11. Making an Item Unsuitable for Its Normal Usage on Shabbat

One may not cause an object to become unsuitable for its normal usage (levatel kli me-heikhano) on Shabbat. Doing so is akin to demolishing something (Soter) on Shabbat. Therefore, if oil is dripping from a lamp, one may not put a container underneath it to collect the oil. Since the lamp and its oil are muktzeh, the container will become forbidden to move, and thus it will no longer be fit for normal use on Shabbat. If one wants to ensure that the dripping oil does not make a mess, he should put something under it before Shabbat. Similarly, one may not put a container under a chicken in which it can lay its eggs. Since an egg laid on Shabbat is muktzeh, the container with an egg in it will become forbidden to move (Shabbat 42b; SA 310:6, 265:3).

However, there is a way around this problem. Before placing the receptacle beneath the lamp or the chicken, one may place an item that is more important than the oil or egg. One may then move the container for the sake of that non-muktzeh item (MB 265:6).

If one is worried about sparks flying from a lamp, he may put a kli underneath it to collect the sparks. Because sparks are insubstantial and go out almost immediately, the kli may subsequently be moved. It is not rendered unsuitable for its normal use. However, he should not put water into the kli, because that will extinguish the sparks more quickly (Shabbat 47b; SA 265:4).

Making pillows and blankets wet is forbidden, because doing so makes them unsuitable for their normal use (SA 305:19). It is also forbidden to make an item of clothing so dirty that it is no longer wearable without washing. If liquid spilled on the floor, one may not use clothing to mop it up; by doing so, one is making the clothing unfit to wear. However, one may use a rag to mop up the spill, since this is the intended use of the rag. It is also permissible for many people to dry their hands on a towel, even if it will eventually become too wet to use any longer. This is because they are not making it unusable; rather, they are using it for its intended purpose. Similarly, one may put a garbage bag into a garbage can on Shabbat and put garbage in it, even though doing so gives the bag the muktzeh status of the garbage inside it. This is not considered rendering it unusable, as holding garbage is the purpose of the garbage bag (Levush 265:3; Shulĥan Shlomo 308:17:7; Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 480; Orĥot Shabbat 2:19:329).

One may place a box in front of chicks as a step stool so that they can go back and forth from their coop. Even though animals are muktzeh, this is not considered making the box unusable, since he can shoo the chicks away from it whenever he wants. However, while they are on the box, he may not move it (Shabbat 128b; SA 308:39).

12. The Permissibility of Removing Filthy Items – “Graf Shel Re’i”

Even though a truly disgusting item – such as a graf shel re’i (a receptacle that contains excrement), a dead mouse, or food scraps – is muktzeh maĥmat gufo, the Sages permitted removing it for the sake of human dignity. They did not encumber this removal by requiring that it be done with a shinui or min ha-tzad. Rather, one may remove it directly. This is all on condition that the item is in a place where it is disturbing people. However, if it is in a place where it is not bothering anyone, it may not be moved (Beitza 36b; Shabbat 121b; SA 308:34).

The details of this law depend on how disgusting the item is and where it is located. Inside one’s home, even if an item is only slightly dirty – such as a pot with food remnants, a cup with a little wine left over, or an oil lamp covered in soot – as long as it causes discomfort, it is considered a graf shel re’i and may be removed. This is also the case in a yard if people are sitting nearby. However, if there are no people nearby, one may not remove it. If there is excrement in the street or in a yard where people walk, since it is truly repulsive, it may be removed even if no one is sitting nearby. However, if it is in a backyard that almost no one walks through, removing it is forbidden. If there is a dead animal giving off a horrible stench, then even if no one walks by it may be removed (MB 308:131; BHL 308:4 s.v. “keli”; Rema 279:2; MB ad loc. 5).

Even though shells and pits are muktzeh, one may clear them from the table with one’s hands and throw them in the garbage. This may even be done in two steps: first piling them on the side of the table, then collecting them to deposit in the trash (some say that this is the basis for permission to sweep on Shabbat; see n. 14 below).

One who is cracking seeds with his mouth may remove each shell from his mouth by hand and either throw it away or pile it on a plate and then dispose of it later. However, he should not keep them in his hands in order to throw them out later (SSK 20:26). Similarly, one may empty out the refuse that accumulates in a sink strainer.

A garbage can that has garbage in it is muktzeh. However, if it is unpleasant to have a full garbage can, it may be taken out (on condition that there is an eruv). If one lives somewhere that has a dumpster (as opposed to private garbage cans), the garbage pail may be emptied into the dumpster and then brought back inside (SSK 22:48).^[11]

13. Broken Kelim and Worn-Out Clothing

As we have seen (section 3), any item that is not suitable for Shabbat use is muktzeh maĥmat gufo. We must now clarify at what point an item is considered unusable and therefore muktzeh. As a rule, there are two factors that affect the status of such an object: its objective state, and the owner’s subjective attitude toward it. We will now explain.

If one threw out perfectly good clothes or kelim before Shabbat, they do not become muktzeh even though he is their owner. Since his personal attitude differs from that of most people, it is disregarded by halakha. Nevertheless, if before Shabbat he threw out used clothing and kelim, they become muktzeh even if some people would use such items. Since the owner threw them out, and they are used, they become muktzeh (SA 308:12; MB ad loc. 51; Rema 308:7). But if he threw them out on Shabbat, they do not become muktzeh. Since they were not muktzeh when Shabbat began (as they were still somewhat fit for use), they do not lose their status over the course of Shabbat (MB 308:32).

If a kli breaks on Shabbat and the broken parts are still usable, the parts are not muktzeh. The broken pieces are only muktzeh if there is no possibility of using them. Nevertheless, if there is a danger that people may be hurt by the broken pieces, one may even use his hands to clear them away. If a kli broke before Shabbat and the owner threw away the broken pieces, then even if they could be used on Shabbat, they are muktzeh (SA 308:6-7; MB ad loc. 48; SSK 20:42).

If one part of a kli fell off (whether on Shabbat or before Shabbat) but it can be reattached, then even though it is not usable over Shabbat, it is not muktzeh. Just as one may move the kli, one may move the part that broke off, because it is still considered part of the kli. Therefore, if a beaded necklace broke, since one intends to restring the beads, they are not muktzeh (on condition that there is no concern that a knot will be tied on Shabbat to hold the necklace together). Similarly, false teeth or crowns that fall out are not muktzeh, since one intends to put them back. A button that falls off an item of clothing is not muktzeh either, since it will be replaced. Even though a new button is muktzeh since there is no use for it on Shabbat, in this case the button is not muktzeh, since it has already been part of the item of clothing.^[12]

In contrast, if an item was attached to the ground and then broke on Shabbat, it is muktzeh because nobody plans to move something attached to the ground. Therefore, if a door in a house falls off on Shabbat, one may not move it (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:8-10; MB ad loc. 35).^[13]

If disposable dishes have been used but could still be reused, they are not muktzeh. However, once they have been thrown into a filthy garbage can, they are muktzeh. Even if they have not been thrown away, they are muktzeh if they are so dirty that they would generally not be reused. However, if they are in a place where their filthiness disturbs people, they may be cleared away, as they are considered a graf shel re’i (as explained in section 12; SSK 20:42).

If one dried his hands with paper towels and then put them into the paper recycling bin, they are still not muktzeh if people sometimes reuse them to wipe up spills. However, if the paper towels were deposited in a regular dirty garbage can, from which people generally would not retrieve them, they are muktzeh.

14. The Permissibility of Moving Muktzeh Indirectly or with the Body

The main prohibition of muktzeh consists of taking a muktzeh item in one’s hand, the way it is normally moved. The more one deviates from the normal manner of taking an object, the more lenient the law becomes. There are two types of change (shinui) that can be used: min ha-tzad (indirectly, literally “from the side”) and be-gufo (using a part of the body besides the hand. One may move a muktzeh item indirectly, but only for a permitted activity. One may move a muktzeh item with his body even for the sake of the muktzeh item or a prohibited activity. We will now explain:

Min ha-tzad is accomplished by hand, but indirectly. For example, one may pick up fruit covered in straw or dirt in a way that causes them to move. Since the muktzeh items are moved indirectly, through the permitted action of moving the fruit, and the purpose is a permitted activity – eating the fruit – there is no prohibition (Shabbat 123a; SA 311:8-9). Similarly, if one wants to study Torah from a book that has a pen lying on it (assuming the pen was forgotten there, so the book is not a basis; see section 5 above), he may pick up the book even though the pen will then fall off. Likewise, if one accidentally left coins on a pillow and he now wants to sleep on it, he may lift up the pillow so that the coins will fall off. If one accidentally left a rock on top of a barrel and now wants wine from the barrel, he may tip the barrel and cause the rock to fall off. If the barrel was packed tightly among other barrels so that it cannot be tipped over, or if tipping it would break the barrel next to it, he may lift up the barrel while the rock is on top of it and move it to where he can slide the rock off without causing damage (Shabbat 142b; SA 309:4).

One may pick up a broom and use it to sweep up dust or leaves, which are muktzeh. This is because one is doing it indirectly, not with his hands but with a broom, for a permitted purpose – so that the place will be clean. Similarly, if one wants to use a table, he may use a knife to move away shells (that do not have the status of graf she re’i) that have been left on the table (Taz 308:18; MB ad loc. 115).^[14]

If one wants to move the muktzeh item for its own sake, to protect it, one may not move it even indirectly. For example, if money was left on a chair and one is concerned that the money will be stolen, he may not tip the chair so that the money will fall off and become hidden.

In contrast, one may use part of his body to move the money and conceal it. For the entire prohibition of moving muktzeh on Shabbat is to do so in the normal manner, with one’s hand. The Sages did not prohibit moving muktzeh with the body. This includes moving with one’s foot, his arm, his breath, or any other limb other than the hand (SA 311:8; Rema 308:3). Therefore, if money is lying on the ground, one may move it with his foot to conceal it. Similarly, if an item is lying on the ground and is at risk of being stepped on and broken, he may use his foot to move it out of harm’s way. So, too, if a drawer has become a basis but has an item in it which one needs, he may open the drawer with part of his body and remove the necessary item. One may sit on a stone or on the wood of a construction site even though sitting down causes it to move (MB 308:82). Similarly, one may lean on a car, on condition that doing so will not set off the alarm.

15. If One Picked up Muktzeh Permissibly or Mistakenly, and the Status of a Minor

As we have seen, one may move a kli she-melakhto le-isur for a permitted purpose (le-tzorekh gufo) or for its space (le-tzorekh mekomo). Thus, one may take a hammer to crack nuts. After use, one is not required to drop it. Rather, he may return the hammer to its proper place. If there were scissors on the table where one now wants to eat, he need not drop them as close to the table as possible, but may put them away. Since he picked them up in a permitted fashion, he may carry them to their proper place.

Similarly, if one finished eating fruit and is left holding peels or pits that are muktzeh maĥmat gufo, he does not need to drop them. Since they reached his hand permissibly, he may take them where he wants.

In contrast, once one has already put down a muktzeh item that he had been permitted to hold, it resumes its muktzeh status. At that point, even if it is not in its proper place, he may no longer move it (SA 308:3; MB 506:29). Similarly, if one forgot that an item is muktzeh and picked it up, he must put it down immediately (MB 308:13).

If one is carrying a muktzeh item that he had been permitted to hold, le-khatĥila he should not shift the object from one hand to the other. This is because some maintain that moving the item to his other hand is like putting it down, in which case he may no longer move it. Be-di’avad, if he did shift the muktzeh item to his other hand, he may continue going to the place where he wants to put it down.^[15]

If a child is younger than the age of ĥinukh (see ch. 24), one may hold his hand and walk with him, even if he is holding something muktzeh in his other hand. As long as the adult is not carrying the child, the adult is not considered carrying the muktzeh item. However, one may not pick up a child who is holding something muktzeh. Rather, the adult should first shake the muktzeh item out of the child’s hand, and then pick him up. This shaking is permitted, because it is min ha-tzad for a permitted purpose, i.e., to pick up the child. If the child is crying hysterically and will not calm down unless someone picks him up along with the muktzeh item he is holding, one may pick him up. As we will see (24:6), the Sages permitted transgressing rabbinic enactments for the sake of a sick child, and a child who is crying hysterically is liable to become weak like a sick person. However, if the object the child is holding is valuable, one may not pick him up, because we are concerned that if the object falls, the adult will end up picking it up and carrying it (Shabbat 141b; SA 309:1).^[16]

01. The Mitzva of Ĥinukh, Educating One’s Children

It is a Torah commandment to teach Torah to children. Thus we read: “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 11:19). The primary objective of this teaching is to ensure that the children observe all the Torah’s instructions: “Study them and be careful to do them” (Devarim 5:1). Therefore, the Sages stated that alongside the mitzva to teach children Torah is the obligation to educate them toward mitzva observance. For how can they be taught the mitzvot without getting used to keeping them in practice? Thus, there is a Torah commandment both to teach children Torah and to accustom them to keeping the mitzvot in general. Nevertheless, the actual observance of specific mitzvot by the child is a rabbinic obligation.

A child should be educated to keep the positive commandments from the time that he can understand what the mitzva involves, and can properly observe it. Thus, the appropriate age for each mitzva varies in accordance with its complexity and the difficulty of its observance. For example, a boy should be educated about tzitzit once he knows how to put them on, can make sure that there are two sets of strings in back and two in front, and can recite the berakha. However, since one may only put on tefilin if he is able to maintain a clean body and utter concentration, a boy should only be educated about this mitzva shortly before his bar mitzva (Sukka 42a; MB 343:3).

The age at which we begin to educate children about mitzvot is about six or seven because that is when children start to study Torah in earnest and thus can begin to keep most mitzvot properly. This applies to berakhot and prayers as well. The age of ĥinukh is six or seven, as that is when most children can begin to do them properly. Nevertheless, we begin habituating them to recite berakhot and prayers from around the age of three, just as they start learning Torah at that age (BB 21a; Sukka 42a; SA YD 245:5).

The same principle applies to kiddush and havdala; from the age of three we begin to encourage the children come and listen. When the child understands the idea of Shabbat and can listen properly to kiddush and havdala, we make sure that he does so. If he is not present when kiddush or havdala is made, he should recite it himself.

02. Educating Children about Negative Commandments

It is a mitzva to train children to avoid prohibited activities from the time they begin to understand that certain things are permitted and certain things are prohibited. In other words, it is not enough that a child understands that he must stop what he is doing when he is told “no”; rather, he must understand that what he is doing is never allowed. Most children begin to understand this at approximately age three. From then on, if one sees his child engaged in a prohibited activity, such as eating non-kosher food or turning on a light on Shabbat, one must stop him from doing so (MB 343:3). Once the child reaches the age of ĥinukh – when we start teaching him Torah at about age six or seven – one should begin to explain more about the principles behind the prohibitions, so that he will know how to observe them properly.

There is no mitzva to teach one’s child who is younger than three to avoid prohibitions. Therefore, if such a child finds prohibited food and wants to eat it, or if he wants to turn a light on or off on Shabbat, one does not need to stop him from doing so. Similarly, if one’s small child is a kohen, and he goes to a place of ritual impurity (such as a cemetery), one does not need to stop him, since he does not understand the prohibition.

All of this refers to situations in which the small child is acting autonomously. In contrast, if an adult causes a child, even a day-old baby, to do something prohibited, the adult violates a Torah prohibition, for the Torah commands us not to cause a child to violate prohibitions. Thus one may not feed a child blood or insects or bring a young kohen into contact with ritual impurity (Yevamot 114a; MB 343:4). An adult may not even feed a child rabbinically prohibited food (SA 343:1).

However, it is not prohibited to give a small child an item that he might use in an impermissible fashion. For example, one may give paper to a small child on Shabbat even though it is likely that he will tear it and destroy letters that are written upon it, as giving him paper is not considered the same as instructing him to tear paper. However, one who puts non-kosher food into a small child’s hand, though, is considered feeding him, as this is the normal way to feed a child (MA; MB 340:14).

On Shabbat, there is an additional prohibition, for we are commanded not to have children undertake melakha on our behalf: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). This means that if a child turns on a light because he thinks this is what his parents want, and his parents know and do not object, then in addition to neglecting the rabbinic mitzva of ĥinukh, they are also transgressing a Torah prohibition by having their child do melakha for them. If a child turns on the light for another Jew (other than a parent), who sees him doing so and does not object, that Jew transgresses rabbinically (SHT 334:54).

Even though we have seen that one may not feed a minor forbidden food, if a child is hungry or thirsty before kiddush or havdala or during a fast, then even after he has reached the age of ĥinukh, the adult may give him food and drink. It is only forbidden to feed a child food that is intrinsically non-kosher. If the food is kosher but rendered unfit by the time, a child who is hungry or thirsty may be fed (MB 269:1; above 6:9).

03. Who Is Obligated to Educate and Object?

According to some, the obligation of ĥinukh devolves equally upon the father and mother (Terumat Ha-deshen). However, most poskim maintain that only the father is obligated to train children to do mitzvot, that is, objecting when they transgress negative commandments and requiring them to perform positive commandments. This is an extension of the obligation to teach them Torah, which also devolves upon the father. Despite this, it is clear that the mother has a general mitzva to educate her children about Torah and mitzvot; the general commandment to love one’s fellow and the demand for truth obligate every mother to educate her children to cling to the holy Torah and observe its commandments. What is incumbent upon the father alone is the responsibility to meticulously educate about Torah and mitzvot (Ri; Maharam; Hagahot Maimoniyot). If no father is present, whether due to death or absence, then the mother is obligated to teach her children meticulously about the Torah and mitzva observance (Eliya Rabba 640:4; Kaf Ha-ĥayim 343:9).

Thus, if a child who has reached the age of ĥinukh (about six or seven) is involved in a game and does not want to come to hear kiddush or havdala or recite Birkat Ha-mazon, the father must insist, so as to educate him properly. However, the mother may occasionally ignore such breaches in order to maintain a pleasant atmosphere in the home. If the father has passed away or is absent, the mother must take his place and insist that her children become habituated to keeping the mitzvot.^[1]

When parents neglect to educate their children and do not stop them from violating Torah law, the local beit din or public representatives who are responsible for local education must admonish the father. However, if the parents are negligent in educating their children about rabbinic obligations, there is no need to admonish the father.

The poskim disagree regarding what an adult must do if he sees someone else’s child of educable age (six or seven) desecrate Shabbat or eat forbidden foods. Some maintain that the obligation to educate children is the sole responsibility of the father, and nobody else is obligated to prevent them from sinning (Rambam; SA 343:1). Others maintain that all Jews are obligated to prevent children of educable age from transgressing (Tosafot; Rosh; Rema). Practically speaking, several Aĥaronim rule that if an adult sees any child transgressing a Torah prohibition – such as turning on a light or washing his clothes on Shabbat, or eating foods prohibited by Torah law – he must stop him. However, if one sees a child transgressing a rabbinic prohibition – such as eating chicken with milk, or playing with muktzeh items on Shabbat – he does not need to stop him (Ĥayei Adam; MB 343:7). It would seem that if a minor repeatedly transgresses the same prohibition, even if it is rabbinic, it is proper to inform his parents.

If a minor is in danger of harming someone or damaging property, one must stop him in order to prevent the harm or damage. This law is derived from the mitzva to return a lost object to its owner: “If you see your fellow’s ox or sheep gone astray, do not ignore it…restore it to him” (Devarim 22:2). If there is a mitzva to return another’s lost item, there is certainly a mitzva to prevent damage to his property. Similarly, we are told: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Vayikra 19:16). According to the Sages, the mitzva of saving someone’s property is included in this mitzva (Sifra).

We must stress that the mitzva of ĥinukh must be done in such a way that the child will be receptive. Therefore, one should not force a child to begin keeping all the mitzvot and saying all the prayers properly at the age of six or seven. A child’s early years are meant to allow him to get used to praying and keeping mitzvot. This way, by the time children reach halakhic maturity at the age of bar or bat mitzva, they will be capable of keeping all the mitzvot properly.

04. The Prohibition for a Child to Turn Lights On and Off

If the lights went off in a home, and a child understands that his parents would be pleased if he would turn them back on, the parents must tell him not to do so. As we have already learned, parents have an obligation to educate their children to keep the mitzvot, and this includes preventing them from transgressing prohibitions. Even if a child is not yet three years old, which is generally the age at which we begin teaching children to avoid prohibited activities, the law is more stringent for Shabbat. As long as the child understands that turning on the lights would be helpful to his parents, it is as if he is doing it for them, and they must prevent him from doing it, based on the verse we cited above: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). This means that we are commanded to make sure that children do not perform melakha on our behalf. Even if the lights went off in a neighbor’s home and one’s child goes over to turn on the lights for them, the neighbor must not allow him to do melakha for them.

Similarly, if a fire breaks out on Shabbat and a child attempts to put it out, whether at his parents’ home or at someone else’s house, he must be stopped from extinguishing it. Since the child understands that the adults want the fire to be extinguished, he is essentially doing the melakha for them, and thus they are obligated to tell him not to do so (Shabbat 121a; SA 334:25; MB ad loc. 66). Certainly, then, one may not tell a child explicitly to turn on a light or extinguish a fire; as we already learned, an adult may not cause a child to do anything prohibited (Yevamot 114a).^[2]

Of course, if a child mistakenly turned off a light, it is important that no one yell at him in a way that will cause him to try to “correct” his mistake by turning the light back on. Even if no one yelled at him, but he simply wants to correct his mistake and turn it back on, he must be told not to do so.

If a child mistakenly performed a melakha on Shabbat (such as turning on the light), others may not benefit from it if he did it for the sake of an adult, but if he did it for his own sake, others may benefit from the light (BHL 325:10, s.v. “eino yehudi”).

05. Permissive Rulings under Pressing Circumstances

Sometimes, under pressing circumstances, one may tell a minor to transgress a rabbinic prohibition, but one may never tell a minor to violate Torah law. First, as we saw regarding ĥinukh in general, the Torah forbids causing a child to transgress. Second, as noted, there is an explicit injunction against children doing melakha on Shabbat: “But the seventh day is a Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or daughter” (Shemot 20:10). We will now explain when one may ask a minor to transgress a rabbinic injunction.

According to Rashba and Ran, one may tell a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition if it is for his own sake. Even though this is forbidden according to most Rishonim (Rambam; Tosafot; SA 343:1), under pressing circumstances we rely on those who are permissive (R. Akiva Eger; BHL 343:1, s.v. “mi-divrei”). Therefore, if the light in a child’s room was accidentally left on or turned on, and he finds it difficult to sleep, one may tell him to turn off the light, as this action is rabbinically prohibited. It is preferable that a child under the age of six do it. If the child is older than six, it is preferable that he turn it off with a shinui.

Under pressing circumstances, one may tell a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition, even if he does not stand to gain from the transgression personally. As we have seen (9:11), the Sages permitted transgressing a shvut di-shvut for the sake of a mitzva or under pressing circumstances. The entire obligation of a child to keep Shabbat is rabbinic, so if he transgresses a rabbinic prohibition, it is by definition a shvut di-shvut. As long as one is lenient in this respect only occasionally, there is no concern that the child will become accustomed to belittle Shabbat (Mordechai; Taz 346:6; SAH 343:6; Livyat Ĥen §124).^[3]

If the light went out on Shabbat in a place where it is needed, a baby who is not old enough to understand that his parents want him to turn on the light (about a year old) and who will play with a switch without understanding whether he is doing something helpful or harmful may be held in front of the switch with the hope that he will play with it and turn it on and removed from there as soon as he turns it on. Since he does not understand the implications of flipping the switch on and off, his action is not significant for the purposes of transgression. Rather, he is considered mitasek (performing a melakha obliviously; see below, 26:3) (Rashba, Yevamot 114a; Orĥot Shabbat 24:7-8).

06. A Child Is Comparable to a Sick Person

The Sages forbade a Jew to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for him on Shabbat. In contrast, if a child needs something very badly, his status is akin to that of one who is ill, for whom one may ask a non-Jew to do melakha. For example, if a child has no food and is hungry, one may ask a non-Jew to cook for him. If he desperately needs light, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on a light for him (Rema 276:1; MB ad loc. 6; see below 28:2). In general there is greater need to be lenient on behalf of babies, but one may be lenient even with very needy older children just as he would be lenient with a sick person.^[4]

A child who is not feeling well may take medicine even if the pain is mild. Just as the enactment prohibiting the use of medication on Shabbat does not apply to a sick person, so too it does not apply to a child. Thus, if necessary, one may put cream on a baby’s skin, on condition that one does not spread it. Rather, one should simply place the cream on the skin. If the baby’s diaper then causes the cream to spread, one does not violate any prohibition, since the cream was not applied in order to smooth the skin (see 14:5 above and 28:8 below).

07. Permitted and Prohibited Games on Shabbat

It is a mitzva to educate children to study a great deal of Torah on Shabbat. It is thus proper to teach them to minimize game playing so that they will not get used to wasting the precious and holy time of Shabbat on mundane activities. The closer they get to the age of bar or bat mitzva, the more they should be encouraged to study Torah more and play games less. It is good for the parents themselves to learn with their children, thus fulfilling the mitzva of “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 11:19). It is proper for each community to offer many Torah classes for children on Shabbat.

Nevertheless, children may play on Shabbat. Therefore, the laws detailed in the following paragraphs apply to all children who are under bar or bat mitzva age. However, for adults the laws are different. First of all, le-khatĥila it is preferable to follow the opinion that adults may not play any games on Shabbat (22:13 above). Second, even according to those who allow adults to play games on Shabbat, some games are problematic. For children, who are obligated to keep Shabbat only as training for adulthood, we are lenient; for adults, who are required to keep Shabbat by Torah law, we are stringent. Below we will explain the laws for minors. When adults need to be stringent even according to the lenient position that allows them to play games, we will say so explicitly.

One may play checkers, chess, and memory games on Shabbat. One may also play with dice and spinning tops. However, one may not play any game in which the winner is awarded money or food. It is also forbidden to play games that normally involve writing (SA 338:5, 322:6; Ĥayei Adam 38:11). Some maintain that it is preferable not to play Monopoly or other games in which people win money and property, even though it is not real money. Children who wish to be lenient about this may (SSK 16:33), but adults should be stringent.

All games that involve writing, pasting, cutting, or weaving are forbidden on Shabbat. However, minors may put together a jigsaw puzzle or form words by joining letters on a board. Even though adults must be stringent in these two cases, children may rely on those who are lenient. According to this opinion, there is no violation of Kotev since all the writing was already there, and the letters and puzzle pieces are simply being moved together temporarily (18:4 above).

One may not build model planes or boats out of plastic parts if they require a great deal of precision and are meant to last for a long time.

Children may play with interlocking blocks, build with them, and take apart what they have built. Children may also make paper planes or boats. However, it is proper for adults to be stringent. (See above 15:7 and Harĥavot.)

The Sages forbade making a temporary tent on Shabbat, but this is permissible if it is erected in a different order from usual. Therefore, children may not drape a blanket over chairs in order to create a tent to play in. However, this is permissible if they hold the blanket horizontally in the air, and afterward place chairs underneath. It is also forbidden to use interlocking blocks to build a house or garage whose inside area is a square tefaĥ or more, but if they start by holding the roof up and then attach the walls from underneath, it is permitted (above 15:5).

One may use a kit to make jewelry that is not made to last, on condition that the end of the thread is not tied with a regular knot but rather with a bow knot (SSK 16:22).

One may not sort playing pieces or cards of two games that got mixed up together, as it constitutes Borer. However, if people want to play one of the games, they may remove the pieces they need from the mix. This sorting is not considered derekh melakha but rather derekh misĥak (the normal way to play), because one normally begins such a game by taking out its pieces (above 11:16).

One may not make shapes out of Play-Doh or modeling clay, as it constitutes Memare’aĥ (SA 314:11). If one makes shapes that have meaning, it also constitutes Kotev (Ĥayei Adam, Yom Tov, 92:3). Therefore, Play-Doh and modeling clay are muktzeh.

08. Additional Games and Playing in the Yard

One may compress a spring on a toy car so that the car will move forward, as long as the car does not make noise and no lights light up. One may not play with any battery-operated toy (17:2 above).

One may not blow up a balloon because a knot is usually tied at the end. However, if the balloon is sealed with a valve instead of a knot, and it has previously been inflated, it may be inflated on Shabbat (above 15:8).

Children may not play with toy musical instruments such as trumpets, pianos, guitars, bells, and noisemakers on Shabbat. Such toys are muktzeh. However, one may give a baby a toy that makes noise when it is shaken or a button is pushed. However, the adult himself may not cause the toy to make noise (MB 338:1; BHL s.v. “aval”; SSK 16:2-3 and n. 10; Harĥavot).

Sand is muktzeh unless it was set aside before Shabbat for children to play with (23:3 above). In that case, they may play with the sand as long as it is fine and dry enough that it cannot be used to fashion shapes. However, if the sand is wet enough that one can scoop out holes or fill them up, one may not play with it on account of the melakha of Boneh. One may not make sand wet, because of the melakha of Lash (15:2 above).

One may not play with marbles on the ground, because one may level the ground to make sure that the marbles roll smoothly. Similarly, one may not play any game on the ground that requires that the ground be flat, because one may end up leveling it. Even if the ground is paved, one may not play there, as there is a concern that one might then end up playing on unpaved ground. However, one may play on the floor inside; since all homes today have flooring, we are not worried that playing there will lead anyone to play outside on unpaved ground (15:2 above).

It is permissible to play with apricot pits, which children commonly play with; since they are set aside for this purpose by the children, they are not muktzeh like other pits. Even pits removed from apricots on Shabbat are not muktzeh, since many children play with them (see SSK ch. 16 n. 33).

One may swing on a swing, but if it hangs from a tree, even if only on one side, it is prohibited. If the swing hangs from a peg that was driven into the tree, it is permitted (19:7 above).

09. Ball Games and Running

Children may not play soccer, football, baseball, or basketball on Shabbat. Since adults make a big deal out of these games and they have intricate rules and procedures, they are prohibited, as they are considered a prohibited weekday activity. Besides, sometimes these games involve additional prohibited activities, such as preparing the field for a game, driving to the field, registering for the game, and buying and selling tickets or team merchandise. It is also prohibited to watch a soccer or basketball game on Shabbat, because this is a weekday activity. It is even prohibited to play with the balls associated with these sports at home or in a yard, because they are muktzeh and because it is a weekday activity. For the same reasons, all of the above applies to tennis as well.^[5]

Children may play and run around for their enjoyment but may not participate in exercise classes (see above 22:8).

Children may play with balls designed for young children, on condition that they play indoors or in a paved yard. However, they may not play on grass or on a dirt yard, out of concern that they will level the ground. They may play table tennis for fun, since that is generally played indoors. There is no need to worry that by allowing children to play with balls at a young age, they will get used to it and will continue doing so as adults, since the permission is limited to balls designed for children, which in any case adults do not play with.

One may not recover a ball from a tree using one’s hand or a stick, as it might lead to breaking a branch. If the ball fell out on its own, one may play with it (19:7 above; SSK 16:8).

10. Bicycles, Scooters, and Skates

One may not ride a regular two-wheeler bicycle, because this is a weekday activity (22:8 above). Even if a bicycle has training wheels, one may not ride it. However, small children may ride tricycles, because tricycles are only used by small children, and there is a significant difference between tricycles and bicycles. Therefore, riding them is not considered a weekday activity (above, 22:8 and n. 4).

Some allow children to ride scooters and wear skates on Shabbat. According to them, just as children may run on Shabbat, they may use scooters and skates. Opposing them are those who feel that while children may run on Shabbat, that permission is limited to unassisted movement. In contrast, using equipment that makes one move faster and more effectively is considered a weekday activity.

Even though those who are lenient here have an opinion on which to rely be-di’avad, it is proper to be stringent, since the stringent opinion seems more compelling. Just as the widespread practice is to refrain from riding bicycles because this is a weekday activity that clashes with the spirit of Shabbat, it is similarly inappropriate to use scooters or skates on Shabbat. Additionally, by our limiting small children to simpler games, older children will learn to dedicate Shabbat to Torah and to rest.

01. Asking a Non-Jew to Do Melakha on Shabbat

Shabbat belongs to Jews alone, as the Torah states: “For it is a sign between Me and you throughout the ages, that you may know that I the Lord have consecrated you” (Shemot 31:13). In addition, the Sages go so far as to say that “A non-Jew who observes Shabbat is liable for the death penalty” (San. 58b). In other words, if a non-Jew were to invent his own religion and establish a “Shabbat” for himself, during which he would refrain from engaging in melakha and in developing the world, he would be liable for death at the hands of heaven (see Rashi ad loc. and MT, Laws of Kings 10:9).

Although a non-Jew may do melakha on Shabbat, the Sages forbade a Jew to ask a non-Jew to do melakha for him on Shabbat. This includes even rabbinically prohibited activities. The Sages found support for this from the wording of the verse: “No melakha shall be done on them” (Shemot 12:16). The verse does not use the active “Do not do melakha,” but rather the passive “No melakha shall be done.” Thus we see that it is proper that no melakha is done for a Jew on Shabbat or Yom Tov. As the Midrash elaborates: “‘No melakha shall be done’ – neither by you, nor by your friend, nor by a non-Jew” (Mekhilta ad loc.).^[1]

If the melakha will be done with a Jew’s property, one may not ask a non-Jew to do a melakha even for the non-Jew’s benefit. For example, one may not tell a visiting non-Jew: “Turn on the light for yourself.” Similarly, one may not say to a non-Jew: “Cook my food for yourself.” However, if the meat belongs to the non-Jew, one may tell him to cook it for himself. Since the non-Jew is performing the melakha with his own possessions for his own benefit, the Sages did not forbid such speech (SA 307:21; MB ad loc. 73).

The Sages decreed that a Jew may not benefit from a melakha performed by a non-Jew for the Jew’s benefit. For example, if the lights in one’s home went out, and a non-Jewish neighbor came and turned the lights on, neither the Jews living in that home nor any other Jews may benefit from these lights, since they were turned on for a Jew on Shabbat (SA 276:1). If the melakha undertaken by the non-Jew is time-consuming, a Jew may not benefit from it immediately after Shabbat either. Rather, he must wait until enough time has passed so that the melakha could have been done after Shabbat. For example, if a non-Jew picked fruit or fished for a Jew on Shabbat, the fruit or fish may not be eaten after Shabbat until enough time has passed that they could have been picked or caught then (SA 325:5-6).^[2]

If the melakha performed by the non-Jew for the Jew is only prohibited rabbinically, then only the Jew for whom the melakha was performed may not benefit from it on Shabbat. Other Jews may benefit from the melakha even on Shabbat. Once Shabbat is over and enough time has passed so that the melakha could have been done after Shabbat, even the Jew for whom the melakha was performed may benefit from it (SA 325:8; MB ad loc. 41).

02. Benefiting from a Melakha That a Non-Jew Performed for Himself

The prohibition on benefiting from a melakha done by a non-Jew on Shabbat is limited to a case where the non-Jew undertook the melakha for the benefit of a Jew. However, if he did the melakha for himself or for another non-Jew, then a Jew may benefit from it. For example, if a non-Jew turned on a light because he wanted to read a book, a Jew may benefit from this light (SA 276:2). Moreover, even if the non-Jew intended to turn on the light for both himself and a Jew, the Jew may benefit from it since in any case the non-Jew needed to turn on the light for himself (Ĥayei Adam; AHS 276:8; BHL 276:2 s.v. “ve-im” is inclined this way as well, in contrast to MA).

Therefore, if the lights went out in a Jew’s home, he may not ask a non-Jewish neighbor to turn on the light, but he may arrange things so that the non-Jew will turn on the light for himself, after which the Jew may benefit from the light. For example, he can invite the non-Jew to come over and eat something. When the non-Jew arrives and sees that the house is dark, he will realize that he should turn on the light. Since the non-Jew is turning the light on for himself, so that he can see the food that is being served, the Jew may benefit from the light as well (AHS 276:9).

Similarly, if a Jew has non-Jewish household help, one may send him to wash dishes in the kitchen even if it is dark there. Upon entering the kitchen, the non-Jew will turn on the light for himself, after which the Jew may benefit from the light. The Jew may even request that the non-Jew leave the light on after finishing his work (MB 276:27; SSK 30:57). However, if a Jew needs to walk somewhere in the dark, he may not ask his non-Jewish domestic worker to come along so that he will turn on a flashlight for himself. In this case, it is clear that the non-Jew is actually doing the melakha for the Jew (SA 276:3).

If a non-Jew heated water for himself on Shabbat and some extra water remained, a Jew may not use it, since the non-Jew may have heated the extra water with him in mind. Even if this was not the case, if the non-Jew sees the Jew using the remaining water, he may decide to add extra water for the Jew on future occasions. However, if the non-Jew does not know the Jew, then the Jew may use the extra water, because there is no concern that the non-Jew added the water for him or will add water for him in the future (SA 325:11; MB ad loc. 66). If a non-Jew picked fruit, caught fish, or milked cows on Shabbat for his own use, a Jew may not eat or drink the products on Shabbat, even if the non-Jew is a stranger. Since these food items were not edible when Shabbat began, they are muktzeh (SA 325:5).^[3]

03. Making Use of a Melakha Performed on Shabbat for a Jew

If a Jewish home was dimly lit – enough to allow the household members to eat, clean up, and wash the dishes, but not enough to allow them to read – and a non-Jew came and turned on an additional light for them, a Jew may use its light to eat, clean up, and wash the dishes, but not read. They may only do what they could have done without the additional light, but activities that were impossible to do without the additional light may not be done (SA 276:4; MB ad loc. 32).

If a non-Jew turned off a light to help a Jew sleep, the Jew may sleep in that room. Even though the non-Jew turned off the light on his behalf, and had he not done so the Jew would not have been able to sleep, the Jew is not benefiting from anything substantive created by the non-Jew’s melakha but from the absence of light.

Even though a Jew may benefit in the above situations from the light or darkness that a non-Jew contributed to a room, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to turn the lights on or off. However, he may hint at such a request. He must be careful with his formulation, though. It may not include anything that might be taken as a command. For example, if there is not enough light, one may not say to a non-Jew: “Do me a favor – there is not enough light in the room.” Pointing to the light is also forbidden, because this is considered a hint that resembles a command (Ĥayei Adam 62:2). Similarly, if the light is on and is keeping one from sleeping, he may not say to a non-Jew: “Do what needs to be done” or “Do me a favor – I cannot sleep here,” nor may he point to the light.

In contrast, one may hint by way of description. Thus if one needs more light, he may say to a non-Jew: “It is difficult for me to clean the house or to read when the light is so dim,” or “The house is not well lit because only one light is on.” These descriptions do not comprise a request that the non-Jew act; he is simply reporting the facts. The non-Jew then decides on his own to help the Jew by turning on an additional light. Similarly, if light is keeping a Jew from sleeping, he may say: “It is hard for me to sleep with the light on.” The non-Jew will then figure out on his own that if he wants to help the Jew, he should turn off the light.

If no toilet paper was cut before Shabbat, this also may be reported to a non-Jew in descriptive form: “I have no toilet paper.” The non-Jew will then cut toilet paper for him. This is not considered benefiting from a melakha that a non-Jew performed, because it is possible in a pinch to use toilet paper even when it has not been cut. However, he may not formulate his statement as a command, such as “Do me a favor – I have no toilet paper.” Similarly, if the oven was left on accidentally, one may say to a non-Jew: “What a shame that so much electricity is being wasted.” The non-Jew will understand the hint on his own and turn it off. However, one may not include a command in the hint, such as: “Whoever turns it off will not lose [i.e., will be rewarded].”^[4]

In short, one may benefit from the actions of a non-Jew on Shabbat as long as he is careful to avoid two rabbinic prohibitions. First, he may not tell the non-Jew to perform a melakha, but must hint at it by reporting the facts. Second, one may not benefit from melakha performed by a non-Jew if it makes it possible for him to do something that he could not have done otherwise. Thus one may hint one’s request to a non-Jew by means of a description, and one may benefit from light that a non-Jew added where there was already enough light to manage in a pinch. In addition, one may benefit from a non-Jew’s act of turning off a light or an oven, since this does not involve direct benefit from the melakha he performed.^[5]

All the methods presented here are permitted le-khatĥila. When none of these methods are sufficient, then for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, the Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically forbidden melakha. Sometimes one may even ask him to perform a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law, as will be explained in the upcoming sections.

04. For the Sake of a Mitzva or for a Great Need

The Sages permitted asking a non-Jew to do a rabbinically forbidden melakha in cases of great need, such as to prevent suffering or loss, or for the sake of a mitzva. Such cases are a shvut di-shvut, a combination of two rabbinic prohibitions: the action itself is prohibited rabbinically, and the entire prohibition of asking a non-Jew to perform melakha on Shabbat is rabbinic.

In contrast, one may not ask a non-Jew to perform a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law, even for the sake of a mitzva. One may do so only for the sake of settling Eretz Yisrael or when there is a pressing communal mitzva need. Additionally, if not doing the melakha would entail suffering a very large financial loss, the Sages permit asking a non-Jew to do it. This is because they were afraid that if they were to prohibit this, the person suffering the loss would end up desecrating Shabbat himself on account of his great anguish. These laws are detailed above (9:11-12; 16:5 and n. 1).

Let us illustrate this principle. One may ask a non-Jew to remove a shofar from a tree in order to use it on Rosh Ha-shana, since the prohibition of using a tree is rabbinic (SA 307:7; above, 19:7). Similarly, one may ask a non-Jew to bring wine for kiddush or siddurim for the synagogue through a karmelit, as carrying there is rabbinically prohibited (MB 325:60; 21:3 above). One may also ask a non-Jew to bring food that is essential to the Shabbat meals through a karmelit, as this food enables people to fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat. However, one may not ask a non-Jew to carry food that is not essential to the meal (MB 325:62).

One may ask a non-Jew to move muktzeh items in order to prevent a loss. For example, one may ask a non-Jew to collect scattered money, so that it will not get lost or stolen. One may also ask a non-Jew to bring bags of cement from the yard into the house so that they are not ruined in the rain (SA 307:19; see MB ad loc. 69).

If a door is squeaking so loudly that it is difficult to sleep, one may ask a non-Jew to oil the hinges. The relevant prohibition is rabbinic, since the door can be used even if the hinges are not oiled (Melakhim Omnayikh 6:1 and n. 1). Additionally, if mosquitoes are buzzing around in a room and disturbing one’s sleep, one may ask a non-Jew to spray and kill them. Since mosquitoes are not being killed to use their bodies, the prohibition is rabbinic (20:8 above).

If it is uncertain whether a particular action is prohibited rabbinically or by Torah law, one may ask a non-Jew to undertake the action for the sake of a mitzva or a great need. The prohibition of asking a non-Jew to perform melakha is rabbinic, and in general when there is uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinic rule, we are lenient.

If the lights went out in a synagogue or in a beit midrash, one may ask a non-Jew to turn them on using a shinui, since doing so is only prohibited rabbinically. If using a shinui is not feasible, as long as there is a pressing need that relates to a communal mitzva, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the light even without a shinui. If possible, it is preferable to give him something to eat there, so that he will be turning the light on for himself, which is permissible even if it is not for the sake of a mitzva.

05. A Non-Jew’s Melakha for Someone Sick or Suffering (and Air Conditioners)

Under normal circumstances, one may not ask a non-Jew to perform melakha on Shabbat. However, for the sake of a sick person, one may ask a non-Jew to perform melakhot, even those that are prohibited by Torah law. These leniencies apply even to one who is not dangerously ill. If one is dangerously ill, then even a Jew must desecrate Shabbat in order to help him, as saving a life overrides Shabbat (SA 328:17). The laws pertaining to sick people will be explained below in chapters 27 and 28.

A child who needs something very badly has the same status as a sick person, and one may ask a non-Jew to do even melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law on his behalf. Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to cook for a child who has nothing to eat or to turn on a light in the home of children who are very scared of the dark (Rema 276:1; MB ad loc. 6; Rema 328:17; 24:6 above).

In the cold areas of northern Europe, keeping homes warm on Shabbat was an ongoing struggle. Since homes were generally heated by coal- or wood-burning stoves, by Shabbat morning the fuel supply would be depleted and the fire in the stove would go out. Since all people are considered ill when it comes to extreme cold, the rabbis permitted asking a non-Jew to come and light the stove on Shabbat morning (SA 276:5). The non-Jew who did this was known as the “Shabbos goy.” Nowadays, however, when heaters are powered by electricity or gas and do not run out during Shabbat, there is no justification for using a “Shabbos goy” on a regular basis. Only if, by chance, the heater went off and it is extremely cold, may one ask a non-Jew to turn on the heat. One may do this even if there are no small children. In a home with children who truly need the heat, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on a heater even if it is not extremely cold (SSK 23:28; see n. 87 ad loc.).

Permission to ask a non-Jew to do melakhot that are prohibited by Torah law is limited to the needs of the ill. For one who is suffering but not ill, one may ask a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically prohibited melakha but not one that is prohibited by Torah law. Based on this, some maintain that on a hot day one may ask a non-Jew to turn on an air conditioner, claiming that turning on an air conditioner is only rabbinically prohibited. Accordingly, for the sake of the mitzva of oneg Shabbat, and in order to alleviate great suffering, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on an air conditioner. However, since others maintain that turning on an air conditioner is prohibited by Torah law (17:2 above), it is proper to ask the non-Jew to turn it on using a shinui (for example, using a teaspoon to depress the air conditioner’s on button), which renders the action a shvut di-shvut.

If the air conditioner is running and has gotten too cold, one may ask a non-Jew to turn it off. Preferably, one should simply tell him that it is too cold, and allow him to figure out on his own that he should turn off the air conditioner. If he does not take the hint, one may tell him directly.^[6]

06. Employees, Sharecroppers, and Renters in Fields and Factories

A Jew may not hire workers to do work for him on Shabbat, as a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to do anything for him on Shabbat that he may not do himself. Therefore, a Jew may not hire a non-Jew to work in his field, factory, or store. However, one may hire a non-Jewish worker to help serve food or wash dishes on Shabbat. Since a Jew may do these activities on Shabbat, he may hire a non-Jew to do them. In this case, it is not necessary for the Shabbat payment to be subsumed within a weekday payment (Tehila Le-David 243:1; SSK 28:63; and above 22:14).

If a non-Jew did some work for a Jew on Shabbat, the Jew may not benefit from it on Shabbat. After Shabbat he may benefit from it, but only once enough time has elapsed so that the melakha could have been performed after Shabbat. If the melakha that the non-Jew did for him was done publicly on Shabbat, such as building a home, the Sages decreed that he may never live in the house. However, he may sell it to another Jew. Under pressing circumstances, the first Jew may live in the house the non-Jew built for him (SA 244:3-4 and MB ad loc. 19-20; SA 325:14 and MB ad loc. 73).

All of the above applies to a wage earner. In contrast, a non-Jewish sharecropper or tenant farmer in a Jew’s field may work on Shabbat. Since he shares in the profits, he is working for his own benefit.

Therefore, a Jewish factory owner or store owner may allow a non-Jew to run his business over Shabbat if the non-Jew receives a percentage of the earnings. Even though the Jew is profiting from the work of the non-Jew on Shabbat, since the non-Jew is working to earn money for himself, he is not viewed as working on behalf of the Jew. The Jew may profit from a percentage of this work.^[7]

Similarly, a Jew in Israel who owns a field, factory, or store abroad may rent them to a non-Jew in return for a set fee. The non-Jew may then keep the establishment open on Shabbat. Since the Jew gets his rent money in any case, the non-Jew who works on Shabbat is viewed as working for himself. This is on condition that the non-Jew is not only renting on Shabbat, because then it would be clear that the Jew wants the non-Jew to work on Shabbat. Rather, he should rent out the store on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis, so Shabbat is subsumed within the total.

07. Marit Ayin and Causing a Jew to Sin

Every case where we have learned that a Jew may rent his store or factory to a non-Jew or give his field to a non-Jewish sharecropper applies only where there is no marit ayin (“appearance” of transgression). However, if the site is known to be Jewish-owned, and those who see it operating on Shabbat are liable to suspect the owner of hiring non-Jews to work for him on Shabbat, such rental or profit-sharing arrangements are prohibited.

This is what the Sages meant when they forbade a Jew to contract his bathhouse to a non-Jew to operate on Shabbat. Since generally bathhouses were run by day laborers, people who saw the bathhouse open on Shabbat would suspect that a Jew had desecrated Shabbat by hiring non-Jews. This could breach the boundaries of Shabbat, as others might begin hiring non-Jews to work for them on Shabbat. However, if it was publicly announced that the Jew rented the bathhouse to a non-Jew, it is permitted. So too, if the widespread local custom is to operate bathhouses under profit-sharing arrangements, the custom may be followed (SA 243:1-2).^[8]

The same applies to a store. If it is known that a store is Jewish-owned, one may not rent it out to a non-Jew who will open it on Shabbat, because of marit ayin. However, if it has been publicly announced that the store has been rented to a non-Jew, it is not prohibited.

Even if there is a possibility that Jews who do not observe Shabbat will enter this store and shop there on Shabbat, the Jew is not viewed as aiding their transgression, since they could buy what they need in a different store. However, if most prospective customers are Jews, and keeping the store open breaches the boundaries of Shabbat, then the arrangement is prohibited (see Tzitz Eliezer 13:39).^[9]

08. Non-Jewish Contractors

The prohibition on hiring non-Jews to work on Shabbat applies to wage-earners but not to contractors. For these purposes, “contract work” means that the worker agrees to complete a job by a specified date for an agreed-upon amount of money. It makes no difference which days the contractor works. As long as he finishes the work by the agreed-upon date, he receives payment in full. Since the non-Jew can complete the work without working on Shabbat, even if he works on Shabbat it is for his own benefit, to complete the job he contracted, and is permitted even though the Jew benefits from the swift completion of the work.

For example, a Jew may make an agreement with a non-Jew to sew clothes or make shoes for him for a certain sum. The non-Jew’s choice to work on Shabbat does not make it prohibited. However, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew on Friday to sew clothes or make shoes for him by the time Shabbat ends, since in order to do so the non-Jew would have to work on Shabbat. This is the equivalent of a Jew asking a non-Jew to work for him on Shabbat.

Similarly, a Jew may bring his car to a non-Jew’s garage on Friday, even though he knows that the non-Jewish mechanic might fix it on Shabbat. Since the non-Jew is being paid contractually, at the going rate for the job, and the Jew did not ask him to work specifically on Shabbat, he is not viewed as working for the Jew on Shabbat. Even if he informs the Jew immediately after Shabbat that he finished working on the car, the Jew may retrieve the car and use it. However, one may not arrange with the mechanic to finish the job by a time that would require him to work on Shabbat. In such a case, the non-Jew is working for the Jew on Shabbat (SA 244:1; MB ad loc. 2).^[10]

A non-Jew may only do contract work for a Jew on Shabbat if it is not apparent that the work is being done on a Jew’s behalf. If it is apparent, as is the case if the work is being done in the Jew’s home, it is forbidden to contract the work to a non-Jew because of marit ayin. Therefore, the Sages instructed that one should not allow a non-Jewish contractor who is hired to build a home to work on Shabbat, since if people see the contractor working they will think that the homeowner has desecrated Shabbat by hiring a non-Jew to work on Shabbat (SA 244:1). Today, when the norm is to hire a contractor to build one’s home, it would seem that it should be permissible to be lenient. Observers will generally assume that the non-Jewish workers are working for a non-Jewish contractor, and there will be no issue of marit ayin. However, in practice, the custom is to be stringent and follow the opinion that even today people will likely suspect the homeowner of building his house using wage-earners (Ran). Furthermore, there is a concern that the homeowner, who knows that his house is being built on Shabbat, will end up supervising the construction and desecrating Shabbat. However, under pressing circumstances, for a great need, where there is a concern that if the non-Jews do not work on Shabbat the construction will not be completed, one may be lenient at the instruction of a halakhic authority.^[11]

09. Partnerships, Stocks, and Banks

If a Jew and a non-Jew have joint ownership of a store or factory, they must agree when they enter into the partnership that the non-Jew will be responsible for the store on Shabbat and all of that day’s earnings will be his, while the Jew will be responsible for the store on a designated weekday and all of that day’s earnings will be his. For the remainder of the week, they may split the earnings evenly. This assumes that the owners keep track of the store’s daily earnings so that these calculations can be made. If each day’s profit is roughly similar or cannot be determined, they may split all the profits evenly. Then it is assumed that each partner collects the earnings of the day when the store is his sole responsibility (SA 245:1; SAH ad loc. 5; MB ad loc. 5-6; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 2:65).^[12]

This is all, of course, on condition that it is known that they are partners, so there is no concern that observers will think that the non-Jew is working for the Jew. Alternatively, the partnership is permissible if it is common to have profit-sharing arrangements in this type of business.^[13]

One may purchase stock in a company that is managed by non-Jews and does business on Shabbat, because the non-Jews running the company on Shabbat are doing so for their own profit. The Jew’s profit is a byproduct (SA 245:4). Even when it is likely that the company employs Jews who desecrate Shabbat as part of their work, a stockholder is not responsible for this. Those Jews are desecrating Shabbat in any case, so buying stock does not directly abet their Shabbat desecration (see above, n. 9). However, if the company is run by Jews, or if the majority of its work is done by Jews who are desecrating Shabbat, a stockholder would become a partner in Shabbat desecration. Thus, one may not purchase stock in such a company.^[14]

If a bank is under Jewish ownership and has non-Jewish clients, it may enter into an agreement with a bank under non-Jewish ownership specifying that on Shabbat the non-Jewish bank will take care of all necessary transactions for the Jewish bank’s non-Jewish clients. The non-Jewish bank is not viewed as working for Jews on Shabbat; since it profits from each transaction, it is viewed as working for its own profit (Melamed Le-ho’il 1:33).^[15]

01. Principles Behind the Prohibition of Benefiting from Melakha Done on Shabbat

The Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat. The Sages added a protective fence by prohibiting deriving benefit from melakha done on Shabbat (ma’aseh Shabbat), as it is improper to benefit on Shabbat from Shabbat desecration. Whether the melakha was done knowingly (be–mezid) or unknowingly (be-shogeg), it is forbidden for any Jew to benefit from the melakha for the rest of that Shabbat. Some maintain that if the melakha was done be-shogeg, one may benefit from it. Some rely on this opinion under pressing circumstances (as explained in the next section). For our purposes, shogeg means that one was aware of his actions but forgot that it was Shabbat or was unaware that this act is a forbidden melakha on Shabbat; we have translated it, here and elsewhere, as “unknowing.”

After Shabbat, anyone may benefit from a melakha that was done on Shabbat except for the perpetrator, if he did it be-mezid, who may never benefit from it (SA 318:1, as explained in section 7 below).

If a small child performed a melakha on Shabbat on behalf of an adult, during Shabbat no one may benefit from it. On Saturday night, anyone may benefit once enough time has passed that the melakha could have been completed after Shabbat. If the child did the melakha for his own sake, an adult may benefit from it on Shabbat (above, 24:4).

If a non-Jew did melakha on Shabbat for a Jew, no Jew may benefit from it until enough time has elapsed after Shabbat for the melakha to have been completed, so that no one benefits from melakha done on Shabbat and no one profits from work done by a non-Jew on Shabbat (above, ch. 25 n. 2). If a non-Jew did a melakha for himself, a Jew may benefit from it on Shabbat (above, 25:2). In some cases, one may hint to a non-Jew to do melakha on Shabbat (above 25:3). For the sake of a mitzva, or to avoid great loss or suffering, one may ask a non-Jew to do a rabbinically prohibited melakha (25:4).

02. The Prohibition of Benefiting from a Melakha Performed on Shabbat

As we have seen, if a Jew knowingly performs a melakha on Shabbat, neither he nor any other Jew may benefit from it during Shabbat. Even if he did the melakha unknowingly, according to most poskim no one may benefit from it, because the Sages did not want any Jew to benefit from melakha done on Shabbat (SA 318:1). Others maintain that only if the melakha was done knowingly is it forbidden to benefit from it on Shabbat; in contrast, if the melakha was done unknowingly, one may benefit from it. Some allow one to rely on this opinion when necessary (MB 318:7). A non-observant Jew who is aware that it is Shabbat and that the action he is taking may be prohibited is considered to be transgressing knowingly. Even those who are lenient maintain that one may not benefit from his melakha on Shabbat.^[1]

Therefore, if a Jew turned on a light on Shabbat, neither he nor any other Jew may benefit from the light. As we have already seen, some maintain that under pressing circumstances, as long as the light was turned on unknowingly, one may benefit from it. Under normal circumstances, though, or if the light was turned on knowingly, one may not benefit from it.

Nevertheless, if one could have engaged in a certain activity with difficulty even without the light, one may also engage in this activity after the light is turned on. For example, if a light in a stairwell was turned on on Shabbat, as long as one could have ascended the stairs in the dark, one may do so in the light. However, one should not run up the stairs, as this would constitute taking advantage of the light. If a bathroom light was turned on on Shabbat, one may still use the bathroom, since one could have done so without light as well. However, if one could not have arranged certain items in one’s home without the light, one may not arrange them using the light. If there was originally enough light to read, even with difficulty, and then an additional light was turned on, one may continue reading even though it has become easier.

If a light in a room was on and one knowingly turned it off, one may sleep in the room. Even though it is now easier to sleep there, it is permitted, since there is no direct benefit from the melakha; it simply removed an impediment to sleep.

If a Jew turned on a radio or music player on Shabbat, one may not benefit by listening to it. However, if it would be inconvenient to leave the room, he need not do so, since the sound was turned on against his wishes, and he does not want to benefit from it. Even if a non-Jew turned on such a device, one still may not benefit from it, both because it is a weekday activity and because it detracts from the honor due Shabbat (above 22:19).

One is not obligated to stay out of his room because his roommate sinned by turning on the heat in their shared room. However, le-khatĥila he should try to prevent his roommate from transgressing. If he was unsuccessful, he should have in mind not to benefit from the prohibited action. He should not move toward the heater in order to warm up. Rather, he should remain in his usual place. If he benefits against his will, he is not transgressing. If he can open a window in order to avoid benefiting from the heat, this is preferable (based on Rema 276:1; AHS ad loc. 4; MB ad loc. 11-13).^[2]

Some maintain that one must not even fulfill a mitzva through a melakha that was performed on Shabbat. Others maintain that since mitzvot were not given for our benefit, doing a mitzva cannot be considered deriving benefit from a melakha. In their opinion, if a light was turned on during Shabbat, one may study Torah or pray by its light. One who wishes to follow this leniency has an opinion to rely on. However, if food was cooked on Shabbat, all agree that one may not eat it. Even though eating it would fulfill the mitzva of oneg Shabbat, since the way one fulfills this mitzva is by experiencing pleasure, it would violate the Sages’ decree forbidding benefit from a melakha done on Shabbat. Similarly, if a light was turned on during Shabbat, one may not eat by its light.^[3]

03. Cases In Which Deriving Benefit Is Permitted

The prohibition on deriving benefit on Shabbat from the unknowing performance of a melakha applies only to a case of a melakha that is prohibited by Torah law. In contrast, if a rabbinically prohibited action was done unknowingly, one may benefit from it on Shabbat. Nevertheless, if it was done knowingly, it has the same status as a Torah prohibition: one may benefit from it only after Shabbat (MB 318:3 and BHL ad loc.; Yalkut Yosef 318:3). For example, the Sages prohibited separating teruma, ma’aser, and ĥalla on Shabbat, because it resembles tikun (fixing or improving) of the produce. If one unknowingly performed the separation on Shabbat, the “improved” produce may be eaten on Shabbat, but if he did this knowingly, it may not be eaten until after Shabbat (MB 339:25; above 22:5).

If one unknowingly turned on an electrical appliance without a heating element (e.g., a fan, air conditioner, or refrigerator), since some maintain that this action is not prohibited by Torah law, one who wishes to be lenient and benefit from the appliance has an opinion on which to rely. However, if one turned on a heater with metal heating coils or a light bulb with an incandescent filament, he has definitely transgressed a Torah prohibition. Thus, even if it was done unknowingly, he may not benefit from the results of his action on Shabbat. In the case of the heater, he should open the window or leave the room to avoid benefiting from the melakha.^[4]

If one performed a melakha obliviously (mitasek), there is no prohibition on deriving benefit from it, since the melakha had no intent. This is true even if the melakha is prohibited by Torah law. For example, if one absentmindedly brushed his hand or leaned against a light switch and turned it on, one may derive benefit from it.

There is a difference between shogeg and mitasek. As noted, shogeg means that one was aware of his actions but forgot that it was Shabbat or was unaware that this act is a forbidden melakha on Shabbat. When the Temple stood, one who did a melakha be-shogeg was obligated to bring a sin offering. In contrast, mitasek means that one did a melakha obliviously, without being aware of his actions. Such an act did not obligate its perpetrator to bring an offering. Since mitasek is less severe than shogeg, there is no prohibition to benefit from what was done obliviously.^[5]

However, if one absentmindedly turned on a light out of habit, as he does all week long when entering a room, he is considered shogeg. Even though he was not thinking explicitly about what he was doing, nevertheless since the intent of his action was to turn on the light, he is considered shogeg and one may not derive benefit from his melakha.

04. Benefiting from an Action That Did Not Alter an Item

Some say that if a melakha did not physically alter an object, like if it was transported from a public domain to a private domain, the item does not become prohibited, and one may benefit from it on Shabbat in the private domain (Rabbeinu Yona and Ritva). The same would apply to food that was transported via motor vehicle on Shabbat; since the food itself underwent no change, it would not be prohibited. However, others maintain that there is no difference between types of melakhot (Tosafot, Ramban, and Rashba). Even if the melakha did not alter the food at all, one may not benefit from it on Shabbat if it was transported in a prohibited fashion. In practice, le-khatĥila it is proper to be stringent, but under pressing circumstances one may rely on those who are lenient, particularly if the melakha was done unknowingly.^[6]

If a melakha that was performed on Shabbat enables an additional, permissible action to occur, one may benefit from the permissible action. For example, if a hammer was fixed on Shabbat, it may not be used, even for permitted purposes like cracking nuts. However, if one violated this prohibition and cracked nuts with the hammer, he may benefit from the nuts, since the act of cracking the nuts is not intrinsically forbidden.

If a locked door was unlocked in a forbidden fashion, such as with the use of an electronic key card, some say that one may not enter the room through that opening, since the door was unlocked in a prohibited fashion. Others maintain that one may enter, since unlocking the door did not create anything new; it simply removed an impediment to entering. Be-di’avad, in a time of need, one may be lenient. If a refrigerator door was opened and the refrigerator light went on, one may remove food from the refrigerator (see above, 17:9).

If a Jew who does not observe Shabbat approached an automatic door and thus caused it to open, one may not enter through it. Only under pressing circumstances may one be lenient. If another Jew passed by and unintentionally caused the door to open, one may enter through it (see above, 17:11).^[7]

05. If One Did an Action of Disputed Permissibility

The prohibition on benefiting from a melakha done on Shabbat only applies when the action is clearly prohibited. However, if the action is the subject of dispute, even if general practice follows the stricter opinion, one may benefit be-di’avad from the melakha. This is because the entire foundation of the prohibition on benefiting from work done on Shabbat is rabbinic, and since we are lenient whenever there is a uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinic rule, we follow the lenient position in the dispute over whether this act is prohibited (Pri Megadim; MB 318:2).

For example, if one cooks raw meat, it is clear that he has transgressed, and the food may not be eaten on Shabbat. However, if one took partially-cooked food that is edible under pressing circumstances and placed it on a fire until it cooked fully, it may be eaten on Shabbat. Even though the halakha follows the opinion that doing so is prohibited by Torah law (SA 318:4), since there is an opinion that if the food was already edible, cooking it further is not prohibited (above, ch. 10 n. 1), if one transgressed and cooked such food on Shabbat, it may be eaten.

Similarly, if one took cold soup that had been cooked before Shabbat and heated it on a plata on Shabbat, although many maintain that he has violated Torah law (SA 318:4), it may be eaten, because Rambam allows doing this (above, 10:5-6).

Let us say one took a tea bag, put it in a glass, and poured boiling water over it directly from an urn, which is a kli rishon. Doing so is prohibited because, according to most poskim, pouring boiling water from a kli rishon cooks the outer layer of the food (above, 10:7-8). Nevertheless, be-di’avad one may drink the tea, because some maintain that one does not violate Bishul by pouring hot water over a tea bag, only by placing the tea bag directly into a kli rishon (Rashbam, Ramban, Rashba).

06. Power Outages

If there is a power outage, whether local or citywide, Jewish technicians may do what is necessary to restore power to all the area’s residents. This is because many areas have sick people whose lives would be at risk without the electric equipment they need. Because of the possibility of loss of life, the area’s electricity supply must be restored. Moreover, since the restoration is permissible, all residents of the neighborhood may benefit from it (above, 17:5). If there was food on the plata that cooled down while the electricity was off and then warmed up again when the electricity was restored, it may be eaten even if the food was not fully cooked beforehand, and only finished cooking after the electricity was restored, since it was cooked in a permissible manner.

If a small area lost electricity and it is clear that there is no risk to life involved, one may not restore the electricity. If the electricity was nevertheless restored, and as a result a light came on, one may not benefit from it. This means that anything that could not have been done without the light may not be done using the light (as explained in section 2 above). If food warmed up as a result of the electricity that was restored impermissibly, one must wait until it cools off before eating it. If food finished cooking as a result of this transgression, one may not eat it (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 32 n. 182; see above, 10:3).

07. Benefiting after Shabbat from a Melakha Performed on Shabbat

As we have learned, one who performs a melakha on Shabbat be-shogeg may benefit from it immediately after Shabbat, as may other Jews. If he transgressed be-mezid, he may never benefit from it, though others may benefit from it after Shabbat. For example, if one knowingly cooked food on Shabbat, he may never eat it. Others, including those he cooked for, may eat the food after Shabbat (MB 318:5). Similarly, if one built a house on Shabbat, others may benefit from it after Shabbat, but he may never use it. However, he may sell the house to others (MB 318:4).

One who knowingly laundered his clothes on Shabbat may not wear them even after Shabbat, because one may never benefit from a melakha that he performed knowingly on Shabbat. A solution in such a case is to wash the clothes again during the week, after which he may wear them (Ben Ish Ĥai, Year 2, Vayeĥi 19).

If a non-observant Jew regularly performs melakha on Shabbat for other Jews, they may not benefit from this melakha even after Shabbat. Only when a melakha is done occasionally may those on whose behalf the melakha was done benefit from it after Shabbat, as there is no concern that they will ask him to desecrate Shabbat again so that they can benefit after Shabbat. However, if he does this melakha regularly, they may never benefit from it. For example, one may not buy bread from one who regularly bakes it on Shabbat in order to sell it after Shabbat, even if all the ingredients are kosher. Eating it encourages him to continue desecrating Shabbat, and they would take part in his transgression. Similarly, no Jew may eat at a restaurant where a Jewish chef cooks on Shabbat for customers who will come after Shabbat.

One may not watch sports games or other televised events after Shabbat if these events were filmed by Jews on Shabbat. Since the filming involved intentional Shabbat desecration on the part of the videographers for the sake of their viewers after Shabbat, the viewers may not benefit from this Shabbat desecration. The same applies to fruits and vegetables brought to market on Sunday. If it is known for certain that they were picked by Jews on Shabbat, no Jew may eat them.^[8]

Technically, one may buy dairy products from a dairy farm that desecrates Shabbat when milking the cows (see above 20:4), because the milk produced on Shabbat is mixed with the milk produced on other days. Thus, for any bag of milk that one buys, it is uncertain whether it was milked on Shabbat. Since the prohibition of benefiting from melakha done on Shabbat is rabbinic, in cases of uncertainty we may be lenient. This also applies to a factory that produces paper all week long, including Shabbat. Technically, one may buy its paper. Nevertheless, it is always preferable to buy products from factories and companies that observe Shabbat. If all Shabbat observers were to unite in order to strengthen Shabbat observance, it would be possible as a temporary measure to forbid any benefit from the products of factories that desecrate Shabbat (see Yalkut Yosef 318:72, 74-5; Orĥot Shabbat 25:57-61).

08. After Shabbat

Starting half an hour after Shabbat ends, one may listen to news broadcasts produced by Jews, since sufficient time has elapsed for the producers to have collected the material and write the stories after Shabbat. However, one who listens to the news immediately after Shabbat transgresses the prohibition on benefiting from melakha done on Shabbat. Starting fifteen minutes after Shabbat, one may listen to other types of programs, because in that amount of time a news program can be prepared for broadcast. Even if the technicians and newscasters live far from the studio and desecrated Shabbat to travel to the studio, since the listeners gain nothing from this desecration, it is not forbidden to listen to the broadcast.

When Shabbat is over in Israel, one may not listen to broadcasts by Jews in America, since Shabbat there ends between seven and ten hours later than in Israel. Thus, one who listens in Israel would be benefiting from the Shabbat desecration of American Jews. For the same reason, one who is in Israel must wait approximately two hours after Shabbat ends before listening to Jewish broadcasts from Western Europe. In contrast, one may listen to broadcasts produced by non-Jews immediately after Shabbat in Israel ends.

One may travel by bus starting half an hour after Shabbat, as that is a reasonable amount of time for the bus driver to reach one’s stop without having desecrated Shabbat. If the bus route is so long that it is clear that the driver started the route when it was still Shabbat, some forbid riding the bus (Minĥat Yitzĥak 9:39; Orĥot Shabbat 25:62), and others permit (Mishneh Halakhot 7:50). Many maintain that there is technically no prohibition because one who boards the bus half an hour after Shabbat does not benefit from the fact that the bus traveled on Shabbat; nevertheless, they continue, it is proper to be stringent as a protective measure (Tzitz Eliezer 13:48; SSK 59:9; Yalkut Yosef 318:76).

09. Interacting with Non-Observant Jews and Lifnei Iver

The Torah commands: “Do not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Vayikra 19:14), meaning that one may not cause another person to transgress (MT, Laws of a Murderer 12:14). This commandment is known as “lifnei iver” (“before the blind”). If the other person would have transgressed even without his aid, many maintain that the accessory has not transgressed the Torah prohibition on causing others to sin. However, he has transgressed the rabbinic prohibition of aiding (mesayei’a) a transgressor. Therefore, one may not allow a non-observant Jew to borrow his car or radio on Shabbat.

Similarly, one may not give directions to a Jew who is driving on Shabbat and stops to ask for directions, even if the driver may actually end up spending more time driving without directions. There are two reasons for this. First, one may not aid a transgressor. Second, one may not speak on Shabbat about things that are prohibited on Shabbat (above 22:9). It is proper to apologize to the driver and explain that giving him directions is forbidden on Shabbat.^[9]

An observant soldier may leave the light on in the bathroom before Shabbat, even though he knows that at some point a non-observant soldier will turn it off. One does not need to waive his right to leave the light on just so that his non-observant friend does not transgress by extinguishing the light. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that his non-observant friend would turn the light on and off in any case (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in Ha-tzava Ka-halakha 31:5).

One may invite a non-observant Jew for an entire Shabbat, even if he knows that after Friday night dinner his friend will drive home. This is as long as one honestly offers him a place to stay, such that the invitation does not necessitate Shabbat desecration. Although some forbid this, one may be lenient when one’s intent is to spread love among Jews, bringing people closer to Torah and to each other. However, sometimes it is proper to be stringent for educational reasons.

Some are stringent and forbid a synagogue to host the celebration of a bar mitzva from a non-observant family when it is clear that some of the guests will drive to the synagogue. They maintain that the synagogue’s agreement to host the bar mitzva is like accepting and aiding Shabbat desecration. Others permit it on the grounds that these guests would be desecrating Shabbat in any case. Furthermore, the synagogue members did not ask anyone to drive, and in fact they would prefer that people come on foot. In practice, as long as the non-observant guests are respectful of the synagogue and are careful not to desecrate Shabbat inside it, the synagogue may host the bar mitzva. Nevertheless, according to many, it is still preferable to advise the family to have the boy called up to the Torah on a Monday or Thursday during Minĥa instead of on Shabbat.

There is a similar disagreement about hosting a brit mila on Shabbat when it is clear that many family members will desecrate Shabbat by driving to the brit. In practice, a mohel may perform the brit on Shabbat in this situation.^[10]

10. Keeping Websites and Vending Machines Open on Shabbat

If a Jew owns a vending machine, and most of its users are Jewish, he must disable it for Shabbat in order to avoid aiding their desecration of Shabbat. If most of the customers are non-Jews, he need not disable it (see SSK 29:28-29 and n. 75). The money that the non-Jews put in the vending machine is not considered payment for work done on Shabbat, since they are paying primarily for the product and not to operate the machine itself.

Some maintain that websites designed for a Jewish audience must be disabled on Shabbat so that they do not aid transgression. Since this is difficult practically, the site owner is not obligated to take them down; after all, the site visitors can easily desecrate Shabbat by visiting other sites, and as long as the site owner has done nothing to promote his site on Shabbat, there is no prohibition. However, if the site is primarily commercial, and most prospective customers are Jews, it means that the owner of the site benefits from the Shabbat activity, so he must make efforts to disable it for Shabbat. If this is very difficult, it is not obligatory. Since those who access the site are already desecrating Shabbat knowingly and regularly, some maintain that the prohibition of aiding someone’s transgression does not apply. In contrast, if most of the customers are non-Jews, it is not necessary to disable the website for Shabbat. The purchases made on Shabbat are not considered payment for work done on Shabbat since the work to set up the site was done during the week.^[11]

01. The Principles of Piku’aĥ Nefesh (Saving a Life)

Saving a life overrides Shabbat, as the Torah states: “Keep My decrees and laws, which a person shall do and live by; I am the Lord” (Vayikra 18:5). The Sages expound: “‘live by’ – and not die by” (Yoma 85b); the mitzvot of the Torah were given so that people may live by them, not die to fulfill them.^[1]

We desecrate Shabbat to attempt a rescue, even if the chances of its success are slim. Thus, we desecrate Shabbat to bring someone medication, even if it works in only a small percentage of cases, and even if it is an experimental drug that might not be effective. However, we do not desecrate Shabbat to acquire a drug if there is no substantive reason to think that it might help (MA 328:1; Rema, YD 155:3; Orĥot Shabbat 20:7).

In a case of uncertainty, we still desecrate Shabbat. For example, if a building collapses, and we do not know whether anyone was inside, and even if someone was inside, we do not know whether he is still alive, we clear away the rubble on Shabbat despite the uncertainty (SA 329:2-5). The act of clearing rubble (“mefakĥin et ha-gal”) lends its name to the general category of piku’aĥ nefesh, which overrides Shabbat.  

Even if a rescue attempt fails, God rewards all who made an effort. Similarly, if several people drove to different places to obtain a certain medicine that someone needed, they all receive divine reward, even though some of them traveled for naught (Menaĥot 64a; SA 328:15).

Even though one may desecrate Shabbat to save a sick person, one who knows that he will need to care for a dangerously sick person on Shabbat should prepare as much as possible beforehand to minimize the melakhot he will perform on Shabbat, since one must prepare for Shabbat before Shabbat (MB 344:11). If it is uncertain whether one will need to care for a sick person on Shabbat, it is good for him to prepare before Shabbat, though it is not obligatory (MB 330:1). For instance, if one sometimes is called upon to care for the wounded, he should preferably prepare adhesive and cloth bandages before Shabbat so that he will not have to cut them on Shabbat.

It is good for a woman who is due to give birth to prepare her hospital bag before Shabbat. If the expectant couple is planning to drive to the hospital in their car, they should preferably remove unnecessary items from the car before Shabbat. However, the expectant mother does not need to spend the Shabbatot near her due date close to the hospital, as that is an excessive burden that one is not required to undertake on Friday. If she has to travel to the hospital on Shabbat, she may do so, since saving a life overrides Shabbat (SSK 32:34 and 36:6-7).

02. Determining Danger

Any illness that doctors normally consider dangerous or that regular people would make haste to save a patient suffering from it is deemed dangerous halakhically, even if only a small minority of people die because of it, and therefore justifies desecrating Shabbat. Thus, one may drive a woman in labor to the hospital, even though in a clear majority of cases she can safely give birth at home (Magid Mishneh 2:11). However, one may not desecrate Shabbat on account of illnesses and risks that are generally not considered dangerous (Shevet Mi-Yehuda 1:19:2; SSK ch. 32 nn. 2 and 23).

The Sages defined certain conditions as dangerous. These include internal injuries (severe pains or wounds or internal bleeding); injuries on the back of the hand and foot (that is, infections and dangerous cuts); very high fevers; scorpion or snake bites; and eye afflictions (SA 328:3-9). The Sages determined all of these cases based on experience, and today’s doctors agree in principle, though they use different terminology to describe the conditions. This is not the place to expand on the definition of a life-threatening condition, but there is a general principle: If those present think that the ill or injured party might be in mortal danger, they immediately do whatever is necessary to help him. If they need to call a doctor, they should do so; if they need to drive him to the hospital, they should do so.

When the people nearby do not know whether the patient might be in danger, they should ask a doctor, nurse, or medic in the vicinity, or they should call a doctor. If the doctor thinks that the patient might be in mortal danger, even if the patient claims that his condition is not dangerous, they must heed the doctor (SA 328:10 and 618:1, 5).

If the patient maintains that he is in danger, then even if the doctor thinks he is not, we must desecrate Shabbat and take him to the hospital to be examined. This is because “The heart knows its own bitterness” (Mishlei 14:10), meaning that sometimes only the patient can assess his own condition. Similarly, if a sick person demands a certain medicine or treatment that, based on his experience, could save his life, we heed him (SA 618:1). We only rely on the patient’s intuition on condition that it makes some sense. However, if his illness is known and he demands a treatment that the doctors believe is ineffective, we heed the doctors (BHL 328:10, s.v. “ve-rofe”). Similarly, if the sick person is known to be hypochondriac or excessively fearful and a medically knowledgeable person is certain that he is not in any danger, we do not desecrate Shabbat on his account.

If, in an effort to be pious, one asks a rabbi whether to desecrate Shabbat in order to help someone in mortal danger, he is a killer, for while he is asking, the patient’s situation may deteriorate, and the Torah commands us: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Vayikra 19:16). Furthermore, the rabbi whose students ask such questions is reprehensible, as he should have taught them that saving a life overrides Shabbat (y. Yoma 8:5; MB 328:6).

03. For Whom Do We Desecrate Shabbat?

The Sages offered a rationale for desecrating Shabbat to save someone’s life: “Desecrate one Shabbat so that he will observe many Shabbatot” (Yoma 85b). However, in practice, even when it is clear that the person being saved will not observe Shabbat, one is commanded to desecrate Shabbat to save him because the Torah strives to increase life. Therefore, we desecrate Shabbat to save a mentally impaired person (shoteh), who is exempt from observing the mitzvot. Similarly, we desecrate Shabbat for someone who is unconscious and about to die, in order to prolong his life for a short while (BHL 329:4, s.v. “ela”).

We desecrate Shabbat in order to save an unborn fetus, even if forty days have not yet passed since conception (Behag; Ritva; BHL 330:7, end of s.v. “o”). Similarly, we desecrate Shabbat to save a premature baby. Although in the past it was forbidden to desecrate Shabbat to save a baby born in the eighth month, whose nails and hair had not yet grown in, as it was certain that it would not survive, nowadays, with the improvement of medicine and the invention of the incubator, whenever doctors assess that the baby has a chance of long-term survival, we desecrate Shabbat to save him. (See SA 330:7-8; SSK 36:12 and n. 26.)

Technically, a Jew may not desecrate Shabbat to save a non-Jew, since one may only desecrate Shabbat for the sake of someone who is himself commanded to keep Shabbat. However, in practice, this rule only applies when another non-Jew is present to save his fellow non-Jew. If no other non-Jew is present, one must treat the non-Jew, even if this requires desecrating Shabbat. Since we want non-Jews to save Jews, we must save them as well. Thus, saving a non-Jew’s life is included in the category of piku’aĥ nefesh.^[2]

04. Using a Non-Jew or Child to Minimize Shabbat Desecration

As we have seen (above, 25:1), a Jew who performs melakha on Shabbat violates Torah law, whereas a Jew who asks a non-Jew to perform melakha for him violates rabbinic law. Similarly, a minor who performs melakha on Shabbat only transgresses rabbinically (above, 24:1). Consequently, it would seem, at first glance, that when it is necessary to do melakha in order to save a sick person, it is preferable to ask a non-Jew or a child to do it, thereby minimizing Shabbat desecration. However, the Sages stated: “These things should not be done by non-Jews or children, but rather by adult Jews” (Yoma 84b; SA 328:12). This means that even if a non-Jew or a child is present, one should not ask him to do the melakha. Only an adult Jew should do it. Rishonim offer two possible explanations for this rule. First, it is possible that a non-Jew or a child will hesitate and not act aggressively enough to help the sick person (Tosafot). Second, even when it is clear that they will act aggressively enough, we are concerned that those present might incorrectly conclude that an adult Jew may not desecrate Shabbat in order to help someone who is dangerously ill. Then, if faced with a similar situation sometime in the future, they might delay helping in order to look for a non-Jew or a child. In the meantime, the sick person might die (Ran).

Therefore, the Rishonim write that if many people are available to help the sick person, it is a mitzva for the most respected person present to do so, thus making it clear to everyone that saving a life overrides Shabbat and that there is no need to seek ways to minimize the melakha (Ri’az; Tashbetz; MB 328:34).

If the situation is less pressured, and it is easy to find a non-Jew or a child to do the necessary melakhot, and doing so will not cause any delay, then even though le-khatĥila an adult Jew may do whatever melakha is necessary to save a life, it is optimal greater enhancement to minimize Shabbat desecration by having a non-Jew or a child perform the melakhot (SSK 38:2). However, if there is even the slightest, tiniest shadow of a doubt that using a non-Jew or a child will delay the provision of lifesaving treatment, either now or in the future, it is better for an adult Jew to do the melakha.^[3]

05. Using a Shinui to Minimize Shabbat Desecration

When dealing with saving lives on Shabbat, a serious dilemma arises. On the one hand, it would seem to be preferable to use a shinui when doing whatever melakhot are necessary. After all, when a melakha is done in the normal way, one violates Torah law, while when it is done with a shinui, one transgresses only rabbinically (above 9:3). On the other hand, when it comes to saving a life on Shabbat, the Sages proclaimed that “One who acts quickly is to be praised” (Yoma 84b; SA 328:2). If so, it would seem preferable to refrain from placing constraints upon one who is attempting to save a life. Rather, he should act as he would on a weekday, as efforts such as minimizing Shabbat desecration or attempting to do the melakhot with a shinui are likely to slow him down. This is especially true if he thinks it is necessary to consult with a rabbi about how to act when a person’s life is in danger.

In practice, the basic principle is that rescue efforts must be undertaken in the best and fastest way possible. If trying to do melakhot with a shinui is likely to delay treatment, it is preferable to do them in the normal fashion, without any shinui. This is because according to halakha, the rescuer may do melakhot in the normal way, since saving a life overrides Shabbat. Nevertheless, when it is clear that a shinui will not hamper the rescue in any way, it is preferable le-khatĥila to make use of a shinui. Therefore, it is advisable for doctors, nurses, and emergency medical workers to learn how to minimize Shabbat desecration while saving a person’s life.

There is a similar dilemma regarding treatments normally administered to a gravely ill patient during the week, some of which are not necessary to prevent his death. Since the caregivers do not know which treatments are truly necessary and which are not, they must treat the patient just as they would treat him during the week. However, one who understands medicine and knows for certain that a specific melakha is not necessary to save the patient, or that the treatment can be postponed until after Shabbat, he should avoid doing the melakha on Shabbat (SA 328:4). Palliative treatments are administered on Shabbat even when it is clear that they do not treat the disease, because when the patient’s pain is reduced, he will have more strength to overcome his illness.^[4]

06. Traveling to the Hospital

When rushing a patient to the hospital, one drives normally, as he would during the week. He should not try to drive with a shinui, as this may cause delay or be dangerous. One may travel to the hospital in a private vehicle or call an ambulance. All items necessary for the patient or woman in labor – vital medications, medical documents, and proper identification – may be carried from the house to the car, even in an area without an eruv. Even items that are not vital to saving lives but are important to the patient or his chaperone – including changes of clothing, food, and books – may be taken to the hospital. If there is no eruv, such items should be carried with a shinui. In addition, the person carrying them should walk directly from the house to the car without stopping, so that the act of carrying will qualify as a shvut di-shvut, which is permitted in a case of great necessity. Muktzeh items may not be brought, but if they were packed in the hospital bag together with necessary items, one may bring the bag. Muktzeh items that will be greatly needed after Shabbat – such as money and a cellphone – may be placed in the bag on Shabbat using a shinui and brought to the hospital along with the bag.^[5]

After arriving at the hospital and parking in a place that does not interfere with the arrival of other vehicles, it is, at first glance, forbidden to turn off the car. After all, thus far all travel was for the patient’s sake; in contrast, one turns off the car for the sake of the car itself – to lock it and to make sure that the batteries do not die. Therefore, when possible, one should ask a non-Jew to turn off the car’s motor and headlights and then to lock the car.

If no non-Jew is available, or if searching for one is likely to delay attending to the patient, one may turn off the car and headlights with a shinui, so that the prohibition is only rabbinic. For example, he may grasp the key or press the button that operates the headlights with the back of his fingers. He should also lock the car with a shinui, for example, by pushing the remote control with the back of his fingers. Then, even though the headlights will go on as a result, it will have been done with a shinui. The reason all this is permitted is that the Sages allowed one to take such steps at the end of a rescue effort to ensure that people are willing to do what needs to be done at the beginning. After all, if a driver knows that he will not be able to turn off and lock his car upon arrival at the hospital, the next time he might avoid taking the patient to the hospital altogether. Therefore, the Sages permitted transgressing any rabbinic prohibitions to make it easier for those individuals helping to save lives.^[6]