being carries itself” (he-ĥai nosei et atzmo). Therefore, the non-Jew who rides the animal is not considered a burden (nor are the clothes he wears, as they are secondary to his body). However, the Sages enacted that a Jew may not use an animal at all. He may not lean on it, place an object on it, or sit in a wagon hitched to it, even if a non-Jew is driving the wagon for his own purposes (SA 305:18). The reason for this enactment is to avoid burdening the animal on Shabbat (y. Beitza 5:2). Another reason is that while riding an animal, one may come to break off a tree branch in order to goad the animal, thus transgressing Kotzer (Beitza 36b).

A Jew may not take another Jew’s animal outside of teĥum Shabbat. This teĥum is based on the teĥum of the animal’s owner (see below, 30:3). If the owner entrusted the animal to a shepherd, whether Jew or non-Jew, the teĥum is based on that of the shepherd (SA 397:3-5). The prohibition is only for the animal to leave the teĥum at the initiative of its owner; it is not prohibited for the animal to leave of its own volition or for a non-Jewish shepherd to take it outside the teĥum (Rema 305:23; MB ad loc. 79).

02. Animals and Carrying

As we have seen, one must allow animals to rest on Shabbat. This includes making sure that one’s animal does not enter a semipublic (karmelit) or public domain with a burden on its back. However, not everything an animal carries is defined as a burden. Just as one may enter a different domain wearing his clothes because they are secondary to his body, so too a donkey suffering from the cold may be taken outside wearing a pack saddle that is meant to warm it. Other animals, though, which do not suffer from the cold, may not be taken outside with a saddle (SA 305:7). Similarly, a dog that is wrapped in an article of clothing may not be taken outside. Since it does not truly need this, the clothing is considered a burden. If one is not taking the dog outside, one may dress it, as there is no prohibition to carry in a private domain.

One may take out an animal that is wearing a bandage to protect an injury or a sheep that is wearing a cover designed to keep its wool from getting dirty. This is on condition that they are tightly bound to the animal, with no possibility that they will fall off, thus ensuring that no one will end up carrying them in a semipublic or public domain (SA 305:6). One may not take out an animal with a muzzle that is meant to prevent the animal from grazing in other people’s fields. This is because the muzzle is not worn for the animal’s sake, but for the sake of the fields’ owners (SA 305:11).

One may not lead an animal with a bell around its neck, as doing so generates sound, and it is rabbinically prohibited to generate sound with an object specifically designed for this purpose, such as a musical instrument. However, if the bell is silenced and makes no sound, the animal may be led around in a private domain but not a public domain. If the animal were to be led around in a public domain, it would seem like it was being taken to market for sale (Shabbat 53a and 54b; MB 305:42-43). The bell itself is not considered a burden as it is secondary to the animal’s halter.

One may take out a horse wearing a bridle or a donkey wearing a halter since these items are used to direct the animals and to prevent them from running away. However, a donkey may not be taken out wearing a bridle, as this would be an excessive precaution, far more than is necessary to ensure that the donkey will not run away. The general principle is that anything normally used to ensure that an animal will not run away is not considered a burden, but anything excessive is considered a burden (SA 305:1; MB ad loc. 8).

A dog may be allowed out in a public domain wearing its collar, because that is the normal way for it to go out since it allows one to restrain the dog if necessary by grabbing its collar or attaching a leash to it (SA 305:5; MB ad loc. 12). The person holding the leash is not considered carrying the leash, since it is secondary to the dog’s body. However, he must take care to grasp the leash within a tefaĥ of its end. He also must make sure that the leash does not droop to within a tefaĥ of the ground at any point. If either of these things happens, it looks like he is carrying the leash. If the leash is too long, he may wrap it around the dog’s neck so it is less likely to droop (SA 305:16).

A blind person may enter a public domain with a seeing-eye dog, even though he is holding the harness attached to the dog. Since the harness is always attached to the dog, it is secondary to its body, and there is no problem of carrying. (Although Orĥot Shabbat 31:17 is stringent, it seems reasonable to permit, as explained in Harĥavot; this is also the position of Mikveh Ha-mayim 4:39; Menuĥat Ahava 3:27:49; and Yalkut Yosef 305:59.)

A dog may be taken out into a public domain wearing dog tags connected to its collar or ear and on which is engraved the name of the dog’s owner. The tags make it clear that the dog has an owner, and thus people are more likely to leave it alone.^[1]

03. Feeding Animals

An animal may be led to graze in a grassy area, and it does not constitute Kotzer since the animal is eating for its own sake. We are not commanded to make sure that animals keep Shabbat, only that they do not labor for our benefit (Shabbat 122:1; SA 324:13).

One may provide food and water to animals in his possession that depend on him, like cows, chickens, and cats. Food and water may also be provided to animals belonging to another Jew. However, one may not feed or water self-sufficient animals like bees and doves. Even though feeding them is not a melakha, the Sages prohibited it because it is seen as requiring excessive effort (SA 324:11; BHL s.v. “ve-yonei”).

One may put food out for hungry animals like stray dogs and cats. As we know, God shows mercy to all His creatures, as it is written: “His mercy is upon all His works” (Tehilim 145:9). It is proper to emulate His ways (AHS 324:2-3; see MB ad loc. 31).

Animals are muktzeh. Therefore, they may not be picked up, nor may their limbs be lifted up. However, when it is necessary for their well-being (for example, in order to get them to their food), one may take hold of them and move their limbs to prevent them from suffering (tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim), as long as one does not lift them off the ground (SA 308:39-40; MB ad loc. 151).

If animals have difficulty eating unless the food is placed directly in their mouths, one may feed them in this way as long as he does not force-feed them. Force-feeding refers to shoving the food so far down their throats that they are unable to spit it up. This requires excessive effort (Shabbat 155b; SA 324:9-10).

One may ask a non-Jew to feed geese that have been force-fed for so long that they are unable to eat otherwise and would suffer hunger and pain if they were not fed on Shabbat. In such a case, one may ask a non-Jew to feed them one time on Shabbat. If there is no non-Jew available, the poskim disagree whether a Jew may feed them to minimize their suffering (MB 324:27). It is better not to force-feed geese at all, as doing so causes them pain and entails multiple prohibitions (see BHL ad loc.; SSK 27:26).

One may cut up food for animals if they would not be able to readily eat it otherwise. This includes cutting up pumpkins that are fed to animals and tough carcasses that are fed to dogs and that they have trouble eating. However, one may not cut up any food for them that they could eat by themselves. Even if cutting makes it easier for them to eat, it is excessive effort and thus forbidden on Shabbat (SA 324:3-8).

04. Milking on Shabbat

Torah law forbids milking a cow or any other animal on Shabbat, as doing so separates the milk from the cow’s body and constitutes Mefarek (separating something from its source), a tolada of Dash. Just as one may not separate grain from its husk, so too, one may not separate milk from its source (Shabbat 95a).

The problem is that if a dairy cow, which produces great quantities of milk, is not milked on Shabbat, it suffers greatly. Therefore, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to milk a cow on Shabbat. Even though, generally speaking, it is rabbinically prohibited to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for us on Shabbat, here they suspended the prohibition in order to avoid tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim. It is true that this milk is muktzeh on Shabbat. However, after Shabbat a Jew may drink or sell it (SA 305:20).

If there is no non-Jew available, a Jew may milk the cow, as long as the milk goes to waste. For example, it may be milked directly onto the ground, or into a bucket that contains an agent that will ruin the milk. This is because milking to make use of the milk is prohibited by Torah law, whereas milking for another reason, in which the milk goes to waste, is only rabbinically prohibited. A Torah prohibition may not be transgressed in order to prevent animals’ suffering, but the Sages suspended their own enactment.^[2]

Nowadays, dairy farming has been modernized, and milking is automated. A cup is placed on the teat and connected to a pump via a tube. If there is a non-Jew available, one may ask him to turn on the machine and place the cups on the cow on Shabbat, because otherwise the cows would suffer. If no non-Jew is available, common practice is for a Jew to use a timer or a delay mechanism that is set before Shabbat to turn on the machine. On Shabbat, before the machine turns on, the cups are attached to the cow’s teats, and then the machine turns on and automatically pumps out the milk. Thus, the Jew has not performed any melakha directly, for when he attached the cups, the machine was not on. Even though placing the cups on the teats causes a melakha to take place, this is not prohibited by Torah law. The Torah only forbids direct action, as it states: “You shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:10). The Sages forbade indirectly causing a melakha to be performed. Here, to prevent the cows from becoming painfully engorged, the Sages permitted acting via grama. After Shabbat, a Jew may benefit from this milk.

If the cups must be attached to the teats while the machine is operating, then doing so in order to save the milk violates Torah law. Therefore, the milk should spill directly onto the ground, making the action rabbinically prohibited and thus permissible to prevent tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim (SSK 27:50; for the laws relevant to a woman who is engorged, see above 11:17).

05. Carrying Pets and Sick Animals

As we will see later on (23:5), anything that has no practical use on Shabbat is muktzeh and may not be carried. Animals are included in this category and thus may not be carried on Shabbat. If, in order to prevent them from being hurt, it is necessary to move them, the Sages permitted pulling them but not picking them up (SA 308:39-40). At first glance, this would seem to pertain to house pets like cats and dogs, and indeed, this is the position of Yalkut Yosef (vol. 2, p. 383) and Orĥot Shabbat (19:124). However, it seems more reasonable to assume that muktzeh pertains only to animals with which one does not normally play. Pets whose owners play with them and pick them up all week long would not be muktzeh, and their owners may thus touch them and pick them up on Shabbat. Similarly, seeing-eye dogs are not muktzeh (Igrot Moshe, OĤ 5:22:21; Shulĥan Shlomo 308:74). Although some are stringent, muktzeh is a rabbinic prohibition so the halakha follows those who are lenient.^[3]

A fish that jumped out of an aquarium and will presumably stay alive if it is returned may be put back even though it is muktzeh. This is because, when necessary, and when there is no other solution, one may move a muktzeh object to prevent tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim. Even though some are stringent in this case, one may rely on the lenient approach (See SA 305:19; MB ad loc. 70; SSK 27:28).

If a fish in an aquarium dies, and it is possible that if it is left in the aquarium other fish will catch whatever terminal disease it had, then even though the dead fish is muktzeh, it may be removed from the tank to save the remaining fish. If there is a dog or cat in the vicinity, the fish should be fed to them (see SSK 27:29).

06. The Melakha of Tzad

Trapping animals was one of the melakhot performed for the Mishkan. They would trap teĥashim to make curtains from their skins and the ĥilazon to produce tekhelet to dye the curtains (Shabbat 73a; Rashi ad loc.; Shabbat 75a).

The Torah prohibition of Tzad is limited to those animals – beasts, birds, or fish – that are normally trapped or hunted for a purpose, whether to eat their meat, use their skins, or enjoy their beauty (as is the case with parrots). In contrast, one who traps species that are not normally hunted, such as flies and other insects, violates rabbinic law (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:3).

The prohibition of Tzad does not apply to tame animals that do not run away from their owners, such as cows, donkeys, and dogs. Since in any case they stay with their owners, there is no such thing as trapping them (Rema 316:12; MB ad loc. 59). Nevertheless, carrying these animals is prohibited, as they are muktzeh. When necessary they may be grabbed and dragged into their pen or kennel, as long as they are not picked up (SA 308:40; see section 3 above).

If an animal is partially tame in that it runs away when a human tries to grab it but returns to its cage at night, its trapping is rabbinically prohibited (Rema 316:12: MB ad loc. 57, 59). When necessary, in order to avoid monetary loss or tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim, one may rely on those who are lenient and trap a partially tame animal. (See SA ad loc.; SSK 27:36.)

The Torah prohibition refers to completely trapping an animal; that is, holding it in hand, with ropes, or in a cage such that one can do with it as he pleases. Similarly, one who shepherds an animal into an area small enough that he can chase and catch it in one motion, he violates Torah law. In contrast, if one herds an animal into a large area where he would still need to chase it down in order to capture it, he does not violate Torah law, as the animal is not well and truly trapped. However, this is rabbinically prohibited, because the animal can now be more easily trapped. If he subsequently captures it, even though doing so is easier than usual, he is still violates Torah law, as this is the Tzad that the Torah forbids (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:1).

Hunting with the aid of a dog is forbidden. However, if one commands the dog with his voice and does not actually touch it, the prohibition is rabbinic. If he takes any action to help with the capture, he violates Torah law (Rema 316:2; MB ad loc. 10).

A mouse trap may be put out on Friday, since no action is taken on Shabbat. However, it is rabbinically prohibited to put out a trap on Shabbat. This is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is not certain that the trap will succeed in catching anything (MB 316:18).

An animal may be freed from a trap on Shabbat. While there is a prohibition to trap an animal, there is no prohibition to free an animal from a trap on Shabbat (MB 316:25).

One who wishes to feed a caged animal or bird whose nature is to try to escape must take care not to open the cage even briefly. If he mistakenly opened the cage, then if the cage is so small that confining the animal or bird to it would be considered Tzad by Torah law, then the cage may not be closed even be-di’avad. If the cage is large enough that confining the animal or bird to it would only be rabbinically prohibited, be-di’avad one may close it, since the animal or bird was inside when Shabbat began (Pri Megadim; BHL 316:6 s.v. “ve-halakh”).

07. Unintentional Trapping

Just as one may not chase an animal in order to trap it, so too one may not exploit the opportunity to catch an animal that got stuck in a confined space. Therefore, if a deer enters a house, the door may not be closed behind it. If a bird flies in through a window, the window may not be shut behind it (Shabbat 106b; SA 316:5). If one wishes to close the door or window in order to protect against thieves or the cold, the animal must first be chased out of the house.

If the household members are having trouble chasing out the animal or bird because it is hiding and eluding pursuit, if necessary the door or window may be closed. This is because the person doing so does not intend to trap the animal or bird, but only to protect the house from thieves or the cold. Besides, even after the door or window is closed, the animal is not truly trapped, because capturing it is still an effort.

Similarly, if a window screen has flies on it, and one wishes to close the window beyond it in order to prevent the heat or cold from entering, he must first chase away the flies so that they are not trapped between the window and the screen. If it is difficult to do so, the window may be closed even while they are still there, since one does not intend to trap the flies, only to protect against the heat or cold. Besides, the flies are not truly trapped; even if he wants to catch them, he would have to make an effort to do so.

Similarly, one who wants to close a small box that has flies in it should chase them away before closing it. If it is difficult to chase them all away, he should leave something between the cover and the box in order to create an escape hatch for the flies. If necessary, the box may be closed even though a fly will be trapped inside it, since his intention is not to trap the fly, but only to close the box. Besides, the fly is not truly trapped; even if he wants to catch it, when he opens the box it may very well escape.^[4]

08. Slaughtering (Shoĥet)

Shoĥet refers to the melakha of taking the life of a living being. For the Mishkan, they slaughtered teĥashim and goats in order to use their skins for the curtains (Shabbat 73a, 75a).

It is not only slaughtering that is prohibited. Rather, killing a living being in any fashion is forbidden by Torah law. It does not matter whether death is brought about by striking, strangling, or any other method. One who kills a tiny ant violates Torah law, as does one who removes a fish from water, since this kills the fish. Similarly, one who reaches his hand into an animal’s womb and aborts its fetus on Shabbat violates Torah law (Shabbat 107b).

The Torah prohibition applies when the animal is killed for its corpse, i.e., to make use of its meat, skin, or blood. In contrast, one who kills destructively, such as stamping on ants because he wants them dead, transgresses rabbinically.

If one is walking and comes across ants, he should jump over them in order to avoid killing them and violating a rabbinic prohibition. If there is a colony of ants in his path and it is impossible to step there without killing ants, he should walk around them. If he is in a place where he cannot pass without walking on them, he may continue walking, since he does not intend to kill them. It is preferable that he walk on the sides of his feet and do his best to avoid killing ants.

Similarly, if there are insects in a toilet and there is a reasonable chance that flushing the toilet will kill them, it is preferable, when possible, to wait until they fly or crawl away. However, if they do not emerge, or if one must flush for the sake of human dignity, he may do so.

If ants are in a sink and can be blown out of the way, that is best. If it is difficult to do so, dishes or hands may still be washed, even though this will probably drown the ants. Since the one washing is not interested in killing them, and he needs the water, it is not prohibited.^[5]

09. Wounding (Ĥovel)

Just as it is prohibited by Torah law to kill any living being, it is also prohibited by Torah law to cause a loss of blood. After all, “blood is life” (Devarim 12:23). Additionally, with the release of a little blood, there is a localized loss of life. This prohibition applies even when the blood does not exit the body, but simply hemorrhages from blood vessels and accumulates under the skin. This too is viewed as a localized loss of life (SA 316:8; BHL s.v. “ve-haĥovel).^[6]

Accordingly, if one strikes another person on Shabbat with intent to injure and causes a hemorrhage or hematoma, he is not only guilty of an interpersonal transgression but also desecrates Shabbat. This is also true of one who angrily strikes an animal and causes a hemorrhage or hematoma. In addition to violating tza’ar ba’alei ĥayim, he transgresses the prohibition of Ĥovel.

One may not do a blood test on Shabbat. Since the goal is to use the blood, taking it is prohibited by Torah law. In cases of danger to life, of course, it is permitted. It is also forbidden to scratch or pick at a scab if doing so will cause it to bleed, or to brush one’s teeth in a way that will cause the gums to bleed (as explained in 14:2).

A Jew may administer a shot to one who is ill, even if not dangerously so, as long as the injection is into flesh, since this will not necessarily cause the sick person to bleed. In contrast, if the shot or infusion is done into a vein, it is prohibited for a Jew to administer it to one who is not dangerously ill, since there will definitely be at least a little blood. However, a non-Jew may be asked to give this injection. If the sick person is dangerously ill, even a Jew may give the injection (below 28:7).

10. Trapping and Killing Snakes, Scorpions, Mosquitoes, and Other Pests

Danger to life overrides Shabbat. Therefore, animals likely to endanger human life may be killed even on Shabbat, like poisonous snakes and scorpions. Even if one is unsure whether a particular animal is poisonous, he may kill it. Similarly, a dangerous dog or rabid animal may be killed.

It is prohibited on Shabbat to kill animals whose bites hurt a great deal but are not life-threatening. This applies to snakes and scorpions that are definitely not poisonous. It is only forbidden to kill them the way one would kill them during the week, so one may kill them in the course of walking; one walks in their direction and in the course of walking steps on them and kills them. The reason for this dispensation is that killing an animal in a destructive manner, when one does not have any use for the cadaver, is only prohibited rabbinically. Thus, in order to avoid great suffering, the Sages permitted killing such animals in the course of walking. However, it is prohibited to kill them directly, out of concern that people will conclude that one may kill animals even when there is no concern that they will cause harm. If such animals are chasing a person, they may be killed even without a shinui.

Even if they are not chasing anyone, a receptacle may be placed over them in order to neutralize the threat. This does not need to be done with a shinui, because the person’s goal is not to trap them, only to prevent them from stinging or biting (SA 316:7; MB ad loc. 27).

Animals whose stings are not so painful, such as mosquitoes and fleas, may not be killed in any manner on Shabbat. If the mosquito or flea is clinging to one’s skin and cannot be removed without being grabbed, the Sages permitted grabbing it in order to remove it. This is on condition that he not kill it or even squeeze it, which might kill it. Even though grabbing an animal without intending to use it is rabbinically prohibited, the Sages were lenient here since the goal is to avoid suffering (SA 316:9). If one wishes to grab a flea and remove it from under his clothing rather than from his skin need not be dissuaded from doing so (MB 316:37; SHT ad loc. 63).

If there are mosquitoes or other pests in a room, one may spray insecticide to repel them as long as he does not spray the bugs directly and leaves open a window through which they can escape. This way he will not necessarily kill any of them. However, one may not spray them directly or to spray in a place where they have no means of escape, because then he will definitely kill them and transgress a prohibition (Yabi’a Omer 3:20; see SSK 25:6).

One may apply liquid mosquito repellent on Shabbat, but not an ointment (see above, 14:5).

One may place tablets into a plug-in device that contains a heating element that causes the tablets to heat up and release a mosquito-repellent vapor. It is proper to place the tablets at a short distance from the heating element so that they do not reach the temperature of yad soledet bo, which might present a problem of Bishul (Ha-ĥashmal Ba-halakha vol. 2, p. 364; above 10:4). However, if one is uncertain whether the tablets will reach yad soledet bo, he may place them.

01. The Melakha of Hotza’ah

The melakha of Hotza’ah consists of transporting an object from a private domain (reshut ha-yaĥid) to a public domain (reshut ha-rabim) or vice versa, or transporting an object more than four amot in a public domain.

During the six weekdays, man’s role is to perform melakhot in order to improve and develop the world; to craft tools and instruments, build houses, and cultivate crops for food and textiles. The highest purpose of each and every melakha is to build the Mishkan and Mikdash, in which God’s presence can dwell. Despite the tremendous value of work, the Torah commands us to refrain from all melakha on Shabbat in order to explore the foundations of faith and to study Torah. In this way, the work that we do all week long is imbued with deeper significance. It has the power to bring the world closer to perfection and establish within it a Mikdash for the Lord, God of Israel.

The novelty of Hotza’ah is that an act that does not physically alter an object can still be considered a melakha. Even changing its location in some substantive way is considered a melakha. Location is thus of paramount importance. There is nothing in the world that does not have a location, a place. When an item is in its place, it has a purpose; when it is not, it is unimportant. For example, in a place with no water, water is very valuable, while in a place with plenty of water, its value declines. Furthermore, nothing can exist without a place to be. This explains why God is referred to as Makom (Place) – because He ensures the world’s continued existence and provides a place for it to be. When the Sages discussed each type of place, they used the word “reshut” (property, authority, domain), since every object exists by the authority of the place where it rests.

We find in the Torah that the donations for the Mishkan were collected from each individual’s private domain (reshut ha-yaĥid) and were brought to the public domain (reshut ha-rabim) where the Mishkan was built. This was considered a melakha, as the verse states explicitly: “Moshe then ordered that the proclamation be made throughout the encampment: ‘Let no man or woman make further effort (melakha) on behalf of the donations for the sanctuary!’ And the people stopped bringing” (Shemot 36:6).

According to Torah law, there are three types of domains: a private domain (reshut ha-yaĥid), a public domain (reshut ha-rabim), and an exempt area (mekom petur). The Sages decreed that most places defined by Torah law as a mekom petur would have the status of a public domain. Such a rabbinically defined public domain is called a karmelit.

02. Private and Public Domains

A reshut ha-yaĥid is an area enclosed by walls, which render it a single place, and one may carry objects in this enclosed area. Even a large area surrounded by walls is considered one place, and there is no fundamental difference whether an object is located on its east or west side.

The classic example of a reshut ha-yaĥid is a house, though an area may be considered a reshut ha-yaĥid even without a roof. As long as it is enclosed by a barrier ten tefaĥim high (76 cm), it is a reshut ha-yaĥid. A pit that is ten tefaĥim deep is also considered a reshut ha-yaĥid, as is a rock or hill that is ten tefaĥim high. Even if there are no walls surrounding the rock or hill, the fact that they are raised ten tefaĥim from the ground puts them in the same category as something walled. We treat them as if they have walls that extend upward beyond the top of the rock or hill. To be defined as a reshut ha-yaĥid, an area must be at least four tefaĥim wide (about 30 cm). Lacking this width, the area is not significant enough to be deemed a reshut ha-yaĥid, only a mekom petur. It should be noted that a sharp incline is considered a wall as well.^[1]

A reshut ha-rabim is an area that serves public needs such as streets, squares, markets, and intercity roads. To qualify as a reshut ha-rabim, an area must be at least 16 amot wide, and unroofed. Some add an additional condition: every day it must be traversed by 600,000 people, equivalent to the number of Israelites during our ancestors’ travels in the desert, according to the Torah (see section 8 below). In principle, all prohibitions on carrying are connected to reshut ha-rabim. Formulated in the negative, there is no Torah prohibition on carrying where there is no reshut ha-rabim. Within a reshut ha-rabim, one may not carry an object more than four amot (see sections 3-4 below), and one may not transport an object from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim and vice versa.

03. Mekom Petur and Karmelit

The third type of domain is a mekom petur (an exempt area). According to Torah law, this includes fields, deserts, oceans, lakes, and other places not enclosed by walls (and thus not deemed reshut ha-yaĥid) and also not used by the masses on a regular basis (and thus are not deemed reshut ha-rabim). Since these are undefined places, they have no significance as a location. An object in a mekom petur is not located in a place that establishes a connection with it. Therefore, Torah law permits carrying an object from a mekom petur to a reshut ha-yaĥid or a reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa. Similarly, one may carry objects within a mekom petur for as long and far as he wishes.

However, since a mekom petur is in some ways similar to a reshut ha-rabim – as the masses may make use of both types of areas – the Sages safeguarded the Torah and declared that any open area that is not a reshut ha-yaĥid shall be called a karmelit and have a status akin to that of a reshut ha-rabim. Thus it is prohibited to carry an object more than four amot in a karmelit, and one may not carry anything from a karmelit to a reshut ha-yaĥid or reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa.

The only places that are still called a mekom petur are those that are not fit for significant use, such as rocks that are higher than three tefaĥim (about 23 cm) and also less than four tefaĥim wide (about 30 cm). One may carry something from a mekom petur into a reshut ha-yaĥid or reshut ha-rabim, and vice versa. Such a mekom petur was not included in the decree because it is fundamentally different from the other domains. Since it is over three tefaĥim high, it is distinct from the ground, and since it is less than four tefaĥim wide, it is not big enough to be significant. Therefore, no one will make the mistake of thinking that if one may carry in an insignificant mekom petur, one may also carry in a larger and more significant place.^[2]

04. The Reason Behind the Prohibition of Carrying Four Amot in a Reshut Ha-Rabim

As we have seen, one may not transport objects from one domain to another. Within a private domain, even in a large house with many rooms, one may move objects around freely, because the entire reshut ha-yaĥid is considered one domain. Moving items within it is not considered transporting them from one domain to another. In contrast, in a reshut ha-rabim, one may move an object within his four amot. Since a reshut ha-rabim is communal, each individual may make use of only the four amot he occupies. Four amot is enough space for one to lie down with arms and legs outstretched. If one moves an item outside his four amot, he has moved it from his space to the communal reshut ha-rabim. This is prohibited by Torah law.

From a spiritual perspective, it should be noted that all the confusion and corruption in the world stems from division and dissension. Nations fight one another, people compete with each other, and ideological movements struggle with one another. Thus, tremendous amounts of energy are wasted on strife and contention. Even an individual is often torn between his seemingly contradictory desires. The way to rectify these tensions is to reveal the unity underlying all existence. With belief that one God created the entire world, we can understand that all the different desires in the world are directed toward one goal. Only by following the Torah’s directions can we harmonize them, and thus improve and perfect the world. Now we can understand why the commandment to “Love your neighbor as yourself” is considered a major Torah principle: it bridges the world’s fissures and helps us reveal its fundamental unity.

We are now in a position to understand why objects may be carried in a reshut ha-yaĥid. In a sense, a reshut ha-yaĥid is a perfected place. The walls that enclose it give it a unity of purpose. Thus all its rooms and the areas within it are considered in one place, within which items may be carried. In contrast, a reshut ha-rabim has yet to be perfected. It still expresses the different interests of many different people, and the objects found within it are not yet considered in one place. This is why carrying anything more than four amot in a reshut ha-rabim is considered a melakha.

As for a karmelit, on the one hand it is not set aside for public use and does not obviously express different interests. Thus, according to Torah law it is the same as a mekom petur, and carrying in it is not prohibited. On the other hand, since a karmelit is used in a variety of ways by a variety of people, it has something in common with a reshut ha-rabim. Therefore, the Sages decided that a karmelit should be treated like a reshut ha-rabim, and carrying in it is prohibited.

If a reshut ha-rabim is enclosed by a wall or fence, and it has gates that are closed at night, its fundamental unity and common denominator is thus revealed, and it is perfected like a reshut ha-yaĥid. One may thus carry throughout. A karmelit can be perfected even without being enclosed by a fence or wall. A tzurat ha-petaĥ alone suffices to make it the equivalent of a reshut ha-yaĥid in which items may be carried (as explained below, 29:2).