03. Genetic Diseases

It is often asked whether a man who carries a serious genetic disease is obligated to fulfill the mitzva of procreation in light of the real risk of having a child who suffers from that disease. Poskim disagree about this; some say that he still has an obligation to have a son and a daughter, for even if they are sick, he has contributed to populating the world. Moreover, there is a good chance that the child will be completely healthy. Others say that the Torah does not command us to procreate when there is a significant risk of having a child whose life will be one of constant suffering. In practice, in cases like these, a wise person should be consulted.^[3]

Nowadays, however, by God’s grace, there is a solution for most genetic illnesses, namely, it is often possible to do IVF and then, a few days later, to check the embryos for disease (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD), and only implant disease-free embryos in the woman’s uterus. Where this option is available, the couple has an obligation to fulfill the mitzva in this way, so as not to have sick children.

04. Additional Halakhic Questions

If an unmarried young man has cancer and must undergo radiation therapy and other treatments that may permanently affect his virility, it is a mitzva for him to provide sperm prior to the treatment, so that it can be frozen and then used to impregnate his eventual wife. Even if he is too young to be contemplating marriage, once he has reached the age of thirteen he is obligated in mitzvot. To fulfill the mitzva of procreation, there is a mitzva for him to produce semen that can later be used to have children. This is not wasting seed, as it is for the sake of procreation. Even if the treatments might not render him sterile, in which case it will have been unnecessary for him to provide sperm, he still has a mitzva to do so in order to guarantee his future ability to have children and fulfill the mitzva. If he can provide sperm without touching himself, that is preferable; if not, he may stimulate himself manually.^[4]

If a husband or wife is HIV-positive, then every time they have sexual relations, the spouse is at risk of contracting the virus. The only way to avoid this is to use a condom, which protects the healthy spouse. Some poskim rule that the couple may not have sexual relations, since regular condom use is considered wasting seed, and the couple must therefore divorce (Minḥat Shlomo 3:103:16). Others maintain that the prohibition of condom use is for its usual purpose, namely, contraception. However, if it is being used to protect the life of the husband or wife, they may use a condom, so they can at least fulfill the mitzva of ona (Aḥiezer 3:24:5; Igrot Moshe, EH 1:63; Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:2). Halakha follows the latter opinion.

05. Procreation for the Mentally or Psychologically Disabled or Ill

Those who are mentally of psychologically ill or disabled, namely, those who cannot take responsibility for care of children, are exempt from the mitzva to procreate. We can infer from the idea that marriage can be delayed until a man’s worldview and ability to provide for a family stabilize (5:7 and 5:9 above) that one who is incapable of taking responsibility for the care of his children, even at the most basic level, is not obligated in the mitzva. Even if such a person is capable of marrying, the couple should avoid having children. The easiest method is via an IUD.^[5]

06. A Mamzer

The poskim disagree about whether a man fulfills the mitzva of procreation by having a son and daughter through an adulterous sexual union that renders them mamzerim.^[6] Poskim also disagree about whether a mamzer has a mitzva to marry a woman whom he is permitted to marry – a mamzeret or convert – and have a son and daughter, even though these children will also be mamzerim.

Those who maintain that the mitzva applies to them adduce proof from the Talmud’s statement that the laws of sota apply to mamzerim. That is, if there is reason to suspect that the wife has committed adultery, we erase God’s name and give her the infused water to drink in order to make peace between the husband and wife, even though any children they go on to have will be mamzerim (Sota 26a). The implication is that mamzerim do fulfill a mitzva when they have children.

Others say that it is preferable for a mamzer not to have children, so as to avoid increasing the number of mamzerim. Proof for this view lies in the suggestion of the Sages that a mamzer marry a slave woman in order to purify his offspring. In order to avoid passing on his mamzer status, he may marry a woman from a gentile nation who has been acquired by a Jew. After the birth of their children, he can arrange for their freedom. Their status will be that of freed slaves – Jewish and not mamzerim. This course of action is recommended even though he will not fulfill the mitzva of procreation, because the children born of this union are not considered of his halakhic lineage. We see that it is preferable for a mamzer not to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, so that he will not pass on the status of mamzer to his offspring.^[7]

07. Ten Years of Childlessness

The Sages assume that a husband and wife who have been married for ten years and have not had children will probably not have children together, so they declare that the husband must divorce his wife, pay her ketuba, and marry someone else in order to fulfill the mitzva. Even though divorce is terribly destructive – the Sages go so far as to say, “The altar sheds tears for someone who divorces his first wife” (Gittin 90b) – nevertheless the mitzva of procreation takes priority, for through it a person achieves continuity. Also, the short-term pain of divorce is generally less hurtful than the long-term pain of remaining childless.

True, when polygamy was practiced, the husband had the option of marrying a second wife without divorcing the first. This is what happened when Sarah was childless, as it says (Bereishit 16:3): “So Sarai, Avram’s wife, took her maid, Hagar the Egyptian – after Avram had dwelt in the land of Canaan ten years – and gave her to her husband Avram as a wife” (Yevamot 64a).

If a couple has one child, even if ten years pass and it is no longer possible that they will have an additional child and fulfill the Torah obligation of procreation, the husband is not obligated to divorce his wife. By having even one child, they fulfill the general mitzva for which the world was created (above, 5:3 and n. 2).^[8]

During the period in which a couple did not have children, if they were separated for an extended period of time or the husband or wife was sick, that time is not factored in the ten years. If the wife became pregnant but miscarried, the ten years are calculated from the time of the miscarriage (SA EH 154:10-12).

If a couple living outside of Eretz Yisrael moved to Eretz Yisrael, the ten years are counted from their arrival in Eretz Yisrael, because it is possible that in the merit of living in Eretz Yisrael they will conceive. Similarly, if a couple living in Eretz Yisrael left for a certain period of time, the time they spend abroad is not factored into the ten years (Rashi and Ramban on Bereishit 16:3; AHS 154:25).

If the husband believes that he is infertile, he is not obligated to divorce his wife. Nevertheless, if she wishes to get divorced in order to remarry and have children, he is obligated to grant her a divorce and pay her ketuba. However, if she wishes to stay with him, she may do so, since she does not have a personal obligation to procreate (Yevamot 64a; SA EH 154:6; above 5:3).

It is important to emphasize that the obligation of a husband to divorce his wife after ten years does not establish that she is infertile, but simply means the chances of their conceiving a child together are slim. It is certainly possible that she will be able to have children with a different husband. Therefore, a man who has not yet had children may marry her. If after ten years she has not conceived with her new husband, he too must divorce her. After that, a man who has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may not marry her. Since she has failed to conceive with two different men, it is likely that that she is infertile (Yevamot 64a; SA EH 154:16-17).

Everything we have said about a man being obligated to divorce his wife after ten years applies to a situation in which there is no clear medical diagnosis. However, if reliable doctors have concluded that there is no chance that the wife will conceive, then even though the couple has not yet been married for ten years, her husband may divorce her in order to fulfill the mitzva to procreate; and vice versa, if ten years have passed but reliable doctors believe that there is still a reasonable chance that the wife will conceive, her husband is not required to divorce her (see Responsa Maharashdam YD §91; Meshiv Davar 4:9; Ish U-veito 16:15, end of n. 1.)

08. Permission Not to Divorce

The Sages’ obligation for a man to divorce his wife after ten childless years can be very painful. Some men, including Torah scholars, despite their desire to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, found it very difficult to divorce their beloved wives, with whom they had entered into an eternal covenant. They sought ways to permit their marriages to continue. Indeed, there are several grounds that sometimes permit this.

The most straightforward grounds for permission are when the husband believes himself to be the cause of their childlessness, or that there is at least a reasonable chance that he is the cause – for example, if he is sickly, or if an accident may have rendered him infertile. Even in these cases, if his wife wants a divorce in order to have a child, he is required to divorce her.

When it is impossible to claim that the husband is infertile, other justifications are sometimes sought. Some assert that since halakha does not require a person to spend more than a fifth of his assets on the fulfillment of a positive commandment (Rema 656:1), if the ketuba payment is more than this he is not obligated to divorce her (see Bigdei Kehuna, EH §1.) However, it seems that poskim do not rely on this claim. Rather, they require the husband to divorce his wife and pay her ketuba, because the mitzva of procreation is so important that one must spend more than a fifth of his assets in order to fulfill it (Avnei Nezer EH 1:1). Moreover, the cap of one-fifth may apply only when an exorbitant price is being demanded for a mitzva. If the price demanded is the accepted price of the mitzva, one is obligated to pay it (see BHL 656, s.v “afilu”). Nonetheless, perhaps one can say that the obligation to divorce is the general rule, but if someone is especially attached to his wife, to the extent that the pain of divorce seems terrible, above and beyond the norm, and worse than losing most of his assets, he is not obligated to divorce his wife.

When the amount of the ketuba payment is more than the husband can afford, some say that he cannot divorce his wife (Rashba; Pri Ḥadash). Many others maintain that since the divorce is halakhically required, if the husband is unable to pay the entire amount of the ketuba he pays as much as he can, and the beit din sets up a payment plan for the remaining amount. The divorce, however, is not delayed (Responsa Radbaz 1:458; Get Mekushar 119:18; Yaskil Avdi, vol. 2, Kuntres Aḥaron, EH §1; Yabi’a Omer, EH 7:2:10).

Outside of Eretz Yisrael, some wish to rely on the few Rishonim who maintain that even after ten years there, it is unnecessary to get divorced.^[9]

In practice, in each and every case, all factors are considered, and usually, by combining two or more rationales, justification is found to keep them together.

Another claim that can be used to allow a childless couple to remain married is for the woman to refuse to accept a get. The man can then claim that Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban forbids him from divorcing her against her will. (Technically, if he insists on marrying another woman, he might be permitted to take a second wife; if he does not insist, he would simply remain married to the current wife.) However, this is be-di’avad because it is based on the wife’s refusal to uphold halakha.^[10]

09. Noaḥides

The mitzva of procreation is relevant even to Noaḥides (non-Jews), as God said to Noaḥ and his sons: “And you, be fruitful and multiply, abound on the earth and increase on it” (Bereishit 9:7). However, the specific obligations that require men to get married by the age of twenty (24 at the latest) and to have a son and a daughter (5:7-9 above) do not apply to Noaḥides (see Sanhedrin 59a).

If a Noaḥide had a son and a daughter and later converted to Judaism, he has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation, for even when he was a non-Jew, the mitzva was relevant to him (Yevamot 62a). There is a disagreement as to whether this is the case only if his children also converted, or if it is true even if they did not (5:4 above).

Since the mitzva for Noaḥides is a general one and is not an absolute obligation with specific parameters, a Noaḥide who has good reasons not to fulfill it – for example, if there is a reasonable concern that his children will be sick, or if there is a serious concern that he will not be able to educate his children to be decent people – he need not do so even le-khatḥila.^[11]

Some say that Noaḥides may not waste seed. We have seen (4:1) that this is one of the sins that was punished by the flood, as we read:

The earth became corrupt before God; the earth was filled with lawlessness. When God saw how corrupt the earth was, for all flesh had corrupted its ways on earth, God said to Noah, “I have decided to put an end to all flesh, for the earth is filled with lawlessness because of them: I am about to destroy them with the earth.” (Bereishit 6:11-13)

The Sages explain that the flood waters were as hot and thick as semen, for “with hot passion they sinned, and with hot water they were punished” (Sanhedrin 108b). The waters of the deep overflowed and drowned them (R. Ḥayim Palachi, Ḥayim Ve-shalom §16; Tzofnat Pa’ane’aḥ §30).

In contrast, some say that there is no prohibition for Noaḥides to masturbate and waste seed; since this prohibition hinges on the mitzva to procreate, which does not apply to Noaḥides, they are also not included in the prohibition to waste seed (based on Tosafot to Sanhedrin 59b, s.v. “ve-hu”; Igrot Moshe 4:116). It would seem, though, that even according to those who are lenient, such behavior is improper, for all desire should be directed toward increasing love within the framework of marriage.^[12]

01. Castration

The purpose of creation is to increase life in the world, as the Torah says at the end of the creation story: “God blessed them and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it’” (Bereishit 1:28; similarly, ibid. 1:22, 8:17, 9:1, 7). As an extension of this, the Torah prohibits castrating any male, human or animal. It says regarding sacrificial offerings, “You shall not offer to the Lord anything [with its testes] bruised or crushed or torn or cut. You must not do this in your land” (Vayikra 22:24). The Sages understand “You must not do this” to be a prohibition on damaging the reproductive organs, and “in your land” to be an extension of the prohibition to any male, animal or human. The penalty for castrating is lashes. Although the Torah uses the words “in your land,” the Sages have a tradition that the prohibition applies outside Eretz Yisrael as well (Shabbat 110b; MT, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 16:10).

The male reproductive system has three main components: the testicles (which produce sperm), the vas deferens or sperm ducts, and the penis. Severely damaging any one of them causes sterility and violates a Torah prohibition. Even “castrating” someone who has already been sterilized is a prohibition. Thus, if one man attacks another and crushes his testicles, rendering the victim sterile, and afterwards another person comes over and cuts off the victim’s testicles, a third performs a vasectomy, a fourth smashes his penis, and a fifth cuts it off, each one transgresses a Torah prohibition and is punished with lashes (Shabbat 111a; SA EH 5:11).

Even drinking a potion which induces sterility is prohibited (Shabbat 111a; SA EH 5:11). We can derive this from the next verse, “For they are mutilated (moshḥatam bahem), they have a defect” (Vayikra 22:25). In other words, destroying (hashḥata) a man’s ability to have children is prohibited. However, since this type of “castration” is indirect (as it does not directly damage reproductive organs), many say that it is prohibited only rabbinically. Others maintain that the prohibition is from the Torah but does not incur lashes since it does not directly damage the reproductive organs.^[1]

02. The Prohibition of Marrying a Petzu’a Daka

A saris (a man who is sterile because any of the three parts of his reproductive system does not function) may not marry a Jewish woman, as it says, “No one whose testes are crushed (petzu’a daka) or whose penis is cut off (kerut shofkha) shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Devarim 23:2). A saris may marry a convert or a freed slave, because the Torah prohibits marrying “into the congregation of the Lord,” meaning women who were born Jewish (m. Yevamot 76a). Even a married man who becomes a saris must divorce his wife (Otzar Ha-poskim 5:2).

The marriage prohibition is limited to a person who became a saris due to human action, whether intentional or accidental (for example, as the result of a traffic accident). In contrast, someone whom God made infertile, who was born that way, may marry into the congregation. True, he will be unable to have children, and in most cases, he will not be able to have sexual relations with his wife. Nevertheless, if he finds a woman who agrees to marry him, they are considered a married couple in all respects.

The law that a saris cannot marry is a divine decree whose rationale we cannot fully understand. However, it does teach us the great importance of the mitzva of procreation, which is the primary purpose of marriage – since a saris cannot have children, he may not marry into the congregation (Moreh Nevukhim III:49; Bekhor Shor; Rabbeinu Beḥaye; Ḥizkuni). Additionally, as a rule, a saris cannot fulfill the mitzva of ona, and there is concern that his wife’s sexual frustration may lead her to commit adultery. To prevent this, the Torah does not permit him to marry a Jewish-born woman (Moreh Nevukhim III:49; Raavad on Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 15:2). Another possible rationale for this commandment is that it has helped Jews stay far away from the practice of castration. In the past, kings would regularly castrate men, whom they would then assign to be ministers, officials, and guards for women, as the kings did not have to worry about their loyalty. Some men would castrate themselves, or parents would castrate young children, in order to qualify them for these royal jobs. Even today, some people undergo vasectomies and the like so that they can have sex freely without worrying about the possibility of an unwanted pregnancy. The Torah distances us from all of this by prohibiting castration. This explains why someone who is naturally sterile, whose condition is not the result of human injury or negligence, is not prohibited from marrying into the congregation (Sefer Ha-ḥinukh §559).

03. The Parameters of the Prohibition

As we have learned, a saris rendered sterile by human intervention may not marry a Jewish-born woman, but may marry a convert or a freed slave (m. Yevamot 76a).^[2]

We have also seen that the prohibition does not apply to someone born sterile. If someone was rendered sterile as the result of illness, poskim disagree as to his status. According to Rosh, such a person may not marry a Jewish-born woman. Since humans play a role in the contraction of diseases, for example by eating unhealthy foods or by polluting the environment, such sterility is seen as being man-made. In contrast, according to Rambam and most Rishonim, a person who became sterile due to illness is considered to have been made sterile by God, and may thus marry into the community. The halakha follows this position (Yam Shel Shlomo; Mishkenot Yaakov; Birkei Yosef; Pitḥei Teshuva 5:7; Maharsham; AHS 5:18).

We learn an important principle from the law that a born saris may marry: Normally, the mitzva of ona is considered the foundation of marriage. Accordingly, if someone wishes to marry on condition that he is not obligated to fulfill the mitzva of ona, the marriage does not take effect (SA EH 38:5; above ch. 1, n. 2). Nevertheless, if due to circumstances beyond his control – for instance, he is a born saris – a man cannot have sexual relations with his wife, the marriage does take effect. We therefore see that it is possible for a couple to base a marriage on their emotional connection and their commitment to be good to one another.^[3]

The prohibition is for a man who became a saris to marry a Jewish-born woman. However, a woman who underwent a procedure of sterilization (for example, a hysterectomy) is permitted to marry a Jewish-born man (Sefer Ha-ḥinukh §559; Otzar Ha-poskim 5:1:1). Nevertheless, a man who has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may not marry her, as doing so makes it impossible for him to fulfill his obligation to procreate (above 5:8).

04. Practical Questions

A man’s reproductive organs may be damaged several ways; to determine whether a particular injury renders him a petzu’a daka, the general rule is that if he can sire children, he is not a petzu’a daka, and he may marry a Jewish-born woman like any other Jewish man. This determination is left to reliable doctors. In the time of the Rishonim, many doctors believed that a man lacking one testicle could not have children. Based on this, most Rishonim ruled that such a man had the status of petzu’a daka. Rabbeinu Tam and several other Rishonim maintained that he can sire children (SA EH 5:7). Nowadays it is clear to doctors that such a man can father children, so clearly he is not considered a petzu’a daka.^[4]

Older men commonly experience swelling of the prostate gland, through which the vas deferens and the urethra pass. This makes it difficult to urinate. In some very serious cases, the prostate gland is severed to allow the excretion of urine. The problem is that severing the prostate prevents the flow of sperm through the penis during sexual relations. Instead, the sperm travels from the testicles into the bladder, and from there it is excreted together with the urine. Thus, even though his body produces viable sperm cells, the man cannot actually impregnate his wife, as he does not ejaculate sperm cells during sex. Some poskim claimed that since this person became sterile, practically speaking, as a result of human intervention, he may not marry a born Jew, and if he is already married, he must divorce his wife. In practice, however, there is general agreement that he is not considered a petzu’a daka. First, severing the prostate is a procedure performed as a result of an illness. As we saw in the previous section, according to most poskim such a person is viewed as having been made sterile by God. Additionally, the doctor performs the surgery to relieve his pain, not to sterilize him. Furthermore, he is not a petzu’a daka because, in fact, his sperm ducts remain intact. It is only due to a peripheral issue that the sperm are not ejaculated during sexual relations.

A more difficult case is that of a man who has his testicles removed to improve his chances of surviving prostate cancer (or another cancer), as the testes produce the hormones that accelerate malignant activity. Many maintain that even though technically his testicles are removed by a person, he is still considered to have been made sterile by God. As we saw above, Rambam (and most poskim) say that in a case where sterility is a consequence of illness, the man is considered to have been made sterile by God. Additionally, we might argue that even those who are stringent in that case (Rosh) would be lenient in our case; they might agree that it is only when the illness itself damages the reproductive organs that the man may not marry a born Jew, because he is considered to bear some responsibility for the illness. In contrast, if the illness does not damage the reproductive organs, but rather the doctors are forced to remove his testicles to save him from the illness, he may marry a Jewish-born woman (Ḥelkat Yo’av EH §3; R. Tzvi Pesaḥ Frank).

The same applies to someone who has cancer and undergoes radiation therapy that completely destroys his ability to produce sperm. Even though he cannot have children, since his sterility results from treatment of an illness, it is considered an act of God and he may marry a Jewish-born woman.^[5]

When any doubt arises in such matters, halakha follows those who are lenient, for the general principle is that under pressing circumstances we rely on lenient opinions. These cases definitely qualify, as if we were to rule stringently, the man would not be allowed to marry a Jewish-born woman, and if married, he would be required to divorce. Additionally, according to many poskim, the law of saris is like the law of mamzer; under Torah law, the marriage restrictions apply when it is certain that someone is indeed a mamzer, petzu’a daka, or krut shofkha, but when there is any uncertainty as to his status, the restrictions do not apply. Therefore, in any case of uncertainty, the halakha accords with those who are lenient.^[6]

05. The Prohibition on Female Sterilization

The prohibition of sterilization applies to women as well as men, but sterilizing a woman is a rabbinic prohibition rather than a Torah one. The Torah prohibits male castration, as it says, “You shall not offer to the Lord anything [with its testes] bruised or crushed or torn or cut. You shall have no such practices in your land” (Vayikra 22:24). All these actions damage the male reproductive organs, which are external, and not the female reproductive organs, which are internal. Similarly, the prohibition of a saris to marry applies only to a man who has been sterilized, as the verse states, “No one whose testes are crushed or whose penis is cut off shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Devarim 23:2). Clearly, this refers to a man. In contrast, a woman who has been sterilized is allowed to marry freely. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the mitzva of procreation, a man who has not yet fulfilled his obligation may not marry an infertile woman.

The rabbinic prohibition of female sterilization is limited to cases where this is done directly, either through physical trauma or surgery. However, indirect sterilization, such as by drinking an infertility potion, is permitted. Even this indirect sterilization, though, is permitted only when truly necessary to sterilize her, such as if she has extremely difficult labor, or if her children turned out poorly and she is afraid to bring more children into the world, and accepted methods of birth control are not viable options for her (above, 5:17-19). However, when there is no particular reason, infertility may not be caused even indirectly, as there is a general prohibition on wantonly destroying anything in God’s world (bal tashḥit; Devarim 20:19). Certainly, then, one may not destroy a woman’s ability to have children.

Permission for a woman to undergo sterilization is also contingent upon her husband’s consent, because in agreeing to marry him she committed to be his full partner in the mitzva of procreation (Ḥatam Sofer, EH §20; above 5:14; see also 5:6).^[7]

In recent years, the issue has arisen of sterilizing a woman by tubal ligation, a procedure, colloquially called “getting one’s tubes tied,” in which the fallopian tubes (through which the egg travels from the ovaries to the uterus, where it can be fertilized) are cut, tied, or blocked, preventing the eggs from reaching the uterus, making pregnancy impossible. The question is whether a woman who experiences difficult pregnancies and does not want any more children may ask her doctor to sterilize her via tubal ligation. Some say that tubal ligation is like drinking a sterility potion, since the sterilization is not visible externally (Si’aḥ Naḥum §100). Additionally, this type of sterilization is not irreversible; sometimes the tubes can be surgically repaired. Even if the reversal procedure does not work, it is still possible to extract an egg from the ovary and do IVF. Others say that since ligation is an act of sterilization performed on the reproductive organs themselves, it is rabbinically prohibited. Thus, as long as it is possible for a woman to take birth control pills or have an IUD inserted, tubal ligation is prohibited (Igrot Moshe EH 4:33-34 and 4:32:1). Today there is a procedure that blocks the fallopian tubes indirectly. This is permitted even according to the stringent opinion.^[8]

06. “A Monument and a Name”: Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya

A saris has a choice: he can sink into the pain and despair of knowing that he will not leave anyone to carry his name forward, or he can link his life to the eternally holy, thereby gaining an everlasting name, better than sons and daughters. As the prophet Yeshayahu says:

Let not the eunuch say, “I am a withered tree.” For thus said the Lord: “As for the eunuchs who keep My Sabbaths, who have chosen what I desire and hold fast to My covenant – I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish.” (Yeshayahu 56:3-5)

As long as sin exists, so will death and disease. Once the world is cured of all its sins, it will also be cured of all its illnesses. Certain sins in particular may cause infertility; one of them is dishonoring the Jewish people and the Temple. Following the miraculous recovery of King Ḥizkiyahu, emissaries of the Babylonian king visited him. Instead of drawing them closer to faith, he was arrogant and fawning, showing off all of his personal treasures as well as those of the Temple. The prophet told him, “Some of your sons, your own issue whom you will have fathered, will be taken to serve as eunuchs in the palace of the king of Babylon” (Yeshayahu 39:1-7).

The Sages say that this harsh prophecy was fulfilled in the lives of Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, who were descendants of King Ḥizkiyahu. In childhood they were separated from their family and nation and taken to King Nebuchadnezzar’s palace to serve as attendants and advisors. In keeping with ancient practice, they were castrated (Sanhedrin 93b; Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer 51).^[9] By examining their character and deeds, we can learn about the life purpose of one decreed by fate to be a saris.

After Nebuchadnezzar brought these four youths to his city, he ordered that they be fed meat from his table and be taught the Chaldean language and culture, so that they would assimilate. However, they made great efforts to remain loyal to their faith. Since the meat was not kosher, they did not eat it; for years they survived on a variety of legumes. Had the king discovered their disobedience, they would have been put to death. But they were prepared to sacrifice their lives if it came down to it.

During their years of exile in the king’s palace, Nebuchadnezzar’s army destroyed the Temple and exiled the Jews to Babylonia. Nevertheless, Daniel and his friends, who by then were important officials, did not lose their faith. Eventually, Babylonia was defeated, and Medea became the ruling power. Darius, King of Medea, enacted a decree that required his subjects to pray exclusively to him. However, Daniel defied the decree and continued to pray to God. When he was caught, he was thrown into the lions’ den, but was miraculously saved by God (Daniel 6).

Although Daniel was a eunuch, he did not wallow in his grief. Rather, we are told that “Daniel, a beloved person, devoted himself to acts of kindness…. He helped brides prepare for their weddings and made them happy, accompanied the dead, gave charity to the poor, and prayed three times a day. His prayers were accepted with favor” (Avot De-Rabbi Natan 4:5).

Let us return to the time when Babylonia reigned. The Jewish nation was in crisis. An evil kingdom ruled the world. The Temple lay in ruins. The Jewish people were exiled from their land, and it seemed that there was no hope left for the Jewish faith. Consequently, many of the exiled Jews abandoned Torah and mitzvot, as they felt that within a generation or two, assimilation was inevitable. Nebuchadnezzar decided to erect a large golden idol to symbolize the power of his kingdom and his rule. He set a time for an impressive ceremony, during which all attendees would prostrate themselves before this idol. It seems that many Jews were among those who bowed down. Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, who were senior officials in Nebuchadnezzar’s palace, could have justified bowing down by claiming that it was not an idol, merely a statue to glorify the king (Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot, Pesaḥim 53b s.v. “ma”). However, because the statue looked like an idol, they decided it was better to be thrown into a fiery furnace rather than bow down to it publicly and desecrate God’s name. A great miracle occurred; they emerged from the furnace unscathed. God’s name was sanctified in front of everyone, Jews and non-Jews. (Daniel was not present at the time, as explained in Sanhedrin 93a.)

The Sages say that at that dark time, when the Jewish people abandoned their faith and heritage to prostrate themselves before the image, “God sought to transform the entire world into night…and blood…but He looked at Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, and He was placated” (Sanhedrin 93a). In their merit, the Jewish people remembered their covenant with God, returned to their land, and rebuilt the Temple and the walls of Jerusalem.

Instead of giving up on life, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya chose to identify with God’s wishes and laws, and as a result were able to accomplish great things. As the Sages said, “Make His will into your will, so that He will make your will into His. Subordinate your will to His so that He will subordinate the will of others to yours” (Avot 2:4). While they could not participate in the covenant of brit mila, so strongly connected with continuity, they embraced the divine covenant with the Jewish people, the Torah, and Eretz Yisrael. This enabled them to reveal the inner value of life when it is connected to its divine source. Thus, they are described as “those who hold fast to My covenant” (Yeshayahu 56:4).^[10]

From the lives and deeds of Daniel, Ḥananya, Mishael, and Azarya, we can learn that sometimes it is precisely the infertile who can use their faith to connect to the essence of life. For most people, the here and now is riddled with worry about family and children, but the infertile can focus on pure unconditional faith in God. This allows them to dedicate their lives to giving expression to the covenant between God and the Jewish people. This sustains the entire world and allows the Jews to return to their land and rebuild Jerusalem and the Temple. As it says, “I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish” (Yeshayahu 56:5).

01. The Pain of Infertility and Its Causes

The suffering of the childless is intense. The Sages say, “A person who has no children is considered to be like the dead” (Nedarim 64b). They base this on the verse, “When Raḥel saw that she had borne Yaakov no children, she became envious of her sister; and Raḥel said to Yaakov, ‘Give me children, or I shall die’” (Bereishit 30:1). By making this statement, the Sages are trying to help people understand the depth of the anguish of the childless, so that they will pray for them (Tosafot ad loc.). Even couples who already have children but long to have more can become despondent, especially when they live in a community where large families are the norm.

The question is how we are to understand this suffering: As some kind of punishment for transgression, in which case a person must repent in order to merit having children? Or is one’s fate sealed even before he is born, in which he is blameless in his suffering?

The answer is extremely complex. Sometimes suffering stems from sin, sometimes from fate, and sometimes from a combination of both. Sometimes repentance and prayer help, and sometimes not. It depends on countless factors, as we will now explain.

The Sages say, “Life, children, and sustenance do not depend upon merit, but rather upon mazal” (Mo’ed Katan 28a). “Life” refers to length of life, “children” refers to the number of children, and “sustenance” refers to livelihood. These were all assumed to be determined by one’s fate at the moment of the person’s birth, and not by merit. The Talmud proves this from the fact that Rabbah and R. Ḥisda were both righteous people whose prayers were answered in a time of drought. Yet R. Ḥisda lived to be 92, while Rabbah died at forty. R. Ḥisda’s family celebrated sixty weddings, while Rabbah’s household endured sixty bereavements. R. Ḥisda’s household was so wealthy that even its dogs were fed high-quality wheat bread; Rabbah’s household was so poor that they sometimes did not even have low-quality barley bread on the table (ibid.). This accords with the Sages’ statement, “There is no reward for mitzvot in this world” (Kiddushin 39b). Reward for the mitzvot we fulfill and punishments for the sins we commit are not received in this fleeting world but rather in the eternal world of truth.

The term “mazal” used by the Talmud is what we would call “fate.” As we know today, a person’s genetic makeup is fixed at the moment of conception, and it is a major determinant of how tall, smart, or healthy one will be and what they will look like. The Sages’ statement that life, children, and sustenance are determined by fate at the moment of birth expresses a similar idea.

Yet this seems to be a matter of dispute among the Sages. According to R. Ḥanina, the Jewish people are subject to mazal, while according to R. Yoḥanan they are not (Shabbat 156a). However, the commentators explain that all agree that mazal has a strong influence, and all agree that the Jewish people, more than any other people, can sometimes change their mazal through prayer and good deeds. The disagreement lies in the question of whether it is common or rare for a Jew to change his mazal (see Tosafot on Shabbat ad loc.; Ritva and Ran on Mo’ed Katan 28a).

The idea is that every person has a specific destiny to fulfill in this world, and their mazal is determined accordingly. Sometimes one’s destiny requires him to be poor and wretched; other times, it may require him to be rich and healthy. Sometimes a person’s fate is set in stone and there is no escaping it (except in very rare cases). Other times, it is not absolute, and his actions will determine whether he suffers or flourishes. Sometimes, suffering purifies people and saves them from something even worse. In such cases, it is specifically the righteous who suffer. In any case, until the world reaches moral perfection, there will be human suffering, and the way people cope with their suffering can bring moral refinement to the world.

From a certain perspective, the pain of childlessness differs from other types of suffering. Since having children is a mitzva, righteous people make a greater effort to change their fate in this area, and sometimes the merit of the mitzva may help them alter fate. Even so, there have been righteous people who have been childless.

After this preface, we can now address the proper way to cope with the pain of childlessness.

02. The Effort of Repentance, Torah, and Kindness

It is a mitzva for every couple that has difficulty fulfilling the mitzva of procreation to avail themselves of all conventional medical methods in order to have children. While doing so, they should have faith that everything is under God’s benevolent supervision, refining and purifying them, to increase their joy in this world and the next, and to give them the privilege of improving the world.

The Sages say that a person who is suffering should scrutinize his actions. Perhaps if he corrects his shortcomings, his suffering will end. If he scrutinizes his actions and does not find any particular sin, he should consider that perhaps he sinned by neglecting Torah study. If so, strengthening his Torah study may allow him to realize his destiny and be spared from suffering. If he determines that he has not neglected Torah study, it must be that his suffering is “suffering of love” (yisurim shel ahava), that is, suffering whose purpose is the betterment of all, the perfection and refinement of the world (Berakhot 5a).

In any event, even when suffering results from sin or neglect of Torah study, if a person can correct it, he not only betters himself, but benefits the whole world, for the world is judged based on the deeds of the majority of its inhabitants. “If a person performs one mitzva, he is praiseworthy, for he has tipped the scales toward merit for himself and for the entire world. But if he commits even one sin, woe to him, for he has tipped the scales toward guilt for himself and the whole world” (Kiddushin 40b).

The Sages say, “Great is repentance, for it rips up the sentence issued against a person” (Rosh Ha-shana 17b). Not only does repentance rectify the sin of the penitent himself, sometimes it can even rectify sins of previous generations. It may be that a person has been sentenced to be childless because of those sins, and by returning sincerely to God, immersing himself diligently in Torah study, and performing acts of kindness, he can cause the sentence to be torn up, and then he will have children.

We learn a similar lesson from Ḥofni and Pinḥas, the sons of the high priest Eli, who desecrated the name of heaven in the Tabernacle in Shilo. Because their father did not object strenuously enough to their behavior, he was told, “A time is coming when I will break your power and that of your father’s house, and there shall be no elder in your house” (1 Shmuel 2:31). Indeed, for the next few generations, all of Eli’s descendants died young. As time went on and they married into other families, the only descendants who were affected were those who were named after Eli or whose souls were connected to him. Even a thousand years later, there were still descendants of Eli who carried on his legacy, and the curse affected them. The Talmud says that Rabbah and Abaye were both descendants of Eli, and were expected to die very young. However, they followed the Sages’ instructions and repented sincerely. Rabbah studied Torah diligently and was privileged to live to the age of forty. Abaye engaged in Torah study and acts of kindness, and lived to be sixty. This accords with the homiletic interpretation of the verse, “Assuredly I swear concerning the house of Eli that the iniquity of the house of Eli will never be expiated by [animal] sacrifice or [meal] offering” (ibid., 3:14). The Sages explain: “An animal sacrifice or a meal offering will not atone for the sin, but Torah and kindness will” (Rosh Ha-shana 18a).^[1]

Similarly, our ancestors Avraham and Sarah gave birth to Yitzḥak in the merit of drawing people closer to Torah. Avraham reached out to the men and Sarah reached out to the women. They invited guests into their home and taught them about God, thus combining Torah study and acts of kindness. It was fitting, then, that they were entertaining guests when they received the news that they would have a child.

Moving to Israel – the land of life – and developing it can also help the childless to conceive and bring new life to the world (see Yevamot 64a).

03. Prayer of the Childless

Prayer is so powerful that it can rip up a decree of childlessness and break through whatever is blocking conception, as it is written: “Yitzḥak pleaded with the Lord on behalf of his wife, because she was barren; and the Lord responded to his plea, and his wife Rivka conceived” (Bereishit 25:21). The Sages say that Yitzḥak and Rivka recited many prayers and had the same goal in mind. The phrase translated above, “on behalf of his wife,” is “le-nokhaḥ ishto,” which can also be translated as “facing his wife.” These words teach us that:

Yitzḥak prostrated himself in one corner and Rivka prostrated herself in another. He said, “Master of the universe, may all the children You give me come from this righteous woman.” She made the same request: “May all the children You give me come from this righteous man.” (Bereishit Rabba 63:5)

Yitzḥak said, “Why were the patriarchs and matriarchs infertile? Because God craves the prayers of the righteous” (Yevamot 64a). This must be elucidated: The prayers of the righteous help open the gates of blessing for the entire world. Were the righteous to enjoy the good life they deserve, they would not pray for the rest of the world, which would be left to suffer. Since God wants the best for the world, He craves the prayers of the righteous, which connect the world to its source, thus changing reality for the better. The gates of heaven open, raining down blessing on the whole world. As a result, everyone dealing with the same type of difficulty as the righteous is delivered along with them.

Similarly, the Sages say, “When Sarah conceived, many barren women conceived as well. Many deaf people started hearing, many blind people started seeing, and many of the insane became sane” (Bereishit Rabba 53:8). This explains Sarah’s statement, “God has brought me laughter; everyone who hears will laugh with me” (Bereishit 21:6). For, to a certain extent, all were healed with her.

There are times when it is a person’s destiny to bring a brand new soul into this world, a soul whose mission is to move the world forward. Since this soul is so new that it has never entered the world, it faces many obstacles. The angels in heaven object that the world is not worthy of advancing to another level. Therefore, the people who are meant to give birth to these souls suffer from infertility. Through their process of purification via repentance and prayer, they open the gates of heaven and are privileged to give birth to new souls.^[2]

04. Ḥanna’s Prayer

Ḥanna, who was barren, suffered so much that on the holidays she could not bring herself to rejoice before God in the Mishkan at Shilo. While her family ate the meat of the sacrificial offerings and rejoiced, she withdrew and cried. “Her husband Elkana said to her, ‘Ḥanna, why are you crying and why aren’t you eating? Why are you so sad? Am I not more devoted to you than ten sons?’” In response, Ḥanna joined the feast.

After they had eaten and drunk at Shilo, Ḥanna rose. The priest Eli was sitting on the seat near the doorpost of the sanctuary of the Lord. In her wretchedness, she prayed to the Lord, weeping all the while. And she made this vow: “O Lord of Hosts, if You will look upon the suffering of Your maidservant, and will remember me and not forget Your maidservant, and if You will grant Your maidservant a male child, I will dedicate him to the Lord for all the days of his life; and no razor shall ever touch his head.” (1 Shmuel 1:8-11)

From the depths of her bitter pain she was able to offer a heartfelt prayer. This opened the gates of heaven and enabled the birth of the soul of Shmuel, the greatest prophet of Israel after Moshe Rabbeinu.

The Sages say (Berakhot 31b):

From the day that God created His world, no one referred to God by the name Lord of Hosts (Tzeva’ot) until Ḥanna did. She said before Him, “God, Master of the universe, out of all the many hosts that You have created in Your world, is it difficult for You to grant me one son?!”

Appropriately, the name that Ḥanna introduced in her prayer was actualized by her son, the prophet Shmuel. He was the one who had the privilege of revealing holiness to the masses (tzeva’ot) of Israel in its land, as well as establishing generations of prophets, founding Israel’s monarchy, and planning the building of the Temple.

There is another powerful description of Ḥanna’s prayer:

As she kept on praying before the Lord, Eli watched her mouth. Now Ḥanna was praying in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice could not be heard. So Eli thought she was drunk. Eli said to her, “How long will you make a drunken spectacle of yourself? Sober up!” (1 Shmuel 1:12-14)

In other words, Ḥanna’s prayer was so extraordinary and innovative that even the high priest Eli initially thought that she was drunk.

Ḥanna replied, “Oh no, my lord! I am a very unhappy woman. I have drunk no wine or other strong drink, but I have been pouring out my heart to the Lord. Do not take your maidservant for a worthless woman; I have only been speaking all this time out of my great anguish and distress.” “Then go in peace,” said Eli, “and may the God of Israel grant you what you have asked of Him.” (ibid., 15-17)

Not only did Ḥanna’s prayer lead to the birth of the prophet Shmuel, but the Sages derive several laws from her prayer: supplicants must pray with intent, must form the words with their lips, and must not raise their voices (Berakhot 31a). From the depths of her pain of childlessness, Ḥanna revealed new laws and uncovered new understandings of prayer. This is an example of how the pain and distress of infertility can bring blessing to the world.

05. Comfort for the Infertile

Sometimes all the prayers, repentance, intense Torah learning, and kind acts do not solve the problem of infertility. Months pass, years go by, and the couple does not conceive. It may be that their fate is sealed and cannot be changed, because the soul which they would conceive belongs to a more perfect world whose time has not yet come. Perhaps if they would manage to change their fate, their child would be profoundly evil, because he would be incompatible with his time period. Thus, God is being kind to them by sparing them the birth of a child who would cause them great pain and send them to the grave in misery. Along these lines, the Sages state that after the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the Jewish people, the dignitaries of the other nations mocked them and said that they were infertile and could not have children in Eretz Yisrael. The Jews retorted, “When evil rules the land, it is better to be barren rather than give birth to evil children who will end up in hell, like you” (Berakhot 10a). This explains the verse, “Rejoice, O barren one, you who bore no child! Shout aloud for joy, you who did not travail! For the children of the wife forlorn shall outnumber those of the espoused, said the Lord” (Yeshayahu 54:1).

Some writers go so far as to say that the infertile should be careful not to pray excessively. Instead, they should say that if their having children is not what God wants, then they retract their request, because sometimes heaven knows that were this couple to have children, they would be evil or undergo terrible suffering. To minimize the couple’s pain, heaven does not grant them children (Shevet Musar 24:19).

Even so, the infertile should know that all the prayers that they recite, the good deeds that they do, and the Torah that they study are not going to waste. Even if they do not produce the hoped-for result, they may help other childless couples conceive. In any case, these practices certainly improve the world and bring it closer to the day when those children’s souls can be born.

06. The Value of Their Love and Joy

A couple that has not been blessed with children face a great challenge. Will they wallow in their pain, and lose their faith and joie de vivre? Or will they overcome their pain, increase their love for each other, fulfill the mitzva of ona with extra joy, and constantly think about how to bring goodness and joy into the lives of their families and friends? Though they have not been blessed with children, there is great intrinsic value in their intimacy.

The Sages ask why our matriarchs were barren. One of the Sages answers, “So that they would endear themselves to their husbands through their beauty.” Another explains, “So that their husbands take pleasure in them, for when a woman is pregnant, she loses her looks and is neglected by her husband.” During the ninety years that Sarah did not give birth, Avraham treated her like a bride under the wedding canopy, and all the women inquired about her (Bereishit Rabba 45:4). Thus, from one perspective, childless couples can increase and intensify the love, passion, and joy they share.

That is the meaning behind the kabbalistic statement that each time a husband and wife unite sexually in love and passion, an abundance of life and blessing is added to this world. As Shlah states:

Each and every act of intercourse, when undertaken in sanctity, will have a positive impact. Even if the wife does not conceive…[the husband] is not wasting seed; rather, a holy soul comes into existence as a result…. For a soul comes into being with every act of intercourse, and the offspring of others are then endowed with these souls…. This is why Avraham could sleep with Sarah even though she was barren. It was not, God forbid, a waste. (Sha’ar Ha-otiyot, Kedushat Ha-zivug §402)

Shlah goes on to cite Zohar, which explains that the perfect love and devotion that infused the intimate relations of these two righteous people, Avraham and Sarah, led to the creation of souls in the supernal realms, which then descended to this world, and with which children of various families were endowed. When those children grew up, they were drawn to Avraham and Sarah, who brought them close to God. These are the souls referred to in the verse (Bereishit 12:5), “The souls they created in Ḥaran” (Zohar III 168a). Thus, when husband and wife overcome their sadness and unite with devotion and passion, they become partners in drawing down souls into the world and create sparks of souls through their sexual union.

Furthermore, when a childless couple manages, despite their pain and suffering, to strengthen their faith, deepen their love for each other, and bring one another pleasure through the mitzva of ona, they add life and blessing to the entire world. There is a special purity in their love, which is unconditional and does not depend on the children they share. Their loving unity gives expression to divine unity, revealing it in this world. Although they cannot have children, they can reveal the intrinsic value of life, thus adding vitality and continued existence to all the worlds. As Arizal explains, there are two kinds of sexual intercourse – one serves the purpose of creating souls, while the other sustains worlds and keeps them alive (Sha’ar Ha-Mitzvot, Bereishit, p. 7). It is true that even couples who have children may experience the second type of intercourse, for example when the wife is pregnant, nursing, or menopausal. However, since this is the only type of union a childless couple have, it has a greater influence on the world. All this is assuming that the love and happiness they share indeed enable them to break through the barriers of sadness and have a positive view of the world; to rejoice in the joy of relatives and friends, contribute to the world, and be kind to others as best they can.

07. Adoption

The Sages say, “One who raises an orphaned boy or girl in his home is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to them” (Megilla 13a). This refers not only to an orphan who has lost both parents, but also to a child whose parents are unable to meet all his basic physical and emotional needs, as the source for this assertion is a midrash that extrapolates that Moshe Rabbeinu is referred to as the son of Pharaoh’s daughter Bitya even though his biological mother, Yocheved, was alive and nursed him. Since Bitya raised him, he is regarded as her son as well.

The Sages also say (Ketubot 50a) that one who raises an orphaned child and marries him off is considered by the Torah as one of those “who do righteous deeds at all times” (Tehilim 106:3). According to the Midrash, God has treasure houses full of rewards for the righteous. Among them is a special warehouse with rewards for those who take in orphans and raise them (Shemot Rabba 45:6).

Some even maintain that a couple who raises an orphan actually fulfills the mitzva of procreation. This approach takes literally the Sages’ statement, “He is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to them” (see Ḥokhmat Shlomo, EH 1:1). Even according to the poskim who maintain that the equation is not literal, from a certain perspective, this couple performs an even greater mitzva because they act voluntarily.

Similarly, we find that even though adopted children are not technically obligated in the mitzva of honoring parents vis-à-vis their adoptive parents, Torah ethics obligate them in everything that is incumbent upon biological children. Perhaps they must do even more, since their parents adopted them voluntarily. Similarly, it is a mitzva for adopted children to mourn for their adoptive parents and recite Kaddish for them. The only difference between an adopted child and a biological one is that the latter may not perform a medical procedure on a parent if it would cause bleeding, while the former may (Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays – Mishpaḥa 1:24-25).

Someone who would find it difficult to raise or help raise an orphan can donate money to help abandoned children, provide for their needs, and get them on their feet. In doing so he is a partner in raising them, and from a certain perspective it is as if he has given birth to them. The more significant the help he gives, the truer this is.

People who help parents care for and educate their children are also considered parents on some level, as it says (Ruth 4:17), “The women neighbors gave him a name, saying, ‘A son is born to Naomi!’ They named him Oved; he was the father of Yishai, father of David.” The Sages explain that the reason that Oved, son of Ruth and Boaz, is also called Naomi’s son is because she was involved in caring for and educating him (Sanhedrin 19b).

08. Teaching Students

The Sages say, “One who teaches Torah to someone else’s child is considered by the Torah as if he gave birth to him.” Whereas Aharon gave birth to his sons, Moshe Rabbeinu taught them Torah, so they are called his sons as well (Sanhedrin 19b).

Similarly, it is written in Shema, “Teach them to your children” (Devarim 6:7). The Sages interpret:

“Your children” – refers to your students. We find that students are referred to as children in many other places as well, as it says, “Then the sons of the prophets at Beit El came out to Elisha” (2 Melakhim 2:3). Were they the prophets’ children? Rather, they were their students. We derive from this that students are called children…. Just as students are called children, so too teachers are called parents. Thus, we read (ibid., 2:12), “Elisha saw and cried out: ‘Father, father! Israel’s chariots and horsemen!’ Then he did not see him again.” (Sifrei)

This notion has halakhic significance as well. If someone finds two lost objects, one belonging to his father and the other to his teacher, and he is unable to return them both, his teacher’s lost object takes precedence, “because his father brought him into this world, while his teacher, by teaching him Torah, brings him into the next world.” However, if his father is also a Torah scholar, then his father’s lost object takes precedence (Bava Metzi’a 33a).

According to Zohar (I 187b), in the verses we saw above (7:6), the prophet Yeshayahu addresses those who are not privileged to have children:

For thus said the Lord: “As for the eunuchs who keep My Sabbaths, who have chosen what I desire and hold fast to My covenant – I will give them, in My House and within My walls, a monument and a name better than sons or daughters. I will give them an everlasting name which shall not perish.” (Yeshayahu 56:4-5)

A story is told about how R. Yoḥanan was distraught after all of his children died young and he had not fulfilled the mitzva of procreating. Then an elder comforted him by saying that his students were considered his children, and in their merit he would have a place in the next world and an everlasting name (Zohar Ḥadash, Ruth, 108b).

Those who support Torah students are also considered their teachers, for without them, the students would be unable to learn.

According to Sefer Ḥasidim (§367), sometimes God does not want to deplete a person’s heavenly account. Therefore, he does not get to enjoy both Torah and children in this world. It is because he is not blessed with children that he can be blessed with Torah, which will give him an everlasting name.

01. The Intermediate Status of the Fetus

One of the most difficult questions in Jewish law is: under what circumstances is terminating a pregnancy justified? Let us first review the basics.

On one hand, it is clear that one may not kill a fetus, whether directly or indirectly. Not only that, we desecrate Shabbat in order to save a fetus, even within forty days of conception, because this fetus will one day be a living human, and the Sages say, “Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf, so that he can observe many [future] Shabbatot” (Yoma 85b). Since the fetus will be a living person in the future, the same logic applies to saving it (Behag; Rambam; Peninei Halakha: Shabbat 27:3).

On the other hand, it is clear that as long as the fetus is in its mother’s womb, it does not have the status of a living human being. Therefore, even though someone who kills another person is liable for the death penalty, someone who kills a fetus is not. Additionally, since a fetus is not yet considered human life, it does not inherit like one who was already born, and it does not become ritually impure if its mother comes into contact with a corpse. A fetus becomes a bona fide human being only at the moment of birth (Nidda 44a-b).

Thus, an unborn fetus has an intermediate status – it will become a person, but is not a person yet.

We further learn that when there is a conflict between the life of the fetus and the life of the mother, the mother’s life takes precedence. As the Mishna states, “If a woman is suffering from a difficult labor, we cut up the fetus inside her and remove it limb by limb, because her life takes precedence over its life” (m. Ohalot 7:6). Even if the fetus will be born any moment, it may be killed in order to save its mother’s life. However, from the moment of birth, that is, from the moment its head or most of its body emerges, he is considered a living human being. Even if the mother’s life is clearly in danger, it is forbidden to kill the baby in order to save her, because “one life does not supersede another” (ibid.). We do not kill one person in order to save another.^[1]

02. The Prohibition of Abortion for Jews and Non-Jews

Although abortion is prohibited for both Jews and Noaḥides (i.e., non-Jews, who are obligated in the seven Noaḥide laws), there is a difference when it comes to punishment. A Jew who kills a fetus is not punished by a beit din for doing so, while a gentile who kills a fetus is liable for the death penalty.

As is well known, non-Jews are obligated in seven mitzvot. A non-Jew who transgresses any of them incurs the death penalty. One of these seven is the prohibition against murder, as Noaḥ was told, upon exiting the ark: “Whoever sheds the blood of a person (ha-adam), by a person (ba-adam) shall his blood be shed, for God made people in His image” (Bereishit 9:6). R. Yishmael extrapolates that even a person who kills a fetus incurs the death penalty, as the verse can be read homiletically: “Whoever sheds the blood of a person (ha-adam) in a person (ba-adam) – his blood shall be shed.” Who is a person in a person? A fetus (Sanhedrin 57b; MT, Laws of Kings 9:4).^[2]

In contrast, a Jew who kills a fetus does not incur the death penalty. When the Torah later explains that a murderer is put to death, it does not hint that a fetus-killer would be included in this category. Nevertheless, it is clear that a Jew may not kill a fetus, as there is a general principle that anything forbidden to non-Jews is forbidden to Jews as well. The purpose of the Torah is to sanctify the Jewish people and to demand much of them when it comes to mitzvot, so it is inconceivable that something forbidden to non-Jews would be permissible for Jews (Sanhedrin 59a). Thus, once we know that a non-Jews may not kill a fetus, it follows that Jews may not, either. The only distinction is in the severity of the punishment: a non-Jew is put to death for killing a fetus, while a Jew is not.

It is important to know that according to halakha, even when a beit din had the authority to apply capital punishment, only very rarely was a Torah-mandated execution carried out. It was so rare that a Sanhedrin which executed one person in seven years was labeled “destructive.” According to R. Elazar b. Azarya, even if it executed only one person in seventy years, it was considered a destructive Sanhedrin (m. Makkot 1:10). Although there are dozens of sins for which the Torah mandates capital punishment, in practice the beit din did not kill a single person in seven (or seventy) years. Thus, we see that the death penalty prescribed by the Torah, whether for Jews or non-Jews, was intended mainly as a deterrent and to express the severity of the sin and its punishment in this world and the next. It was not meant to lead to frequent executions.

In theory, then, in the matter of abortion, the Torah was more stringent for non-Jews than for Jews. This may be because many gentile nations tend to devalue human life, to the extent that some are suspected of bloodshed (m. Avoda Zara 2:1). In order to make it clear that their attitude is completely wrong, the Torah makes abortion a capital crime for them. Nevertheless, it would seem that when it comes to abortion necessitated by severe illness, the law for Jews and non-Jews is the same; in any situation where Jews may terminate a pregnancy, non-Jews may, too.^[3]

03. Abortion for a Great Need

As we have seen, if a pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, she may abort (m. Ohalot 7:6). There are other scenarios in which the permissibility of an abortion is less clear, for example, in a case where the mother’s life is not at risk but carrying to term might lead her to go blind or deaf, or if prenatal testing shows that the fetus is ill and will live a life full of suffering. These questions have arisen in our era, now that medicine can tell us a great deal about the fetus.

This question is a matter of dispute among leading poskim. Those who are stringent maintain that the prohibition against abortion is an offshoot of the prohibition against murder. Although we have seen that a fetus is not yet considered a living human being, it is nevertheless developing into one and can already be considered alive to an extent. Therefore, one who destroys a fetus transgresses an offshoot of the prohibition against murder. Just as it is prohibited to perform euthanasia, so it is forbidden to perform an abortion. Only in a case where the pregnancy endangers the life of the mother is it permissible to destroy a fetus (R. Unterman, No’am 6). R. Moshe Feinstein goes so far as to say that since aborting a fetus is considered like murder, only when it is almost certain that the fetus will cause its mother’s death is abortion permitted in order to save her (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69).

In contrast, many poskim maintain that the prohibition against abortion is not an offshoot of murder. Some say that abortion is forbidden because of ḥavala (the prohibition to cause bodily harm); just as it is forbidden for a person to cut off one of his limbs, so too it is forbidden to kill a fetus, which is a limb of its mother (Responsa Maharit 1:97; Amud Ha-yemini §32). Others say that abortion is forbidden because of hashḥata (wanton destruction), based on a fortiori reasoning: if it is a grave sin even to waste seed (hashḥatat zera), clearly it is forbidden to kill a fetus that has already begun to develop (Ḥavot Ya’ir §31). Others offer a conceptually similar rationale: we are commanded to be fruitful and multiply, so abortion is prohibited on the grounds that it prevents such growth and procreation (Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 4:46). According to all of these opinions, since abortion does not constitute a form of murder – one of the most severe prohibitions – it is permissible to perform an abortion in very difficult circumstances, just as it is permissible to amputate a limb in order to preserve a patient’s overall health (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3:3).

Even though it emerges from the discussions in the Talmud, Rishonim, and Aḥaronim that the prohibition of abortion is not as severe as an offshoot of murder, many poskim nevertheless rule strictly: some because of the great value of life that exists in potential within the fetus, and others because they do not rely on the opinions of doctors. Practically speaking, even though there is a tendency to rule restrictively in cases of uncertainty vis-à-vis such weighty issues, in this case it is proper to rule leniently, because forbidding abortion in such cases can cause terrible suffering, both to the parents and to the unborn child. Families sometimes break apart under such strain. Therefore, under such extremely pressing circumstances, we can rely on the lenient opinions, as their position is better grounded in the sources. This is the inclination of my teachers, the heads of Yeshivat Merkaz Ha-Rav. Still, every such case must be carefully considered by a Torah scholar who understands the halakhic issue and has obtained the expert opinion of a God-fearing doctor.^[4]

04. The First Forty Days and the Subsequent Stages of Pregnancy

The earlier the stage of the fetus’s gestational development, the more room there is for leniency in allowing an abortion. Conversely, the more developed the fetus is, the higher the degree of life it exhibits, and even the most lenient opinions would permit abortion only in more drastic cases.

Until forty days have passed since conception, the fetus’s organs have not yet begun to form, and it does not yet even have the status of a fetus. Consequently, if a woman aborts or miscarries her fetus within the first forty days, if she subsequently bears a son, he has the status of “firstborn,” as the earlier fetus is considered “mere water” (Yevamot 69b). Based on this, even some of those who adopt the stringent view permit abortion during the first forty days in a case of great need.^[5]

From day 41, since the fetus’s organs have begun to take shape, those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that abortion may be performed only if the mother’s life may be in danger. Nevertheless, some of those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that since the woman’s pregnancy is not considered discernible until three months have passed, in cases of great need, abortion can be permitted (several Aḥaronim cited by Yabi’a Omer, EH 4:1).

In contrast, according to those who take the permissive approach, since abortion is not prohibited as a form of murder, it is permitted even after the end of the first trimester in cases of great need. However, the more developed the fetus is, the more compelling a reason is required to permit aborting it. Therefore, couples are encouraged to perform any necessary testing as early as possible, so that if an abortion is necessary it can be done as soon as possible (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3; Amud Ha-yemini §32).

Once a fetus is viable, that is, that it could survive on its own if it were born, it is almost impossible to permit abortion, even according to those who take the permissive approach. However, if it is clear that the fetus would not live for more than thirty days even if it were born naturally, then in certain cases some of those who rule permissively would permit abortion.

When pregnancy jeopardizes the mother’s life, all poskim permit abortion; even if labor has already begun, we kill the fetus to save the mother; but once the baby’s head or most of its body has emerged, we do not hurt it, for it is considered a human being, and we do not kill one person to save another (Ohalot 7:6).^[6]

05. Aborting a Fetus with Tay-Sachs

Tay-Sachs is an incurable genetic disorder caused by the lack of the vital enzyme hexosaminidase-A (Hex-A). Those born with the disease begin to lag in their physical and intellectual development starting at about six months old. This is followed by blindness and paralysis, then death, generally by the age of four. Nowadays, testing can determine with certainty whether a fetus has Tay-Sachs. If it does, the question arises: is it permissible to abort?

According to those who adopt the restrictive approach, the prohibition of abortion is an offshoot of the prohibition of murder, and just as it is forbidden to kill a sick person, so too it is forbidden to kill a sick fetus. Thus, it is forbidden to abort a Tay-Sachs fetus (R. Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69). R. Auerbach and R. Elyashiv rule this way as well; however, if the mother’s knowledge that she will give birth to such a sick baby leads to such a terrible emotional state that there is concern for her mental health, even these poskim permitted abortion, because mental illness can be life-threatening, and the mother’s life takes precedence over that of the fetus (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425, n. 18). (R. Feinstein does not permit an abortion even then; according to him, abortion is permitted only when it is almost certain that the mother will die.)

In contrast, according to those who adopt the permissive approach, abortion is allowed even when there is no concern that the mother of the Tay-Sachs fetus will become mentally ill, for they do not view abortion as murder, but as ḥavala or hashḥata. If so, it is preferable to prevent the fetus from the terrible suffering that would be its lot; it is better for this fetus not to be born at all. It is also best to spare the mother the terrible anguish of seeing her child suffer, without being able to do anything to help (Amud Ha-yemini §32). Obviously, it is best to perform the abortion as early as possible. However, be-di’avad, R. Waldenberg permits performing this abortion until the seventh month (Tzitz Eliezer 13:102).^[7]

As we saw (section 3 above), in practice one may rely upon those who rule permissively in cases of great necessity.

06. A Down Syndrome Fetus

People with Down syndrome have an extra chromosome, which leads to intellectual and physical disabilities of varying severity. They have distinctive builds and facial features, and are at increased risk for certain illnesses and defects, including heart defects and duodenal atresia, infection, and leukemia. Nevertheless, due to advances in medical care, their life expectancy has increased in recent years, and they can live to age fifty and beyond. Their intellectual disabilities generally mean that they cannot live independently, but rather require assistance and support, like young children. Recently, educational methods have been developed which improve their abilities to learn and to function. Some are even able to get married and live in their own homes. (Men with Down syndrome are almost always sterile.) However, even in the best of circumstances, people with Down syndrome require the level of care and support afforded to older children. The question is: is it permissible to terminate a pregnancy when the fetus has Down syndrome?

Those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that just as one may not take the life of a child with Down syndrome, so too one may not destroy a fetus with Down syndrome. True, someone who kills a child commits a capital crime, while someone one who kills a fetus does not. Nevertheless, since these poskim view the prohibition against killing a fetus as an offshoot of murder, a woman carrying a Down syndrome fetus may not abort.

Even though R. Shlomo Goren permits aborting a fetus with Tay-Sachs, because the child would suffer and die within a few years, he does not permit the abortion of a fetus with Down syndrome. Only when there is a concern that the birth will disrupt the family’s equilibrium and endanger the mental health of one of the parents would an abortion be permitted (Torat Ha-refu’a, p. 192).

Those who adopt the more permissive approach maintain that if it would be difficult for the parents to cope with the hardships involved in raising a child with Down syndrome, and it would cause them great pain, an abortion is permitted. This is because these poskim maintain that abortion is prohibited as a form of ḥavala or hashḥata, so to prevent great suffering on the part of the child and its parents, they would permit an abortion (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3; 13:102:6; 14:101-102; Amud Ha-yemini §32). As we said in section 3, under pressing circumstances one may rely on the permissive opinion. However, here we are talking about a problem which does not always justify an abortion. There are families which, despite the tremendous difficulties involved, successfully meet the challenge of raising a child with Down syndrome, and sometimes even grow as a result. Therefore, greater discretion must be exercised, taking into consideration the state of this family, and an outstanding Torah scholar must be consulted.^[8]

07. Concern About Defects in the Fetus

Thus far we have discussed cases in which a fetus clearly suffers from a specific condition. However, sometimes all that we can know is that a fetus is at risk of being ill. For example, if the mother contracted German measles in the first month of her pregnancy, there is a fifty percent chance that the child will be born with birth defects. Additionally, sometimes an ultrasound raises a concern that a fetus might have very serious problems, but also may be perfectly healthy.

According to those who take the restrictive view, when we know for sure that the fetus is very sick – and certainly when we are not sure – abortion is still prohibited.

According to those who espouse the permissive approach, since abortion is prohibited as a form of ḥavala or hashḥata, not murder, it is permitted when there is a great need. Therefore, even in an uncertain case, if there is reasonable concern that the fetus has a serious condition that would condemn it to a life full of suffering, abortion is permitted (Amud Ha-yemini §32).

This is relevant when there is no possibility of reaching a clear conclusion regarding the condition of the fetus. But usually, if the parents wait until week twenty and reevaluate the fetus’s condition, the doctors will know much more. Therefore, abortion is forbidden before that point. For example, if the mother contracts CMV (Cytomegalovirus) in her first trimester, the odds are about forty percent that the fetus will contract the virus as well. If the fetus does contract the virus, the odds are about ten percent that it will suffer abnormalities serious enough to warrant abortion according to the permissive approach. Therefore, one must wait until the twentieth week of pregnancy. If it becomes clear that the fetus suffers from serious abnormalities, termination of the pregnancy would be permissible according to the permissive approach (as explained in section 4 and n. 7). As we saw in section 3, in pressing circumstances one may rely on the permissive view, as it is better grounded in the Talmud and halakhic literature.

08. Credibility of Doctors and Consultation with Rabbis

For all questions regarding abortion, it is imperative to seek the opinion of an honest doctor who relates with reverence to the potential life of a fetus, and then to consult a rabbi who has expertise in these issues. Unfortunately, in many cases, doctors have been negligent in their care, conducted irresponsible tests, and condemned perfectly healthy fetuses to death. Sometimes this happens when test results are inconclusive, yet the doctors rush to instruct the parents to abort instead of repeating the test. Other times, a problem is discovered in the third month of the pregnancy whose specific nature cannot be determined until the fifth month (as in the case of CMV). However, because doctors make light of the serious issue of abortion, they recommend abortion in the third month instead of waiting for more accurate tests to become feasible.

I was told about a woman who got pregnant for the first time after years of waiting. After a gynecological exam, she was told that her fetus had died, and she was sent for a D&C. I need not describe her devastation. Luckily for her, while she was tearfully awaiting the procedure, a doctor passed by whom she knew from her previous treatments. Upon hearing her painful story, he suggested repeating the exam. His examination showed that the fetus was alive. She had the privilege of giving birth, and then raising a beautiful daughter.

As a result of such cases, some poskim rule that one may not rely on the opinion of a non-religious doctor in these matters, lest he declare that a fetus has grave defects and encourage abortion without justification (such as where an abnormality or illness is uncertain, or where it is certain but tolerable). If no God-fearing doctor is available, the couple should have two doctors independently evaluate the fetus’s condition. If both determine that something is seriously wrong, then the couple should consult with a rabbi to determine whether an abortion is justified (R. Ovadia Yosef, Assia 1, p. 92).

In practice, even though a God-fearing doctor and a hospital that follows Jewish law are preferred, one may rely on a non-religious doctor on two conditions: that the doctor relates to the fetus’s life with the utmost seriousness, and that in any case of uncertainty he will reexamine and reevaluate the situation until he arrives at the most informed conclusion possible. If it is necessary to wait several weeks for better information, he must wait rather than make a premature pronouncement.

Although we learned (section 3) that halakha follows the permissive view, a couple must not rely solely on medical test results. Rather, they must consult a rabbi with expertise in these areas. First, so that the rabbi can verify with a doctor he trusts that the medical opinion they received is reliable and that all the appropriate tests were done. Second, because one cannot rule permissively on such a weighty question without having a serious discussion exploring all its aspects, including the severity of the fetal abnormality, the reliability of the tests, the family’s circumstances, the stage of the fetus, and the method to be used to abort. Additionally, it is very difficult for a couple to grapple with such a fateful moral choice. Consulting a responsible rabbi will ease their conscience and allow them to continue building a wonderful family.

09. The Desirability of Prenatal Testing

As we have seen, some poskim prohibit abortion even when the fetus suffers from a serious illness. Many of them add that the mother should not do prenatal tests, as it would be pointless; even if the tests showed the fetus to be abnormal, these poskim would not permit abortion. Better to trust in God and His goodness rather than constantly worry about insoluble problems.

In practice, though, women should undergo the necessary tests. True, according to the restrictive opinion, even in a case where the fetus is clearly sick, abortion is prohibited. Nevertheless, there is a permissive view as well, and in a problematic case, the couple can consult a rabbi who will advise them as to which opinion to follow. Moreover, if there is a reasonable concern that the mother’s grief would jeopardize her mental health, abortion would be permissible even according to many who take the restrictive approach, as mental illness can be life-threatening, and when there is a conflict between the life of the mother and the life of the fetus, the mother’s life takes precedence. Even if the couple follows the restrictive opinion, conducting the proper tests will allow the parents to prepare themselves emotionally in the time remaining before the birth. Therefore, it is good to do prenatal testing. My rabbi and teacher R. Avraham Shapira ruled this way in practice.

It is still necessary to clarify which tests should be done. For example, it is known that the older the woman, the higher the odds that her fetus will suffer from Down syndrome. The question is: from what maternal age is it appropriate to test? Another question: For various reasons, some doctors recommend performing all types of tests during pregnancy. Some of them are very expensive, and many of them cause stress and worry. Is it best for a pregnant woman to have all these tests done? Or is it best for her to have a joyful, serene pregnancy, relying on God and His goodness?^[9]

As a rule, tests to detect serious, common problems should be conducted, while tests to detect rare problems should not. This is consistent with people’s approach to life in general; most do not worry about minimal risks when it comes to car safety or dietary choices. A good rule of thumb to determine the importance of doing a particular test, at least in Israel today, is whether it is covered by the HMOs. When the cost of a test is covered, it means that the Ministry of Health, based on the mass amounts of data at its disposal, concluded that this test should be done. Thus, it is best to do it. In contrast, when a test is not covered by basic insurance, it indicates that it is not so important, and one need not do it. Nevertheless, if a trustworthy doctor follows this general approach yet recommends doing additional tests that he thinks are very important, it is best to accept the advice and undergo the tests.^[10]

10. A Mamzer Fetus

If a married woman had relations with another man, or was raped and became pregnant, the resulting child is a mamzer or mamzeret and may not marry a born Jew. (Although it is permissible for a male mamzer to marry a female mamzeret and they are each allowed to marry converts, the children of these unions are also mamzerim.) The question is: may a woman abort a mamzer fetus?

R. Yair Bacharach writes that le-khatḥila she may not abort the fetus, despite the fact that Maharil writes that at the brit of a mamzer we do not recite the blessing, “preserve this child to his father and mother,” because we do not want to increase mamzerim among the Jewish people. Nevertheless, le-khatḥila, it is prohibited to harm the fetus (Responsa Ĥavot Yair §31). This implies, though, that in a case of exceptional pain and dishonor to the family, it is permissible. According to Maharit, who maintains that abortion is prohibited because of ḥavala and is permissible when there is a great need (Responsa Maharit 1:97), it seems that preventing the birth of a mamzer can be considered a great need. The eminent R. Yosef Ḥayim of Baghdad was asked whether a married woman who became pregnant from an extramarital affair could take a potion that would cause her to miscarry. He did not want to rule on the matter himself, but he copied the words of Ḥavot Ya’ir, which implies that le-khatḥila it is prohibited, and cited Maharit and She’elat Ya’avetz (1:43) as permitting an abortion in such cases (Rav Pe’alim, EH 1:4). Even though he himself did not want to decide, what he wrote suggests that he was inclined toward the lenient opinion. R. Uziel also writes that a woman may abort a mamzer (Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 4:47).

According to those who maintain that abortion is prohibited as an offshoot of murder, aborting a mamzer is certainly prohibited. As we said in section 3, though, the primary halakhic position is the more permissive one.

11. Unplanned Pregnancy and Possible Pregnancy from Rape

An unmarried woman with an unplanned pregnancy may not abort her perfectly healthy fetus. However, in pressing circumstances, when the pregnancy is likely to cause her psychological difficulties, abortion can be permitted within the first forty days from conception. As we saw above (section 4), according to most poskim, within the first forty days of pregnancy the organs of the fetus have not yet formed, and the more stringent laws of a fetus do not yet apply. It is best to end the pregnancy via oral medication or similar methods, so that the abortion is performed indirectly, thereby reducing the severity of the prohibition (as explained in n. 8).

Once the fetus has reached the 41st day, even if the pregnancy is causing the woman psychological difficulties, she may not abort. Even if she knows that she will be unable to care for the child, whether because of embarrassment or finances, she still may not abort. Rather, she should give the child up for adoption. Even according to those who maintain the more permissive view on abortion, permission is granted when the fetus is sick or its life would involve continuous suffering; here, however, the fetus is healthy, so abortion is prohibited. It is well known that there are many good people who are interested in adopting babies, so the child can have a good life. Still, if the case involves a young woman whose parents and teachers think will lose her way and have trouble building a solid family, there are grounds to consult a wise Torah scholar.

In reality, there is no need to reach the point where such a question must be posed. There is a simple solution. Any woman who is raped or seduced should go straight to a doctor and get a prescription for the “morning after pill” that prevents pregnancy when taken within three days of having sexual relations. Alternatively, if an IUD is implanted within a day of a rape, it prevents pregnancy. It would seem that all would agree that a rape victim may do either of these, since they certainly do not involve killing a fetus. Rather, they prevent a pregnancy from occurring. This is an opportunity to stress the critical importance of an open mother-daughter relationship, which will allow a daughter to turn to her mother for help if difficult situations arise.^[11]

12. The Mother’s Health and Financial Considerations

As we saw (section 1), if a pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, she may abort. However, poskim disagree concerning cases in which the pregnancy is not life-threatening, but rather exacerbates a preexisting condition, like if the mother already has an aural or ocular condition that pregnancy will intensify, possibly leaving her deaf or blind. Alternatively, the pregnancy will worsen an illness that does not threaten her life, but causes terrible pain. Those who adopt the restrictive approach prohibit abortion in such cases (Igrot Moshe, ḤM 2:69; Shevet Ha-Levi 7:208 and 9:266), whereas those who adopt a more permissive approach allow it (Torat Ḥesed, EH 42:32; Mishpetei Uziel, ḤM 3:46; Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3).

Sometimes pregnancy can jeopardize the mother’s mental health. In such a case, some poskim rule that even those who adopt the restrictive approach would permit abortion, since mental illness can be life-threatening and cause one to become suicidal (Levushei Mordechai, ḤM §39; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). Recently, effective medications have been developed to treat many psychiatric disorders. Therefore, if a psychiatrist says that the mother can be medicated so that she will not become suicidal, she may not abort (Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425, n. 12).

According to the more permissive approach, abortion can be allowed if the pregnancy would cause tremendous emotional anguish, even if there is no concern that it will lead to suicide. In practice, every question of this sort requires a couple first to consult with a God-fearing mental health professional and then to ask a wise person based on the assessment obtained.

It is forbidden to abort for financial concerns. Even when a couple believe that their financial situation will not allow them to raise another child, they may not terminate the pregnancy. Even those who adopt the more permissive approach maintain that aborting for financial or social reasons is a grave transgression. Zohar states that one who causes a fetus’s death demolishes what God constructed, causes weeping in heaven, distances the Divine Presence from this world, and increases the world’s troubles (Zohar II 3b; Tzitz Eliezer 7:48 and the end of 9:51:3).

13. A Pregnant Cancer Patient

If a pregnant woman has an aggressive form of cancer, she may abort, because pregnancy causes cancer to metastasize more quickly. Even if the abortion will not save her life, but only slow the spread of the disease and prolong her life by a few months, she still may undergo an abortion, because her life takes precedence over that of the fetus. Moreover, even the temporary prolonging of life is important, as we see from the fact that we desecrate Shabbat to extend the life of someone sick or dying (She’elat Yeshurun §39). It would seem that even those who adopt the restrictive approach would agree with this. Even if there are some who maintain that it is still forbidden to abort the fetus directly, they would still permit the mother to undergo conventional chemotherapy treatment, even if it will indirectly cause the death of the fetus (see Nishmat Avraham, ḤM 425:1, n. 15.)

Nonetheless, if the woman wishes to continue her pregnancy, she may, even though it will hasten her death, and even though people are generally obligated to do whatever they can to prolong their lives. In this case, where the goal is to sustain the life of the fetus she is carrying, she may continue her pregnancy (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3).

14. Multifetal Pregnancies

Sometimes, as a result of fertility treatments, a woman becomes pregnant with multiple fetuses. Carrying two fetuses is not considered especially risky, as some women have twins without medical intervention. Even carrying three fetuses is generally not considered especially risky, and triplet births occasionally take place naturally. However, if there are five or more fetuses, there is a significant risk that they will all die or be born prematurely, leading to terrible illnesses.

The vast majority of poskim agree that it is permissible to destroy some of the fetuses so that the others will survive. (The process is euphemistically called “fetal reduction.”) Some explain that each fetus is considered a rodef relative to the others. Others say that because fetuses are not yet considered human life, one may kill some to save the rest. Accordingly, in a triplet pregnancy, only in an unusual case of heightened risk may one kill a fetus. In a quadruplet pregnancy, the situation must be carefully assessed; most of the time it will be permissible to kill one fetus, and two if necessary. In a quintuplet pregnancy, there is a consensus that taking the lives of some of the fetuses is permissible in order to ensure the survival of the rest. Each individual case demands the opinion of a God-fearing doctor and then consultation with a rabbi.

Sometimes, in a twin or triplet pregnancy, one of the fetuses develops more slowly than the others. If the doctor feels that keeping that fetus alive will cause the loss of the other fetuses, it is permissible to take its life in order to save the others. This is both because the weaker fetus would likely not survive in any case and in order to save the remaining fetuses.^[12]

01. Shabbat Rest – The Completion of Creation

It took six days for God to create the heavens, the earth, and all within them. At first glance, an additional day seems unnecessary. Nevertheless, God created the seventh day and designated it for rest and cessation of labor. As a result, the world contains rest, blessing, and holiness. Thus we read:

The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array. On the seventh day God finished the work that He had been doing, and He ceased on the seventh day from all the work that He had done. And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy, because on it God ceased from all the work of creation that He had done. (Bereishit 2:1-3)

The Sages ask:

Does God really get tired? Is it not already stated: “The Lord is God from of old, Creator of the earth from end to end. He never grows faint or weary” (Yeshayahu 40:28)? Not only that, but He actually gives the weary strength, as it is written: “He gives strength to the weary” (ibid. 29). Why then does it say: “He rested on the seventh day” (Shemot 20:11)? It is as though God declared that He created His world in six days and rested on the seventh. (Mekhilta Yitro)

Why did God dictate that even He must rest on the seventh day? In order to create rest, satisfaction, tranquility, and calm for the world. As long as God was busy creating the world, the world was constantly expanding; when He rested on the seventh day, rest was given to the world (Bereishit Rabba 10:9).

Nonstop work, without rest, expresses a tremendous yearning for perfection and an unending sense of a void that can never be filled. Despite all of our work, toil, and travail, we are unable to achieve satisfaction and peace of mind, because perfection remains so far away, and our shortcomings extend indefinitely. There is so much emptiness to fill and so many problems to fix that we can never stop working. This is how people would be living if the world had been created in six days without Shabbat. But with the creation of Shabbat, the world was blessed with rest (Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael ch. 40).

One is able to rest when he knows that his actions are valuable. He derives satisfaction from his labor, knowing that his work is not for naught. This allows him to gather his strength and ready himself for the next stage, when he will resume working. However, if one does not appreciate the value of his work, he will not be blessed with peace of mind even if he stops working. This was true at the beginning of the world as well. Although the heaven and earth, continents and oceans, trees and grasses, luminaries and the deep, fish, birds, and animals were already created, and even though man – created in the divine image – already walked therein, the world was still devoid of meaning, and thus there was no rest. With the creation of the seventh day for rest and cessation of labor, the ability to absorb the inner worth of the world and all actions taken in it was created as well.

To a certain extent, all of mankind has internalized the idea that the creation of the seventh day gives meaning to work and creation, thus allowing everyone to enjoy rest and draw satisfaction from labor. To benefit from this it is not necessary to rest specifically on Shabbat. But the true and absolute value of creation and work, their divine aspect, can be internalized only by resting on Shabbat, the day that God designated for rest. This is a privilege granted to Israel alone. Furthermore, Jews cannot find rest through any finite human value: “Our place of rest is only through God” (R. Kook’s Orot, Zeronim, “Tzima’on Le-El Ĥai”).

Without that rest, which expresses the value and purpose of the world, there is no point in its existence. Thus the Sages state: “This can be compared to a king who built, sculpted, and decorated a marriage canopy. What was missing? A bride to enter it! Similarly, what was the world missing? Shabbat” (Bereishit Rabba 10:9). Of what use to the king are all the rooms in the palace and their beautiful furnishings if he does not have a bride to enjoy them with? The bride brings blessing to the palace, because the delight she provides for the king leads him to be benevolent toward the entire kingdom. The Sages further state (ibid.): “This can be compared to a king who made a signet ring for himself. What was lacking? The seal! Similarly, what was the world lacking? Shabbat.” The seal is what gives a signet ring meaning and identity. Similarly, Shabbat with its sanctity supplies meaning to the world (Maharal op. cit.).

02. Shabbat and the Jewish People

The Sages ask: Why does the Torah’s description of the end of the sixth day of creation conclude with “And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Bereishit 1:31), with the definite article? They explain that the Torah alludes the sixth of Sivan, when the Torah was given to Israel. “God set a condition with Creation: ‘If Israel accepts the Torah, you will continue to exist, but if not, then I will return you to being formless and void” (Shabbat 88a). Immediately after the completion of the sixth weekday was the creation of Shabbat, the expression of God’s kingship. It is upon this sixth day that, in the future, God would give the Torah to Israel (ibid. 86b).

Until Jews made their appearance in the world, Shabbat was alone, with no one present to reveal its holiness and blessedness. The Sages express this as follows:

Shabbat said before: “Master of the Universe, everybody has a partner except for me. The six days of creation pair off; only I have no partner.” God replied: “The people of Israel are your partner.” When the Jews stood before Sinai, God said to them: “Remember what I told Shabbat: ‘The people of Israel are your partner.’” This is the meaning of the commandment “Commemorate the day of Shabbat to sanctify it (Shemot 20:8).” (Bereishit Rabba 11:8)

It is true that even before the Jewish people accepted the Torah, Shabbat was already sanctified and blessed, since that is when God stopped His work. Moreover, Shabbat is the heart and soul of the world. However, the blessing that Shabbat bestowed then was limited to ensuring the world’s existence. All the imperfections endemic to the world remained, without the possibility of repair. Therefore God stipulated with His world that should the Jews refuse the Torah, the world would revert to chaos. What would be the point of its existence if it, with all its pain, were to continue without the possibility of progressing and advancing toward a more perfect state?

03. The Link Between the Exodus and Shabbat

During the first two millennia after creation, humans learned how to sustain themselves; to find food, clothing, and shelter; and to organize a society that could cope successfully with the challenges of their surroundings. Yet apart from a select few who clung to monotheistic faith and morality, the entire world operated based on need and brute strength, without any idealistic goals. This situation continued until the Patriarchs Avraham, Yitzĥak, and Yaakov appeared on the scene, called God’s name, and dedicated their lives to improving the world through truth and kindness. They rejected paganism, which sanctified forces of nature and denied morality. Based on their intuitions, the Patriarchs kept mitzvot and observed Shabbat (Bereishit Rabba 79:7). Nevertheless, because they still had not received the Torah, they could not sustain their ideals within the world. On the contrary, the very wickedness they fought rose up against them; Egypt, then the most powerful of all nations, subjugated and enslaved the Israelites, forcing them to do backbreaking labor in order to sustain the Egyptian economy and provide the Egyptians with all their wants and needs. This showed the Israelites how wicked human nature could be and how badly the world needs the faith heralded by their ancestors.

The Israelites had a tradition, recorded on scrolls, that God would redeem them from Egypt. Each Shabbat they would enjoy reading these scrolls (see Shemot Rabba 5:18). This belief preserved their identity, and they steadily increased in number until they became a nation. Then the God of their ancestors revealed Himself to them, took them out of Egypt, redeemed them, and gave them the Torah and Shabbat.

The Israelites were not redeemed from merely Egyptian slavery when, after the Exodus, they accepted the Torah and Shabbat. They were also freed from their enslavement to nature and the struggle for survival. They were freed from the view that man’s sole purpose is to accumulate as much money and wealth as possible, even if it means controlling and enslaving others to that end.

Jews observe Shabbat and thus always remember that God created and sustains the world. Man’s purpose is to cleave to God and His attributes and to free himself from the bonds of slavery to the evil inclination and the struggle for survival. Even if due to the exigencies of circumstances and lack of choice one must work hard to support himself – even if one has been sold into slavery – he still rests on Shabbat. By doing so, he demonstrates that he is not entirely enslaved; his spirit remains free and connected to its divine roots:

Observe Shabbat day and keep it holy, as the Lord your God has commanded you. Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha – you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your ox or your ass, or any of you cattle, or the stranger in your settlements, so that your male and female slave may rest as you do. Remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God freed you from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm. Therefore the Lord your God has commanded you to observe the day of Shabbat. (Devarim 5:12-15)

God intentionally created the world incomplete so that people would have the opportunity to participate in repairing and improving it. It is impossible to fix the world without recognizing that its source is God and man’s destiny is to walk in His ways, as explained in the Torah. This is the purpose of the Jewish people – to reveal the word of God in the world: “I created this nation for My sake; they will tell My praise” (Yeshayahu 43:21). Therefore, the Sages stated that the heavens and earth were created in the merit of the Jews (Vayikra Rabba 36:4). Through Shabbat, a blessed and sacred time, the Jewish people can fulfill their destiny. This is why the Torah was given on Shabbat (Shabbat 86b) and why Shabbat is a time especially conducive to Torah study.

04. The Uniqueness of Israel and Shabbat

Shabbat reveals the special connection between God and Israel, as is stated:

Nevertheless, you must keep My Shabbatot, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout the ages, that you may know that I the Lord have consecrated you. You shall keep Shabbat, for it is holy for you…. The Israelite people shall keep Shabbat, observing Shabbat throughout the ages as a covenant for all time; it shall be a sign for all time between Me and the people of Israel that in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day He ceased from work and was refreshed. (Shemot 31:13-17)

The Sages report that “God said to Moshe: ‘I have a wonderful gift in my treasury, and its name is Shabbat. I wish to give it to Israel. Go and inform them”’ (Beitza 16a). They further state: “All the mitzvot that God gave to Israel were given publicly, except for Shabbat, which was given in private, as it says: ‘it shall be a sign for all time between Me and the people of Israel’” (ibid.). They then raise a question: Isn’t the mitzva of Shabbat found in the Ten Commandments, which were given very publicly? They respond that the true, inner meaning of Shabbat, which reveals the divine nature of the world, is something that cannot be revealed publicly. It is something special that is linked to the special connection between God and the Jews. In their words: “God gives people a neshama yeteira [lit. “expanded soul”] before Shabbat, and after Shabbat he withdraws it from them” (ibid.). By means of this neshama yeteira, the Jews are able to grasp the godly significance of the world and their special role within it.

This explains the Sages’ statement: “A non-Jew who observes Shabbat is deserving of the death penalty” (San. 58b). They further state:

In human society, if a king and a noblewoman are sitting and talking with each other, wouldn’t one who interrupts them be deserving of death? Similarly, Shabbat is something shared by the Jews and God, as [Scripture] states: “between Me and the people of Israel.” Therefore a non-Jew who insinuates himself between them before undertaking circumcision deserves death. (Devarim Rabba 1:21; see Harĥavot 25:1)

In order to express the Jews’ great love for Shabbat, which is like that of a royal bride at the side of her groom, there is a Jewish custom to go outside before sundown on Friday to greet Shabbat, just as one goes out to greet an honored guest. The Gemara tells us that R. Ĥanina would put on his best clothes and greet Shabbat with the declaration: “Let us go and greet the Shabbat queen.” R. Yannai would wear his fancy clothes and greet Shabbat by declaring: “Welcome, O bride; welcome, O bride.” This inspired R. Shlomo Alkabetz’s magnificent poem Lekha Dodi: “Go, my beloved (Israel) to greet the bride; let us greet Shabbat.”

05. The Six Days of Creation and Shabbat

The six weekdays and Shabbat are interconnected. Just as every person has a body and a soul, so too the week has a body and a soul: weekdays are its body and Shabbat is its soul. Just as a wholesome person’s body and soul work together harmoniously – the body receiving spiritual illumination from the soul and providing it with the means to express itself – so, too, a wholesome week integrates Shabbat with the days of the week. During the week we prepare for Shabbat and give concrete expression to the ideas behind Shabbat, while on Shabbat we draw the spiritual strength that takes us through the week.

On the one hand, we relate to Shabbat as the weekend. All week we prepare for its culmination – Shabbat – which in turn elevates the actions undertaken during the six weekdays and imbues them with meaning. On the other hand, Shabbat is also the anchor and beginning of the next week. From Shabbat we draw spiritual strength for the upcoming week so that we are able to realize, through our activities, the spiritual values that we absorb on Shabbat. Thus, the life of a Jew is not a uniform continuum that moves toward erosion and entropy. On the contrary, it is a life of constant elevation.

These two aspects can be explained as follows: from the perspective of the world, the creation of the six weekdays preceded Shabbat, while from the perspective of man, created on the sixth day, Shabbat preceded the following six days (see Shabbat 69b).

The Sages offer another perspective on the relationship between Shabbat and weekdays: Shabbat is in the middle of the week, with three days preceding it and three days following it. On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday we prepare for the upcoming Shabbat, and on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday the influence of the outgoing Shabbat is still felt (Pesaĥim 106a; see below 2:10-11; 8:7).

Since Shabbat is linked to the six weekdays, it is clear that the greater one’s actions during the week, the greater the heights he will achieve on Shabbat. Similarly, the greater the heights he attains on Shabbat, the more he will be able to infuse the ensuing week with sanctity and meaning.

Maharal explains that the idea of Shabbat is hinted at in the number of days of the week. Everything physical has six sides: up, down, front, back, right, and left. The number seven expresses inner essence. Similarly, the physical world was created in six days, and on the seventh day Shabbat, the sacred essence of the world, was created (Tiferet Yisrael ch. 40).