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06. Who Is Obligated in Mishlo’aĥ Manot and Matanot La-evyonim?

Every Jew is obligated in mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim. Even though women are ordinarily exempt from positive time-bound mitzvot, they must fulfill the mitzvot of Purim, since they too participated in the miracle. For reasons of modesty, one should take care that women send mishlo’aĥ manot only to women and men send only to men. However, one does not need to be particular about this when it comes to matanot la-evyonim, as giving charity does not engender excessive familiarity (Rema 695:4 mentions concern for an accidental betrothal through mishlo’aĥ manot).

Even a married woman must fulfill these mitzvot. Therefore, a married couple must send two mishloĥei manot – one from the husband and one from the wife – and each mishlo’aĥ manot must contain at least two portions of food. Even though the main objective of sending mishlo’aĥ manot is to foster friendship between the sender and the recipient, it seems that it is unnecessary to specify explicitly that one mishlo’aĥ manot is from the husband and the other is from the wife. This does not detract from the goal of fostering friendship, because it is clear that the mishlo’aĥ manot are from both of them, since they are a married couple. The friendship engendered will thus extend to both of them.

For matanot la-evyonim, a married couple must give the equivalent of four gifts – two from the husband and two from the wife. It is unnecessary for the wife to give her gifts in person; her husband can distribute them on her behalf. A man may also give these four gifts to two poor people, each one receiving one gift from him and one gift from her. The custom today is to give the equivalent of four gifts to a gabbai tzedaka, who then distributes them to two poor people on the couple’s behalf.

Children who have reached the age at which they are obligated to observe mitzvot are obligated in mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim, even though they are still dependent on their parents for support. Since the purpose of mishlo’aĥ manot is to increase love among Jews, the child must send them explicitly in his or her name. Regarding matanot la-evyonim, however, the parents may give on their child’s behalf.

It is proper to train children who have reached the age of ĥinukh to observe these mitzvot. Some do so by sending them to deliver the mishlo’aĥ manot. Others even give their children food items of their own, so that they can then send to their friends. Regarding matanot la-evyonim, some parents give their children money to give to poor people, while others give money to the poor themselves on behalf of their children. In such a case, the parents educate their children to observe mitzvot by telling them what they did.^[5]

A poor person who is supported by charity is still obligated in mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim. If he has only enough food for his own Purim meal, he should trade with a friend, meaning that each one should give the other the contents of his meal. This way, they both fulfill the mitzva of mishlo’aĥ manot. They should do the same thing regarding matanot la-evyonim (sa 695:4, mb 694:1-2).

[5]. The obligation of women in these mitzvot is explained in Rema 695:4. However, Pri Ĥadash states that they are exempt, since it says in regard to mishlo’aĥ manot, “ish le-re’ehu” (lit. “a man to his friend”). The Vilna Gaon seems to concur, but the vast majority of poskim maintain that women are obligated in these mitzvot, because they too participated in the miracle of Purim. So states Sha’arei Teshuva 695:9 in the name of Responsa Shvut Yaakov 1:45 and She’eilat Yaavetz 1:108. ma 695:12 notes his observation that married women are not careful in their observance of these mitzvot, perhaps because of the principle that one’s wife is considered like himself. He concludes, however, that women should be stringent in this regard. Eliya Rabba, mb 695:25, Ĥayei Adam 155:33, and ahs 695:18 all concur.

Eshel Avraham (Buczacz) states that children are exempt from matanot la-evyonim, because they have no money of their own; we educate them only in the mitzva of mishlo’aĥ manot. Pri Megadim and Siddur Beit Yaakov, however, maintain that one must also educate children in the mitzva of matanot la-evyonim.

A mourner, even during shiva, is obligated in all the mitzvot of Purim, including mishlo’aĥ manot. According to Sephardic custom, one may send mishlo’aĥ manot to a mourner. According to Ashkenazic custom, however, one must not send mishlo’aĥ manot to a mourner during the entire year of mourning for a parent or during the shloshim period for other relatives. When one member of a couple is in mourning, one may send mishlo’aĥ manot to that person’s spouse.

07. The Proper Time for Matanot La-evyonim and Mishlo’aĥ Manot

One must send mishlo’aĥ manot and give matanot la-evyonim on Purim day, as it says, “To observe them as days of feasting and joy, and as an occasion for sending gifts to one another and presents to the poor” (Esther 9:22). If one gives these gifts on the night of Purim, he does not fulfill his obligation.^[6]

If one cannot find poor people to receive matanot la-evyonim on Purim, he should set aside his gifts and save them until he finds poor people. Thus, he fulfills the mitzva by the very act of setting the gifts aside. Similarly, a gabbai tzedaka who does not manage, on Purim, to distribute all the funds he collected should distribute them to the poor after Purim (sa 694:4).

However, the mitzva of mishlo’aĥ manot applies only on the day of Purim itself, as that is when there is a mitzva to increase love and happiness between friends. Therefore, if one is alone on Purim and has no one to receive his mishlo’aĥ manot, he cannot compensate for the mitzva after Purim. But now that we have telephones and internet, one may call a friend or write an e-mail and ask him to send mishlo’aĥ manot on his behalf on Purim, thus fulfilling one’s obligation.

One who is concerned that he will not find poor people on Purim may give money to the gabbai tzedaka before Purim, but the giver must stipulate that he maintains ownership over the money until Purim. Then, the gabbai acts as his shali’aĥ and gives the money to two poor people on Purim day on his behalf. Similarly, one who will be alone on Purim may prepare mishlo’aĥ manot in advance, leave them with a friend, and appoint him as his shali’aĥ to give them to another friend on Purim, on his behalf.^[7]

[6]. Megilla 7b explains that one does not discharge his obligation to feast on Purim by eating at night, since the verse says, “To make them days of feasting and joy,” and since the mitzvot of mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim appear in the same verse, the same rule applies to both mitzvot. Rosh, Rashba, Rema 695:4, Vilna Gaon, and mb 695:22 concur. It goes without saying that if one gives these gifts before Purim, he does not discharge his obligation.

[7]. ma 694:1 quotes Ha-ma’or as saying that one must not give matanot la-evyonim before Purim, lest the recipients consume them before the holiday. This implies that if the poor people eat the food purchased with such gifts on Purim, the giver discharges his obligation. Pri Megadim ad loc. comes to the same conclusion. However, Maĥatzit Ha-shekel seems to maintain that one must give the gifts specifically on the day of Purim, and bhl 694:1 cites this opinion. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about what the law is in a case in which one sends mishlo’aĥ manot before Purim but they reach the recipient on Purim: Yad Aharon states that one fulfills one’s obligation in such a case, but Torah Lishma §188 maintains that one does not fulfill one’s obligation, because one must increase love on the day of Purim specifically. ahs 695:16 rules according to the latter opinion with regard to both mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim. There is further uncertainty in a case where one gives the gifts before Purim, telling the recipient that they are merely a deposit until the day of Purim. Mahari Algazi maintains that such a person fulfills his obligation, whereas Devar Eliyahu §69 maintains that he does not fulfill his obligation, because both types of gifts must be given on the day of Purim. If, however, one sends these items via a shali’aĥ on Purim, he discharges his obligations according to all opinions.

08. Between Mishlo’aĥ Manot and Matanot La-evyonim

The mitzva of mishlo’aĥ manot is designed to increase love and harmony between fellow Jews. Therefore, one who sends mishlo’aĥ manot to his friend anonymously does not fulfill his obligation. Matanot la-evyonim, on the other hand, is like charity and is designed to help the poor in the best possible manner. Therefore, when possible, it is preferable to give matanot la-evyonim anonymously.

One can fulfill the mitzvot of mishlo’aĥ manot or matanot la-evyonim by inviting one’s friend to the Purim meal. If one wants this meal to count as mishlo’aĥ manot, he should place two portions of food in front of his friend, simultaneously, and tell him that this is his mishlo’aĥ manot (Kaf Ha-ĥayim 695:42).

If he wants to fulfill the mitzva of matanot la-evyonim through this meal, it is preferable not to state this outright to the poor person, so that he receives the gift in a more respectable manner, with love and joy. Indeed, this is a very beautiful way to fulfill the mitzva. Similarly, one can anonymously give gifts to the poor in the form of mishlo’aĥ manot containing good and useful food, such that the poor person will not be embarrassed and will even think that the mishlo’aĥ manot was given to him out of love, not due to his poverty.^[8]

Rambam writes:

It is preferable for one so spend more liberally on his gifts to the poor than with his festive meal and with sending portions to his friends, for there is no greater or more glorious joy than gladdening the hearts of the poor, the orphans, the widows, and the converts. One who gladdens the hearts of these unfortunate people resembles the Divine Presence, as it says: “Reviving the spirits of the lowly, reviving the hearts of the contrite” (Yeshayahu 57:15). (mt, Laws of Megilla 2:17)

In other words, technically, everyone may decide how to prioritize his expenditures – in mishlo’aĥ manot and the se’uda or in matanot la-evyonim. However, one who wants to fulfill the mitzva according to the guidance of our Sages should, le-khatĥila, give precedence to spending more on matanot la-evyonim. Thus, one should calculate how much he will spend on mishlo’aĥ manot and the Purim meal and give more than that to the poor. One who gives ma’aser kesafim each month to the poor or to Torah students may include ma’aser kesafim in this calculation. Therefore, if, together with ma’aser kesafim, one gives more to the poor than he expends on mishlo’aĥ manot and the Purim meal, he has beautified the mitzva in accordance with the guidance of the Sages, and he will, consequently, be privileged to experience the “great and glorious joy” that Rambam mentioned.

[8]. Ketav Sofer, oĥ 141:4, states, based on Rema, that one who sends mishlo’aĥ manot anonymously does not fulfill his obligation. ahs 696:3 seems to concur with this view. It is worth adding that one who wishes to give matanot la-evyonim by sending food should find a way to send it anonymously, because if the poor person knows the sender’s identity, he will presumably want to reciprocate by sending his own mishlo’aĥ manot in return. Then, the poor person will not gain anything from the food sent to him. Nevertheless, if this actually occurs, the sender fulfills his obligation, be-di’avad, as we explained above, at the end of section 6, despite the fact that his good intention to help the poor person did not come to fruition.

According to some Aĥaronim, one cannot give both mishlo’aĥ manot and matanot la-evyonim to the same person.

09. The Mitzva to Rejoice and Eat a Se’uda

We are commanded to observe Purim as a day of feasting and joy. Even though the mitzva of rejoicing continues throughout the night and day of Purim, it reaches its climax at the se’uda, the festive meal. The proper way to express joy is through a large meal, during which the participants drink a good deal; conversely, the proper and most joyful way to drink is in context of a se’uda. Therefore, everyone is obligated to participate in one set meal on Purim, for feasting and joy. This meal must be conducted during the day; if one holds the meal at night, he does not discharge his obligation, as it says, “To observe them as days of feasting and joy” (Esther 9:22, Megilla 7b).

Even though the obligation is to conduct one festive meal during the day, there is nevertheless a mitzva to conduct a meal on the night of Purim, serving foods that bring joy, and to eat and drink a little more than usual. Some have a custom to eat seeds and legumes on the night of Purim, to commemorate the food that Daniel, his colleagues, and Esther ate in the king’s palace. All of the cooked foods were prohibited to them, so they ate seeds and legumes in order not to defile themselves by eating prohibited foods.

There is a mitzva to increase one’s joy throughout the night and day of Purim. The more one rejoices, the more he enhances the mitzva. Thus, the Jewish people have a custom to sing, dance, get together with friends, study Torah, eat good food, and drink beverages that make one happy throughout the holiday of Purim.^[9]

One must ideally prepare meat for the main se’uda during the day, because most people agree that eating meat makes one happy. One who has difficulty eating meat should try to eat poultry, as poultry brings people joy as well. If one cannot obtain poultry or does not like it, he should prepare other tasty foods and rejoice in eating them while drinking wine.

One must formalize the meal (kove’a se’uda) with bread, because according to some of the greatest poskim, a meal without bread is not considered a significant meal.^[10]

It is a mitzva to eat the meal together with others – family members or friends – in order to enhance its joy. After all, one who eats alone cannot rejoice properly (Shlah; mb 695:9).

There is a mitzva to engage somewhat in feasting and joy on the second day of Purim as well, as it says, “days of feasting and joy.” In other words, residents of Jerusalem should rejoice somewhat on the fourteenth of Adar, and people who live elsewhere should do the same on the fifteenth (Rema 695:2).

[9]. The mitzva to eat a se’uda is elaborated upon in Megilla 7b. By eating a meal, one fulfills the injunction of the verse, “To observe them as days of feasting and joy” (Esther 9:22). While it is true that the Sages derive from here that one may not fast or deliver eulogies on Purim (Megilla 5b), there is certainly also a mitzva to rejoice actively, which one accomplishes by partaking in a joyous meal. So explains Shibolei Ha-leket §201. (Some maintain that the festive meal is a rabbinic mitzva; Binyan Shlomo §58 discusses this.) The mitzva includes eating meat and drinking wine, which is why sa 696:7 rules that even an onen (a mourner whose deceased relative has not yet been buried) must observe it.

According to Rambam (mt, Laws of Megilla 2:14), Rashba, and Ritva (Megilla 4a), the mitzva of eating and drinking is only during the day, as the verse in Esther says “days.” ma 695:6 cites Kol Bo as stating that some have a custom not to eat meat at night, so as not to mistakenly think that this counts as the Purim meal. On the other hand, Raavya maintains that one must have a meal with meat and wine at night, just as it is a mitzva to read the Megilla at night in addition to the main reading of the day. The only difference is that the main, more dignified meal must take place during the day. Baĥ concurs. Tosafot (Megilla 4a) also seem to agree that there is a mitzva to have a festive meal at night as well. Rema 695:1 rules similarly in the name of Mahari Brin, as do mb ad loc. 3, Kaf Ha-ĥayim 695:4. Either way, it is clear, according to the simple understanding of the issue, that one enhances the mitzva by engaging in all types of joyous activities throughout the day, as is customary.

[10]. It is a mitzva to make an elaborate Purim meal, as Rambam, Tur, and Rema state. It seems that according to these authorities, the meal should be even more elaborate than a Yom Tov meal. The term “joy” includes eating meat and drinking wine, as the Sages state in Pesaĥim 109a regarding Yom Tov. Even though the obligation to eat meat on Yom Tov used to relate specifically to the meat of a peace offering (shelamim), there is nonetheless a mitzva to eat meat on Yom Tov even after the destruction of the Temple, since doing so makes one happy, as sah 529:7 and bhl 529:2 explain. See Yeĥaveh Da’at 6:33. Eating chicken also brings joy, as the Gemara and Tosafot in Beitza 10b indicate.

The poskim disagree about whether one must eat bread at the Purim meal. According to Me’iri, Raavya, Maharshal, and Mor U-ketzi’a, one must eat bread, just as it is a mitzva to rejoice on Yom Tov and to eat bread at the meals. Terumat Ha-deshen and ma 695:9 maintain that one does not need to eat bread. They explain that the obligation to eat bread on Yom Tov is not based on the obligation to rejoice, but on the concept of honoring Yom Tov, which the Torah calls, “sacred occasions” (Vayikra 23:4). They similarly disagree about one who forgot to recite Al Ha-nisim in Birkat Ha-mazon (see above ch. 15 n. 19). Nevertheless, mb 695:12 states that one should not repeat Birkat Ha-mazon, since we are lenient in cases of uncertainty about berakhot, and ahs 695:7, 12 rules, on the one hand, that it is a mitzva to eat bread at the Purim meal, but on the other hand, one who forgets Al Ha-nisim does not need to repeat Birkat Ha-mazon, as the obligation to recite Al Ha-nisim in Birkat Ha-mazon cannot be more stringent than the obligation to recite it in the Amida. See Yeĥaveh Da’at 6:89.

10. The Mitzva to Drink

The mitzva to rejoice on Purim is very unique. It is even greater than the mitzva to rejoice on the festivals (Sukkot, Pesaĥ, and Shavu’ot), about which it says, “You shall rejoice in your festival” (Devarim 16:14). Since most people enjoy drinking wine, it is a mitzva to drink wine on the festivals; however, there is no mitzva to drink a lot (sa 529:1-3). Regarding Purim, however, there is an explicit mitzva to drink a lot. Moreover, the essence of Purim is that it should be “days of feasting (mishteh, lit. ‘drinking’) and joy” (Esther 9:22). Therefore, the Sages said, “A person is obligated to get drunk on Purim until he does not know the difference between ‘Cursed is Haman’ and ‘Blessed is Mordechai’” (Megilla 7b).

There are many opinions regarding the parameters of this mitzva, and they can be divided into two main categories. Some take the words of the Sages literally, meaning that one must get so drunk that he actually cannot differentiate between “Cursed is Haman” and “Blessed is Mordechai” (Rif, Rosh). That is, he should reach a state of simple joy, in which there is no distinction between different levels. In the eyes of one who has reached such a state, “Cursed is Haman” is the same as “Blessed is Mordechai,” since everything is good and everything is for the good. This is the nature of drunk people: They cannot perceive details; everything seems the same to them. However, if one knows that he is liable to do prohibited or disgusting things while he is in a state of drunkenness, he must refrain from reaching such a state. Rather, he should drink heavily until he falls asleep as a result, and while he sleeps he will not be able to differentiate between “Cursed is Haman” and “Blessed is Mordechai”—that is, between good and evil.

Others maintain that the mitzva is to drink more than usual, until one becomes tipsy, but one should not become so drunk that he is liable to act unbecomingly. The reasoning behind this viewpoint is that the halakha does not follow the talmudic opinion that one must drink “until he does not know” (Rabbeinu Ephraim). Alternatively, we accept that opinion, but we interpret it to mean that one should drink until he cannot pronounce his words properly, and when he has to repeat the phrase “Cursed is Haman and blessed is Mordechai” several times, he will occasionally stumble (Tosafot, Ran).

In practice, each person must choose for himself the way that will best allow him to drink and rejoice for the sake of heaven. Since people’s natures are different from one another, there are varying opinions as to how one should drink and rejoice.^[11]

[11]. There are three levels of intoxication: tipsy, drunk, and as drunk as Lot. 1) An tipsy person is one who drinks wine until he feels somewhat happy and disoriented, but is still capable of standing respectfully before a king. Such a person may not recite the Amida until the effects of the wine dissipate, but if he nonetheless prays, his prayer is valid. 2) A drunk person is one who drinks so much that he cannot stand before a king because he is incapable of acting respectfully. If he recites the Amida, he does not discharge his obligation, because his prayer is an abomination. Nevertheless, he may recite Birkhot Ha-nehenin (berakhot recited upon deriving pleasure from something) even in his state of drunkenness. 3) A person who is as drunk as Lot is one who drinks so much that he does not know what is happening to him. He is like a shoteh (a mentally impaired person), who is exempt from all mitzvot. See Peninei Halakha: Prayer 5:11.

We can now apply these levels to the mitzva of drinking on Purim. Rif and Rosh cite Rava’s statement that “a person is obligated to get drunk (livesumei) on Purim until he does not know…” implying that they understand the mitzva according to its simple meaning. The Aramaic word livesumei means to get drunk, as Rashi explains (Megilla 7b). Apparently, this relates to the second category mentioned above – that of a drunk person. In contrast, a person who is as drunk as Lot cannot discern anything, let alone the difference between “Cursed is Haman” and “Blessed is Mordechai.” However, even within the category of a drunk person, there are different levels: 1) one who cannot stand before a king and speak properly; 2) “until he does not know,” which is as I explained in the main text: He cannot discern details, but instead shows an indiscriminate perspective. As the Sages state, “One who puts his eye on his cup (i.e., is drunk), the whole world appears to him like a plain” (Yoma 75a). Such a person forgets his troubles, and everything is for the good in his eyes – both “Cursed is Haman” and “Blessed is Mordechai.” Such a drunk person is liable to disgrace himself. Many authorities maintain that the mitzva to get drunk on Purim refers to this level of drunkenness, and Taz and the Vilna Gaon seem to agree. Ĥakham Zvi and many other great scholars adopted this approach in practice. Raavya 2:564 states that it is a mitzva to get drunk “until he does not know,” but one is not obligated to do so. Apparently, his reasoning is that it is possible to fulfill the mitzva of drinking without reaching this level of drunkenness. From the words of Rif and Rosh, however, it seems that it is obligatory. Even though the Talmud relates that Rabba slaughtered R. Zeira because he was so drunk, implying that it is bad to drink in excess, the fact that Rabba invited R. Zeira to join in his Purim feast again the next year and that R. Zeira was apprehensive about going implies that the mitzva is indeed to get drunk “until he does not know,” in the literal sense (Eshkol, Pri Ĥadash).

mt, Laws of Megilla 2:15 states, “One should drink wine until he gets drunk and falls asleep in his drunkenness.” This, in essence, is an intermediate opinion. On the one hand, one must reach the level of “until he does not know,” but he should not do so while awake, because that would mean he is very drunk. Rather, he should fall asleep as a result of his drunkenness. Mahari Brin concurs with this opinion, and it is cited in Rema 695:2.

Others maintain that one does not need to get so drunk, because drunkenness is shameful and liable to bring one to commit serious transgressions. So states Orĥot Ĥayim. Similarly, Me’iri states: “We are not commanded to get drunk and degrade ourselves in the process of rejoicing, for the type of joy we are commanded to achieve is not one of debauchery and folly, but one of pleasure that leads to loving God and thanking Him for the miracles He performed on our behalf.” Ha-ma’or states in the name of Rabbeinu Ephraim that the fact that the Gemara related the story of Rabba slaughtering R. Zeira implies that the halakha does not require us to drink “until he does not know.” However, it is clear that even these opinions agree that one must drink enough to become tipsy to the point that it would be forbidden to pray. This is clearly indicated from the discussion concerning the timing of the meal, which the poskim determine should take place a significant amount of time before the time of prayer, since one may not pray immediately after the meal. Furthermore, it is a mitzva to drink more on Purim than one does on Yom Tov, since Purim is a day of mishteh. It is a mitzva to drink on Yom Tov in order to rejoice, and it seems that one must drink at least a revi’it measure (Torah Or 99:3). And since one becomes tipsy after drinking only a revi’it, it follows that on Purim one must drink until he nears the level of drunkenness.

Tosafot and Ran explain that one must drink enough to occasionally stumble on the words “Cursed is Haman and blessed is Mordechai.” Abudraham explains that there was once a song that required the audience to respond accurately – sometimes “Cursed is Haman” and sometimes “Blessed is Mordechai”; people who were intoxicated would often get confused. Aguda and Rabbeinu Yeruĥam explain that the numerical value of both phrases is the same, and when people drink they find it hard to calculate the numbers. Nimukei Yosef explains that one must drink and joke around until he makes himself appear as if he does not know the difference between Haman and Mordechai. According to these opinions as well, the mitzva is to become tipsy, not drunk. They maintain that the halakha follows Rava, that one must drink “until he does not know,” but that this does not mean getting totally drunk. Shlah and Responsa Rema Mi-Fano maintain a similar position. Upon examining these opinions, we find that the mitzva is to become tipsy or even slightly drunk. This fits with the opinion of Baĥ, which accepts the position of Rabbeinu Ephraim in practice, but states, “One should become tipsy or even drunk to the point that he cannot speak before a king, but he should retain his faculties.” Yad Ephraim also is in this vein, but maintains that Rava’s statement was not rejected. Rather, he meant that one should get drunk until “he does not know,” without actually reaching that extreme level of drunkenness (“ad ve-lo ad bi-khlal”). Sefat Emet and R. Yisrael Salanter also write along these lines, explaining that one must drink all day long, with the goal of being happy, but if he reaches the state of “he does not know,” he becomes exempt from the mitzva of drinking and does not need to continue.

11. Laws of Drinking

One fulfills his obligation to drink on Purim with any intoxicating beverage. However, it is preferable to drink wine, because the miracle came about through wine. If one derives greater joy from drinking other beverages, he should drink mostly what he likes best, as, fundamentally, the mitzva is to rejoice. But if he enjoys drinking wine even a little bit, it is best to begin by drinking wine, in commemoration of the miracle.^[12]

It is a mitzva even for women to drink a lot of wine that brings joy on Purim. However, they must be careful not to get drunk, because drunkenness is more degrading for women than it is for men, and it constitutes a breach of the mitzva of tzni’ut (modesty), for which women are praised.^[13]

If one knows that drinking a lot of wine causes him to cry and become depressed, or causes headaches, it is preferable for him to fulfill the mitzva by drinking just a little more than usual. This is because the main objective of the mitzva is to be happy, and if drinking makes one sad, he undermines the mitzva. If, however, he cries out of joy – for example, if he is happy to cry about important things, like the present state of the Jewish people, the rebuilding of the Holy Temple, or his own unrepentant spiritual state – he may fulfill the mitzva by drinking “until he does not know.”

If one knows that when he gets drunk he goes wild and hurts others, or he ends up wallowing in his own vomit and degrading himself in public, he should not get drunk. Rather, he should fulfill the mitzva by drinking more than usual. Such a person need not bemoan the fact that he cannot control himself when drunk. Even though the Sages state that “When wine enters, a secret comes out” (Eruvin 65a), and thus his actions while drunk seemingly show that he has a deep-seated inclination toward violence and rowdiness, nevertheless, the Sages also say, “The reward is proportionate to the exertion” (Avot 5:23). Since he actually manages to curb his impulses in the course of daily life, it is clear that he continually makes great improvements.^[14]

In order to fulfill the mitzva properly, one must understand that alcohol reaches the height of its influence around twenty minutes after it is ingested. This delay causes some people to make a mistake: When five minutes pass after drinking a cup of wine or hard liquor, and they do not feel any significant change, they think that they need to drink another cup. And when, even then, they feel that they have not fulfilled the mitzva, they drink another cup, and – just to be sure – one more. Then, all of a sudden, the first cup starts taking effect, and then the second, the third, and the fourth. All at once they become very drunk, behave like animals, and begin to vomit, causing much shame and degradation. Therefore, one must know how to drink and rejoice, waiting at least a half-hour between drinks and incorporating one’s drinking into the meal. This way, people will be able to rejoice properly throughout Purim.

[12]. See Mikra’ei Kodesh (Frank) §44, which cites sources indicating that one must drink wine specifically. However, it seems that in practice, this requirement is only le-khatĥila. After all, the mitzva mentioned in the verse and in the writings of the Rishonim is that “A person is obligated to get drunk on Purim until he does not know,” with no mention of wine whatsoever. The main thing is to rejoice through drinking.

[13]. See Ketubot 65a, which indicates that wine and drunkenness are more degrading for women than they are for men. Perhaps this is why the Sages say in Pesaĥim 109a, regarding the mitzva of rejoicing on the festivals, that people should rejoice through what is appropriate for them: men through wine and women through nice clothing. This implies that women cannot rejoice through wine, because drunkenness is degrading for them. See Peninei Halakha: Pesaĥ 16:7 and n. 3, regarding the Four Cups. Nevertheless, it is a mitzva for women to drink a small amount, without getting drunk.

[14]. Ĥayei Adam, quoted in bhl 665:2, s.v. “ad,” states that one should not reach a state of drunkenness in which he sins. It is true that I write later on in the name of Rav Kook that, when it comes to missing prayers, we apply the rule “One who is engaged in performing a mitzva is exempt from performing another mitzva.” Nevertheless, all agree that one may not cause oneself to sin. It is true that Rav Kook writes in Mitzvat Re’iyah (Omissions §695) that the performance of a mitzva protects one from harm, proving this from a statement of Rashba; nevertheless, it seems that everyone agrees that one who knows from experience that getting drunk leads him to sin or degradation should not get drunk. It is also obvious that one who feels sad when he drinks heavily should not drink, as Purim is supposed to be a day of feasting and joy. However, if he cries for good things, and enjoys doing so, he may get drunk, and it is even a mitzva to do so. A proof for this is found in Shibolei Ha-leket §93, which cites an aggadic teaching that R. Akiva used to cry on Shabbat, saying that it gave him pleasure. This is quoted in Beit Yosef and Rema, oĥ 288:2, and in mb ad loc. 4.

12. The Meaning of the Mitzva of Drinking

It is reasonable to ask: Both in Tanakh and in rabbinic literature (Bamidbar Rabba ch. 10, Vayikra Rabba 12:1), it is made clear that drunkenness is disgraceful and liable to bring one to sin. Why, then, are we commanded to get drunk on Purim? The reason is that all the miracles that God performed for the Jewish people on Purim happened through wine. Vashti was removed from her reign at the wine feast, and Esther then took her place. Haman’s demise occurred at a wine feast as well. We must therefore conclude that although drunkenness is generally disgraceful, one cannot ignore its positive aspects. Through wine, simple joy is made manifest and unconstrained material happiness, filled with strength and vitality, is expressed. Throughout the year, the disrepute and rowdiness that associated with drunkenness overshadow its positive aspects, and thus drunkenness causes many problems. On Purim, however, when we drink and rejoice over God’s salvation, in commemoration of the miracles He performed through drinking – the positive aspects of drinking are expressed.

There is a deeper reason as well. On Purim, the eternal sanctity of Israel is revealed, and it becomes clear that everything God does to the Jewish people is for the good. Even things that initially seem bad eventually turn out to be for our benefit. Drinking wine for the sake of a mitzva shows that even the material aspect of Israel is holy at its core. Even though the body and its senses seem to impede the service of God, this is reversed on the sublime plane of Purim, when these physical elements greatly enhance our service of God, with joy and vitality.

Let us delve even deeper. In general, Torah and intellect must guide our lives, and when one follows this path, he is happy, but his happiness is limited by his perception. However, on the lofty level of faith that we reach on Purim, we recognize that God runs the world for the good. Even if His ways are sometimes incomprehensible to us, we disregard our own perceptions and happily accept God’s governing of the world. This is the level of “until he does not know”: cleaving to God Who is beyond human comprehension. This is connected in its entirety to faith through self-sacrifice. With such sublime faith – the faith of the people of Israel – we achieve boundless joy.^[15]

[15]. The simple explanation is quoted in Eliya Rabba and bhl 695:2. See also Mitzvat Re’iyah (omissions §695). It is no coincidence that there is another, deeper explanation, as that is the property of good wine – it reveals secrets. At first there is one interpretation, and through this interpretation another is revealed. These three explanations correspond to the three levels of drinking: 1) tipsy; 2) drunk; and 3) very drunk – “until he does not know,” according to its simple meaning. See Torah Or by R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi, “Ĥayav Inish Li-besumei,” pp. 98a-100b, especially 99c-d. In the merit of their natural humility, women can attain all of this by drinking only a small amount of alcohol.

13. When to Eat the Festive Meal

Most Jews begin the Purim meal in the afternoon, after praying Minĥa. During the morning hours, they are busy sending mishlo’aĥ manot to one another and giving matanot la-evyonim, going out of their way to express love and friendship toward family and friends. When afternoon arrives, it is proper to pray Minĥa before starting the meal; otherwise there is reason to be concerned that people will not be able to pray Minĥa due to drunkenness.

Some people start the meal very late, just before shki’a, eating most of the meal after dark. Many authorities question this practice, as the mitzva is to eat the meal on Purim, and at tzeit ha-kokhavim the next day already begins. Some answer this objection by pointing out that everything follows the beginning, and since these people start the meal on Purim, its continuation at night is still considered part of the Purim meal. The same rule applies to Birkat Ha-mazon. If one starts the meal during the day and finishes it late at night, he nonetheless recites Al Ha-nisim in Birkat Ha-mazon. Furthermore, it is appropriate to rejoice on the night immediately following the fourteenth of Adar as well, because that is when Purim begins in walled cities. Le-khatĥila, however, it is proper to start the meal when there is plenty of time left in the day. Then, if the meal carries over into the night, no harm is done, because the main part of the meal was eaten during the day.

Some say that it is preferable to perform the mitzva as early as possible and eat the meal in the morning. This way, whoever gets drunk can become sober by Minĥa time. The prevalent custom, however, is to conduct the meal in the afternoon.^[16]

It is praiseworthy to study some Torah before beginning the se’uda, as it is written, “The Jews enjoyed light and gladness, joy and honor” (Esther 8:16); the Sages expound, “‘Light’ refers to Torah.” Through Torah study, one can attain consummate joy (Rema 695:2).

According to many authorities, one who knows that he may not be able to pray Minĥa or Ma’ariv if he gets drunk should not get drunk (Ĥayei Adam, bhl). However, R. Avraham Yitzĥak Kook writes that one who drinks on Purim is engaged in performing a mitzva, and the rule is that one who is engaged in performing a mitzva is exempt from performing another mitzva (Oraĥ Mishpat, omissions §7).

[16]. The explanation behind the custom to start the meal just before shki’a is cited in Terumat Ha-deshen §140. The author and his mentors, however, used to eat the meal in the morning. Shlah encouraged people to eat the meal specifically in the morning. This was also the custom of the Vilna Gaon, and Rashash followed this practice as well, for kabbalistic reasons (Kaf Ha-ĥayim 695:23). Rema 695:2 states, based on Maharil, that it is better to eat the meal after praying Minĥa at the earliest time (Minĥa gedola). This is the standard recommendation, which many people follow. Still, others start the meal just before evening, and even some Aĥaronim followed this practice. If the following night is the fifteenth of Adar, there is a mitzva to rejoice on both days in any case (Rema 695:2, mb ad loc. 16). Nevertheless, even in Jerusalem, some extend the meal into the following night, based on the rationale that everything follows the beginning of the meal. Moreover, according to Ran, the prohibition of “ve-lo ya’avor (lit. ‘and it shall not pass’)” (Esther 9:27) does not apply to the active mitzvot of Purim, only to the reading of the Megilla. This is why we eat the meal on Sunday, the sixteenth of Adar, on a Triple Purim (see below 17:5). Therefore, one may extend the meal into the night.

14. Can a Drunk or Tipsy Person Recite Berakhot and Pray Ma’ariv?

A tipsy person is one who is under the influence of alcohol and finds it difficult to concentrate or focus his thoughts, but would still be capable of speaking before a king. A drunk person is one who has drunk so much that he would be incapable of speaking properly before a king.

Individuals in both of these states may recite Birkhot Ha-nehenin. Even though, le-khatĥila, a drunk person should not recite berakhot, he may recite berakhot that must be recited at a specific point in time. Therefore, on Purim, a drunk person may recite all Birkhot Ha-nehenin, Birkat Ha-mazon, and Asher Yatzar.

The law regarding prayer is more stringent. One who is tipsy or drunk after finishing the meal must wait to pray Ma’ariv until he is sober and able to pray with a clear mind. If doing so will cause him to miss praying with a minyan, then if he is merely tipsy, he should pray – from a siddur – with the minyan, because the prayer of a tipsy person is acceptable, be-di’avad. If, however, he is truly drunk, he should not pray with the minyan, because the prayer of a drunk person is invalid and considered an abomination.

If one feels very tired, and there is concern that he will fall asleep and miss praying entirely if he does not pray immediately, the law is as follows. One who is merely tipsy should recite the entire prayer, but one who is drunk should read the Shema without its accompanying berakhot and skip the Amida. This way, he at least discharges his Torah obligation to read the Shema. Furthermore, even if he is overcome by sleep before he manages to pray, he is not viewed as having sinned, because he became drunk for the sake of heaven, and one who is engaged in performing a mitzva is exempt from performing another mitzva. In such a case, he should make up the prayer he missed the next morning by reciting an additional Amida prayer after the Amida for Shaĥarit.

It seems that if one is unsure whether he is considered tipsy or drunk, he may be lenient on Purim and recite the Amida, since on Purim even the king accepts the drunkards with good spirits, because that is the mitzva of the day.^[17]

[17]. See sa and Rema §99, and mb ad loc., regarding tipsiness and drunkenness. Also see Peninei Halakha: Prayer 5:11 regarding the same issue, and ibid. 18:8-10 regarding the laws of making up missed prayers.

The allowance for an intoxicated person to pray when time is running out is explained in Yam shel Shlomo, quoted in mb 99:3, 17. Rema rules leniently as well regarding one who drank a revi’it of wine, either because today’s wines are weaker than those of the past or because today we use siddurim when we pray. In my humble opinion, one may certainly be lenient on Purim regarding this issue, because becoming intoxicated is part of the mitzva of the day.

15. Scheduling the Se’uda when Purim is on Friday

When Purim falls out on Friday, it is customary, le-khatĥila, to begin the meal before the afternoon, in honor of Shabbat. One who was not able to begin the meal before the afternoon should try to begin the meal at least three hours before shki’a. Be-di’avad, however, one may begin eating any time before shki’a. Either way, if one begins the meal close to Shabbat, he should try to limit what he eats, in order to eat the Friday night meal with a good appetite.

Alternatively, there is a custom to combine the Purim meal with the first Shabbat meal on Friday night. Some great Torah authorities follow this custom, while others recommend doing so only be-di’avad. In order to follow this custom, one must pray Minĥa and then begin the meal while it is still Purim. Then, around a half-hour before shki’a, one should accept Shabbat by lighting the Shabbat candles, place a covering over the bread, and recite kiddush over wine. Since one has already recited the berakha over wine (Ha-gafen) during the Purim meal, one should omit that berakha in kiddush. After kiddush, one continues the meal, making sure to eat a keveitza of bread, or at least a kezayit, for the Shabbat meal. At the end of the meal, one recites Retzei Ve-haĥalitzenu in Birkat Ha-mazon, adding Al Ha-nisim in the Ha-Raĥaman (“May the Merciful One”) section at the end of the prayer. After the meal, one prays Ma’ariv.^[18]

[18]. Responsa Maharil §56 states that when Purim falls out on Friday one may begin the meal before Minĥa ketana (about three hours before the end of the day). Rema 695:2 states that one should eat the meal in the morning. mb ad loc. 10 states that, le-khatĥila, one should eat the meal before midday, but be-di’avad, one may begin to eat any time before shki’a (see mb 529:8).

The source of the custom of combining the meals (called “pores mapa u-mekadesh,” literally, “place a cover and recite kiddush,” after a key element of the practice) is Pesaĥim 100a, and it is explained in sa 271:4. Me’iri followed this practice, le-khatĥila, when Purim would fall out on Friday (Me’iri, Ketubot 7a). Some Aĥaronim followed this practice as well. Kaf Ha-ĥayim 271:22 states in the name of Arizal that, le-khatĥila, this should not be done, because one must make kiddush after praying Ma’ariv. According to Me’iri and ma 695:9, one should recite both Retzei and Al Ha-nisim at their regular places. However, mb 695:15 states, based on Ĥayei Adam, that one should not recite Al Ha-nisim. I suggested above that one should recite Al Ha-nisim in the Ha-raĥaman section because it does not affect one’s fulfillment of the mitzva of Birkat Ha-mazon if it is recited there.

16. Costumes and the Prohibition of Lo Yilbash

Many people customarily wear masks and costumes on Purim. Even though there is no source for this in the writings of the Sages, and the Aĥaronim did not write that one must wear costumes, various reasons have been given for the custom. The first reason is that it increases our joy, as a person with an unusual appearance can be amusing and entertaining. Another reason is that when one departs from his normal attire, he is able to let loose, rejoice, and display his love for his friends. Another reason is that having different modes of dress causes disunity among the Jewish people, and changing our external appearances on Purim breaks down the barriers between us and increases unity. Another reason is that by wearing costumes, we become aware of the degree to which we are influenced by external elements, and as a result, we can focus more on the internal elements that are revealed on Purim. Finally, costumes allude to the fact that even when the Jews look like gentiles on the outside, they remain Jews deep down, as the Purim story made clear.

Mahari Mintz writes that the custom in the homes of great and pious individuals in Germany was to dress up on Purim; men even wore women’s clothing and women wore men’s clothing (Responsa §16). He comments that one should not think poorly of them, since there is certainly no concern that this is prohibited. After all, the prohibition of lo yilbash (the prohibition against cross-dressing) refers only to wearing the clothing of the opposite gender for purpose of adultery and licentiousness. However, when this is done for the sake of rejoicing, it is not prohibited. Rema (696:8) writes that this is the accepted practice.

Most poskim, however, maintain that a man may not dress up as a woman, and a woman may not dress up as a man (Baĥ yd 182; Taz yd 182:4). Based on this, many Aĥaronim write that one should censure those who wear the clothing of the opposite sex. This is the correct practice. Some maintain that if a person changes only one article of clothing, and that person’s sex remains recognizable based on the other garments, one should not denounce him (Pri Megadim).^[19]

[19]. According to Baĥ, one may be lenient only when there is a real need to wear a garment of the opposite sex. For example, a man may wear a woman’s raincoat if he has no other way to protect himself from the rain, because his sole intention is to protect himself. Taz concurs. Yad Ha-ketana rules stringently, stating that one may not wear clothes of the opposite gender under any circumstances, even if there is a real need. See Yabi’a Omer yd 6:14. Rema 696:8 states that one may rely on the lenient opinions and dress up on Purim. Knesset Ha-gedola and Shlah warn that one should distance himself from this custom. Birkei Yosef and Yeĥaveh Da’at 5:50 concur.

01. What Is a Walled City?

As we already learned (15:4), the Sages established two separate times for celebrating Purim. Most places celebrate on the fourteenth of Adar, whereas Shushan, along with cities that were surrounded by walls at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun, celebrate on the fifteenth of Adar.

It makes no difference whether the city is located in Eretz Yisrael or outside of it; any city that had a wall at the time of Yehoshua is considered a walled city, even if its wall was subsequently destroyed. Shushan, where the miracle actually took place, is the only exception; it is considered a walled city even though the city had not yet been built at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun (sa 688:1).^[1]

When the Men of the Great Assembly instituted the holiday of Purim, many large cities, especially in Eretz Yisrael, had a tradition that they had been surrounded by a wall at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun. The residents of these cities, therefore, celebrated Purim on the fifteenth of Adar. Over the centuries, however, these cities have been destroyed, and the traditions regarding their status have been lost. Some modern cities, like Lod, have the same name as cities that were known to have been surrounded by a wall at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun. The problem is that we do not know with certainty whether the modern city is located exactly where the city stood in Yehoshua’s time, or perhaps it is simply named after the ancient city but is actually situated somewhere else nearby. Some ancient cities became devoid of Jews, and we do not know whether they existed at the time of Yehoshua, because the traditions regarding their status were lost. There are other cities, such as Hebron, that we know existed at the time, though we do not know if they had a wall. There is only one city concerning which there is a clear tradition that it was surrounded by a wall at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun: our holy and glorious city of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the only place where Purim is celebrated nowadays on the fifteenth of Adar. We will first elaborate on the laws of Jerusalem and then discuss the laws of the various uncertain places.^[2]

[1]. Megilla 3b states that a walled city is a city that was surrounded by a wall before its houses were built, or whose houses were built with the intention of surrounding the city afterward with a wall. If, however, the residents built the city without any expressed intent to build a wall and afterward surrounded it with a wall, it is not considered a walled city (sa 688:1). The Gemara continues: “A city in which there are not ten batlanim is reckoned as a village.” According to She’iltot and Ramban, this principle can be applied to Purim. Rambam, Tosafot, Rosh, and many other Rishonim maintain that this law was stated in reference to the other laws of a walled city, but regarding Purim, a place does not need to have ten batlanim in order to be considered a city. sa 688:1 rules according to this opinion. See mb ad loc. 2. What are batlanim? Rashi writes that they are ten people who do not work and are sustained by the community so that they can always be available to pray in the synagogue. Itur, Rambam, Nimukei Yosef, and others concur. According to Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva, however, they do not have to remain unemployed; they simply need to attend the synagogue services in the morning and the evening on a consistent basis.

[2]. Responsa Divrei Yosef (Schwartz) §2 states that Jerusalem is the only place about which we are certain that it was surrounded by a wall. Take Hebron, for example: According to Radbaz 2:681, it was not surrounded by a wall (see Teĥumin, vol. 1. pp. 122-123), whereas Ĥida writes that the Jews there had a custom to read the Megilla on the fifteenth as well (Kaf Ha-ĥayim 688:17). Regarding Lod, Megilla 4a states clearly that it is a walled city. However, it is uncertain whether modern Lod is located exactly where the ancient city of Lod stood. Therefore, we treat it as an uncertainty. This is how R. Ovadia Yosef rules in Yabi’a Omer 7:60. As for Tiberias, Megilla 5b explains that it has an uncertain status because one side of the city was not walled; it bordered on the sea. In general, even if we would discover a city that has remnants of an ancient wall from the time of Yehoshua bin Nun, it would still be unclear whether the city was built with the intention of surrounding it with a wall, as that is the only way a city can be considered walled. R. Shaul Yisraeli suggested that if the walls of an ancient city are buried beneath the ground and the houses of the modern city are built above the height of the walls, the modern city is not considered walled (cited in Teĥumin vol. 1, p. 126). See the same source for a lengthy discussion concerning the town of Beit El, which is located around a kilometer away from the excavations of the ancient city of Beit El. On p. 128, R. Sraya Deblitzky states, based on Igrot Ha-Re’iyah §423, that one should not determine halakha based on archeological evidence. See p. 130, which cites the ruling of my father and teacher, R. Zalman Melamed, that residents of Beit El should celebrate Purim only on the fourteenth of Adar.

02. Jerusalem and Its Environs

The Sages said: “A walled city and all that adjoins it (samukh) and all that is visible with it (nir’eh imo) are reckoned as a walled city” (Megilla 3b). Therefore, not only do the residents of the Old City of Jerusalem celebrate Purim on the fifteenth of Adar, but so do the residents of all the neighborhoods adjacent to the Old City. Even though the city has expanded greatly over the years, each and every neighborhood takes on the status of the Old City and reads the Megilla on the fifteenth, since each one is adjacent to the one next to it.

While the neighborhoods of Jerusalem were still being built, a question arose regarding the status of neighborhoods that were originally built far away from the rest of the city. Most recently, this question came up regarding the neighborhoods of Ramot and Har Nof. Some authorities maintain that only neighborhoods to which there is a continuous stretch of houses from the Old City are considered part of Jerusalem. If, however, there is a gap of 141 and one third amot (67.8 meters) between the two areas, they are considered separate locations. Accordingly, these authorities ruled that residents of Ramot and Har Nof must read the megilla on the fourteenth.

Others maintain that all neighborhoods that are considered part of the Jerusalem municipality for tax purposes – and all the more so if they are surrounded by the same eruv – take on the status of Jerusalem and read the Megilla exclusively on the fifteenth. Thus, they ruled that residents of Har Nof and Ramot must read the Megilla on the fifteenth. The former Chief Rabbis of Jerusalem, R. Shalom Messas and R. Yitzĥak Kulitz, ruled in this manner, and this is the prevalent custom. All of these rulings were decided, over time, as Jerusalem expanded. With the help of God, Builder of Jerusalem, the city will continue to be built up, and even the furthest neighborhoods eventually become adjacent and linked to the rest of the city, until it becomes clear to all that they are considered part of Jerusalem.^[3]

[3]. Megilla 3b states that if a place is “adjoining, even if it is not visible” or “visible, even if it is not adjoining,” then it is considered part of the walled city. Rashi, Rabbeinu Ĥananel, Raavan, Or Zaru’a, Rashba, Me’iri, and Ritva explain that if a place is not visible from an adjacent walled city, it is considered part of the city as long as it is within a mil (912 meters) of the city. But if the place is visible from the walled city, it is considered part of the city even if it is more than a mil away. They ask: Is the place still considered part of the walled city if it can be seen from the city, but is very far from it? Me’iri explains that the Gemara refers to a place that is subordinate to the city and considered part of the same district. Similarly, Ritva writes that this law applies only when residents of the surrounding villages participate in the affairs of the city.

In contrast, Rambam maintains that even a place from which a walled city can be seen is not considered part of the city if it is more than a mil away. The only distinction is that when the city is visible, we measure the mil as the crow flies, and when it is not visible, we measure it by a straight, terrestrial line (Maharitatz §120). Alternatively, when the city is visible, we measure a mil; and when it is not visible, the nearby place takes on the status of the walled city only if it truly adjacent – on the outskirts of the city (Maharam Alashkar). That is, if there is a distance of 70 and two thirds amot between the two places, and the walled city is not visible, they are considered separate places. And if there are two neighborhoods, the distance is doubled – 141 and one third amot. Ran, Roke’aĥ, and Ohel Mo’ed concur. The Aĥaronim disagree about the opinion of sa 688:2. According to ma and others, sa agrees with Rashi and most Rishonim. Pri Ĥadash and others claim that sa concurs with Rambam.

The reason that places adjacent to or within view of a walled city take on the status of the city is that they are subordinate to and reliant on it. This can be inferred from the words of Ritva, who writes that residents of these places come to take refuge within the city’s walls in times of danger. Turei Even 3:2 and Ĥatam Sofer, oĥ 193 explain that the reason is in order not to separate between people who live close to each other.

Practically speaking, mb 688:6 and sht ad loc. 7 maintain that the first opinion is the primary one. Yabi’a Omer 7:58-59 states that one should take the second opinion into consideration as well, especially since residents of walled cities can satisfy their obligation, be-di’avad, by reading the Megilla on the fourteenth.

How exactly do we measure the distance between a walled city and a place that can be seen from it? Some maintain that we measure only from areas that are actually walled (Yabi’a Omer 7:59:1), while others maintain that the measurement begins from the edges of the expanded city. Another dispute concerns whether the residents of the place need to be able to see all – or at least most of – the walled city (this appears to be Me’iri’s position, and R. Ĥayim Palachi writes this explicitly), or if it is sufficient for them to be able to see a small part of the city (Maharil Diskin, Mikra’ei Kodesh [Frank] §24)?

In practice, the former Chief Rabbis of Jerusalem, R. Shalom Messas (Shemesh U-magen 1:51-52, 2:16-17) and R. Yitzĥak Kulitz, maintained that all neighborhoods that are part of Jerusalem for the purposes of paying municipal taxes read the Megilla exclusively on the fifteenth. They ruled this way even for the residents of Ramot and Har Nof. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach concurs. Moreover, in his opinion, the outlying areas would read the Megilla on the fifteenth even if they were separate entities for tax purposes, because there is an eruv that connects these neighborhoods to the city of Jerusalem (Halikhot Shlomo 20:8-9). These authorities also relied on the majority opinion of the Rishonim, who maintain that “adjacent and visible” is measured from the farthest outskirts of the expanded city. Kaf Ha-ĥayim 688:10 suggests a novel idea: that the definition of a mil is the amount of time it takes to travel a mil; R. Messas mentions this suggestion as additional support for his ruling. My teachers, R. Avraham Shapiro, R. Mordechai Eliyahu, and R. Shaul Yisraeli, also endorsed, in practice, the halakhic determination that all neighborhoods of Jerusalem should read the Megilla on the fifteenth, with a berakha (Mikra’ei Kodesh [Harari] 5:11 and n. 43).

In contrast, several great authorities maintain that the rule is as follows: Any neighborhood within a mil of the wall itself reads on the fifteenth, even if the entire area in between is empty. However, when measuring from a point in the expanded city, an empty area of 141 and a third amot constitutes a gap between Jerusalem and that neighborhood, and thus its residents must read on the fourteenth, with a berakha. This is the opinion of Yabi’a Omer 7:58 and Or Le-Tziyon 1:45. Ĥazon Ish 153:2-3 and Mikra’ei Kodesh (Frank) §23 also rule similarly, but they ruled that the residents of Giv’at Sha’ul should read the Megilla on the fifteenth, despite the fact that hundreds of meters of undeveloped land separated between that neighborhood and the rest of the city at the time. Apparently, they ruled this way because the residents of Giv’at Shaul were dependent on the city for all their affairs. Minĥat Yitzĥak 8:62 ruled that the residents of Ramot should read the Megilla on the fourteenth. The same is reported in the name of R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv. Several years later, however, when Ramot expanded, R. Elyashiv changed his ruling and instructed residents of Ramot to read the Megilla on the fifteenth (even though there is an undeveloped area of more than 141 and a third amot between it and the main part of the city).

A bigger question arose regarding Mevaseret Yerushalayim, which is, indeed, connected to Jerusalem by the eruv, but is its own municipality. According to the second opinion stated above, its residents certainly must read the Megilla on the fourteenth, and some actually do so. According to the first opinion, however, they should read it on the fifteenth, because from some parts of Mevaseret, one can see the outskirts of expanded Jerusalem. In addition, its residents are dependent on Jerusalem to a degree, and, as already mentioned, the two cities are joined by an eruv. R. Messas ruled in accordance with this opinion, and R. Uri Cohen, head of the Meretz Kollel there, implemented this ruling in practice. See Oraĥ Mishpat §146, which states similarly regarding Bayit Vegan in 1920. (Bayit Vegan in those days was like Mevaseret Yerushalayim today.)

From 1948 to 1967, the Old City of Jerusalem was under Jordanian occupation. Because of this, the question arose: Should those residing in neighborhoods adjacent to the Old City celebrate Purim on the fifteenth, even though the area within the walls itself is bereft of Jews? Masat Moshe 2:3 and Birkei Yosef state that in such a situation, the Megilla is read on the fourteenth. The Vilna Gaon maintains, based on the Yerushalmi, that it is read on the fifteenth. Rashba and Ritva concur, and this was the practice in Jerusalem in those days. The proponents of this viewpoint suggest another rationale: Ancient Jerusalem was larger than the area known today as the Old City. R. Zvi Pesaĥ Frank accepted this in practice, recording his ruling in both Har Tzvi 2:131 and Mikra’ei Kodesh §25. It is worth adding that the whole reason Jews came to the new side of Jerusalem was in order to draw closer to the holy ancient Jerusalem. For this reason, all neighborhoods of Jerusalem are subordinate to it in all matters.

03. Uncertain Places

There is uncertainty about when to celebrate Purim in the following cities: Tiberias, Hebron, Shechem, Jaffa, Lod, Gaza, Tzefat, Akko, and Haifa. Some add the following cities to the list: Beit She’an, Jericho, Beersheba, Ramla. In addition, the following cities outside the Land of Israel have uncertain status: Tyre, Sidon, Damascus, Izmir, and Baghdad.^[4]

The Rishonim disagree about how residents of cities of uncertain status should conduct themselves on Purim. All agree that the Megilla must be read on the fourteenth of Adar, with a berakha, in these cities, since even a resident of Jerusalem fulfills his obligation, be-di’avad, if he reads the Megilla on the fourteenth, when most of the world reads it. Therefore, in places of uncertain status, the Megilla must be read, le-khatĥila, on the fourteenth, with a berakha. The question is whether residents of these places must read it on the fifteenth as well.

Some maintain that residents of uncertain places celebrate Purim exclusively on the fourteenth, with no obligation whatsoever to read the Megilla on the fifteenth. Only those who wish to follow a pious custom read it on the fifteenth without a berakha (Ramban, Rashba, Ran, Ritva).

Others maintain that in places of uncertain status, the Megilla must be read on the fifteenth as well, without a berakha, so that the uncertainty surrounding these cities is not forgotten. An additional reason is to enhance the honor of Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, the berakha is omitted because of the uncertainty of the matter (mt, Laws of Megilla 1:11, Me’iri, Shibolei Ha-leket, sa 688:4). The poskim debate the matter of the other mitzvot of Purim – mishlo’aĥ manot, matanot la-evyonim, and se’uda. Some maintain that residents of uncertain cities observe these mitzvot only on the first day, which is Purim for most of the world (Pri Ĥadash). Others maintain that they must perform these mitzvot on the second day as well (Ri’az).^[5] People who live adjacent to cities of uncertain status observe Purim exclusively on the fourteenth, as only those who live adjacent to a city that reads the Megilla on the fifteenth with certainty take on its status, not those who live adjacent to a city of uncertain status. However, some authorities rule stringently, stating that even in places that are near a city of uncertain status, the Megilla should be read on the fifteenth as well.^[6]

In practice, most uncertain places today rely on the lenient opinion and celebrate Purim exclusively on the fourteenth. Only in places where the likelihood that it was truly a walled city is greater, like in Tiberias and Hebron, do many people customarily read the Megilla on the fifteenth as well. Some even fulfill Purim’s other mitzvot on the fifteenth as well in these cities.

[4]. See Mikra’ei Kodesh (Harari) 5:11 (pp. 101-107), which specifies the uncertainty and outlines the custom of each city. There are two possible reasons for uncertainty: 1) whether the city had a wall at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun (and even if it did, perhaps the wall was erected after the houses were built); 2) whether the city is currently located in the same place as in ancient times. Some cities are uncertain for both reasons, while others are uncertain for only one reason. The cities enumerated in the first list were more likely surrounded by a wall, while for those in the second list this were less likely. Consequently, fewer people customarily read the Megilla on the fifteenth in those places.

[5]. Megilla 5b relates that the amora Ĥizkiya read the Megilla in Tiberias on both the fourteenth and the fifteenth, because although the city was walled on three sides, the fourth side bordered on the sea, and thus it was uncertain whether the city was considered walled. In addition, R. Asi read the Megilla in Hutzal on both the fourteenth and the fifteenth, because it was uncertain whether it was walled at the time of Yehoshua bin Nun.

According to Ramban, Rashba, Ran, and Ritva, based on the Ge’onim, those who live in cities of uncertain status read the Megilla exclusively on the fourteenth, with a berakha. Technically, they do not need to read the Megilla at all, because we are lenient in cases of uncertainty about a rabbinic law. However, in order to avoid canceling the mitzva altogether for such people, the Sages established that they read it on the fourteenth, like the majority of the world. Ĥizkiya and R. Asi were merely following a pious custom by reading it on the fifteenth as well. In contrast to the Rishonim mentioned above, Rambam, Shibolei Ha-leket, Me’iri, and sa 688:4 maintain that halakha requires residents of cities of uncertain status to read the Megilla on both days – on the first day with a berakha and on the second day without a berakha. (According to Ri’az, they recite a berakha on both days, while according to R. Yeĥiel, they omit the berakha both days.)

Seemingly, one could ask: How can these people recite a berakha over the Megilla reading on the fourteenth when it is uncertain if their city is considered unwalled? The answer is that the Yerushalmi (y. Megilla 1:1, 1:3, 2:3) states that, be-di’avad, a resident of a walled city who reads the Megilla on the fourteenth fulfills his obligation. It is true that Pri Ĥadash §688 and several other Aĥaronim state that the Bavli disagrees with this, and according to them, a resident of a walled city who reads the Megilla on the fourteenth does not fulfill his obligation. Nonetheless, Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 688:2 and other Aĥaronim maintain that the Bavli agrees with the Yerushalmi. In addition, Vilna Gaon 688:4 explains that this is the basis for the opinion of Rambam and sa. This is also how the position of Ramban and Rashba is explained. Therefore, residents of uncertain cities read the Megilla on the fourteenth, with a berakha.

Rashba, Ritva, and the Vilna Gaon write that the practice of reading the Megilla on both days in uncertain cities applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Others disagree; see ma 688:4. Ben Ish Ĥai (Tetzaveh 14) states that in Baghdad the custom was to read the Megilla on both days.

According to Ri’az and ma 688:5, when there is uncertainty regarding a city’s status, its residents observe all the mitzvot of Purim on both days. Pri Ĥadash and Mateh Yehuda maintain that reading the Megilla is the only mitzva that is performed on both days. Binyan Shlomo explains that the mitzva of reading the Megilla was instituted by the prophets, while the other mitzvot were rabbinically mandated, which is why we are more lenient regarding the other mitzvot when there is an uncertainty. (See mb 688:10, which sides with ma, whereas bhl§695 agrees with Pri Ĥadash. Perhaps the distinction is that he rules leniently when it comes to mitzvot that require monetary outlay.) Igeret Ha-Purim states that the custom in Hebron and Tiberias is only to read the Megilla on the fifteenth, not to observe the other mitzvot. The author of Ben Ish Ĥai observed all of the mitzvot on both days. The Aĥaronim disagree about whether there is Torah reading (Kaf Ha-ĥayim 688:25). Regarding Al Ha-nisim, mb 693:6 states that one should recite it on the second day as well, while Kaf Ha-ĥayim 688:23 states, based on R. Ĥayim Vital, that one should not recite it.

[6]. According to Birkei Yosef 688:9, cited in bhl 688:2, people who live near a city of uncertain status read the Megilla only on the fourteenth. Pe’at Ha-shulĥan 3:15 states that the villages near Tzefat read it on both days. Ĥazon Ish 153:3 concurs; for this reason, Ĥazon Ish required the residents of Bnei Brak, which is close to Jaffa, to read the Megilla on the fifteenth. However, we already learned that, according to many Rishonim, technically, one does not need to read the Megilla on the fifteenth even in places of uncertain status. Therefore, in a nearby village, there are two uncertainties (sfek sfeika), and so we rule leniently. In addition, perhaps one could claim that this strengthens the opinion that even in the city of uncertain status itself the Megilla should be read only on the fourteenth. After all, one of the explanations given for why a place adjacent to a walled city takes on the status of the city is that we want to avoid separating between people who live as neighbors (Turei Even and Ĥatam Sofer, as cited above in n. 3). If residents of a place adjacent to a city of uncertain status would celebrate Purim only on the fourteenth, while the residents of the city itself celebrate on the fifteenth as well, they will be divided. Therefore, it is proper for residents of the uncertain place to follow the practice of those who live adjacent to them and observe only the fourteenth, especially since most Rishonim (based on the Ge’onim) espouse this opinion.

04. Traveling between Walled and Unwalled Cities

Since Purim is celebrated in unwalled cities on the fourteenth and in walled cities (today, only in Jerusalem) on the fifteenth, many questions arise regarding one who travels from an unwalled city to Jerusalem, or vice versa. When should such a person observe the holiday of Purim? The general rule is that a person’s obligation is determined by his location on the day of Purim, not by his permanent residence throughout the year, because one who stays in an unwalled city for even one day is nonetheless considered a resident of an unwalled city with respect to the laws of Purim. The determining moment is alot ha-shaĥar (dawn) – on the fourteenth for unwalled cities, and on the fifteenth for walled cities – because that is when the obligation of the daytime Megilla reading begins.

A resident of Jerusalem who wants to celebrate Purim on the fourteenth must enter an unwalled city on or before the night of the fourteenth and remain there until after alot ha-shaĥar. This way, he is considered a resident of an unwalled city according to all opinions. Then, even if he returns to Jerusalem early in the morning, before managing to read the Megilla, he remains obligated to read the Megilla on that day – the fourteenth – in Jerusalem. In such a case, he should appoint someone who is staying in an unwalled city to be his shali’aĥ to give matanot la-evyonim and mishlo’aĥ manot on his behalf. If, on the other hand, a resident of Jerusalem enters an unwalled city on the night of the fourteenth with intention to return to Jerusalem before alot ha-shaĥar of the fourteenth, or if he first enters the unwalled city after alot ha-shaĥar of the fourteenth, and he returns later on to Jerusalem, he is still considered a resident of Jerusalem, because the determining time is alot ha-shaĥar of the fourteenth.

If a resident of an unwalled city celebrates Purim on the fourteenth and wants to celebrate the holiday again on the fifteenth, in Jerusalem, he must come to Jerusalem on the night of the fifteenth and stay there until after alot ha-shaĥar of the fifteenth. This way, he is considered a resident of Jerusalem for the day and must fulfill all the mitzvot of Purim on the fifteenth. However, he should try to hear the berakhot for the Megilla from someone else – and if he reads the Megilla for himself, he should omit the berakhot altogether – because some authorities maintain that one who already observed Purim on the fourteenth does not need to observe it a second time (based on Rosh). Even though he is halakhically required to observe Purim on the fifteenth as well, when it comes to reciting the berakhot, we take into account the opinion of those who rule that he is exempt and therefore omit the berakhot. One who is going to be in Jerusalem from the night of the fourteenth all the way through the day of the fifteenth must observe Purim only in Jerusalem, and he may recite the berakhot over the Megilla on the fifteenth according to all opinions.

The Rishonim debate the case of a resident of Jerusalem who traveled to an unwalled city on the night of the fourteenth and planned to return to Jerusalem before alot ha-shaĥar, but was delayed and did not manage to return in time. Some authorities maintain that his status is determined by his intentions, and thus he is exempt from observing Purim on the fourteenth (Rif, Ramban). Others maintain that we consider only his actions, and thus he must observe Purim on the fourteenth (Rashi, Ha-ma’or). Within the opinion that his status is determined by his intentions, some maintain that his status is determined by his intention at the time that he traveled to that location (Mishna Berura), and others maintain that his status is determined by his intention when Purim begins. In practice, in both cases one should observe the mitzvot of Purim without reciting berakhot. If added uncertainties arise, one should consult a competent rabbi.^[7]

[7]. This issue is very detailed and complicated. Therefore, I wrote this section in a way that is suitable for everyone, summarizing the disputes very briefly. See Torat Ha-mo’adim 6:9-10, which rules that the law generally follows one’s location, and Hilkhot Ĥag Be-ĥag ch. 9, which rules that the law generally follows one’s intentions. There are many more distinctions regarding this issue; see ibid. and Piskei Teshuvot 688:9-10, which expands upon the topic in great detail.

The determining time is alot ha-shaĥar because that is when the obligation for the daytime Megilla reading – which is the primary reading – begins. Several poskim write that halakha actually implies that in order to become obligated, one must stay there long enough after alot ha-shaĥar to be able to read the Megilla, which is approximately half an hour (see sht 688:17).

I wrote in the main text that the determining time is alot ha-shaĥar of the fourteenth and of the fifteenth, as that is the opinion of Rashi, Ramban, Ritva, Ri’az, sa, and others. Rosh, however, maintains that alot ha-shaĥar of the fourteenth is the only determinant. Accordingly, one can never obligate himself to observe two Purims. In consideration of his opinion, one does not recite the berakhot over the Megilla reading on the second day. Furthermore, according to most poskim, based on the Yerushalmi, it turns out that one who will be in Jerusalem on the fourteenth and in Tel Aviv on the fifteenth is exempt from observing Purim altogether. According to Rosh, however, since he knows on the night of the fourteenth that he does not intend to be in Jerusalem on the fifteenth, he must observe Purim on the fourteenth, and some say on the fifteenth as well.

05. Purim Ha-meshulash

The fifteenth of Adar, when Purim is celebrated in walled cities, sometimes coincides with Shabbat. The fourteenth of Adar never coincides with Shabbat. When the fifteenth falls out on Shabbat, Purim in that year is called Purim Ha-meshulash (“Triple Purim”), because its mitzvot are divided over three days. Why don’t we celebrate Purim on Shabbat? The Sages prohibited us from reading the Megilla on Shabbat for fear that one may carry it through a public domain. It is also inappropriate to conduct the se’uda on Shabbat, because it says, “To observe them as (lit. ‘to make them’) days of feasting and joy” (Esther 9:22), which means that the meal must be made for the sake of Purim, not Shabbat. (The date of Purim depends on an act of the beit din, which sanctifies the new month, while Shabbat is set and established from the time the world was created.)

Therefore, residents of walled cities read the Megilla on Friday. They also give matanot la-evyonim on that day, because poor people anticipate receiving money at the time of the Megilla reading and will be distressed if people neglect to give them gifts on that day. One should try to read the Megilla with a minyan, because some maintain that this reading is not conducted in its proper time, in which case it must be read in a group of ten Jews, men or women (mb 690:61). Nonetheless, the Megilla should be read on Friday, with the berakhot, even when no minyan is available (Tzitz Eliezer 13:73, Yabi’a Omer 6:46).

On Shabbat, which is the day of Purim in walled cities, residents of these cities recite Al Ha-nisim in the prayer services and in Birkat Ha-mazon. They also read the special Torah reading for Purim. That is, they take out two Torah scrolls; they read the weekly Torah portion from the first scroll and the portion for Purim – “Amalek came” (Shemot 17:8-16) – from the second scroll.

On Sunday, they eat the festive Purim meal and send mishlo’aĥ manot to one another, since mishlo’aĥ manot is connected to the meal.

The reason we read the Megilla before Shabbat but postpone the se’uda until after Shabbat is because we must publicize the miracle, by reading the Megilla, no later than the day on which the miracle occurred, as it says, “ve-lo ya’avor (lit. ‘and it shall not pass’)” (Esther 9:27). On the other hand, we may partake in the se’uda only once the day of the miracle has arrived, which is Shabbat. And since it is inappropriate to make such a meal on Shabbat, we postpone it until after Shabbat.

It is best to eat more meat and drink more wine than usual even on Shabbat, because some authorities maintain that the se’uda is supposed to be eaten on Shabbat. If possible, it is also good to send mishlo’aĥ manot privately on Shabbat, on condition that there is an eruv in one’s location.^[8]

[8]. Ran derives from the Yerushalmi (y. Megilla 1:4) that we postpone the Purim meal until Sunday, and sa 688:6 rules accordingly. Radbaz, ma, Noda Bi-Yehuda, and others also agree. However, Ralbaĥ claims that the Bavli disagrees with the Yerushalmi and maintains that one should conduct the Purim meal on Shabbat. Therefore, it is proper to consume more meat and wine than usual at one’s Shabbat meal.

According to many poskim, a resident of an unwalled city who comes to Jerusalem on Friday does not need to observe the mitzvot of Purim Ha-meshulash, because he has already fulfilled his obligation. Others maintain that it is better for him to observe the mitzvot of Purim Ha-meshulash.

Introduction

It was taught in the academy of Eliyahu: One who reviews halakhot every day is assured a place in the Next World, as it states: “His ways are forever” (Habakkuk 3:6). Do not read this “ways” [“halikhot”], rather “laws” [“halakhot”]. (Nida 73a)

Daily study of halakha demonstrates that every facet and epoch of one’s life is connected to the godly ideals whose parameters are described by halakha. One who studies halakha daily connects his temporal, mundane activities to the world of eternal truth. Thus he will be part of the Next World. (Rav Eliezer Melamed, Preface to the Hebrew Peninei Halakha Series)

Over the course of the past two decades, Rav Eliezer Melamed’s Peninei Halakha has evolved from a radio program into a well-known and widely accepted Israeli halakhic code. Its twelve volumes (and counting) adorn the shelves of countless shuls and are the textbook of choice for teaching halakha in dozens of schools. In all, over 300,000 individual volumes of Peninei Halakha have been sold.

Peninei Halakha owes its success in large part to three guidelines that shape Rav Melamed’s composition. Firstly, he begins each topic by defining and elucidating its basic principles before moving on to the practical details. He thus distinguishes between the general and the specific, between the primary and the secondary. Secondly, he anchors his discussions in relevant contemporary issues, thus demonstrating how theoretical ideas impact the details of halakhic practice. Finally, he uses clear and accessible language to explain the theoretical and theological roots of halakha.

The result of these guidelines is a code of law that is crystal clear in its presentation, concise in its formulation, and well-organized. These qualities are attested in the approbations of many leading Torah scholars and former chief rabbis of Israel:

“It is composed in a manner that makes for easy comprehension and is made concrete through the use of examples from the contemporary reality. This is accompanied by explanations that make the material beloved by its audience and teach the love of God and man.” (Rav Shaul Yisraeli z”l, Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz Harav and author of Eretz Ĥemda and other works)

“I attest that Rav Eliezer Melamed invests days and nights clarifying the halakha and its rationale logically and with great erudition.” (Rav Shlomo Goren z”l, former Chief Rabbi of the IDF, Tel Aviv, and the State of Israel)

Rav Melamed’s book is of great value. He adroitly elucidates and illustrates the principles and reasons for the mitzvot and laws he addresses, and then he encompasses the vast details of the issue at hand, presenting both its principles and its specifics in a clear light. (Rav Avraham Shapira z”l, former Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz Harav and Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel)

The content is written well and organized beautifully. Each word is placed on a foundation, so that the reader may read it quickly. (Rav Mordechai Eliyahu z”l, former Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz Harav and Sephardic Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel)

I am impressed by his clear and readable style. He wisely chose relevant halakhic issues and problems of paramount importance to contemporary students of the Torah. He presents the foundations and basics in an organized fashion, to the point that his conclusions are virtually self-evident. (Rav Nachum Eliezer Rabinivitch, Rosh Yeshiva of Birkat Moshe – Maale Adumim)

The effort invested by Rav Melamed in assembling and reworking the material so that it is of use to those who populate the study halls as well as those who love and support Torah and wish to base lives of sanctity on a halakhic foundation – can be discerned between the lines of the work. (Rav Dov Lior, Rabbi and Rosh Yeshiva of Kiryat Arba – Ĥevron)

You have blazed a singular trail in elucidating the depth and breaths of halakha by first considering the basis of each matter. By explaining the fundamental parameters and rationale of the halakha, you provide great clarity for each issue, down to the last detail. (Rav Zalman Baruch Melamed, Rabbi and Rosh Yeshiva of Beit El, and father of Rav Eliezer Melamed)

Rav Melamed’s rulings relate to both Ashkenazic and Sephardic practice and chart a mainstream course rooted in practical common sense even while presenting other positions, whether lenient or stringent, and treating them with due respect.

Yeshivat Har Bracha is proud to present this translation of Rav Eliezer Melamed’s work on the laws of Pesaĥ, the first volume of the eventual translation of the entire series, to the English-speaking world. Although various portions of Rav Melamed’s halakhic writings have appeared in English in the past, online and in print, the reader will find that the present re-launch of the series will standardize style and usage and exhibit the accuracy, clarity, and concision typical of the Hebrew version of Peninei Halakha (for example, the list of kitniyot species that appears in section four of Chapter 9 is the result of hours of research, including consultation with linguists and botanists). We hope that our efforts yield a clear, readable, and thorough presentation of the laws of Pesaĥ.

Many people contributed to the preparation of this volume for publication, and we would like to express our gratitude to them. The initial impetus to translate Peninei Halakha into English came from Yonatan Behar, and Rabbi Maor Cayam was instrumental to transforming the idea into a reality and first publishing Rav Melamed’s works in English. The present volume was first translated by Yehoshua Wertheimer and Moshe Rapps. After undergoing editing, it was proofread by Nechama Unterman who, together with Dr. Yocheved Cohen, has been indispensible to the difficult and occasionally frustrating task of formulating stylistic guidelines for rendering a halakhic work into English. The editorial team at Koren/Maggid Publishers, specifically Tomi Mager and Rabbi Reuven Ziegler, gave this volume its current form and design. Their invaluable guidance ensured that the final product meets the needs and tastes of its English-speaking audience. The creation and presentation of high-quality, compelling Torah content is part and parcel of the vision of Koren and its publisher, Matthew Miller. We hope that Peninei Halakha takes its place on Koren/Maggid’s ever-expanding and increasingly comprehensive bookshelf.

Rabbi Yogev Cohen, Director, the Peninei Halakha Project

Rabbi Elli Fischer, Editor, the English Peninei Halakha Series

Tishrei, 5774

Glossary

afikoman	lit. dessert; the portion of matza eaten to conclude the Seder meal
aĥshevei	a principle whereby one’s actions indicate that he assigns subjective significance to an otherwise insignificant object
al ha-sova	while satisfied
bal yera’eh	the prohibition against ĥametz being seen in one’s possession on Pesaĥ
bal yimatzei	the prohibition against ĥametz being found in one’s possession on Pesaĥ
basar be-ĥalav	the forbidden mixture of milk and meat
batei midrash	Torah study halls
batel be-rov	rendered insignificant by the majority
batel be-shishim	rendered insignificant as less than one sixtieth of a mixture
be-di’avad	a level of performance that ex post facto satisfies an obligation in a less-than-ideal manner
bedika	search; often used as shorthand for bedikat ĥametz
bedikat ĥametz	the mitzva to search for ĥametz in order to eliminate it from possession before Pesaĥ; see chapter 4
beit din	rabbinical court
beit knesset	synagogue
ben yomo	less than 24 hours (the time it takes for absorbed taste to become foul) removed from last use
berakha	a formal blessing recited before eating or performing a mitzva, and on other occasions
berakha aĥarona	a blessing recited after eating or drinking
berakhale-vatala	a blessing in vain
Birkat Ha-mazon	known as the “grace after meals”; the berakha aĥarona consisting of four berakhot recited after a bread-based meal
bitul	nullification
bi’ur ĥametz	the elimination of ĥametz
bli neder	a verbal caveat that ensures that an undertaking does not acquire the status of a vow
de-Oraita	biblically mandated
Eretz Yisrael	the Land of Israel
Erev Pesaĥ	lit. the eve Pesaĥ; the day preceding Pesaĥ, on which Israel is obligated to offer the korban Pesaĥ
gebrokts	see matza sheruya and sec. 8:2
ĤagHa-matzot	the Festival of Unleavened Bread; the biblical name for Pesaĥ
Hagada	the central text of the Seder, the central part of which retells the story of the Exodus
hagala	immersion in boiling water; see chapter 10
halakha	the collective body of Jewish law; an individual Jewish law
ĥalla	the mitzva to give a part of a large batch of dough to a kohen
Hallel	chapters 113-118 of Tehilim, all of which are thanksgiving psalms, recited on Jewish holidays
Hallel Ha-gadol	Tehilim chapter 136; the “Great Hallel”
ĥametz	cereal grain that leavened; see chapter 2.
ĥametz gamur	absolute ĥametz, in which the leavening process has been completed
ĥametz nuksheh	“hardened ĥametz”; see section 2:5
ĥametz she-avar alav ha-Pesaĥ	ĥametz that belonged to a Jew during the holiday
ha-motzi	the berakha over bread
ha-motzi leĥem min ha-aretz	“Who brings forth bread from the earth”; the formula for the berakha on bread
ĥaroset	a sweet paste made of fruits and nuts eaten at the Seder to commemorate the clay mortar our forefathers made when they were enslaved in Egypt
hasava	reclining; see 16:10-11
hatarat nedarim	the annulment of vows before a rabbinical court
heavy libun	see libun
hefker	ownerless
hefsek	A problematic interruption between two acts or recitations that must be performed or recited together
heteira bala	it absorbed permissible matter
Ĥol Ha-mo’ed	the intermediate days of Sukkot and Pesaĥ, on which certain weekday activities are permitted
ĥozer ve-ne’or	“reawakened”; the reversal of nullification in which a nullified ingredient regains its former status; see sections 7:2-3
ĥutz la-aretz	countries outside of Eretz Yisrael
irui	“pouring”; one of the ways taste is transferred; an intermediate phase between kli rishon and kli sheni
isura bala	it absorbed forbidden matter
karet	extirpation, the most severe biblical punishment
karpas	the vegetable eaten at the beginning of the Seder
ke-bole’o kakh polto	taste is released from a vessel in the same manner that it was absorbed; see sec. 10:3
kezayit (pl. kezeytim)	a olive’s bulk, a standard halakhic measure of volume or weight; see sections 16:23-24
kiddush	the invocation of the sanctity of a holy day with blessings over a cup of wine
kinyan	an act that effects an acquisition or another change in status
kitniyot	non-ĥametz species that may not be eaten on Pesaĥ according to Ashkenazic custom; see chapter 9
klirishon	the vessel in which food was cooked; see section 10:8
klisheni	the vessel into which hot food was transferred; see section 10:8
korban	a sacrificial offering
korbanĥagiga	a sacrifice offered at each of the three pilgrimage festivals
korban Pesaĥ	the Paschal offering
korekh	matza and maror eaten together to commemorate the practice of Hillel the Elder in Temple times; see section 16:28
kosshelberakha	a cup of wine linked to the performance of a mitzva
kvisha	“pickling,” or the absorption of taste through prolonged soaking; see section 10:14
leĥem mishneh	the two whole loaves of bread/matza over which the berakha of ha-motzi is recited at Shabbat and Yom Tov meals
leĥemoni	“poor man’s bread”; how matza is described in Devarim 16:3
le-khatĥila	ab initio; a level of performance that satisfies an obligation in an ideal manner
le-shem matzat mitzva	“for the sake of the matza of the mitzva”; the required intention one must have when baking matza to be used for the mitzva
libun	heating a vessel by fire to the point that absorbed taste is incinerated
light libun	heating a utensil by fire to the point that a piece of straw or thread placed on the opposite side of the utensil becomes blackened from the heat
Ma nishtana	“Why is this night different?”; a series of questions that the children ask at the Seder
Ma’ariv	evening prayers
Magid	the part of the Seder in which the story of the Exodus is recounted
MakatBekhorot	the Plague of the Firstborn
marit ayin	“appearances”; an action that must be avoided because it may give a false impression of being a violation
maror	the bitter vegetable that must be eaten at the Seder
Mashi’aĥ	the Messiah; the restorer of the Davidic dynasty
matza	unleavened bread eaten by Jews on Pesaĥ
matza ashira	matza that was kneaded in a liquid other than water, colloquially known as “egg matza”; see section 8:1
mayim she-lanu	water drawn before nightfall and kept overnight in a cool place, later to be used in matza
mekhiratĥametz	the sale of ĥametz to remove it from Jewish possession before Pesaĥ; see chapter 6
melakha	productive work of the type prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov
melakha gemura	full-fledged work; see section 13:2
melolugmav	a measure of liquid; enough to fill the drinker’s mouth with one cheek inflated
mezonot	food that is made from grain but is not bread, or the berakha recited on such foods
mikveh	a ritual immersion pool
mil	a unit of distance; it takes 18 minues (22.5 according to some, and 24 according to others) to walk a mil
Minĥa	the afternoon prayers
minĥa gedola	5.5 seasonal hours before sunset; the earliest time to recite the afternoon prayers
minĥaketana	2.5 seasonal hours before sunset
nat bar nat	taste that has been absorbed into a medium twice removed from its origins
nat bar nat bar nat	taste that is thrice removed from its origins
netilatyadayim	ritual hand washing
Nisan	the first month of the Jewish year
notar	uneaten portions of a sacrifice left over until the morning, which must be incinerated and may not be eaten
noten ta’am bar noten ta’am	see nat bar nat
noten ta’am li-fgam	something that imparts foul taste
olat re’iya	a burnt-offering sacrificed in honor of one of the three pilgrimage festivals
pagum	befouled
pidyon ha-ben	the mitzva of redeeming the [firstborn] son
plata	a warming tray used to reheat foods on Shabbat
pras	half a loaf of bread; see section 16:25
reshut	voluntary, optional
revi’it	a liquid measure equal to a quarter of a log, calculated by most to be c. 75 ml
safek	a case of uncertainty or doubt
safek de-rabanan	an uncertainly about a rabbinic ordinance
se’or	a leavening agent that one uses to make dough ferment
Se’uda shlishit	the obligatory third Shabbat meal
se’udatmitzva	a festive meal celebrating the fulfillment of a mitzva
Seder	the banquet on the first night of Pesaĥ that includes several special recitations, customs, and mitzvot
sefirot	mystical “emanations” through which God created and sustains the world
sfek sfeika	a double uncertainty
sha’ah zmanit	a seasonal hour; one-twelfth of the time between sunrise and sunset (or between sunset and sunrise)
Shabbat Ha-Gadol	the Shabbat immediately before Pesaĥ
Shaĥarit	the morning prayers
shali’aĥ	proxy or agent
she-heĥeyanu	“Who has given us life”; a berakha recited at specific significant occasions
Shekhina	the divine presence in this world
shi’ur	a standard halakhic measurement for weight, distance, or volume
shi’ur akhilat pras	the time it takes to eat half a loaf of bread; see section 16:25
shmura matza	matza that has been guarded from becoming ĥametz; see section 1:2
siyummasekhet	a se’udat mitzva occasioned by the completion of a tractate of the Talmud
Ta’anitBekhorot	the Fast of the Firstborns; see section 13:3
tefaĥim	a handbreadth; a halakhic measurement equal to c. 8cm
tefillin	phylacteries; black leather boxes and straps containing parchment scrolls, worn during weekday morning prayers
teruma	a priestly gift contributed from one’s produce
tum’a	ritual contamination/impurity
Tzafun	the part of the Seder in which the afikoman is eaten
tzeit ha-kokhavim	the appearance of three distinct stars, marking nightfall for various halakhic purposes
yadsoledet bo	hot enough to cause the hand to recoil, somewhere between 45ºC and 71ºC
Yaĥatz	the part of the Seder in which the middle matza is broken and the larger part designated as the afikoman
Yom Tov	the festivals of biblical origin during which melakha is prohibited
yom tov sheni shel galuyot	the extra day of Yom Tov observed in the Diaspora
zeh ve-zeh gorem	an effect produced by multiple factors
zero’a	a piece of roasted or boiled meat or poultry, preferably a shankbone, placed on the Seder plate

01. The Festival of Matzot and the Festival of Pesaḥ

The holiday of Pesaḥ has two different names in the Torah, corresponding to its two different meanings: Ḥag Ha-matzot (the Festival of Matzot), as it is written, “You shall observe the Festival of Matzot (Shemot 23:15 and elsewhere), and Ḥag Ha-Pesaḥ (the Festival of Pesaḥ), as it is written, “the sacrifice of the Festival of Pesaḥ” (Shemot 34:25). Ḥag Ha-matzot represents the revelation of God’s providence, and Ḥag Ha-Pesaḥ represents Israel’s unique spiritual capacity.

At the Exodus from Egypt, God’s sovereignty over the world was given its most apparent and concrete manifestation. Thus, our faith in God is fundamentally rooted in the Exodus. The matza symbolizes this aspect of our holiday, as we read in the Hagada: “This matza that we eat – what is the reason? Because our forefathers’ dough did not have time to rise before the holy Supreme King of kings revealed Himself to them and redeemed them.”

The unique mission and destiny of the people of Israel was also revealed at the time of the Exodus. The distinction between the Israelites and the Egyptians was conspicuous in all of the plagues, as the Egyptians were struck and the Israelites were saved, through to the Plague of the Firstborn, when the destroyer struck every Egyptian household but passed over (pasaḥ) Israelite homes. Israel’s uniqueness is expressed through and symbolized by the Paschal sacrifice.

These two fundamental principles – faith and Israel – are linked together and interdependent. Unlike the other nations, which are formed through human endeavor, the nation of Israel was forged through divine miracles and wonders at the time of the Exodus for the purpose of receiving God’s Torah. Israel’s status entirely depends on their connection with God: when Israel does God’s will and makes God’s name manifest in the world, they earn all the blessings promised in the Torah. But when they do not fulfill God’s will, all of the curses written in the Torah are visited upon them.

Correspondingly, the revelation of God’s name in the world, that is, the manifestation of divine values on earth, depends upon Israel, as Scripture states: “I created this nation for My sake; they will tell My praise” (Yeshayahu 43:21). For this reason, the Sages stated (Bereishit Rabba 1:4) that the idea of Israel preceded the creation of the world, for it is through Israel that the purpose of the world is revealed. This is what the Sages meant when they said: “God set a condition with Creation: ‘If Israel accepts the Torah, you will continue to exist, but if not, then I will return you to being formless and void’” (Shabbat 88a). Israel’s unique capabilities were further made manifest in that God chose us to be His nation and children, in spite of the fact that we were lowly slaves, stuck in the morass of impurity in Egypt.

Thus, the two biblical names of the holiday express two aspects of one matter, namely, the revelation of God’s name in the world through Israel.

02. The Festival of Freedom – the Revelation of Morality

Why did the people of Israel, before their appearance as a nation, first have to endure such terrible slavery in Egypt? The simple explanation is that Israel’s mission is to rectify the moral state of the world, and in order to do so, it must experience firsthand the suffering and the pain that human beings can cause to one another.

Thus, we find several instances where the Torah invokes our experiences in Egypt when instructing us about interpersonal relationships. For example: “You shall not oppress a stranger – for you know the soul of a stranger, since you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Shemot 23:9) and “If a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one born among you, and you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt; I am the Lord your God” (Vayikra 19:33-34).

Similarly, the Sages said that before God began to smite the Egyptians, He instructed Moshe to command Israel concerning the mitzva of releasing slaves, so that even before they gained their freedom from Egypt they resolved that once they become free and have slaves of their own, they would never torment them. On the contrary, after six years they would send slaves free and grant them generous gifts (y. Rosh Ha-shana 3:5).

Indeed, an amazing thing happened at the Exodus. All other peoples who overthrew their enslavers became haughty, took power, and enslaved their former masters. Israel, however, did not try to enslave the Egyptians, even after completely defeating them; they only sought their own freedom. This was the first time that freedom appeared in the world as a moral value.

This is why Pesaḥ is called the Festival of Freedom, or, as the Sages termed it in the liturgy, “zeman ḥeirutenu,” “the season of our freedom.” It is no coincidence that Pesaḥ is the first of the pilgrimage festivals: it embodies the foundation of human freedom and consequently of moral responsibility for every individual and societal act. Perhaps this is also why the years of Israelite kings’ reigns were counted from the beginning the month of Nisan, so that the idea of freedom be fundamental to Israelite sovereignty.

03. Spiritual Liberation from Material Enslavement

Israel and Egypt are diametrically opposed. Egypt was an extremely materialistic society with a pagan worldview. Israel, on the other hand, is unique with its spiritual and abstract worldview. Thus, only Israel was able to accept the abstract belief in one incorporeal and non-physical God. Consequently, Israel’s relationship to the material world is also pure and refined, and Jews are thus naturally modest and circumscribed in their sexual mores. The Egyptians, on the other hand, due to their emphasis on the physical and their materialistic worldview, were strongly attracted to promiscuity and sexual transgression. The Torah thus commands: “You shall not do like the deeds of the land of Egypt, in which you dwelt” (Vayikra 18:3). The Sages interpreted this to mean that no nation committed deeds more abominable than the Egyptians did (Torat Kohanim ad loc.), especially the last generation that enslaved Israel (based on Maharal’s Gevurot Hashem ch. 4).

Egypt of that period indeed accomplished some amazing material and administrative feats by creating a stable regime, an advanced irrigation system, and a sophisticated economy (in part due to the help of Yosef, Yaakov’s son). However, these material accomplishments were disconnected from the spiritual world and even opposed to it. Their worldview was extremely idolatrous. They did not believe in the existence of an independent, spiritual soul, but thought that the soul is contingent on and subservient to the existence of the physical body. The Egyptians went to great lengths to embalm corpses because they thought that one’s existence hinges solely on his physical substance, even in death, when one was no longer able to move or speak but continued to exist in every other respect. Accordingly, they invested enormous effort in building pyramids, which are glorified cemeteries for the body.

To be sure, the material world has an important place in Judaism as well. However, a worldview based solely on physical existence will necessarily be idolatrous and amoral. This is because all of the paradigms provided by nature are amoral. There is beauty and wisdom reflected in the amazing regularity of the laws of nature, but they do not possess morality. The strong prey on the weak just as the powerful enslave the poor. The pagan worldview, instead of striving toward a higher level, sanctifies material existence with all its brutality and injustice. In contrast, a faith-based and spiritual worldview is characterized by constant striving toward improving the world, fighting evil, and empowering justice. This is how the prophet Yeshayahu described the ultimate redemption and the Mashi’aḥ’s leadership:

But with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide with equity for the meek of the land; he shall smite the land with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall slay the wicked. Righteousness shall be the girdle of his waist, and faithfulness the girdle of his loins. The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid…the cow and the bear shall graze, together their young shall lie down. The lion shall eat straw like cattle…. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain, for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. (Yeshayahu 11:4-9)

Thus, the Exodus from Egypt was not merely the emancipation of the Israelites enslaved in Egypt. Rather, it was the liberation of all mankind from the chains of materialism. This is why it is so important to delve into the Exodus, to the extent that we are commanded to see ourselves, every year on the Seder night, as though we ourselves left Egypt. We have also been commanded to remember the Exodus every day and every night. To a certain extent, Shabbat and all holidays were established to commemorate the Exodus, for at the Exodus the spirit of man was freed from the bonds of material existence. Since we have not finished liberating ourselves from the bonds of the material world – the chains of the evil impulse and its lusts – from a spiritual perspective, we still need to continue leaving Egypt. Hence, it is a mitzva to delve into the Exodus.

04. At the Exodus, the Material World Became a Vehicle for God’s Shekhina

The way this world is ordered, its material aspects gain prominence first and easily reach their complete, powerful expression. Spiritual elements, however, remain hidden; eons pass before their significance becomes discernible. It was thus natural that the Egyptians initially overpowered Israel, for Egyptian might had already come to full fruition, while Israel was still like an unborn embryo. Since Israel’s strength could not be yet expressed, the Egyptians exploited Israel’s weakness and enslaved them to fuel their glory and their lusts.

But this was also for the best, because spirituality cannot be expressed in the world without a material basis, and this is exactly what we gained from being enslaved in Egypt. During the entire period that the Egyptians enslaved Israel and thought that they were overpowering us completely, in reality we were drawing and absorbing their power, as it is written: “The Israelites were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceedingly mighty; and the land was filled with them” (Shemot 1:7). The more the Egyptians tried to enslave and subdue us, the more we increased, as it is written: “But the more they tormented them, the more they multiplied, and the more they proliferated” (Ibid. 12) until we numbered 600,000 men of military age. Maharal explains (Gevurot Hashem chs. 4 and 12) that this was the number necessary for the establishment of the nation of Israel. Once we numbered 600,000 and were mature enough to receive the divine revelation, the Egyptian empire collapsed, and we left Egypt to receive the Torah at Sinai.

In addition to the blessing of fertility, we also received, upon leaving Egypt, great wealth, compensation for many years of slavery. Thus, Israel began its course with a solid material foundation, as the Torah says:

When you go, you shall not go empty-handed; rather, every woman shall ask of her neighbor and of she who lives in her house silver and gold vessels and clothes; and you shall put them upon your sons and your daughters, and thus you shall despoil Egypt. (Shemot 3:21-22)

The Egyptians got their just deserts; had they chosen to be righteous, they would have assisted the Israelites in their quest to multiply and prosper, and they would have benefited from this doubly, as they did when Yosef contributed to Egypt’s success during the difficult years of famine. But they chose evil, cruelly enslaving Israel, and consequently they were punished with ten plagues. The name of God was thus sanctified in the world, for the wicked were brought to justice and Israel left to eternal freedom.

05. The Meaning of the Prohibition against Ḥametz – Pride in Relation to God

The prohibition against ḥametz on Pesaḥ is especially stringent, for the Torah not only forbade eating it, but commanded that it not be seen nor found in our possession. Our Sages further forbade eating any food with even the slightest amount of ḥametz mixed in. Thus the avoidance of ḥametz on Pesaḥ is absolute. This is because ḥametz symbolizes evil, as it says in the Zohar (2:40b) that ḥametz is the evil impulse. Specifically, it alludes to the impulse of pride. Fermentation causes dough to rise – it looks as though the dough is inflating itself and puffing up with pride, as an arrogant person would. In contrast, matza, which remains in its original size, as it was when God created it, symbolizes the trait of humility.

At first glance, this is difficult to understand. If ḥametz represents the evil inclination, why is there no commandment or custom to avoid it throughout the year? On the contrary, humanity is praised for knowing how to make wheat into fine ḥametz cakes (see Tanḥuma Tazri’a 5). This was the Creator’s purpose in endowing human beings with the wisdom and practical skills to engage in developing the world. God created an imperfect world intentionally, so that human beings could imitate God’s deeds and take part in improving the world by developing science and technology through diligent work. In other words, human beings are enjoined to improve and expand nature through a process that is perfectly analogous to turning wheat into baked goods. Thus, ḥametz is a good thing.

The answer is that there are two types of pride: One is that man exaggerates his own praiseworthiness and thinks he is wiser, stronger, and better than he really is. Any intelligent person understands that such pride harms one’s ability to actualize his potential, for it impairs his ability to judge, he cannot conduct his life properly, and instead of being happy with his accomplishments, his life is filled with errors and disappointment. Such pride is inappropriate all year long and has nothing to do with the prohibition of ḥametz. On the contrary, such pride distracts people from producing good things for the world.

The second type of pride, which the prohibition of ḥametz on Pesaḥ is designed to root out, is a person’s pride vis-à-vis his Creator, his God. Jewish faith is predicated on the acknowledgment that God created the world and determined its destiny, and that the roots of all things depend on Him alone. Although God gave humanity the ability to improve and to develop the world, this is limited to manipulating and developing the derivatives of the core elements of creation; human beings have no power over those core elements, which are divine creations. God created the world, gives life to all people, chose the people of Israel to be His am segula, His treasured nation, and gave Israel the Torah. Human beings have no authority to call these fundamental principles into question. Therefore, when one stands before his Creator, he must envelop himself in humility and make every effort not mix his human thoughts with the fundamental principles of creation. Such confusion, like ḥametz on Pesaḥ, is forbidden. Just as suicidal thoughts are fundamentally flawed because our lives are a gift from God and not ours for the taking, so too, one who mixes human ideas into the principles of faith inevitably emerges with flawed ideas.

Pesaḥ, and especially the Seder, is designed to instill in us the fundamentals of faith: that the world has a Creator, that He watches over His creatures, and that He chose the people of Israel to reveal His name in the world. Whenever an aspect of the divine is revealed in the world, it appears in a completely miraculous fashion, to show that it is not a human endeavor. Thus, the Exodus was accompanied by signs and wonders, to make public that the election of Israel was a divine matter. Similarly, the Torah was given with obvious miracles, to a generation that lived miraculously for forty years in the desert, in order to make it known that this was an entirely divine matter. In other words, we receive the fundamental principles of faith from God – we do not invent them. Whoever mixes some human aspect into these basic principles of faith is guilty of idolatry. This is alluded to in Zohar’s statement that ḥametz on Pesaḥ is idolatry (2:182a).

Therefore, on Pesaḥ, the holiday geared toward imparting the fundamentals of faith, we are commanded to be extremely cautious to avoid eating and possessing even a smidgen of ḥametz, which symbolizes our human aspects that must not get mixed in when we speak about the roots and foundations of faith. During the rest of the year, however, when we nurture and improve the branches that develop from these roots, ḥametz is allowed and even desirable.

06. The Meaning of Matza

Matza, symbolizing our recognition that the spiritual roots of things are beyond our grasp even though God granted us the ability to operate within and improve the world, is the opposite of ḥametz. Therefore, on Pesaḥ, when we are engrossed in the fundamentals, we do not mix even one iota of ḥametz in our food. We eat only matza, which remains simple and thin throughout its baking, without going through any additional process of swelling.

Through humility before God, expressed in the matza, we internalize the faith, first revealed at the Exodus from Egypt, that God actively watches over the world and elected Israel. To be sure, there were individuals who believed in God even before the Exodus, but their connection with the divine was of a personal nature. The wholeness of faith was first revealed only at the Exodus, with the formation of a complete nation containing all strata of society destined to manifest God’s name in the world.

Matza comes to remind us of faith. Zohar (2:183b) calls matza the “food of faith” (meikhla de-mehemnuta) because by eating matza on the Seder night with the proper intent, one achieves faith, and by eating matza all seven days of Pesaḥ, one implants that faith firmly in one’s heart (Pri Tzadik, Pesaḥ 9).

Since matza signifies faith, it is understandable that its entire manufacturing process must be performed very meticulously, as we will learn (in chapter 12). This is because faith is the roots of all things, and any small flaw in faith can cause tremendous destruction in the world.

We can thus understand why the nation of Israel came into being as slaves in Egypt. All other nations develop naturally, from the ground up, from family to clan to tribe to nation. As they grow, they develop cultures that evolve out of the circumstances of their lives, the climate of their territories, and their conflicts with their neighbors. As part of the emergence of their culture, they develop some type of deistic belief. Since human beings are involved in their invention, such beliefs are idolatrous.

In contrast, Israel became a nation as slaves, without culture. They could not develop their own culture while enslaved and lacking national self-esteem. At the same time, Egyptian culture was foreign to them and presumably despised by them, as it was associated with their tormentors. Israel was thus a tabula rasa, free of preconceived notions, and perfectly capable of absorbing the true faith based on divine revelation and accepting the Torah without introducing human considerations into its fundamental principles. The impoverished, unembellished matza alludes to the condition of the Israelites at that time.

07. One Who Demeans the Holy Days

An important principle is articulated in Mishna Avot (3:11): “Rabbi Elazar Ha-Moda’i says: ‘One who desecrates holy foods, one who demeans the holy days…and one who expounds the Torah not in accordance with halakha, even if he has Torah study and good deeds to his credit, has no share in the World to Come.’”

My teacher and rabbi, R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook, would ask how one with Torah study and good deeds to his credit could not have a share in the World to Come. Moreover, since the mishna does not specify how much Torah study and good deeds this person has to his credit, it is implied that even if the person is a great Torah scholar, highly scrupulous in his observance of mitzvot, and a doer of many good deeds, he has no share in the World to Come since he demeans the holy days and expounds the Torah not in accordance with the halakha.

Tzvi Yehuda went on to describe one who greatly respects tradition and is meticulous about fulfilling the halakhic requirements of the Seder but considers it all to be the product of human intelligence alone. He explains that the importance of the Pesaḥ holiday and the Seder lies in the parents passing their traditions on to the next generations, imparting to them the moral principles of human liberty and a sense of mission to improve the world. The matza merely concretizes Israel’s historical consciousness, and the four cups of wine simply add a dimension of joy. Even though all of these lovely ideas are true, the fundamental principle is missing: that God chose us from among all nations, gave us His Torah, and commanded us to celebrate Pesaḥ and eat matza on the Seder night.
Tzvi Yehuda’s hypothetical Jew similarly honors Shabbat as a day when the family spends time together and grows closer, and when hardworking people can rest and engage in spiritual pursuits. He even adds that “Shabbat kept the Jews more than the Jews kept Shabbat.” He forgets only one thing: that God commanded us to observe Shabbat, down to its finest detail.

This is what the mishna meant by “one who expounds the Torah not in accordance with halakha.” Even though he studies it diligently, to him it is not God’s Torah but merely human wisdom, so he occasionally permits himself to interpret it in opposition to the halakha. Thus, he demeans the holy days in that he thinks they are customs and traditions that human beings invented to give expression to all sorts of spiritual notions. He thereby denies that they are God-given mitzvot of the Torah. Therefore, even though he may have studied much Torah and performed many good deeds, and he is thought of as a good, honorable man in this world – he has no connection with holiness. He has no share in the eternal historical mission of the Jewish people, and thus has no share in the World to Come.

08. One Inquires about the Laws of Pesaḥ Beginning Thirty Days before Pesaḥ

We inquire about and expound upon the laws of Pesaḥ beginning thirty days before Pesaḥ. We learn this from Moshe, who on Pesaḥ itself explained the matter of Pesaḥ Sheni, the make-up date for those unable to bring the Paschal offering, which takes place thirty days later. The main reason for this is that all of Israel had to prepare animal sacrifices as Pesaḥ approached, examining them to be certain that they were free of disqualifying blemishes (Pesaḥim 6a; Avoda Zara 5b).

This enactment was not canceled even after the Temple was destroyed; it is proper to study the laws of Pesaḥ thirty days before the holiday arrives. As is well known, Pesaḥ has very many laws, pertaining to preparing the home for Pesaḥ, seeking and destroying ḥametz, baking the matza, and the Seder. Some Rishonim maintain that the enactment applies specifically to Torah scholars, enjoining them to prioritize answering practical questions about the upcoming holiday. According to this view, there is no universal obligation to set a fixed time for studying the laws of Pesaḥ (Ran and Rashba). Nevertheless, since many Rishonim maintain that it is indeed obligatory to set a fixed time for studying the laws of Pesaḥ beginning thirty days before Pesaḥ, it is proper that every individual do so, beginning on the 14th of Adar (Purim). It is also proper for schools and yeshivot to set a fixed time for studying the laws of Pesaḥ during this period.

There is a dispute amongst halakhic authorities about whether one is obliged to study the laws of the other holidays thirty days in advance. Some say that this enactment was established primarily for preparing the animal sacrifices, and such sacrifices were in fact brought on the three pilgrimage festivals – the olat re’iyah (pilgrimage burnt-offering), shalmei ḥagiga (pilgrimage peace offerings), and shalmei simḥa (festival peace offerings) – and it is therefore proper to study the laws of each festival thirty days in advance. Others say that the practice today primarily concerns Pesaḥ, since its laws are so numerous and strict (MB 429:1).^[1]

These differences of opinion and distinctions concern advance preparations for the holidays. On the holidays themselves, however, there is an ancient enactment of our teacher Moshe to study the laws and spiritual meanings of that holiday (Megilla 32a, MA 429:1).

[1]. Tosafot on Avoda Zara 5b, s.v. “ve-hatnan” states that even after the destruction of the Temple this decree was not nullified. MB and BHL 429:1 reinforce the opinion that one must learn the laws of Pesaḥ thirty days before and rejects Ran’s opinion since most Rishonim disagree with him. This is also the opinion of many Aḥaronim, including SAH 429:1-3, which explains the issue thoroughly and states that this is a rabbinic decree (as opposed to the opinion of Baḥ, which states that it is a Torah law). Conversely, see Yabi’a Omer 2:222, which explains that Ran and Rashba maintain that the essence of the decree is to first answer a person who asks about the laws of Pesaḥ, since he is asking about a pertinent issue, and that this is the opinion of most Rishonim. (There is also debate about the position of SA itself: some infer that it concurs with Ran from the fact that it only mentions the term “inquire”; others reject this inference.) In practice, I used the terms “mitzva” and “proper” since not everyone agrees that this is an obligation. Moreover, even though according to Baḥ this is in fact a Torah obligation, most authorities view it only as a rabbinic decree.

It is also worth noting that some authorities maintain that the main obligation is for rabbis and Torah teachers to begin teaching the laws of Pesaḥ thirty days before the festival, but there is no obligation on each individual. This is what Ḥok Yaakov states in 429:1, 3, adding in the name of Roke’aḥ, Raavan, and Kol Bo that even the reading of Parashat Para right after Purim was established to remind the people to purify themselves for the upcoming Pesaḥ. Similarly, many Aḥaronim write that this is the reason for the establishment of the custom to teach the laws of Pesaḥ on Shabbat Ha-gadol, as recorded in SAH and MB 429:2. Nevertheless, according to most authorities there is still a mitzva for every individual to delve into the laws of Pesaḥ during the thirty days prior to the festival. BHL rules accordingly. However, there is arguably a greater obligation for rabbis and teachers.

01. Four Mitzvot Concerning the Prohibition against Ḥametz

Four Torah commandments deal with the prohibition against ḥametz on Pesaḥ: three negative and one positive.

The first prohibition is to refrain from eating ḥametz, as it is written, “And ḥametz shall not be eaten” (Shemot 13:3). Our Sages taught that the prohibition against eating ḥametz on Pesaḥ includes not deriving any kind of benefit from the ḥametz. The Torah further states: “You shall not eat any leavened product (maḥmetzet)” (Shemot 12:20). Our Sages concluded from this verse that not only something that had fermented on its own is prohibited, but even food that had been leavened by some external agent may not be eaten on Pesaḥ. It must be noted that the Torah was particularly stringent concerning the prohibition against eating ḥametz. Almost all of the Torah’s food prohibitions are punishable by lashes, while eating ḥametz on Pesaḥ is punishable by karet (extirpation), as it is written, “whoever eats ḥametz from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Shemot 12:15).

The second prohibition is that no ḥametz may be found in our possession, as it is written, “Seven days there shall be no se’or found in your homes” (Shemot 12:19). Se’or is the “starter” or leavening agent used to make dough ferment. This verse means not only that se’or is forbidden, but also that no ḥametz may be found in our possession. This prohibition is often called bal yimatzei.

The third prohibition is that no ḥametz may be seen in our possession, as it is written: “Matzot shall be eaten seven days; and no ḥametz of yours shall be seen, and no se’or of yours shall be seen within all your borders” (Shemot 13:7). One violates the second prohibition (bal yimatzei) and this third prohibition (called bal yera’eh) only if one has in his possession on Pesaḥ at least one olive’s bulk (kezayit) of ḥametz. If the volume of the ḥametz that remained in one’s possession was less than a kezayit, he does not violate bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei on account of that ḥametz.

The fourth mitzva – a positive commandment – is to eliminate ḥametz and se’or in advance of Pesaḥ, as it is written, “Seven days you shall eat matzot; however, on the first day you shall remove the se’or from your houses” (Shemot 12:15).

02. When Ḥametz Is Prohibited by Torah Law and by Rabbinic Law

Although the prohibition against ḥametz applies primarily during the seven days of Ḥag Ha-matzot (from the 15th through the 21st of Nisan), we are nevertheless commanded to remove ḥametz from our homes by midday of the 14th of Nisan, Erev Pesaḥ.

The prohibition against eating ḥametz also begins at midday on the 14th, as it is written, “And you shall sacrifice the Pesaḥ [offering] to God…you shall not eat ḥametz with it” (Devarim 16:2-3). This prohibits the eating of ḥametz from the time fit for bringing the Pesaḥ sacrifice, i.e., at midday on the 14th of Nisan. This prohibition against eating ḥametz includes the prohibition against deriving any benefit from it.^[1]

In order to distance one further from possibly violating commandments, the Sages added to the prohibitions and forbade gaining benefit from ḥametz for an additional hour. They also forbade eating ḥametz for two extra hours, since on a cloudy day (and where there are no clocks) people are likely to err by as much as two hours.

These times are calculated by dividing the day into twelve equal parts, each of which is called “a seasonal hour” (“sha’ah zemanit”). Thus, one may eat ḥametz for the first four seasonal hours of the 14th. During the fifth hour it is rabbinically forbidden to eat ḥametz, but it is permissible to derive benefit from it by, for example, feeding it to an animal or selling it to a gentile. With the onset of the sixth hour of the day, it becomes forbidden rabbinically to derive benefit from ḥametz, and if one forgot to sell it to a gentile by then, it must be destroyed. When midday arrives, that is, after the sixth hour ends, ḥametz is forbidden by Torah law both for consumption and for deriving any benefit, and one must dispose of it as soon as possible. Every moment that one does not get rid of it, he violates the positive commandment to eliminate ḥametz (see below, 3:6).

Once the holiday begins, two additional prohibitions apply: bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei.^[2] The prohibition against eating ḥametz also becomes more severe: one who willfully eats ḥametz after midday on the 14th is punishable by lashes only, whereas one who willfully eats ḥametz after the holiday begins is punishable by karet. This is based on the verse: “whoever eats ḥametz, from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Shemot 12:15).

Ḥametz becomes permissible once again after Pesaḥ, except that our Sages forbade ḥametz that belonged to a Jew during the holiday (“ḥametz she-avar alav ha-Pesaḥ”). Since by keeping the ḥametz on Pesaḥ he violated the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei, the Sages prohibited eating or gaining benefit from that ḥametz even after Pesaḥ. Ḥametz that was in the possession of a gentile during Pesaḥ, however, is permissible; a Jew may buy it and eat it (SA 448:1-3).

[1]. The mitzva of removing the ḥametz applies from midday on the 14th, as it is written, “However, on the first day you shall remove the se’or from your houses” (Shemot 12:15). The Sages deduced from other verses that “the first day” refers to Erev Pesaḥ. Since the ḥametz must already have been removed by the onset of the holiday itself so as not to violate bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei, the mitzva of removing the ḥametz must be in the middle of the day preceding Pesaḥ, that is, at midday (Pesaḥim 4b).

The prohibition against eating ḥametz and obtaining any benefit from it applies from midday on the 14th according to R. Yehuda, as explained in Pesaḥim 28a. Rambam, as well as R. Yitzḥak ibn Gi’at, Rosh, and most Rishonim, ruled in accordance with this view. R. Shimon’s view is that the prohibition against eating ḥametz begins with the holiday itself, and it is only the mitzva of removing the ḥametz that comes into effect at midday on the 14th. Some Rishonim rule in accordance with this view, although they disagreed about what the mitzva of eliminating ḥametz entails according to R. Shimon. According to Ramban and Raavad, since one is obligated to eliminate the ḥametz, it is also forbidden to eat it; yet Torah law permits him to benefit from it in the course of its being burned. Only the Sages prohibited deriving any benefit from the ḥametz from the beginning of the sixth hour of the day. According to Ha-ma’or, the mitzva of disposing of the ḥametz does not imply a prohibition against eating it, since by eating it, one is, in fact, disposing of it. As noted, the view of most poskim is that the halakha follows R. Yehuda’s view that the prohibition against eating ḥametz and the prohibition against deriving any benefit from ḥametz are of Torah origin and apply from midday. This is how the halakha is decided in SA (443:1).

According to R. Yehuda, ḥametz she-avar alav ha-Pesaḥ is forbidden by the Torah, whereas according to R. Shimon, the Torah permits it, but the Sages decreed it to be forbidden (Pesaḥim 28b-29a). The halakha follows the latter view (MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 1:4; MB 448:7).

[2]. This is because, with respect to these prohibitions, the Torah states “seven days” explicitly (Raavad, Maharam of Rothenburg, MA, MB 443:1. Others say that the prohibition starts on midday of the 14th (Rashi, and this is also implied by Rabbeinu Ḥananel and Itur, SHT 443:2).

03. What Is Ḥametz and What Is Se’or?

The ḥametz that is prohibited by the Torah on Pesaḥ is any one of the five species of cereal grains that came into contact with water and fermented. The five species are wheat (ḥitta), barley (se’ora), oats (the common identification of the “shibolet shu’al” mentioned by the Sages), rye (shifon), and spelt (kusmin). These species are used to make bread, the staple food of mankind. The Sages ordained a special blessing to be recited before eating bread – “Who brings forth bread from the earth” (“ha-motzi leḥem min ha-aretz”). After eating bread, the Torah commanded us to recite Birkat Ha-mazon. So that bread will be tasty and easy to digest, its dough is fermented and made to rise.

There are two types of leaven products: ḥametz and se’or. Both are produced by mixing flour and water. Common ḥametz is the leavening of the dough to bake bread and cakes. The leavening is done by leaving the dough at rest without handling it. If one wants to accelerate the leavening, one mixes se’or (starter dough) into the dough. Se’or (akin to sourdough) is the second type of leaven product. It is produced by leaving ḥametz for a long time, so that it continues to effervesce and ferment, until it tastes so sour that it is not fit for human consumption. The purpose of se’or is to hasten and improve the quality of leavening of various types of dough, for the preparation of breads and cakes. In other words, ḥametz is intended for eating while se’or is a leavening agent in preparing ḥametz foods. The Torah prohibited both, and the law is the same regarding both. One who leaves a kezayit of either of them in his possession during Pesaḥ violates bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei (Beitza 7b).

But if flour of the five cereal grains is mixed with water, kneaded rapidly, and put it into an oven immediately, then the dough will not have enough time to rise. This is the matza that we are commanded to eat on the first night of Pesaḥ, as a commemoration of the Exodus from Egypt, as is written, “And the people picked up their dough before it leavened” (Shemot 12:34). Thus, specifically those species of grain that may become ḥametz are the species from which one makes matza for the mitzva (Pesaḥim 35a).

Although rice and millet are similar to the five species of cereal grain, and although they rise, they do not undergo a complete fermentation process as the five cereal species do. Therefore, the prohibition against ḥametz does not apply to them, and if one made matza out of one of them, one does not fulfill any mitzva with it on Pesaḥ.

Note that kusmin (spelt) is not the same as kusemet (buckwheat). The former is one of the five species of cereal grain, whereas the latter is a type of legume and may be eaten on Pesaḥ by those who eat kitniyot; even among those who do not eat kitniyot, it is permitted for sick people (MB 453:4, 7; note well that some mix up the names and call spelt kusemet).

04. Defining the Leavening of Dough

As we have learned, the difference between bread and matza is that the dough used for making bread has undergone a leavening process resulting from the fermentation of ingredients within the flour that have come into contact with water. In order to augment the leavening process, bakers customarily mix se’or into the dough, causing the dough to ferment more thoroughly and quickly. However, even without the leavening agent, if dough is left without kneading, it would ferment and rise. Therefore, when preparing matzot, one must work quickly to ensure that the leavening process within the dough does not begin.

As long as the dough is in motion, being kneaded, it does not become ḥametz. Even if the kneading were to continue an entire day, the dough would not become ḥametz, since kneading arrests the leavening process. However, if the dough sits motionless for 18 minutes, the leavening process will begin and all the prohibitions concerning ḥametz will apply to it.

This applies to normal conditions, but where it is hotter, the leavening process is accelerated and the dough becomes ḥametz in even less than 18 minutes.

Cracks appearing in the dough are a physical indication that the dough has become ḥametz. Even if 18 minutes without kneading had not yet passed, since cracks formed in the dough, it has certainly become ḥametz; apparently it was warm so it took less time to become ḥametz, or the kneading was inadequate and certain parts of the dough were neglected, causing those areas to become ḥametz. Even if there are very few cracks, and they appeared only in part of the dough, the entire dough is ḥametz. If no cracks appeared but the dough blanched, it is ḥametz nuksheh (hardened ḥametz; see next section), which is rabbinically forbidden (SA 459:2).^[3]

[3]. The rising of the dough indicates that it has become ḥametz (Me’iri), and other indications, like cracks in the dough, a blanched appearance, and the amount of time that has elapsed, are only relevant in a case where the dough did not rise. However, there are situations in which the dough rises without becoming ḥametz; rather, it has undergone what the Sages call “sirḥon” (spoilage). This applies to the case of rice and of flour mixed with fruit juice. However, when wheat flour mixes with water and begins to rise, it indicates that the mixture has become ḥametz. If the dough sat and was not kneaded for the time that it takes to walk one mil, it has become ḥametz even if there is no visible indication, as explained in the Mishna and Gemara in Pesaḥim 46a. SA 459:2 explains that this amount of time is 18 minutes, although Rambam and R. Ovadia of Bertinoro maintain that it is 24 minutes. BHL ad loc. states that it is possible to rely on the lenient position to prevent a significant loss, but under normal circumstances, because of the strict nature of the prohibition of ḥametz, the poskim adopt the eighteen-minute period without even mentioning the more lenient opinion.

According to Rashi and Me’iri, however, one must check the amount of time that the dough has been sitting only when it is unclear whether or not the leavening process has begun: if more than the time it takes to walk one mil has elapsed, the dough is ḥametz. If one is certain that the dough is not ḥametz, even if it has been sitting for longer than the time that it takes to walk one mil, it is not considered ḥametz. Nonetheless, according to most Rishonim in any situation where the dough has sat for longer than it takes to walk one mil, the dough is ḥametz. This is the ruling in MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 5:13 and SA 459:2. Pri Megadim’s introduction to §467 contends that such dough is complete ḥametz; eating it on Pesaḥ incurs the punishment of karet. Rashbatz writes that one must suspect that such dough has become ḥametz. In a warm place, dough becomes ḥametz in less than the time it takes to walk a mil, as written in Aguda in the name of the Ge’onim. This is the halakhic consensus, as it is also the ruling of Yerei’im, Hagahot Maimoniyot, and Mordechai. Additionally, Rosh writes that even if the dough became warm in one’s hands, the dough will become ḥametz more quickly. This is cited in SA and Rema 459:2 (see also Berur Halakha on Pesaḥim 46a). Although there is dispute as to whether or not the “sitting times” of the dough are combined, Terumat Ha-deshen rules that a full kneading of the dough cancels the previous sitting time, though merely poking the dough would not be effective. This is cited in MB 459:16.

Pesaḥim222222 48b states: “As long as the dough is being worked it cannot become ḥametz.” The vast majority of Rishonim, including MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 5:3 and Tur and SA 459:2, explain that as long as one keeps kneading the dough it will not become ḥametz, even if he does so for the entire day. Yet it appears that the Yerushalmi disagrees with the Bavli and says that if one kneaded the dough for the amount of time that it takes to walk four mil, the dough is considered ḥametz. Baḥ cites Ri’az that ideally we should act in accordance with the Yerushalmi. There is an even more stringent opinion – Ritva’s – according to which as long as one kneads the dough at the appropriate pace so that he will complete the kneading in less time than it would take to walk one mil, the dough does not become ḥametz. However, if the kneading goes on for longer than this time, the dough is considered ḥametz. Even though the vast majority of poskim disagree with Ritva, they rule that lekhatḥila we are strict about finishing the kneading process within 18 minutes, as explained in AHS 459:7.

05. Ḥametz Nuksheh (Hardened Ḥametz)

The ḥametz that the Torah forbade is ḥametz gamur (absolute ḥametz), meaning that the leavening process has been completed, and the food has become edible. But if fermentation had begun but not concluded, and if the food is edible under pressing circumstances, then it is “ḥametz nuksheh.” According to most poskim, ḥametz nuksheh is not forbidden by the Torah, but the Sages prohibited it so that people would not err and come to eat or keep real ḥametz.

An example of ḥametz nuksheh is the glue that scribes used to prepare from flour and water for gluing paper. Since its leavening process was never completed, and it is barely edible, it is ḥametz nuksheh, and the Sages forbade eating it or keeping it on Pesaḥ (MB 442:2). If its form was changed, as when the glue is used to stick papers together, then one is allowed to keep it. Others are more stringent and maintain that if the glue protrudes from between the pages, then it is considered as if it has maintained its same form, and it is forbidden to keep it on Pesaḥ (SA and Rema 242:3).

Similarly, dough that began to ferment to the point that its surface blanched, but the surface was not cracked as with true leavening, is ḥametz nuksheh, and it is forbidden by rabbinic law to eat or keep it on Pesaḥ (SA 459:2).^[4]

[4]. The opinion of SA 447:12 is that ḥametz nuksheh is only rabbinically forbidden, and therefore, ḥametz nuksheh that existed over Pesaḥ is not forbidden after Pesaḥ. This is also the opinion of SAH 442:20-21 and MB 442:2, based on the opinion of most Rishonim. However, several Rishonim maintain that ḥametz nuksheh is forbidden by Torah law. There are two related issues: the prohibition of eating ḥametz nuksheh and the prohibition of keeping ḥametz nuksheh (see Berur Halakha on Pesaḥim 48b regarding the issue of eating, and 42a regarding the issue of keeping it over Pesaḥ). According to Rabbeinu Tam and many other poskim, flour that is mixed with fruit juice and a little bit of water is also considered ḥametz nuksheh. See below (8:1) regarding matza ashira.

06. Ḥametz So Spoiled That a Dog Would Not Eat It

Ḥametz that was originally fit for eating, but that became moldy or spoiled to the point that it is not fit for human consumption, is still considered ḥametz gamur, since it can still be used as a leavening agent. In this respect, ḥametz differs from all other forbidden foods, which are no longer forbidden once they become unfit for human consumption. Ḥametz, in contrast, remains forbidden even when it becomes unfit for human consumption, since it can still serve as a starter for another dough. Only if the ḥametz became so spoiled that it is unfit for consumption by a dog, it is not considered food at all, it no longer has the status of ḥametz, and it is permissible to keep it during Pesaḥ and to derive benefit from it (SA 442:2; MB 10). By rabbinic decree, however, it is still forbidden to eat it on its own, for by eating it one shows that he considers it food (MB 442:43). The same principle applies to all food prohibitions: Even if it is no longer fit for human consumption, the Sages forbid eating it.

The yardstick of being fit for a dog’s consumption is relevant only for measuring the spoilage of ḥametz or se’or. But if se’or was not spoiled, but only became so sour that it is not fit even for a dog, since it is good se’or (that functions as a leavening agent and is usable like regular yeast), all the laws of ḥametz apply to it, and one is required by Torah law to destroy it (BHL 442:9).

This law – that one does not have to burn ḥametz that was spoiled to the point of not being fit for a dog’s consumption – applies only if it became spoiled before the time that ḥametz becomes prohibited. But if it was fit to be eaten by a dog when the prohibition of ḥametz began, then even if it became spoiled later, to the point of being unfit for a dog’s consumption, one must eliminate it. Since the mitzva of eliminating the ḥametz has taken effect, one has not discharged his obligation until he has destroyed the ḥametz completely (MB 442:9; see below, ch. 5, n. 5).^[5]

It is important to note that all of these laws are conditional on the ḥametz having initially been fit for human consumption or for preparing human food, like starter dough. But if it was never fit for human consumption, even if it was fit to be eaten by a dog, the prohibition of ḥametz never applied to it. However, the ḥametz in food prepared for dogs and cats was initially fit for human consumption, and it therefore must be eliminated. Something that was not initially meant for eating but was, in fact, fit for human consumption under pressing circumstances is ḥametz nuksheh, as described above.

[5]. MB 442:44 cites Ḥok Yaakov, which quotes Terumat Ha-deshen that if a gentile prepared ḥametz on Pesaḥ and then made it inedible even for dogs, it is prohibited for a Jew to gain any benefit from it, since it had been proper ḥametz during a time when ḥametz was forbidden. See also Igrot Moshe OḤ 3:62, which is lenient in this matter. Yeḥaveh Da’at 2:60 summarizes the opinions regarding this issue. See AHS YD 103:1-5 regarding other forbidden foods that are no longer prohibited when they become unfit for human consumption.

07. Ways in Which There Is No Leavening

As noted, there are five types of grain that can become ḥametz after touching water. However, if they are roasted in fire, they can no longer become ḥametz, and in principle they may be mixed with water. Nevertheless, the Sages were concerned lest the roasting not be thorough, and thus the grain would become ḥametz when coming into contact with water. Therefore, one must treat them just as one treats regular cereal grains. If they became wet and 18 minutes passed, we suspect they may have become ḥametz, and it is forbidden to gain any benefit from them; one must destroy them (SA 463:3; MB ad loc 7).

The above concerns kernels of grain that were roasted in fire, but if it was flour that was roasted, there are Rishonim who are lenient, maintaining that one need not suspect that the flour was not roasted well. Thus, it is permissible to mix such flour with water or in a cooked food without concern for ḥametz (Rashi, Rambam). Many Rishonim hold that in the case of flour, as well, one must be concerned that it may have not been roasted thoroughly (Rabbeinu Yeruḥam, Hagahot Smak, Hagahot Maimoniyot, and others). The Aḥaronim rule that one must not mix roasted flour with water or in a cooked food, lest it become ḥametz. Nevertheless, if one did make such a mixture, even though it is forbidden to eat it, it is permissible to keep it until after Pesaḥ and to eat it then (MB 463:8; Kaf Ha-ḥayim ad loc. 13).

However, concerning matza that was properly baked, it is agreed that it cannot become leavened. Accordingly, it is permissible to soak matza and matza meal in water, and, indeed, this is what most people do. Ḥasidim, however, customarily do not eat soaked matza (see below, 8:2).

Scalding the grains or the flour in boiling water also destroys the capacity for becoming ḥametz. However, the Ge’onim prohibited reliance on scalding, for today no one knows how to do this scalding, and if the boiling does not destroy the potential for becoming ḥametz, an opposite process of rapid fermentation may be generated, as heat may hasten fermentation. Therefore, scalded grains or flour are treated just like ḥametz: it is forbidden to gain any benefit from them and one must burn them (SA 454:3; MB 13).

Flour on which water dripped, drop by drop, continuously, even all day long, does not become ḥametz, since the falling of the drops disturbs the flour and shakes it, and does not allow the leavening process to develop. Immediately upon cessation of the dripping, one should knead the dough and bake it. If there is doubt that some of the dripping may not have been continuous, then this is a doubt concerning a law of Torah, and one must relate to that flour as ḥametz and burn it (Pesaḥim 39b; SA 466:6).

Another way to prevent the dough from fermenting is by soaking it in cold water (Pesaḥim 46a; SA 457:2). Preferably, one should not do so, lest the water not be cold enough, allowing the dough to ferment (Rosh, MB 454:18).^[6]

Flour that was kneaded with fruit juice does not become leavened at all, but if even a little water was added to the mixture, then it will become leavened (as explained below, 8:1).

[6]. Does freezing the dough halt the leavening process? According to Igrot Moshe OḤ 3:59, one may not assume it does, since perhaps the cold just slows down the leavening process but does not stop it completely. On the other hand, Ḥelkat Yaakov 3:166 and Devar Yehoshua 2:58 are lenient based on the fact that freezing the dough stops the leavening process completely. Nevertheless, one should not purposely prepare dough to freeze and bake on Pesaḥ, but if one prepared dough before Pesaḥ and did not have a chance to bake it before Pesaḥ, as long as the dough has not yet risen, he may freeze the dough and bake it after Pesaḥ.

And even though we generally are not lenient when it comes to scalding the dough, there are practical applications when dealing with a dangerously sick person, where it is better to minimize the number of prohibitions involved, as explained in MB 454:13.

01. The Mitzvot Associated with Eliminating Ḥametz

It is a positive Torah commandment to eliminate all ḥametz from our possession before Pesaḥ, as it is written, “Yet on the first day you must remove the se’or from your homes” (Shemot 12:15). The oral tradition teaches that we are to clear out the ḥametz by midday of the 14th of Nisan, Erev Pesaḥ. This ruling is supported by the verse, “You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice over ḥametz” (ibid. 34:25), which is interpreted to mean that one may not slaughter the Paschal sacrifice while there is still ḥametz in his possession, and the time for slaughtering the Paschal sacrifice begins at midday on the 14th of Nisan (see Pesaḥim 4b; MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 2:1). Men and women are equally obligated in this mitzva, as they are concerning all of the mitzvot of Pesaḥ.

Whoever did not remove the ḥametz from his home by midday of the 14th of Nisan is in violation – every single moment that he delays – of the positive commandment of removing the ḥametz (MB 443:1). Furthermore, from the moment the Pesaḥ holiday begins, he is in violation of two prohibitions: bal yimatzei, as it is written, “Seven days there shall be no se’or found in your homes” (Shemot 12:19), and bal yera’eh, as the Torah declares, “Matzot shall be eaten seven days; and no ḥametz of yours shall be seen, and no se’or of yours shall be seen within all your borders” (ibid. 13:7). Thus, by fulfilling the mitzva of eliminating ḥametz, we are saved from two prohibitions: bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei – that ḥametz should be neither seen nor found in our possession.^[1]

The mitzva of removing the ḥametz is the first in a series of mitzvot connected with Pesaḥ. As noted, ḥametz on Pesaḥ is a metaphor for the evil inclination, and one has to clear out the ḥametz from the house in order to experience the sanctity of the Pesaḥ sacrifice and the eating of the matza properly. Therefore, the first of the preparations for Pesaḥ is removal of the ḥametz.

[1]. A summary of the opinions regarding the times of the onset of the ḥametz prohibitions: The removal and destruction of the ḥametz must be done by midday of the 14th (perhaps according to Ha-ma’or the mitzva begins at midday, but according to the rest of the Rishonim, on the Torah level the removal and destruction of the ḥametz must be completed by midday). There is a dispute regarding the starting times of the other mitzvot connected to ḥametz. Regarding the prohibition of eating ḥametz, R. Yehuda maintains that the Torah prohibition begins at midday of the 14th, and R. Shimon maintains that it begins at the onset of the Pesaḥ festival. Most Rishonim adopt the view of R. Yehuda, but some adopt the view of R. Shimon. Regarding the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei, most Rishonim maintain that these prohibitions begin at the onset of the festival, while a minority maintains that they begin at midday of the 14th (above, 2:2, n. 2).

One who participated in the Paschal sacrifice (korban Pesaḥ) while he still had at least a kezayit of ḥametz in his possession violated a Torah prohibition, as it says: “You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice over ḥametz” (Shemot 34:25). If he was warned about this and still did it on purpose, he incurs the penalty of lashes (MT, Laws of Korban Pesaḥ 1:5).

02. The Prohibition against Ḥametz One Owns

The prohibition against ḥametz on Pesaḥ is unique in that it is not only forbidden to eat it, but it is forbidden even to keep; whoever keeps it in his home violates the two prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei.^[2]

The Torah’s language, “no ḥametz of yours shall be seen, and no se’or of yours shall be seen within all your borders” (Shemot 13:7), shows that there is no prohibition against a Jew having a gentile’s ḥametz or ownerless ḥametz in his domain. It says “of yours” – you are not allowed to see ḥametz that belongs to you specifically, implying that the ḥametz of gentiles and ḥametz that is ownerless are permissible.

Therefore, if a gentile lives in a Jew’s courtyard, even if the gentile works for the Jew, the Jew does not have to eliminate the gentile’s ḥametz. Likewise, if a gentile deposited ḥametz in a Jew’s house for safekeeping before Pesaḥ, the Jew need not clear it out, as long as he is not responsible for the ḥametz. However, he must erect a partition at least ten tefaḥim (handbreadths) high in front of the ḥametz, to make certain that he does not forget and eat of it (SA 440:2). Alternatively, he may lock it up and hide the key, or close it in a cabinet and tape the doors shut, so that if someone opens them, he will be reminded of the prohibition against ḥametz.

A Jew may also permit a gentile enter his home on Pesaḥ, carrying his ḥametz with him. It is forbidden, though, for the Jew to eat with the gentile at the same table, lest the Jew forget and eat of the gentile’s ḥametz. Even if he puts something on the table to remind himself not to eat from the gentile’s ḥametz, he may not eat with the gentile at one table, lest a crumb of ḥametz may get mixed into the Jew’s food. Once the gentile has finished heating, the Jew may clean the table thoroughly of all the ḥametz crumbs and then eat there (SA 440:3; MB ad loc. 18).

[2]. According to Rosh (Pesaḥim 1:9), any ḥametz that can be seen, even if in reality it is not seen, would cause a violation of bal yera’eh. It turns out then, that anyone who is in possession of at least an olive-sized piece of ḥametz violates two prohibitions: bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei. However, according to Kessef Mishneh (on MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 1:3), one who keeps any type of ḥametz in his possession violates bal yimatzei, but he would only violate bal yera’eh if he actually sees the ḥametz.

03. Ḥametz That Has Been Guaranteed by a Jew and the Status of Stocks

We have learned that one violates the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei only by possessing ḥametz that is the property of a Jew, as it is written, “no ḥametz of yours shall be seen” (Shemot 13:7). Yet, at first glance, there is a difficulty here, for it is written, “there shall be no se’or found in your homes” (ibid. 12:19), implying that it is forbidden to have ḥametz in a Jewish home under any circumstances. The Sages explained that, indeed, if the ḥametz belongs to a gentile, and the Jew has not undertaken the responsibility of its safekeeping and guaranteeing its return, then it is not forbidden to have it in the Jew’s domain, as it is written, “and no ḥametz of yours shall be seen.” If, however, the Jew accepted responsibility for the item, then it is considered like his own, and the prohibition applies. This is what the Torah intended when commanding: “there shall be no se’or found in your homes” (Pesaḥim 5b).

Therefore, if a Jew guaranteed the return of ḥametz that was deposited with him, it becomes like his, and he is not allowed to keep it in his home or courtyard but must return it to the gentile or clear it out. Be-di’avad, if he cannot return it to the gentile and clearing it out will cause him a loss, he should sell the ḥametz together with the place it is stored, to a different gentile (SA 440:1; MB ad loc. 4). However, if the Jew undertook the protection of a gentile’s ḥametz that remains in the gentile’s possession, then the Jew does not violate any prohibition (MB 440:7). Thus, a Jewish-owned insurance company may insure a gentile’s ḥametz, because it remains in the gentile’s possession.^[3]

If a Jew deposited ḥametz with a fellow Jew for safekeeping, they are both obligated to eliminate it: the depositor because he owns it, and the custodian because, by committing to safeguard, it is considered his (SA 440:4). Even if he did not undertake its safekeeping, he is obligated to eliminate it.^[4]

If one bought stock in a company that owns ḥametz, and Pesaḥ arrived, if he has the authority to express his view about how to manage the company’s affairs – what to sell and what to buy – then it is considered as if he owns the ḥametz, and he violates bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei on account of it. But if he is not authorized to express an opinion, then he is like everyone who invests in stocks – the company owes him a percentage of its value, but its property is not considered his, and he does not violate any prohibitions on account of its ḥametz holdings. Accordingly, those who invest money in mutual funds or pension funds do not violate any ḥametz prohibitions, even though the managers of the funds may invest part of the money in a company that owns ḥametz, since this ḥametz is not considered the property of the investor. Some rule stringently in this case.^[5]

[3]. According to Ri, the ḥametz is considered to be in a person’s possession only if he accepted the responsibilities of a paid custodian. According to Behag, he is considered the owner of the ḥametz – and thus in violation of the halakha – even if he only accepted the responsibilities of an unpaid custodian. SA records Ri’s view laconically and mentions Behag’s view as “some say” (“yesh omrim”). MB (8) states that le-khatḥila one should show concern for Behag’s view. According to Rambam, even if one did not accept any responsibility for the ḥametz, if the gentile is powerful and will forcibly extract compensation for the Jew’s loss of the ḥametz, the ḥametz is considered owned by the Jew, and he would be considered in violation. According to Raavad, he is not in violation, but the predominant view is that of Rambam. In all these cases, if the ḥametz remained over Pesaḥ, one may eat it be-di’avad, since the prohibition of using ḥametz that existed on Pesaḥ is only rabbinic, and in an uncertain situation we are lenient. The status of insurance companies is addressed in She’arim Metzuyanim Be-halakha 114:29.[4]. Regarding a Jew who deposited his ḥametz with another person, SA 440:4 rules in accordance with R. Yona that even if the custodian accepts responsibility over the ḥametz, since the ḥametz still belongs to the owner, it is the owner’s responsibility to destroy it. This is the opinion of other poskim as well. According to Ramban and Ran, since the ḥametz is not in the owner’s possession and the custodian accepted responsibility for it, the owner of the ḥametz does not transgress any prohibition. As for the custodian, SA 443:2 states that if the owner of the ḥametz did not come to collect it before Pesaḥ, the custodian should preferably sell the ḥametz to a gentile in order to preserve its value. If he did not do so, the custodian is obligated to destroy the ḥametz. MB ad loc. (14) explains that according to Baḥ and MA, the reason for this obligation is that every Jew is responsible for his fellow Jew (“kol Yisrael areivim zeh la-zeh”). Gra’s opinion on the matter is that even if the custodian did not accept responsibility for the ḥametz, he still has a Torah obligation to destroy it, as it is forbidden to harbor a Jew’s ḥametz in one’s home. This is also the opinion of Tzlaḥ and Beit Meir.

[5]. So states She’arim Metzuyanim Be-halakha 114:28. Some are strict and sell their shares of ḥametz-owning companies and companies that insure ḥametz. So states Sidur Pesaḥ Ke-hilkhato 11:5. Many ḥametz-sale documents include provisions to address this (see Piskei Teshuvot 440:1).

04. How One Fulfills the Mitzva of Eliminating Ḥametz

We clear the ḥametz out of our homes in two ways: in thought and in deed, that is, spiritually and in practice. The removal in thought is done through nullification (bitul) of the ḥametz, declaring it ownerless and considered as mere dust. We do this nullification because we violate the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei only with ḥametz that belongs to us and that we consider valuable. One who nullifies his ḥametz and considers it to be as dust does not violate any prohibitions on its account. Similarly, if he declares it ownerless, he commits no violation on its account.

In addition to bitul, we also eliminate our ḥametz in fact. The evening of the 14th, we search the entire house for ḥametz, and on the day of the 14th we eliminate it from our homes.

Although each method independently is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Torah law, the Sages required that we remove the ḥametz using both methods, to be on the safe side. Thus, we annul the ḥametz verbally and clear it out of the house physically.^[6]

On one hand, the Sages did not want to rely on the nullification alone, lest some Jews not annul the ḥametz wholeheartedly and subsequently keep it in their homes to eat after Pesaḥ. Since they did not annul the ḥametz wholeheartedly, they violate bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei by keeping it at home (Rashi, Pesaḥim 2a). Moreover, the Sages were concerned lest, if ḥametz remained in the house, people might eat it by mistake. Therefore, they also required its physical removal from the home (Tosafot ad loc.).

Similarly, the Sages did not want to rely on the search alone, lest some Jews not manage to find all the ḥametz in their homes but then find it on Pesaḥ. In that event, there is a chance that they might wait briefly before burning it – because they would feel badly for a moment about losing their ḥametz – and, in that moment, they would violate the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei. By nullifying the ḥametz before Pesaḥ, however, they would not violate the prohibitions, even if they hesitated a little before burning it (MB 434:6).^[7]

[6]. According to most poskim, on the Torah level, one method of destroying the ḥametz is sufficient: either by nullifying the ḥametz or by searching for and destroying the ḥametz. The Sages decreed that one must use both methods, as I wrote above (1:1), in the name of Ran and as cited in Beit Yosef §432. However, it seems that according to Tur, the Torah’s primary method is bitul, and the Sages added that one must also search for and destroy all ḥametz, because of the reasons presented above.

[7]. According to MA 434:5, citing Tur, if one thoroughly checks his house and yet still an olive-sized piece of ḥametz remains, he violates the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei. (This is why, in his view, the primary elimination of ḥametz at the Torah level is bitul.) However, according to Rambam, Rosh, and the other Rishonim, anyone who checks his house properly, even if he does not manage to find every last bit of ḥametz, does not violate any prohibitions for unintentionally having ḥametz in his house, since he did a proper and thorough inspection. Only if he finds ḥametz in his house on Pesaḥ and intentionally leaves it in his house because he wants the ḥametz, would he violate any prohibition. Moreover, according to Taz, even Tur is of this opinion, as I have written above.

05. The Essence of the Mitzva

A fundamental question arose concerning the essence of the mitzva of removing the ḥametz: is the mitzva essentially to eliminate the ḥametz actively or is the main principle that no ḥametz remains in a Jew’s possession?

According to most Rishonim (Ramban, Maharik, and others), the mitzva is primarily that one’s domain be free of ḥametz. One who has ḥametz must clear it out, and one who has no ḥametz in his possession has fulfilled the mitzva by having no ḥametz in his domain.

However, some Rishonim (Tosafot, Ran) imply that only someone who has ḥametz becomes obliged to fulfill the mitzva, and he fulfills it by clearing the ḥametz out of his house. One who has no ḥametz is exempt from the mitzva. Yet even according to this approach, we do not find that the Rishonim recommended acquiring ḥametz in order to fulfill the mitzva of removing the ḥametz. Nevertheless, there are Aḥaronim who wrote that it is appropriate for one who has no ḥametz in his possession before Pesaḥ to go beyond the letter of the law and buy some ḥametz, so that he may fulfill the mitzva of removing the ḥametz according to those who hold that one must actively remove ḥametz.

In practice, Jews are a holy people and strive to enhance the mitzva by making sure they have ḥametz in their possession on the 14th of Nisan, with which they fulfill the mitzva of eliminating ḥametz in a manner that satisfies all views. Moreover, they are so scrupulous as to remove the ḥametz specifically by burning it, for, according to many poskim, burning is the preferred way to destroy the ḥametz (see below, 5:4).^[8]

[8]. Minḥat Ḥinukh §9 discusses the different sides of the issue at length and notes that according to Rashi, Rambam, and Sefer Ha-ḥinukh, the mitzva is passive. (This is also the view of Ramban at the beginning of his commentary on Pesaḥim and of Maharik §174.) According to Tosafot and Ran, however, the mitzva is an active one, and in their view one who has no ḥametz should acquire ḥametz in order to fulfill the mitzva of eliminating it. R. Ḥayim Soloveitchik of Brisk offered a novel interpretation, namely, that this dispute hinges upon the dispute between the Sages and R. Yehuda regarding the method of destroying the ḥametz: according to R. Yehuda, the mitzva is specifically to burn the ḥametz, whereas according to the Sages, any form of destruction works. Those who follow R. Yehuda’s opinion, therefore, would hold that one must do a positive action to fulfill the mitzva of destroying the ḥametz. This requires further study (and see below, 5, n. 3). Among Aḥaronim, according to Maharash Engel, Ḥelkat Yo’av, and Mekor Ḥayim, there is a mitzva for every person to own ḥametz in order to destroy it; conversely, SAH (436:21), Divrei Ḥayim (1:9), Ḥavot Ya’ir (§4), and Avnei Nezer (OḤ 318) maintain that there is no mitzva to obtain ḥametz in order to destroy it. As mentioned, the custom is to actively destroy some ḥametz to fulfill this mitzva according to all opinions. Indeed, MB (445:10) states that it is proper to leave a kezayit of ḥametz in order to fulfill the mitzva of destroying the ḥametz.

I wrote that fulfillment of the mitzva requires a kezayit because according to many poskim the requirement to eliminate ḥametz applies to a minimum of a kezayit (see MB 442:33). Even according to those who adopt the stringent view that less than a kezayit must be eliminated, it stands to reason that this is only so that one does not eat it and violate the prohibition of eating ḥametz, which applies even to a piece smaller than a kezayit. According to the overwhelming majority of poskim, however, there is no Torah prohibition of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei on a piece of ḥametz smaller than a kezayit. So state Dagul Me-rvava §442, Ḥakham Tzvi §86, and Sha’agat Aryeh §81. According to many, the mitzva to eliminate ḥametz is linked to the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei. (See below, 5:4, n. 3, which discusses how some are careful not to pour lighter fluid on the ḥametz at the time of burning, whereas others maintain that this is not an enhancement of the mitzva.)

06. When the Prohibitions of Eating and Benefiting from Ḥametz Begin

The mitzva of eliminating ḥametz must be carried out by midday of the 14th of Nisan. Every instant that a Jew keeps his ḥametz after that time he is in violation of the positive commandment to remove the ḥametz. Beginning at midday, the Torah prohibition against eating and gaining benefit from ḥametz begins as well (MT, Laws of Ḥametz and Matza 1:8; above, section 1 of the present chapter).

As discussed above (2:2), in order to distance one further from possibly violating commandments, the Sages added to the prohibitions and forbade gaining benefit from ḥametz for an additional hour. They also forbade eating ḥametz for two extra hours, since on a cloudy day people are likely to err by as much as two hours.

These times are calculated by dividing the day into twelve equal parts, each of which is called “a seasonal hour” (“sha’ah zemanit”). It is forbidden to eat ḥametz from the beginning of the fifth hour; it is forbidden to gain any benefit from the ḥametz from the beginning of the sixth hour; and the Torah prohibition against eating and benefiting from ḥametz begins from the beginning of the seventh hour.

Thus, in practice, it is permissible to eat ḥametz throughout the first four hours of the 14th day of Nisan. During the fifth hour, it is forbidden to eat ḥametz by rabbinic decree, but it is still permissible to benefit from the ḥametz – for example, one may feed ḥametz to an animal or sell it to a gentile. With the onset of the sixth hour of the day, it becomes forbidden by rabbinic decree to gain benefit from the ḥametz, and it is consequently no longer considered in his possession, and he can no longer sell it to a gentile or nullify it. The only way to eliminate it is to burn it, crumble it, and throw it into the sea, or scatter it to the wind (SA 443:1).

The poskim disagree about when to calculate the beginning of the day. Magen Avraham maintains that it begins at dawn, that is, from when the first light becomes visible in the east. The Vilna Gaon maintains that it begins at sunrise, that is, from the time when the sun itself becomes visible in the east. The difference between dawn and sunrise is more than an hour; thus, for every halakha contingent on the hours of the day, calendars list two times. The earlier one in the morning is based on the approach of Magen Avraham, and the later one accords with the Vilna Gaon’s approach. This is true concerning the recitation of the morning Shema, which must be done by the end of the first three hours of the day, and it is also true of the Shaḥarit prayer, whose set time is until the end of the fourth hour (Peninei Halakha: Prayer 11:10, n. 14).

In practice, since the final times for eating and benefiting from ḥametz are of rabbinic origin, as are the sale and bitul of ḥametz, the halakha follows the more lenient view, since in cases of doubt on matters of rabbinic origin the halakha follows the lenient view. Nevertheless, it is better to be stringent when possible (MB 443:8).^[9]

[9]. A question arises regarding one who is in America and owns ḥametz in Eretz Yisrael: Until when can he annul or sell his ḥametz? The end of the fifth hour where the ḥametz is, or the end of the fifth hour where the owner is, about seven hours after the last time for annulling ḥametz in Eretz Yisrael? According to most poskim, we follow the location of the person, although there are some who maintain that one should follow the location of the ḥametz. Le-khatḥila one should follow the earlier time, but be-di’avad we follow the location of the person. This is the view of Igrot Moshe OḤ 4:94-95. See also Piskei Teshuvot 443:1.

The first opinion is quoted in the name of MA, even though the author himself was unsure. See also Rema 443:1 and MB ad loc. 9, stating that according to Terumat Ha-deshen this particular issue is assessed using fixed hours, not seasonal hours, and in a case of significant loss, one may rely on this view.

07. The Procedure for Eliminating Ḥametz

As we have learned (section 4, above), we eliminate ḥametz from our homes both in deed and in thought. The process of removal consists of four stages: inspection (bedika), nullification (bitul), elimination (bi’ur), and nullification once again. Let us describe this in detail.

The process begins with the bedika on the evening of the 14th. The search is aimed at ensuring that we have no more ḥametz in our home other than the ḥametz that we are keeping to eat and to destroy. Immediately after the search, we nullify the ḥametz for the first time, and in doing so we eliminate the ḥametz in thought. The next morning, we physically destroy the remaining ḥametz in our possession in deed. It is customary to destroy it by burning it. After the burning, one nullifies any ḥametz in his possession for a second time, thus completing the process of eliminating ḥametz in thought.

There are two more possible ways of disposing of ḥametz: selling it to a gentile and declaring it ownerless. As noted, one violates bal yera’eh and bal yimatzei only for ḥametz in his possession, and it is only ḥametz that is in his possession that he is commanded to eliminate. Thus, if he sells the ḥametz to a gentile or declares it ownerless, he does not violate any prohibition on its account.

Thus, search, disposal, and nullification are actions directed against the ḥametz with the aim of eliminating it. In contrast, declaring the ḥametz ownerless and selling are not directed against the ḥametz to destroy it, but rather their aim is to remove the ḥametz from our possession so that we do not violate the ḥametz prohibitions. With the search, the disposal, and the nullification, we wage war against the ḥametz, whereas by selling it or declaring it ownerless, we evade the responsibility it places upon us. These are all ways to remove the ḥametz.

Now that we have learned the principles of the mitzva of removing the ḥametz, in the coming halakhot we will explain the laws of removal of ḥametz in detail. We will begin with the halakhot of the search for ḥametz, with which we begin our campaign against ḥametz. We will then continue on to the halakhot of nullifying and destroying ḥametz. Then we will address the laws of selling ḥametz to a gentile for one who wishes to preserve the value of his ḥametz and free himself from the need to destroy it.

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