01. Gozez (Shearing)

    The melakha of Gozez (shearing) is the removal of things that grow on the body, such as hair, nails, warts, loose skin, and the like. In contrast, one who actually cuts skin and draws blood transgresses the prohibition of Ĥovel (see below 20:9.) For the Mishkan, lamb’s wool was sheared and then made into thread that was used to make the curtains. Similarly, hair was sheared from taĥash skins so that the skins would be smooth and thus fit for use as curtains in the Mishkan. We see that sometimes shearing is done in order to use material that is attached to a body, as is the case when sheep’s wool is needed to make thread, and sometimes it is done to remove something unwanted, as is the case when removing unwanted hairs to improve animal skins (Rivash; BHL 340:1 s.v. “ve-ĥayav”).

    Unlike the melakha of Kotzer, where the prohibition applies only if one cuts off a plant from its life source (below 19:6), here the prohibition applies to shearing wool from the skin of a dead animal as well, because even after an animal’s death there is still a purpose to shearing its wool. Therefore, one should be careful not to pull out threads from a fur coat or a leather carpet (MB 340:5). If doing so serves a purpose, the prohibition is by Torah law; if there is no purpose, the prohibition is rabbinic.

    Included in the melakha of Gozez is plucking feathers from a chicken. However, one may pluck feathers from a cooked chicken. This is because after a chicken is cooked it is considered food, and the prohibition of shearing does not apply to food (R. Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim [Aderet], Oveir Oraĥ §366; Har Tzvi, Tal Harim, Gozez 3).

    02. Gozez and Ĥovel of Human Beings

    Just as one may not shear an animal’s wool, so too one may not remove anything growing from the human body, such as hairs, nails, loose skin, and warts. One who removes them in the usual fashion transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who removes them with a shinui transgresses a rabbinic prohibition.

    Therefore, one who cuts his nails using a nail scissors or clippers transgresses a Torah prohibition, while one who pulls them off with his teeth transgresses a rabbinic prohibition (MT 9:8). One should make every effort to stop biting his nails entirely; apart from being impolite, a habitual nail biter is likely to bite his nails on Shabbat as well, thus violating Shabbat.

    Similarly, one may not remove warts. If the wart is wet, cutting it with an instrument is a Torah prohibition, while removing it with a shinui, via teeth or hands, is a rabbinic transgression. If the wart is dried out and liable to fall off on its own, then even removing it with an instrument is only a rabbinic transgression (ibid.; SA 340:2; MB ad loc. 6).

    One may not scrape the body to remove skin that has begun to peel. One may not even use one’s teeth to remove the skin from his chapped lips. However, one may remove dandruff, since it is only very loosely attached to the skin, and it falls out readily.

    If a nail was torn off most of the way and is now painful, it may be removed using one’s hands or one’s teeth. Since most of it has already been torn off, it is viewed as if it has already fallen off, and the prohibition on finishing the job is only rabbinic. The Sages permit removing the nail with a shinui if it is causing pain (Shabbat 94b; SA 328:31; Ĥayei Adam 21:4).

    One may not scratch a cut in a way that will make it bleed, because doing so constitutes Ĥovel (see below 20:9). Even though one who scratches is not interested in drawing blood, it is still rabbinically prohibited (MB 316:30). Similarly, one may not brush his teeth if it is almost certain that his gums will bleed. One also may not knowingly suck the blood out of his gums after brushing them to the point that they bleed, as this constitutes Ĥovel (MB 328:147; section 7 below).

    One may remove a splinter lodged in a person’s flesh as long as one is careful not to draw blood. If the splinter is painful, one may remove it even it will certainly cause bleeding. This is because drawing blood in this situation is rabbinically prohibited, and the Sages did not extend their prohibition to cases that entail such pain (MB 328:88).

    One may remove a scab from a wound that has dried and will not bleed upon the scab’s removal. This does not qualify as Gozez since scabs do not grow from the body, but rather are just dried blood from a wound (SA 328:22).

    03. Brushing and Braiding Hair

    One may not brush or comb one’s hair on Shabbat, because when doing so hairs are pulled out. This is actually a beneficial phenomenon. Every day a person sheds dozens of hairs naturally. People would rather that hairs with weak roots be pulled out during brushing rather than fall out on their own in the course of the day, thus making their hair unkempt and their clothes unsightly. In any event, since one may not brush his hair on Shabbat, brushes are considered muktzeh and may not be moved on Shabbat (SA 303:27).

    Nevertheless, one who wishes to make one’s hair neater may use a special brush with soft or widely spaced bristles, so that there is a reasonable chance that it will not pull out hair. Then, even if he does happen to pull out hair, he does not violate a melakha. This is because his intention is not to pull out hair, hair will not necessarily be pulled out, and the brush is not muktzeh. In order to make sure it does not look like he is using a prohibited brush, it is advisable to designate a brush for use specifically on Shabbat (see SSK 14:50).[1]

    One may gently rub one’s hair or beard, and one may use one’s fingers to arrange them and to remove anything stuck in them, as long as one is careful not to pull out hairs. Even if these actions might cause hairs to be removed, one may do so, as this is unintentional. One who generally tugs at his beard in a way that causes hair to be pulled out must refrain from doing so on Shabbat.

    The Sages forbade braiding hair on Shabbat, because making a braid resembles the melakha of Boneh. Similarly, one may not undo a braid, because this resembles melakha of Soter. One may gather hair into a ponytail, as this does not create a structure. Similarly, one may part one’s hair using one’s hands, but one may not use a brush or comb to do so, as this will pull out hairs (SA 303:26; MB ad loc. 84).

    Braiding a wig is also forbidden because it resembles weaving – the melakha of Oreg – while one may not undo a braid because this constitutes “undoing a weave” – the melakha of Potze’a (MB 303:82; SHT ad loc. 71). It is proper to refrain from combing a wig, but one may do so using a soft brush that will not pull out hairs (SSK 14:52). If a wig has become so tangled that it cannot be worn outside, then one may not style it even using one’s hands, as it constitutes Makeh Be-fatish (Ketzot Ha-shulĥan 143, Badei Ha-shulĥan 6).

    It is rabbinically prohibited to curl one’s hair, which includes men curling their sidelocks (peyot), because this is similar to Boneh. Straightening hair or sidelocks is prohibited because of Soter. But if the sidelocks were already curled, they may be twirled even though this may tighten the curls, because no new structure is formed (Tiferet Yisrael on Shabbat ch. 10, Yakhin 35; see Ketzot Ha-shulĥan 146, Badei Ha-shulĥan 21).

    One may not use hair spray or oil to keep one’s hair in place, because this is similar to Boneh (Rivash as cited in BHL 303:27 s.v. “laĥof”). One may not use these substances on wigs either (SSK 14:56). However, women may spray perfume on their hair or bodies (MB 128:23; SSK 14:56-57).


    [1] One commits Gozez whether shearing because he wants the wool or because he wants to beautify the body by removing unsightly growth from it. The latter is similar to shearing the taĥash skins in order to make them into curtains for the Mishkan. Since it is generally in one’s interest for some hairs to fall out while he is brushing his hair, doing so is prohibited by Torah law (Rivash §39; SHT 303:72). However, according to MT, Laws of Nazirism 5:14, a nazirite who brushes his hair is not subject to lashes. Radbaz explains that even though it is in the interest of the nazirite for some hairs to fall out, the prohibition is only rabbinic because the hairs have weak roots and thus are likely to fall out in any case. Eglei Tal, Gozez 15 suggests this as well. Kesef Mishneh explains that according to Rambam the prohibition is rabbinic because one does not intend for his hair to fall out; he is primarily concerned with arranging his hair, not pulling it out. Additionally, it is not certain that any hair will be pulled out at all.

    04. Applying Makeup

    One of the 39 melakhot forbidden on Shabbat is Tzove’a (dyeing). By Torah law, it is limited to long-lasting paints or dyes applied to surfaces that will retain them for an extended period (see below 18:5). The Sages, however, prohibited even color that will not last for a long period, and even if it is applied to a surface that will not retain the color. One example of this is the prohibition on the use of makeup, which colors one’s skin for a short time. Accordingly, one may not use eye shadow, blush, lipstick, or clear lip gloss that provides a shine. Similarly, one may not use even clear nail polish, because the shine it provides is considered color. While this prohibition pertains to applying makeup, removing makeup with water or cotton is permissible. Cotton balls soaked in water should not be used, because of the prohibition of Seĥita.

    It is also forbidden to apply foundation, a cosmetic used to even out one’s complexion. This prohibition is more severe than the prohibition on using other types of makeup, because in addition to transgressing the rabbinic prohibition of Tzove’a, one might also transgress the Torah prohibition of Memare’aĥ (see the next section) if one is using cream foundation.

    One may use powder, however, whether white or colored, because powder has no adhesive agent. It is only when the material used for coloring adheres to the skin that there is a prohibition of Tzove’a; in contrast, if it just stays on the surface of the face and does not adhere to it, one may apply it (Igrot Moshe OĤ 1:114; Yeĥaveh Da’at 4:28). Some are stringent even in such cases (Maharam Brisk 1:23; Beit Yisrael §56). However, since this disagreement pertains to a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha is in accordance with those who are lenient.

    The prohibition on wearing makeup is one of the most difficult to follow. For a woman who is used to putting on makeup every day, it is not easy to refrain from doing so on Shabbat, especially since it is precisely Shabbat when everyone tries to look their best. However, if we explore the issue more deeply, perhaps we can suggest that this, on the contrary, relates to the main idea of Shabbat, a day of holiness and rest. Shabbat is when we take a break from the tension that we experience throughout the week. We work so hard to present ourselves to others as more beautiful than we naturally are, in an attempt to meet society’s cruel and superficial standards of beauty. In contrast, Shabbat helps us truly relax by strengthening our faith and belief in divine providence. We can achieve this spiritual relaxation when we attain an internal acceptance of existence as it is, and an appreciation of our natural beauty, which we highlight with clothing and jewelry. This is oneg Shabbat.

    Nevertheless, before Shabbat, one may, and even should, put on makeup. The Sages state: “One who labors before Shabbat will eat on Shabbat” (AZ 3a). During the week, it is our mission to fix the world, improve it, and prepare it for Shabbat. This allows us to absorb the divine light more completely. However, if we are unable to prepare ourselves fully for Shabbat – for example, we know that makeup applied on Friday will not last through the whole of Shabbat – once Shabbat arrives we must calmly and joyfully accept existence as it is. This very acceptance is what will allow us to continue to fix and improve the world during the week.

    05. Applying Oils, Perfumes, Creams, and Lotions

    One may apply oil to the hands or body on Shabbat in the manner that people normally anoint themselves for pleasure. Similarly, a woman may rub her hair or body with perfumed oil. It is true that the Sages forbade perfuming a garment, because scenting clothing involves Molid (producing something new that did not previously exist), which is similar to performing a melakha (Beitza 23a; Beit Yosef and Rema 511:4). However, there is no prohibition on applying perfume to the body or hair, because the scent is completely secondary to the body, and therefore it is not considered producing something new.[2]

    Although one may rub his body with oil, he may not apply cream because of the prohibition of Memare’aĥ, which is a tolada of Memaĥek (see below 18:6). Memaĥek refers to smoothing rough surfaces such as leather or wood, while Memare’aĥ involves evenly applying a substance to an object in order to make it smooth.

    Therefore, one may not apply any type of cream or ointment to the skin, because in doing so one smoothes the cream onto the skin. Some object that this should not be prohibited, since the cream is meant to be absorbed by the body rather than to remain on the surface of the skin. However, this is incorrect, since even when one wants the cream to be absorbed, he also wants some of it to remain on the skin’s surface to make it smooth. Hence the prohibition of Memare’aĥ applies. In contrast, if the cream is watery, such that if it is left on a surface it will spread out, there is no prohibition of Memare’aĥ, and one may apply it to the body.[3]

    Liquid insect repellent may be used on Shabbat, but if it is a solid, one may not spread it on the body because of the prohibition of Memare’aĥ.

    One who is experiencing mild discomfort may not apply medicinal oil. Furthermore, a healthy person may not apply medicinal oil for pleasure, since the Sages prohibited the use of medicines on Shabbat. However, if one is truly suffering, he may use medicinal oil. If this oil is also used by healthy people, then since it will not be apparent that it is being used medicinally, even one who is experiencing discomfort may apply it (SA 327:1; below 28:4-5). The laws pertaining to massage, both professional and amateur, will be explained below (28:13).


    [2]. Some forbid making the body smell good, on account of Molid (Taz 511:8; MA 511:11; Ben Ish Ĥai, Year 2, Tetzaveh 11). At the opposite extreme, some maintain that one may infuse a garment with scent (Rishon Le-Tziyon, based on Rif, Rambam, and Rosh). However, most poskim maintain that while one may not make clothing smell good, one may make the body smell good (MB 128:23; Yeĥaveh Da’at 1:31; SSK 14:36).[3]. If one would like all the cream to be absorbed into the body and none to remain on the skin, then there is no prohibition of Memare’aĥ (MA 316:24; MB ad loc. 49). Therefore, if one is sick enough that he may receive medical treatment on Shabbat, and he requires a cream, it may be spread on the skin and rubbed in until it is absorbed entirely by the body (Da’at Torah 328:26; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 33 n. 64). However, those who use cosmetic cream for pleasure or beauty do not want it to be entirely absorbed. Rather, they want some to stay on the surface of the skin, making it smooth and beautiful. Therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law to apply that cream.

    06. Bar Soap, Liquid Soap, and Wipes

    While one may use liquid soap to wash one’s hands, the general practice is to be stringent about bar soap or thick liquid soap. There are two reasons for this. First, using bar soap or thick liquid soap resembles Memaĥek, since using a bar of soap smooths its surface and thick liquid soap is spread on the hands or body. Second, when one uses these kinds of soap it looks like he is producing something new, since the soap changes from solid to liquid. Although according to many poskim this use is not technically prohibited, because the person using the soap does not intend to smooth it and because the small amount of soap that is used is dissolved in the water, so it does not seem like anything new is being created, nevertheless, since there is some resemblance to Memare’aĥ and Molid, the common custom is to be stringent and avoid using bar soap or thick liquid soap. Those who are lenient have an opinion to rely upon.

    If a thick liquid soap spreads out upon being left on a surface, it is considered liquid, and all would agree that one may use it on Shabbat. If it is uncertain whether a substance is considered thick or liquid, one may be lenient.[4]

    One may use wet wipes to clean a baby, to clean one’s body in general, or to clean a table and the like. Some are stringent because they maintain that there is a problem of Seĥita, since when using a wipe, one presses on it and squeezes out some moisture, which would help in cleaning. Nevertheless, the lenient opinion is the primary one, because the purpose of a wipe is to use the moisture on the surface of the wipe to clean more effectively. The purpose is not to squeeze out the moisture inside the wipe in order to wet the dirty area. If that were one’s goal, he would simply wash the area with water. As long as the wipe remains damp, he has no interest in the moisture that has not been squeezed out and separated from it, and thus no transgression has taken place. Even if, by chance, a couple of drops were squeezed out, since one did not intend for this to happen, he has not transgressed.[5]

    As we have seen (above 13:11), if one went to the bathroom and has no way to wipe himself other than to tear toilet paper, he may do so with a shinui such as using his elbows to pull the paper from the roll. This is because the Sages permitted transgressing a rabbinic prohibition to avoid great embarrassment. One may also, when necessary, wet toilet paper so it will clean more effectively, as long as one does not intend to squeeze out water from the toilet paper but only to make use of the moisture.


    [4]. MB 326:30 is stringent, based on Tiferet Yisrael, and maintains that one should not use this kind of soap because of Memare’aĥ. This is also the opinion of Ma’aseh Ish, p. 109, and R. Shmuel Laniado, Shulĥan Ha-melekh. Ben Ish Ĥai Year 2, Yitro 15 is stringent on account of Molid. However, several poskim are lenient, including Paĥad Yitzĥak, Ginat Veradim, and Pe’ulat Tzadik. Ketzot Ha-shulĥan agrees (138, Badei Ha-shulĥan 31). Yabi’a Omer 4:27 elaborates on this approach, adding that Rambam presents it in a responsum. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK ch. 14 n. 49, states that technically one may use this kind of soap. Rather, it is an example of “things that are permitted but custom forbids,” and in such cases one should follow the custom. In practice, both SSK 14:18 and Or Le-Tziyon 2:35:5 forbid using it. R. Ovadia Yosef writes in Halikhot Olam vol. 4, p. 108, that it is proper to be stringent, and that this is the custom. However, it would seem that under pressing circumstances one may rely on those who are lenient, and even more so if one is uncertain whether his soap is considered thick or liquid. If there are cracks in bar soap and one wishes to smooth them out, this is prohibited according to all opinions.[5]. Those who are stringent include Orĥot Shabbat 13:46 and Ĥut Shani vol. 2, p. 209. Minĥat Yitzĥak 10:25 and Shevet Ha-Levi 8:59 and 10:58 incline this way as well. Opposing them are Har Tzvi 1:190 and Va-ya’an Yosef OĤ §163, which rule leniently. Many others have also permitted this, including Igrot Moshe OĤ 2:70; SSK 14:37 and n. 99 based on R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach; Rivevot Ephraim 6:194:3; Menuĥat Ahava vol. 2 ch. 12 n. 20; and Be-mar’eh Ha-bazak 3:48. See Harĥavot.

    07. Brushing Teeth and Toothpaste

    One may brush one’s teeth on Shabbat to clean them and to treat bad breath. Similarly, mouthwash may be used to freshen one’s breath. However, it is proper to refrain from using toothpaste, the same way we refrain from using bar soap or thick liquid soap.

    While it is true that some forbid brushing teeth on Shabbat, either due to the concern of Seĥita, because the gums might bleed, or because the bristles of the toothbrush might break, nevertheless, the primary halakhic position is that one may brush one’s teeth with a toothbrush le-khatĥila. It is only in a case where it is almost certain that the gums will bleed that this is prohibited.[6]

    One may wash off the toothbrush with water after brushing, as one normally does, even if one does not intend to use the toothbrush again on Shabbat. This is not considered preparing for the weekday on Shabbat, because it is simply a matter of routine and is not considered a significant chore. Furthermore, removing the residue from the brush also serves a purpose on Shabbat, as leaving it dirty would be disgusting (see MB 667:6; below 22:16).

    One may clean one’s teeth with a toothpick (SA 322:4). If there is no toothpick available, a match may be used. While it is true that matches are muktzeh, they are kelim she-melakhtam le-isur, and one may handle them in order to use them for a permitted activity (below, 23:7). Of course, one must remember that one may not sharpen the match for this purpose, as sharpening it would violate a Torah prohibition.

    One may use denture adhesive powder to attach false teeth to the gums, as this is meant for the short term (Har Tzvi; Tzitz Eliezer 15:25; Yalkut Yosef 314:17; as opposed to SSK 14:40, who is stringent).


    [6]. Those who prohibit include Minĥat Yitzĥak 3:48 and Orĥot Shabbat 17:29. SSK states in 14:39 that the custom is to be stringent. The logic of those who forbid brushing is that it causes bleeding and can break the bristles of the toothbrush. Both claims are incorrect. Since it is rare for either thing to happen, they would be cases of davar she-eino mitkaven and thus brushing is permitted. Some also raise the problem of Seĥita, as water may be squeezed out of the bristles during the brushing. In response, those who permit explain that such squeezing is a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition. First, wringing out hair and the like is only rabbinically prohibited; second, it is done in a backhanded way. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach maintains that it is to one’s advantage (niĥa lei) for the water to be squeezed out, because this improves the cleaning. However, generally the bristles of a toothbrush are neither very long nor very tightly packed, so usually no Seĥita occurs at all. If one rinses his mouth with mouthwash before brushing, then R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach would agree that it is a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei. Those who permit tooth brushing in practice are Seridei Esh 2:28; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 1:112; Or Le-Tziyon 2:35:6; and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Shulĥan Shlomo 320:28:2). Ketzot Ha-shulĥan and Yabi’a Omer 4:27-30 permit using toothpaste as well.

    08. Bathing on Shabbat

    The Sages forbade bathing the body in hot water on Shabbat. This is because some people were so eager to bathe in hot water that they would heat the water on Shabbat, thus transgressing both Hav’ara and Bishul. When they were admonished, they would claim that the water had been heated before Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages forbade bathing one’s body on Shabbat, even in water heated before Shabbat. However, one may wash less than half of the body in hot water. As long as one refrains from washing most of the body, there is no concern that one will succumb and heat the water on Shabbat for the lessened pleasure of bathing less than half of the body. Even when washing each limb individually, one still may not wash the majority of one’s body with hot water (Shabbat 40a; SA 326:1).

    We have seen that one may use hot water already available in the boiler as long as this usage does not cause additional water to be cooked (above 10:24). We have also seen that many permit using water that was heated on Shabbat with solar power (10:25). According to this approach, one may use this water to wash the hands, face, and less than half of the body. However, one still may not use this water to wash most of the body on account of the rabbinic enactment.

    The prohibition on washing the body is specifically limited to hot water. One may wash the whole body in cold or lukewarm water whose temperature is lower than body temperature. One may even turn on the hot water tap so that the water will not be cold, as long as this does not cause the cold water entering the boiler to be cooked (as explained above 10:24-25).

    It is also important to note that the prohibition of washing the body in hot water is limited to normal circumstances. One who suffers greatly if he must go a whole day without bathing in hot water may wash his whole body in water that was heated on Friday or by a solar boiler (R. Akiva Eger; BHL 326:1).

    One who bathes on Shabbat must take care not to wring out his hair with his hands while washing or drying off, in order to avoid the prohibition of Seĥita. He may, however, towel his hair dry. Since he is not interested in the water that is wrung from the hair and absorbed by the towel, there is no prohibition. A woman who always combs or brushes her hair after bathing must be careful not to wash her hair on Shabbat, in order to avoid the prohibition of Gozez (see section 3 above).

    The Sages further cautioned that if one washes in a river, spring, or sea in an area where there is no eruv, he should shake the water off himself when he gets out and thus avoid carrying the water the distance of four amot. He does not have to be totally dry; it is sufficient to remove the excess water that drips from his body. In contrast, there is no rabbinic decree against walking in reshut ha-rabim when wet from rain. This is because rain does not get one as wet as bathing, and even if there is enough rainwater on one’s body that it could be considered carrying, the Sages were not stringent, since the rain falls on him against his will (Shabbat 141a; Beit Yosef and SA 326:7; Taz ad loc. 2).

    09. Swimming and Immersion in a Mikveh

    The Sages prohibited swimming on Shabbat, because one might come to build or mend a raft. One who lifts his feet from the ground and floats in the water is considered swimming. However, if he does not lift his feet, then he is considered bathing, which is permitted (Beitza 36b; Shabbat 40b; SA 339:2). Technically, one may swim in a pool located in a fenced-off area and where the water is confined by the walls of the pool, as in such a case we are not concerned that one might build a raft or carry water outside the eruv. Nevertheless, since nowadays swimming has become one of the most common weekday leisure activities, it is prohibited as a weekday activity (uvdin de-ĥol). Furthermore, there is a concern that after swimming, people will wring out their bathing suits. Moreover, it is improper for one to waste free time on Shabbat with leisure activities instead of dedicating it to Torah study.[7]

    One may immerse in a mikveh on Shabbat to remove impurity. Even though the Sages prohibit immersing implements (tevilat kelim) on Shabbat, this is because it resembles fixing the implement, since as a result of the immersion the implement may be used. A person, however, may immerse on Shabbat to purify himself since he may anyway bathe in cold water and thus it does not resemble an act of fixing or improving something (Beitza 18a; SA 326:8). While it is true that, for several reasons, the Ashkenazic custom is to avoid bathing in cold water on Shabbat, when it is done for the purpose of a mitzva, the custom is not to be stringent (Rema, YD 197:2). Therefore, men who are accustomed to immerse as an act of piety may do so on Shabbat as well.

    The poskim disagree whether the rabbinic ban on bathing on Shabbat applies to immersion in a mikveh. Some maintain that the Sages did not include immersion for the sake of a mitzva in their decree, and thus one may immerse in hot water as long as it was heated in a permissible fashion (Korban Netanel). Others maintain that the enactment applies to this immersion as well, and thus one may not even immerse in hot water on Shabbat (Noda Bi-Yehuda). Many are customarily lenient and immerse in hot water. Those who wish to be stringent should make sure that the water is lukewarm, lower than body temperature, as most poskim agree that one may bathe on Shabbat. Thus, one may certainly immerse for the sake of a mitzva.[8]


    [7]. Even though technically one may wash one’s whole body in cold water, the Ashkenazic custom is to be stringent out of concern that one might wring out his hair upon leaving the water, that one might carry water four amot in a reshut ha-rabim, or that one might come to swim (Terumat Ha-deshen §255; Maharil Ĥadashot §139; MA 326:8; MB ad loc. 21). However, even those who are stringent regarding Shabbat agree that on Yom Tov one may bathe the entire body in cool or cold water. One who does so must be careful not to wring out his hair with his hands. He must dry off with a towel instead (SSK 14:11). Some write that even when using a towel, one must be careful to be gentle in drying off (Ben Ish Ĥai, Year 2, Pekudei 8). I did not include the Ashkenazic custom prohibiting bathing in cold water in the main text, because it rarely arises, and it applies only to those few individuals who normally bathe for pleasure in cold water. In contrast, if there is an element of anguish involved, we are lenient about washing in either cold or hot water. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ashkenazic custom forbids swimming in a pool. While it is true that Sephardic custom follows the letter of the law and permits both bathing in cold water and swimming in an enclosed pool in a reshut ha-yaĥid, nevertheless, it seems that swimming in a pool should be prohibited even for Sephardim. This is because people generally swim in swimsuits, and there is a serious concern that they might wring them out. Furthermore, in the past the entire leniency of swimming in a pool was relevant only to uncommon cases of individuals who had a small pool in their yard and would float around in it for a short while. In contrast, pools built today are meant to be used for extended periods. Because swimming in a pool is a normal leisure activity, it is considered a weekday activity. If swimming on Shabbat were permitted, people would waste time that they could use for Torah learning, and they would miss out on that key aspect of Shabbat. Yalkut Yosef 326:11 (in vol. 4, p. 69) states similarly. See also the laws regarding running and exercising, below 22:7-8.

    [8]. Terumat Ha-deshen §255 rules that according to the Ashkenazic custom, which does not allow bathing in cold water, a woman who could have immersed before Shabbat may not immerse on Shabbat. Accordingly, the Vilna Gaon writes that a man who had a nocturnal emission may not immerse on Shabbat. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Ashkenazic poskim permit any immersion on Shabbat. Rema YD 197:2, AHS ad loc. 8, and Taharat Yisrael 14 rule accordingly with regard to women’s immersion. Those who permit men’s immersion include Olat Shabbat 326:15; Eliya Rabba ad loc. 5; Tosefet Shabbat 12; and Igrot Moshe OĤ 4:74.

    The Sages did not prohibit immersion in hot water on Shabbat, according to Korban Netanel, Shabbat 2:100 and Ĥesed Le-Avraham §30 (as cited in SHT 326:5). Many Aĥaronim attest to the practice of women immersing on Friday night in hot water (Divrei Ĥayim 2:26; R. Yehuda Ayash in Responsa Bnei Yehuda 2:32; Responsa Divrei Yosef §64). In contrast, others maintain that immersion in hot water is included in the rabbinic prohibition (Noda Bi-Yehuda, 2: 24; Ĥakham Tzvi §11; Beit Meir, beginning of §326; Ĥayei Adam 70:1; and R. Akiva Eger 1:17). SHT 326:5 states that one may be lenient only under pressing circumstance. However, in practice many are lenient and permit women to immerse in hot water. Thus state Orĥot Shabbat 2:21, n. 30; Menuĥat Ahava 2:10, n. 173; and Badei Ha-shulĥan 197:17. Livyat Ĥen §79 states (following Ĥakham Tzvi) that le-khatĥila a woman should immerse during bein ha-shmashot (dusk), since rabbinic prohibitions on Shabbat do not apply to mitzvot that are undertaken during bein ha-shmashot. If she is unable to immerse during bein ha-shmashot, she may immerse in hot water on Shabbat. It seems to me that those who wish to be stringent should preferably immerse in lukewarm water, since there are three opinions regarding the nature of the prohibition of washing in hot water (mentioned in the previous section):

    1) According to Beit Me’ir and R. Akiva Eger, even water that has been heated slightly to remove its chill is prohibited.

    2) According to Ĥakham Tzvi §11, Ĥatam Sofer OĤ §146, and Tehila Le-David 326:3, the prohibition applies to lukewarm water, but water that has been heated merely to remove its chill is permitted.

    3) According to Noda Bi-Yehuda 2:24, Ĥayei Adam 70:1, Zera Emet 1:71, and AHS 326:3, the prohibition pertains only to hot water, but lukewarm water is permitted.

    Thus, even according to the opinion that one may not immerse in hot water, according to Noda Bi-Yehuda and those who follow his approach one may immerse in lukewarm water. If the heat of the water is slightly cooler than body temperature, it may be that Ĥakham Tzvi and those who follow his approach would agree that this is not forbidden. Therefore, one who wishes to be stringent should heat the water to body temperature or lower. The subsequent immersion thereby complies with the overwhelming majority of poskim, and at the same time does not cause suffering.

    01. The Principles of Boneh, Soter, and Makeh Be-patish

    The melakha of Boneh (building) is the melakha through which the Mishkan was constructed. The melakha includes leveling the ground in preparation for erecting the Mishkan upon it and so that people can walk easily in its courtyard. It also includes putting up the walls of the Mishkan, its roofing, and its courtyard gate.

    Building anything on the ground or in a house, or adding anything onto a pre-existing structure, is a transgression of a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if one fills in a small hole in a wall or a yard, adds cement or plaster to a wall, or adds water to freshly poured concrete to strengthen it (a process known as curing), he has transgressed a Torah prohibition (Shabbat 102b; 73b).

    Any activity that is forbidden on account of Boneh may not be undone, on account of the melakha of Soter (demolishing), assuming that there is a purpose to the demolition. If the act of undoing is destructive, it is rabbinically prohibited. Examples of purposeful demolition include destroying something in order to rebuild it more effectively, digging a hole in the ground in order to lay foundations, or drilling a hole in a wall in order to insert a screw (Shabbat 31b; MT 10:15).

    At times, demolition may be purposeful in itself. In such cases, even if there is no intention to build, one still transgresses Boneh. Examples of this include removing extra cement that is stuck on the floor or wall, digging a hole in order to hide things in it, or creating a hole in a wall in order to conceal things there (Shabbat 102b).

    An additional melakha connected to building is Makeh Be-patish (applying the finishing touch). For example, after completing the construction of a house, sometimes there are stones protruding from the wall. They are then often hammered down to make the wall’s surface uniform. Similarly, after completing the manufacture of a metal tool, there are sometimes rough edges remaining that are smoothed out using a hammer. Both of these actions are prohibited on account of Makeh Be-patish. Toladot of this melakha include fixing broken tools, improving tools whose manufacture is complete, and installing a window to allow air to circulate and light to enter (MT 10:16). There are different opinions in the Gemara regarding whether certain construction-related activities are prohibited on account of Boneh or on account of Makeh Be-patish (Shabbat 102b). We will not explore these types of disagreements, since the primary purpose of this work is to teach people what is permitted and prohibited rabbinically and by Torah law.

    Making cheese on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law because it causes component parts to solidify and coalesce, in the manner of construction (MT 7:6). Making snowballs or snowmen is also prohibited; but since these do not last, the prohibition is rabbinic.

    02. Boneh on the Ground, and Safeguards against it

    As we have seen, Boneh includes the prohibition of leveling the ground, whether in order to make it easier to walk on, enable chairs and benches to be placed upon it, or to build upon it. Therefore, one who levels a mound of earth or fills in a hole transgresses a Torah prohibition.

    If a yard was flooded by rain, one may not spread sand or gravel over it in order to cover the mud. Since those materials are normally left in the ground, this is considered leveling the ground, a violation of Boneh. However, one may spread straw that is designated for animal food over the mud, since he does not intend to leave it there. This is on condition that the straw is spread with a shinui, such as using the back of a shovel to distribute it. Otherwise, the act of spreading looks like a weekday activity (Eruvin 104a; SA 313:10).

    One may cover excrement or saliva with sand, since one who does this does not intend to improve the yard, but only to cover the filth (Beitza 8b; MB 313:55). Similarly, if oil spilled on the sidewalk or the floor, one may cover it with sand to prevent people from slipping. This is on condition that the sand was designated for this purpose and thus is not muktzeh (below 23:3). One may similarly spread salt on ice in order to prevent people from slipping (SSK 25:10).

    One may not sweep the yard lest he level indentations and thereby transgress a Torah prohibition. However, if the yard is floored with tiles or pavement, he may sweep it.[1]

    One who has clay stuck to his shoes should not try to rub it off against the ground, because he may end up leveling the ground (SA 302:6). Some are not worried about this possibility, and permit rubbing off the clay (Rema, Taz). One who so wishes may be lenient, but it is preferable to be stringent. In contrast, one may rub off the clay against a grate, tiles, or stones even le-khatĥila (MB 302:28).

    One should not rub saliva that is on the ground into the dirt with one’s shoes, to avoid leveling the ground. If one finds the saliva disgusting, he may step on it in the natural course of his walking, as long as his intention is not to spread it and level the ground (SA 316:11).

    One may not play marbles on the ground lest he level the ground so that the marbles roll smoothly. Similarly, one may not play any game on the ground that requires completely flat ground, lest he end up leveling it. Even if the ground is paved, one may not play there, as there is a concern that one might then end up playing on unpaved ground (SA 338:5 and MB ad loc. 20; MB 308:158). However, one may play on the floor inside one’s home; since all homes today have flooring, we are not worried that, as a result of playing there, anyone will end up playing outside on unpaved ground (SSK 16:5).

    Children may play in a sandbox containing fine, dry sand, for as long as the sand is dry, the sand will pour back into any indentations made. However, if the sand is wet enough to make holes in it, one may not to play with it (MB 308:143). Wetting the sand is also forbidden, as it constitutes Lash (MB 321:50). If the sand has not been designated for play it is muktzeh, and thus playing with it is forbidden (SA 308:38; MB ad loc. 144).


    [1]. Rif maintains that one may sweep the unfloored ground because one will not necessarily level the ground, and thus if one does so it is unintentional, a davar she-eino mitkaven. Rambam permits sweeping an area that is floored. However, if it is unfloored, he is concerned that one might intend to level the ground. Rosh maintains that even a floored area may not be swept because one may come to sweep an unfloored area and level the ground. SA 337:2 rules in accordance with Rambam, while Rema follows Rosh. However, BHL s.v. “ve-yesh” states that in a place where all homes have flooring, Rosh’s prohibition does not apply. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach adds that a paved area outside a house, even if it is not covered by a roof, is considered part of the house, and even the Rema would permit sweeping such an area (SSK ch. 23 n. 10). See below, ch. 23 n. 14 and Harĥavot 23:14:6 regarding why there is no problem of muktzeh when sweeping dust from the floor.

    03. Attaching Things to a House or the Ground

    Permanently affixing something useful to a house or the ground violates the Torah prohibition of Boneh. Removing such fixtures violates the Torah prohibition of Soter. This is the case even if the attachment is not tight and the objects can easily be detached and reattached, as is the case with hinged or sliding windows or doors. Since these are permanently attached to the house, they become part of it, and installing them or removing them is a transgression of a Torah prohibition. Therefore, even if a room is hot, one may not remove a window from the wall or from its frame (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:9; MB ad loc. 39). Similarly, one may not attach or detach a filter that is screwed onto a faucet, rubber pipes attached to the sink, or light bulbs screwed into their sockets, since their attachment to the house is permanent. Similarly, pounding a nail into the wall or gluing a hook to the wall violates a Torah prohibition, since these additions are permanent (Shabbat 103a; MB 314:8).

    One may similarly not attach curtain hooks to a curtain track or the curtains themselves to the hooks on the track. Fastening a curtain rod to brackets that protrude from the wall is also prohibited. Even though all these attachments are loose, since the items are being attached to the building, these actions are prohibited by Torah law. If the rod is not truly attached to the brackets, but rather simply rests upon or inside them and can move back and forth easily, then the rod may be placed on the brackets. In such a case, one may also thread the loops at the top of the curtain through the rod.

    If the object being attached to the house or the ground will not last long, the prohibition is rabbinic. For example, it is only rabbinically forbidden to attach a vacuum hook to a wall, since its suction cup will not keep the hook anchored for long.

    When something may not be attached to the ground or a house, it is also forbidden to tighten its existing attachment. Therefore, one may not tighten the loose screws of a sink, door handle, or closet handle.

    In contrast, objects that are not really attached and do not become part of the house may be put up or taken down. For example, one may hang a picture on a nail, because the picture is not considered part of the wall. If a window breaks and cold wind is blowing through the house, the broken window may be covered with cloth to keep out the wind. This is because the cloth does not become part of the wall, but is placed there only temporarily (MB 313:3 and 315:7; SSK 23:41 and 23:44). Similarly, one may stick papers to a refrigerator using magnets, because the magnets are not considered part of the refrigerator. For the same reason, one may hang a colander over the lip of the sink. Inserting a plug in a socket or removing it is also not considered Boneh or Soter, because the plug is not considered part of the house.[2]

    It is self-evident that one may open and close doors, windows, and faucets. This is the case even when the door is not usually opened, or when the faucet in question is the water main, which is rarely shut off. Since they remain attached to the building and this type of opening or closing is the way they are normally used, it is not considered Boneh or Soter. Similarly, one may open and close a porch’s sliding roof that is attached with hinges or that slides on a track, as it is considered the same as a window (Rema 626:3).

    It is prohibited by Torah law to use a nail or a screw to reattach a door handle that has fallen off. Reattaching it without a nail or a screw in a way that joins the handles of both sides of the door to each other is rabbinically prohibited, since the attachment is only temporary. In contrast, one may insert one of the two handles into the door without using nails or screws. This is not considered an attachment at all, since the handle is just resting there with nothing to support it. However, there is still a concern that one might forget that it is Shabbat and decide to reattach it properly with nails. Therefore, the door handle should be replaced awkwardly, tilted upward or downward, so there is no concern that anyone will tighten the connection. A handle that has begun to come loose from its attachment to the corresponding handle may not be pushed back into place.[3]


    [2]. Some are stringent in the case of a plug that is plugged or unplugged only infrequently, such as a refrigerator plug (Ĥut Shani 36:1). However, it would seem that all plugs should be treated in the same way, since plugs in general are plugged and unplugged frequently. Furthermore, their primary connection is to the electrical appliance, and thus they are not considered part of the wall. (See SSK 13:33, n. 112; Orĥot Shabbat 8:17; Menuĥat Ahava 1:24:20.) However, because a plug is muktzeh, it should be grasped using a shinui.

    [3]. If the handle had already fallen off multiple times before Shabbat, and everyone is accustomed to using the door with only one of the two handles attached, one may push that one handle back into its normal place, with no awkwardness (Menuĥat Ahava vol. 3 ch. 23 n. 71). The permissive rationale of attaching it awkwardly is cited in Ĥut Shani 36:4:7. When it is impossible to insert even one handle, one may open the door with the help of a screwdriver or the like (SSK 23:37). Water tanks, septic tanks, and electrical or telephone junction panels boxes are considered part of the building, and thus it is rabbinically prohibited to place a permanent cover on such a structure or to open such a cover. If the tank’s cover has a handle, one may open and close it on Shabbat (Shabbat 126b; SA 308:10; MB ad loc. 42; SSK ch. 23 n. 146).

    04. Making a Tent (Ohel)

    Making an ohel is a tolada of Boneh. In contrast to the melakha of Boneh, which involves attaching different components, such as stone, wood, cement, and metal, to construct a house or implement, making an ohel does not involve the attachment of various components but the erection of something that separates between different areas. The roof of a tent serves as a barrier between the sky and those who are inside the tent, protecting them from the elements. Therefore, pitching a tent on Shabbat using sheets or other things that are not considered construction materials is prohibited by Torah law if the tent is stable and will last for a long time (at least eight days). This is the case even if one tied no knots and used no screws or nails, but only loops and pegs. Even if he only made a roof or a wall, or even simply added a tefaĥ to an existing roof or wall, he has transgressed a Torah prohibition (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav 315:8; MB ad loc. 1; SHT ad loc. 6).

    The Torah prohibition is limited to a permanent, durable ohel. The Sages further forbid making a temporary ohel. Therefore, one may not spread a curtain or netting over a bed, whether for privacy or for protection against insects.

    Since the critical part of an ohel is the roof, one may not make any sort of temporary roof to protect a person beneath it, even if it is only a tefaĥ wide. But one may put up a temporary meĥitza. For example, one may erect a meĥitza between men and women attending a Torah lecture. However, one may not erect a meĥitza that serves to render something halakhically permitted (meĥitza ha-materet) even on a temporary basis. For example, if a sukka has only two walls, a third wall may not be erected, even if it is temporary, since erecting this meĥitza renders the sukka kosher. Similarly, one may not erect a temporary meĥitza in order to close a gap in an eruv, because this renders the eruv kosher (SA 315:1; below 29:8).

    The rabbinic prohibition of making a temporary ohel is limited to the case of a new ohel, but one may make a temporary addition to a pre-existing ohel. Therefore, one who wishes to spread an awning in his garden on Shabbat to protect himself from the sun should make sure to spread it at least a tefaĥ before Shabbat. He may then extend it fully on Shabbat. Similarly, if the beginning of a permanent roof is already in place, one may put up an awning to serve as a temporary continuation of the roof. One may also take down whatever was temporarily added on Shabbat (SA 315:2; MB ad loc. 38).

    Even if no one had actually begun to spread out the awning before Shabbat, but it contains a pull-string that is designed for extending it, this string is considered the beginning of the extension, and thus one may complete the extension of the awning on Shabbat (MB 315:37).

    A porch’s sliding roof that is attached with hinges or that slides on a track may be opened and closed on Shabbat. This is because it is not considered an ohel, but rather is comparable to opening and closing a door (Rema 626:3). Similarly, one may open a patio umbrella that is permanently affixed in the yard.

    The hinged hood or canopy of a baby carriage or stroller may be opened and closed on Shabbat. Furthermore, since it may be opened, it is considered the beginning of an ohel, and one may add to it as well. Thus, if one wishes to protect more of the carriage by extending the hood using a cloth diaper or a plastic sheet, he may do so (SSK 24:13).

    05. Additional Laws Pertaining Ohel

    As we have seen, making even a temporary ohel is rabbinically prohibited. Included in this prohibition is placing a wide board or a sheet across vertical supports to protect oneself from the elements. However, when the supports are not permanent, this can be permitted if the ohel is erected in a manner that differs significantly from the normal way of doing it. The Sages forbade putting up a temporary ohel in the usual order – first putting up the walls or supports, and only then putting up the roof. However, if the order is reversed, the Sages permit one to put up a temporary ohel. Thus, if the roof is first held up in the air and then walls or supports are placed underneath it, this would be permitted. Usually a second person is necessary in order to erect a tent in this way (Shabbat 43b; SA 311:6; Bi’ur Ha-Gra ad loc.).

    These rules apply to children’s games as well. Children who are of an age where they can understand the laws of Shabbat may not spread blankets over chairs in order to create a tent in which to play, but they may hold the blanket in the air and then place chairs underneath it. Similarly, they may not use interlocking toy bricks (like Lego) to build a house or garage whose inside area is a square tefaĥ or more, but they may hold the roof up and then attach the walls from underneath.

    Just as one may not put up a temporary ohel, one may not take one down. Just as one may put up a temporary ohel if he changes the order of construction, so too he may take one down if he changes the order. The walls must be removed first, and only afterward the roof (SSK 24:22).

    Even if there is no intention to erect an ohel in order to take shelter under it, nevertheless, if in actuality one makes something in the form of an ohel and the space underneath serves a purpose, it may not be erected in that form. For example, one may not take two barrels of wine and place a third one across the top. Since it is necessary to have airflow between the barrels so that the wine will not get overheated and spoil, this structure is considered a temporary ohel: the two barrels are considered walls, and the barrel atop them is considered a roof. However, the Sages permit doing so if the order is reversed; one person may hold up the top barrel while someone else slips the other two barrels underneath.

    One may place a tabletop on legs as long as each leg is less than a tefaĥ wide. In such a case, the legs are not considered meĥitzot, and one may set the legs first and then place the tabletop on top of them. If each of the legs is a tefaĥ wide, they are considered meĥitzot. If one wishes to set up such a table, he must hold the tabletop in the air and then have someone else slip the legs underneath it.[4] In contrast, when opening a folding crib, one may place the board and mattress normally, as there are no walls beneath them and there is no purpose served by the space underneath them.

    One may open a baby carriage or stroller, a folding table, a folding chair, a cot, or a playpen on Shabbat because the entire structure is already completed and connected before Shabbat. The only part that is done on Shabbat is opening it (SA 315:5).

    One may not cover a very large barrel (whose diameter is close to a meter), as this resembles making an ohel if a tefaĥ of open space remains (Shabbat 139b; SA 315:13). However, if the cover of the barrel has a handle on it, then it is clear that this is simply the cover of a receptacle and not the roof of a tent, and thus one may place it on top of the barrel (SSK ch. 24 n. 72). One may overturn a large pot and use it to cover food and protect it from the sun or insects, because overturning a pot is not considered making an ohel. Similarly, one may overturn a recliner or couch even though space is created underneath it, because overturning furniture is not considered making an ohel (BHL 315:5, s.v. “kisei”).

    Many maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to put on a hat with a hard brim a tefaĥ wide, because doing so is considered making a temporary ohel. This is despite the fact that one may use a hand fan to shield himself from the sun and hold a talit horizontally over one who is called up to the Torah in honor of his marriage. Nevertheless, a hat that remains on one’s head without moving is more similar to a temporary ohel (Shabbat 138b; Rabbeinu Ĥananel; Rambam; SA 301:40). The custom, though, is to be lenient and to allow one to wear a black hat, since it is worn primarily for the sake of honor and not to provide shade. It is also possible that the brims of today’s hats are not considered hard (MB 301:151). Alternatively, perhaps the custom relies on Rashi, who maintains that a hat is never comparable to an ohel; the only concern is that if one’s hat is blown off, people might chase after it and end up carrying it.

    The universal custom is to forbid using an umbrella on Shabbat because it resembles an ohel (see BHL 315:8, s.v. “tefaĥ”; SSK 24:15).


    [4]. According to Rabbeinu Tam, Rosh, Smak, and Hagahot Maimoniyot, if the meĥitzot (that is, legs that are more than a tefaĥ wide) were set up before Shabbat, it is not forbidden to place the tabletop on them. If the legs were set up on Shabbat, then one may not place the tabletop on them even if the space underneath is not being used. However, according to Rashba, Ran, and Magid Mishneh, even when the legs are narrower than a tefaĥ, if the space underneath is needed then one may not place the tabletop on them. According to Tosafot (as quoted by Rashba) and Tur, two conditions must be met in order for the placement to be prohibited: 1) the meĥitzot must be put into place on Shabbat; and 2) the space underneath must serve a purpose. Since this law is rabbinic, SA 315:3 follows this lenient position. Therefore, if the legs are less than a tefaĥ wide, even if the space underneath it is used, for example, as a place for people to put their feet, one may set the table up in the usual way. Some, however, beautify Shabbat by changing the order of the setup even in this case, as explained in Harĥavot.

    06. Permitted and Prohibited Implements

    Just as Boneh and Soter apply to building or demolishing a house, the ground, or an ohel, they also apply to building or demolishing an implement.[5] Therefore, one may not insert the handle of a hammer into the hammer head or a broom handle into the broom shaft. A permanent insertion is prohibited by Torah law, while a temporary insertion is forbidden rabbinically. Similarly, it is prohibited by Torah law to put together a bed or chair using nails, screws, or glue, since such attachments are full and permanent. Fixing a chair leg or table leg that has fallen off is also forbidden, as is attaching or removing a rubber chair tip or table tip (a rubber protector that goes underneath a chair leg or table leg).

    If there is a possibility that people will forget it is Shabbat and end up fixing the implement, the Sages forbid moving it. For example, if a leg falls off a chair or table, one may not move the item and prop it up on another piece of furniture, because someone might see it and decide to repair it. However, if the implement would be complicated to fix, or if it had already been used in this manner before Shabbat, there is no concern that he will forget and repair it on Shabbat, so it may be moved (SA 313:8; Rema 308:16; MB ad loc. 69; SSK 20:44).

    One may use implements on Shabbat whose normal usage involves screwing or unscrewing. Thus, one may screw a lid on a jar, salt shaker, or pressure cooker, put on jewelry whose ends screw together, or look through binoculars that are focused by turning a knob. Since this is the normal way of using these devices, screwing and unscrewing them is not considered a melakha. However, one may not unscrew something if it unusual to do so. For example, one may not unscrew the knob of a pot cover (SHT 313:32; MA states that the prohibition is by Torah law, while Taz maintains that it is rabbinic).

    Most poskim allow adjusting the height of a lectern (“shtender”) by loosening a knob and tightening it at the desired height, as this is the normal usage and the lectern remains usable at every stage of the adjustment (Orĥot Shabbat 8:9 citing R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv; Yalkut Yosef 314:2).

    One may adjust a baby carriage or stroller with hinges or latches from an upright position to a horizontal one and vice versa. However, if doing so involves removing screws that hold the seat in position and then screwing them back in, it is forbidden because it entails making a strong attachment that is adjusted only infrequently (SSK 28:50).


    [5]. Beitza 22a states that “Beit Shammai maintains that Boneh and Soter apply to kelim, while Beit Hillel maintains that Boneh and Soter do not apply to kelim.” The halakha follows Beit Hillel, as Rava rules in Shabbat 122b. However, we find in Shabbat 102b that according to Rav, one may not insert the wooden handle into the metal blade of a scythe as it constitutes Boneh. Tosafot ad loc. (s.v. “hai”) explain that in a case of bona fide assembly, Boneh and Soter apply to implements as well. The statement that Boneh does not apply to implements refers to loose attachments, as I wrote in the main text. This is also the opinion of Smag, Rosh, and Tur. Ramban, Rashba, and Ritva (on Shabbat 102b) maintain that one may not build an implement in its entirety because of Boneh, but adding onto an implement is prohibited because of Makeh Be-fatish. Rashi Shabbat 74b and Yere’im maintain that even creating an implement is prohibited on account of Makeh Be-fatish, not Boneh. The practical significance of this halakhic disagreement is when it comes to Soter. If the prohibition is on account of Makeh Be-fatish, then undoing one’s actions is not prohibited by Torah law, as Soter is defined as undoing an act of Boneh. Therefore, if undoing what was done to an implement is necessary for Shabbat, according to Ramban and those who follow his approach one may do so, while according to Rashi and those who follow his approach it would even be permitted to take the entire implement apart. However, according to Tosafot and Rosh, this would be forbidden even for a Shabbat need. Only when dealing with a low-quality implement (such as a mustekei – a barrel made of an inferior material) would it be permissible to take it apart for a Shabbat need, as explained below in section 11. SA 314:1 rules in accordance with Tosafot and Rosh. However, in 314:7, in the context of asking a non-Jew to break a vessel for a Shabbat need, it is lenient in accordance with Rashi and those who follow him. The justification for this leniency is that two mitigating factors are involved: asking a non-Jew to do melakha on Shabbat (which is only a rabbinic prohibition) and a Shabbat need (for example, if the fruits in the vessel are otherwise inaccessible). See Menuĥat Ahava 3:23:32. Rambam (MT 10:13) follows Tosafot, maintaining that Boneh applies to implements. On the other hand, he permits breaking a barrel to get to the food inside it, even if the barrel is not considered a mustekei (MT 23:2). See Kaf Ha-ĥayim 314:5.

    07. Permissible Assembly and Disassembly of Implements

    There is a difference between attaching things to a house and attaching things to an implement. One may not add anything to (or remove anything from) a house even if it is attached loosely, since the house is considered permanent. For example, one may not install a window on its hinges or remove it from its hinges. Although it is attached loosely and it is easy to make or break this attachment, it is forbidden because the window is part of the house. Note that if a wardrobe or free-standing closet has a volume of forty se’ah (three cubic amot, or just over ten cubic feet) it has the same status as a house. Thus, one may not connect anything to a large wardrobe, even loosely (Rema 314:1).

    In contrast, devices, which are less permanent, may be assembled using temporary attachments that do not require craftsmanship or strength. Therefore, one may assemble and disassemble a portable cot of the type travelers use, which can be assembled and disassembled daily, and which is loosely attached (Shabbat 47a-b; SA 313:6). Similarly, one may remove the door of an implement that is easily assembled and disassembled and that turns easily on its hinges. Technically, one should be permitted to place this door on its hinges as well. However if the hinge is attached to the implement with nails or screws, the Sages forbid it out of concern lest one tighten the attachment and thereby transgress a Torah prohibition. Only if nothing can be tightened, such as if the hinge is part of the implement, may the door then be attached to the implement (Shabbat 122b; SA 308:9).

    The general principle here is that if an implement is normally assembled with a firm attachment, the Sages forbid even attaching it loosely. They were concerned that one might forget and attach it firmly, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. However, if an implement is assembled with temporary and easy attachments, there is no reason to fear that one will attach it firmly and thus transgress a Torah prohibition, and it may be assembled and disassembled. Therefore, one may extend a table by adding a leaf designed for this purpose, and one may remove a leaf as well, since the leaves are clearly temporary. Similarly, the feeding tray on a child’s high chair, which is constantly attached and detached, may be used freely on Shabbat, since the attachment is loose.

    Based on this, many maintain that the prohibitions of Boneh and Soter do not apply to building with interlocking toy bricks (like Lego) and the like, since the pieces are attached to each other temporarily and are designed to be disassembled (Tzitz Eliezer 13:31; Yeĥaveh Da’at 2:55; but SSK 16:19 is stringent).

    Some Aĥaronim maintain that it is rabbinically forbidden to make paper airplanes or boats or to fold napkins into special shapes because this resembles Boneh (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK 11:41; 16:21). Others permit this on the basis that the prohibition of Boneh does not apply to things that are temporary and will soon be disassembled (Rivevot Ephraim 1:223:8 quoting R. Moshe Feinstein). One who is lenient has an opinion to rely on, and one who is stringent is commendable. Children may be lenient even le-khatĥila (see Harĥavot).

    08. Fixing Broken Implements

    Some items are sturdily assembled initially but loosen over time. If people are used to using these items in their loosened state, it is not prohibited to assemble or disassemble them. As noted, assembling implements loosely is not considered Boneh. Furthermore, since people are used to using them this way, we are not concerned that they will end up fixing them with nails or glue (see Rema 308:16; SA 313:6).

    Thus, if a wheel falls off a baby’s crib and people are comfortable using the crib after replacing the wheel loosely, it may be replaced. Similarly, rubber chair tips and table tips may be replaced if they are only loosely attached. This is also the case if the leg of a child’s doll has come off: if the leg is attached to the doll tightly, it may not be snapped back into place, but if it is connected loosely, it may be replaced.

    If a temple fell off a pair of glasses, it may not be screwed back into place, since generally it is screwed on tightly. One may not even attach it loosely, because one may forget and tighten it, thus transgressing a Torah prohibition. However, if the screw is lost, there is no longer a concern that anyone will tighten it. Thus, one may reattach the temple using a safety pin, as this is a weak attachment that is permitted for implements (Shulĥan Shlomo 314:11:2).

    If a lens fell out of the glasses’ frame and replacing it requires screwing it back in, it may not be replaced at all, even if the screw is left loose. This is because we are concerned that later on one will forget and tighten it. But if there is no screw, but rather the frame has expanded a bit so that the lens sometimes falls out, then the lens may be replaced in the frame. We are not concerned that one will permanently reattach it, as that would require expertise (Menuĥat Ahava 3:23:35; Orĥot Shabbat 8:49-50).

    One may not straighten a spoon, knife, or glasses temple on Shabbat by hand, because this is considered Makeh Be-fatish (MA 340:11; MB 509:1, 7; see Harĥavot).

    The prohibition of Boneh does not apply to compressing a spring on a toy car so that the car will move forward. One may do so as long as the car does not make noise or light up (see SSK 16:14).

    One may inflate an air mattress, air pillow, or rubber ball that had been previously inflated. Since this is permissible, it may be done in the usual fashion, using a manual pump. However, one may not inflate these items for the first time on Shabbat, because many poskim maintain that inflating them for the first time makes them into viable implements for the first time, which is prohibited. One may not blow up a balloon even if it had previously been inflated, lest one tie a knot at the bottom. However, if the balloon is sealed with a valve instead of a knot, and it had previously been inflated, it may be inflated on Shabbat (SSK 15:89; 16:7; 34:24).

    09. Cleaning the Floor and Making Repairs

    If the floor is dirty, and leaving it in such a state dishonors Shabbat, one may sweep the floor. A yard, though, may not be swept, because one may end up leveling the ground and thus transgressing Boneh (see section 2 above, n. 1).

    In contrast, one may not wash the floor, since leaving the floor unwashed does not dishonor Shabbat as leaving it unswept does, and there is concern that one who washed an area with a hard floor will end up washing a dirt floor as well, which would involve leveling the ground and thus transgressing Boneh (SA 337:3; MB ad loc. 3). However, if water spilled on the floor, one may remove the water using a squeegee (SSK 23:7).

    If a particular spot on the floor has become especially filthy, for example, if juice spilled on it, one may pour a bit of water on it and then either wipe it away with a squeegee or soak it up with something that would not normally be wrung out (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 23 n. 30; Yalkut Yosef 337:2). If the entire floor is filthy, one who is lenient and pours water on it and wipes it away with a squeegee has an opinion upon which to rely (Or Le-Tziyon 43:8).

    If clumps of grass are blocking a drainage pipe, causing water to back up onto the roof and leak into the house, the Sages permit stepping on the clump to break up and remove the blockage. Normally, even fixing something with a shinui is rabbinically prohibited, but in this case, where otherwise a loss will be incurred, the Sages permit (Ketubot 60a; SA 336:9).

    Based on this, some prohibit unclogging a sink using a plunger. They maintain that the Sages permit removing blockages only if a shinui is used, but using a plunger to break up a blockage is the normal way to deal with this problem. Thus it is forbidden by Torah law, and even in a time of need one may not be lenient (Yabi’a Omer 5:33; R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv). In contrast, others permit this, maintaining that a blockage that can be broken up using a plunger is not a total blockage, and thus breaking it up is not considered a true repair. Furthermore, the improvement that is made is not to the pipe itself. Rather, one is simply dislodging the sludge that clogged it (Minĥat Yitzĥak 5:75; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK 12:18; Menuĥat Ahava 3:24:29). In practice, in a case of need, it is proper for two people to hold the plunger and unclog the drain together. This way, even according to the stringent opinion, the prohibition would only be rabbinic; and when in doubt about a rabbinic mitzva, the halakha follows the lenient position. (See above 9:3 and n. 1.)

    All agree that one may not remove a blockage using professional equipment like a plumber’s snake. It is also forbidden by Torah law to take apart the pipe under the sink in order to empty it of sludge and then reassemble it.

    One may remove garbage that accumulates in the sink strainer. It is not necessary to do this with a shinui, because this action does not fix anything; one is simply removing filth (SA 308:34; SSK 12:17; below 22:12).

    One may not oil a door’s squeaky hinge or a baby carriage’s wheel, as this is considered a repair (SSK 23:43; 28:53). If pantyhose start to tear (or “run”), one may not put nail polish or soap at the tip of the run to prevent further ripping, because this reinforces the hose (SSK 15:77).

    10. Meĥatekh

    The melakha of Meĥatekh is instrumental in transforming raw material into houses, implements, clothing, etc. For example, if one wishes to make leather clothing, he must first cut the leather to the right size. If one wishes to build a house, he must cut the stones, metal, and panels to the right size. If one wishes to install a window, he must cut the glass to the right size. The general principle is that one who cuts something to a specific size on Shabbat transgresses the Torah prohibition of Meĥatekh. Similarly, it is forbidden by Torah law to cut off the soft part of feathers in order to make pillows and blankets, since one must cut precisely between the hard and soft sections (Shabbat 74b). This is the distinction between Meĥatekh and Kore’a: the primary purpose of Kore’a is to separate two distinct parts, whereas the primary purpose of Meĥatekh is to cut with precision in order to create something new.

    The melakha of Meĥatekh does not apply to foods. Therefore one may cut a cake into equal-sized pieces. Similarly, one may cut grooves into an orange in order to peel it. Pills and suppositories used by sick people are also considered food for this purpose, and may be cut where scored (SSK 33:4).

    Items that animals would consume are considered food and thus not subject to Meĥatekh. Therefore, one may use a knife to cut straw or hay to use as a toothpick. However, one may not fashion a toothpick from hard wood. Since it is inedible to animals, cutting it to size constitutes Meĥatekh: if by means of a tool, one violates a Torah prohibition, and if by hand, which is considered a shinui, a rabbinic prohibition (Beitza 33a-b; MT 11:7; SA 322:4; MB 322:13, 18).

    One may take fragrant branches of hard wood that were harvested before Shabbat and trim or rub them so that their aroma spreads. One may also break them into smaller pieces so that more people can smell them. Even though the branches are hard and animals would not eat them, one may break them, since the size of the pieces does not matter. One may only do so on condition that they are broken by hand. If he uses a tool, we are concerned that he will forget and fashion a toothpick, thus transgressing Torah law (Beitza, loc. cit.; SA 322:5; MB ad loc. 17-18; Rema 336:8).

    11. Opening Cans

    One may open cans on Shabbat in order to eat the food inside them. Since cans are disposable and meant for single use, they are not considered true receptacles and are more akin to shells that are broken to get at the nut within.

    Similarly, we read in the Mishna: “One may break a barrel in order to eat the dried figs inside it, as long as he does not intend to create a receptacle” (Shabbat 146a). Many explain that this mishna refers to a mustekei, an inferior sort of barrel meant for a single use. Because the barrel was unimportant, it was secondary to the food inside it, just as a nutshell is secondary to the nut inside it. Thus, one may break the barrel in order to eat its figs. They would not break the barrel in a way that scatters the figs; rather they would break off the top, and the figs would remain within for several days, until they were all eaten. The Sages did make one condition: “As long as he does not intend to create a receptacle.” If one makes a neat opening and plans to reuse the barrel to store other things, then he is truly creating a receptacle when he opens it, and is thus transgressing (SA 314:1).

    The same applies to cans. One may open them on Shabbat if one plans to eat their contents, even if it will take several days to finish the food. Once the food is finished, the can is thrown out; therefore it is considered unimportant and may be opened on Shabbat. However, one who intends to reuse the can for other items may not open the can on Shabbat, since he is creating an opening and rendering it usable, which amounts to creating a receptacle.

    Some are stringent and do not open cans on Shabbat even when they intend to throw them out. Since the can is in fact capable of storing additional items, creating an opening for it essentially makes it into a receptacle (Ĥazon Ish 51:11). However, in practice the halakha follows the lenient position. Since we are dealing with cans and containers that are designed to be disposable, it is not forbidden to open them. Those who wish to be stringent should open cans before Shabbat. If they need to open a can on Shabbat, they should immediately empty it of its contents.[6]


    [6]. Along the same lines as the dispensation quoted in the mishna above, a beraita cites R. Shimon b. Gamliel as stating: “One may bring a barrel of wine and chop off the top with a sword” (Shabbat 146a). This is because the person does not intend to make a neat opening. He simply wants to get to the wine. This is the ruling of SA 314:1 and 314:6. However, Rishonim disagree regarding the type of barrel to which the dispensation applies. Tosafot and Rosh understand that the dispensation refers to a mustekei barrel, which broke and was then put back together using tar. In contrast, Ran maintains that even a high-quality barrel may be broken in order to reach the food inside it. This would also seem to be the opinion of Rambam (MT 23:2). SA 314:1 is stringent like Tosafot and Rosh. In any event, even according to the more stringent opinion, today’s cans would not be considered better than the mustekei barrels of the Talmud, which were meant to be used only once. For example, the mustekei barrel that was broken open could not be reused. In order to store dried figs or wine in the barrel, its top would have to be reattached.Ĥazon Ish 51:11 is concerned that a can becomes a receptacle upon being opened. If so, opening it is not breaking it but rather creating a receptacle (kli), because it can now be used repeatedly. However, many maintain that the can was already a kli prior to being opened, as in fact it preserved the food within it (Tehila Le-David 314:12). Opening it thus destroys it, as it can no longer be used. Even if, 60 years ago, many people used cans to store nails and the like, today almost no one does this (Or Le-Tziyon 1:24). Those who are lenient here include R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (SSK 9:3 and Shulĥan Shlomo 314:5); Minĥat Yitzĥak 4:82; R. Ovadia Yosef (Halikhot Olam vol. 4, p. 250); and R. Mordechai Eliyahu. However, in order to avoid the problem raised by Ĥazon Ish that one might be creating a receptacle, some suggest puncturing the bottom of a can before opening it. Then, when it is opened, it does not become a receptacle because there is a hole in the bottom (SSK 9:3). On the other hand, many who follow Ĥazon Ish feel that one may not even make this first hole (Minĥat Ish 17:3). Additionally, those who feel one may open a can should not make the hole because it is a destructive act, which is rabbinically forbidden. Moreover, sometimes puncturing the can may cause a violation of Borer. Thus, it is preferable to open a can in the normal way. One who wishes to comply with the stringent opinion as well should open cans before Shabbat, or at least empty them out immediately after opening them.

    12. Opening Bags and Wrappers

    Many dairy products are sold in plastic containers. One may peel the cover of such a plastic container. Similarly, packages of wafers and chocolate bars may be opened. Since the wrapper is meant to be disposable, it is secondary to the food inside it, just as an orange peel is secondary to the orange and may be removed in order to eat the orange.

    One may make a hole in the top of a bag of milk or juice in order to pour out the liquid, open the top of a bag of sugar that is glued shut, and rip open bags of candies or other foods.

    Similarly, we find that the Sages permitted cutting open ĥotalot (palm leaves used to protect unripe dates) on Shabbat. They permitted this because these leaves lacked importance, as they were considered entirely secondary to the dates inside them, similar to an orange peel. (Shabbat 146a; Kol Bo; SA 314:8).

    Some are stringent and do not open bags or packages if the food will remain inside for a while, as is the case with a bag of sugar. They maintain that one who makes a neat opening is not ruining the bag, but rather is creating a receptacle (Ĥazon Ish 51:10). According to this approach, the only way to open such bags is to tear them apart entirely and transfer their contents to a different container.

    In practice the halakha follows the lenient position, because these bags have no importance and are thrown out after the food they contain is finished. Therefore, one may open them in whatever way enables easy removal of their contents, and he may use them until the food inside is used up.[7]

    It should also be mentioned that when opening these bags, one should try not to tear any letters. However, if necessary, one may open the bag even if it is clear that doing so will tear letters (as explained below, 18:3).

    Similarly, one may open packages that contain items that are necessary for Shabbat, such as tissues and diapers. It is proper to open them more messily than one would during the week. Those who follow the stringent opinion would need to destroy the packaging so that it can no longer hold its original contents. The halakha is in accordance with those who are lenient.[8]


    [7]. The dispensation to tear ĥotalot (Shabbat 146a) is not limited, so even if the opening allows the dates to be removed easily, there is no prohibition. Even in the case of a mustekei barrel (Shabbat 146a; Beitza 33b), one may make an opening through which the contents can be removed over the course of a few days, on condition that there is no possibility that it is a neat opening, which would allow the barrel to be used repeatedly. Therefore, the mishna in Shabbat allows making an opening in the top of a barrel even if it is made to pour out wine. Only if the hole is made in the side of the barrel, where it is clear that the opening is meant to be used multiple times, is it forbidden (Shabbat 146a). Indeed, this is the ruling of SA 314:6. The reasoning behind all these permissive rulings is that since we are dealing with packaging that is meant to be used only once, the container is secondary to the food within it. Thus, it is comparable to the peel of a fruit, which may be cut up and removed with no limitations. Even when the package is large and it will take days to finish up what is inside, as is the case with a milk carton or a bag of sugar, there is no prohibition, as the Sages permitted opening a wine barrel or ĥotalot even though they were not immediately emptied out. (This is also implied in m. Kelim 16:5, according to the explanation of Rash.) It is only if a neat hole is made in the package, in order to allow multiple uses after the current contents of the package are finished, that there is a prohibition. In contrast, when dealing with containers of milk, packages of sugar, and the like, it would never dawn on anyone to reuse them, so there is no issue of Boneh or Kore’a when opening them. Those who are stringent maintain that the dispensation to make an opening is limited to something that is not part of the packaging itself but only adheres to it, like the lid of a barrel; but if one makes a neat opening in the package itself to pour the milk or measure out the sugar, it is like making a receptacle. However, the prohibition is only rabbinic, since the opening only serves for the contents’ removal, not their reinsertion (Ĥazon Ish 51:10; see Orĥot Shabbat 12:6). They are also concerned about Kore’a when opening a bag of sugar, since many maintain that tearing is prohibited if it serves a constructive purpose. However, we have already seen that the law pertaining to a package of food is the same as that of ĥotalot, where the prohibition of Kore’a is completely irrelevant. Some of the lenient opinions concede that ideally one should comply with the stringent position and open packages before Shabbat. If it is necessary to open a bag of milk on Shabbat, le-khatĥila it is better to make a smaller opening than one normally would during the week or to tear the plastic with one’s teeth, so that it is clear that one does not mean to make a neat opening. This way, even some of the stringent opinions would concede that it is permissible.

    [8]. The law of opening packages of clothing and the like is the same as that of packages of food (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Shulĥan Shlomo 314:7:6). Just as one may use packages of food until their contents have been finished, so too when opening packages of tissues or diapers he may use the packages until their contents have been finished. Those who are stringent require destroying the packaging entirely (Minĥat Ish 17:22; Orĥot Shabbat 12:23). According to Yalkut Yosef 314 n. 22, one should not rip the wrapping paper off a book or picture, because those who are lenient only permit tearing a package when the item is needed for Shabbat, and that is not the case here. It would seem in practice that one may do so if there is a need. However, MB 340:41 and BHL s.v. “ha-niyar” prohibit opening a letter even if there is a great need. On the other hand, Maharil, MA 519:4, and Taz ad loc. 5 permit it. Since the prohibition is rabbinic and there is a need, one may be lenient.

    13. Opening Bottles

    Poskim disagree about whether one may open a wine bottle that has a metal screw cap. Some prohibit opening it, maintaining that before the bottle is opened, the cap is simply a cover, but after it is opened and separated from the little metal rim that is left behind on the bottle, it becomes an implement, because it has become a screw cap that aids in opening and closing the bottle (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach).

    However, most poskim are not concerned about opening such a cap. They maintain that even before it is opened it is already considered a bottle cap. Opening it does not create a new entity. Separating the metal rim from the cap is comparable to cracking open a nutshell in order to eat the nut. Additionally, the one who opens the bottle has no intention of making an implement; he just wants to open the bottle. Even though it happens to be that a screw cap is created, there is no prohibition.

    Although one who wishes may be lenient may do so, and there are many who are lenient in practice, le-khatĥila it is preferable to defer to the stringent opinion and open such a bottle before Shabbat. An additional solution is to keep around old bottle caps and then immediately throw out the new cap after opening a bottle on Shabbat. Since in this case there is no intention to use the bottle cap that was opened on Shabbat, even those who are stringent would concede that one may open it.

    If no old bottle cap is available and a bottle was not opened before Shabbat, another solution for those who are stringent is to puncture the bottle cap before opening it. This effectively ruins the bottle cap so that after it is opened it is not considered an implement (SSK 9:18). According to those who are lenient, it is preferable to open the cap without puncturing it.

    Even most of those who are stringent regarding a metal bottle cap maintain that a plastic cap may be opened, as this is considered a bottle cap even before it is opened. Thus, opening a plastic bottle cap does not make it an implement (SSK 9:21). This is the custom. One may also use a corkscrew to remove a cork on Shabbat.[9]


    [9]. The stringent opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach regarding the removal of metal bottle caps is quoted in Shulĥan Shlomo (314:9:4-5). It is also recorded in SSK 9:18 and Orĥot Shabbat 12:17. Responsa Devar Yehoshua 2:45 disagrees with R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, based on Magid Mishneh 12:2, which explains that as long as one does not intend to create an implement, we do not consider it a psik reisha. Therefore, one may pour a large quantity of cold water into a very hot kettle. Since he does not intend to temper the kettle and thus apply one of the final stages of the metal forging process, it is not prohibited even though in fact he is doing so. MA 318:36, Bi’ur Ha-Gra 314:11, and MB 318:80 follow this position. Here too, one’s intention is to open the bottle, not to produce a bottle cap. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach disagrees with this position, maintaining that even though one’s primary intention is to open the bottle, he also wishes to produce a bottle cap. However, many believe that the bottle cap was considered functional even before the bottle is opened, but could not be used in practice because it was attached to the bottle by the metal rim. This is the approach of Tzitz Eliezer 14:45:1, Yeĥaveh Da’at 2:42, and Or Le-Tziyon 2:27:8; R. Mordechai Eliyahu ruled this way as well. If one intends to throw away the bottle cap, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach agrees that one may open the bottle (as explained by Devar Yehoshua ad loc.). If one needs the cap, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach allows him to puncture it and then open it, because by doing so he renders it less functional as a bottle cap. However, according to those who are lenient, since it is not necessary to puncture the cap, it is questionable whether one may do so. If it is considered an implement even before it is opened, it is rabbinically prohibited to destroy it. If it is comparable to a mustekei, it might be permitted to destroy it (even if it is not necessary). Those who take into account the opinion of R. Auerbach and his followers do so in an attempt to avoid a possible Torah prohibition.According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, one may remove the ring that remains on a metal or plastic bottle cap, since the cap is already functional without it. Others forbid this on account of Makeh Be-fatish. R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv maintains that this is forbidden because of Meĥatekh (Orĥot Shabbat 12:19-20). It would seem that even those who prohibit this would agree that the prohibition is rabbinic.

    14. Opening Soda Cans and Separating Attached Plastic Containers

    Some forbid opening a pop-top can on Shabbat. They are concerned that this action may constitute Boneh, because it creates a neat opening that allows one to drink. They are also concerned that one may be transgressing Meĥatekh, because the tab is pre-scored and produces a very precise opening.

    However, many permit this, maintaining that because the can is meant to be disposable, opening the top does not create a receptacle. Rather, it is comparable to breaking a barrel in order to remove the wine inside it. Meĥatekh is also not an issue, because that applies only when material must be cut to an exact size. Since it does not matter where a cut is made on the can, and the only goal is to create an opening for drinking, the can may be opened in the most convenient way possible – by lifting the tab.

    One may be lenient if he wishes. If one wishes to be stringent, he should not drink from the opening formed by popping the top, but rather should pour the drink from the can into his cup. This makes it clear that he is not interested in the neat opening of the can. If one wishes to be more stringent, he should be careful to lift the tab only slightly, less than he would on a weekday. This way the act of cutting is not completed, and the opening is not as good as it is usually.[10]

    There is another case that is subject to debate. Many dairy products (yogurts, puddings, and the like) come in containers that are loosely connected to each other. May one separate them by applying light pressure to that connection?

    Some maintain that breaking the containers apart along score lines that are made for this purpose is a violation of the Torah prohibition of Meĥatekh. They are also concerned that this might be Makeh Be-fatish, since separating the containers makes them usable.

    Others are lenient, maintaining that cutting is forbidden only when it is precise, and here the goal is simply to separate the containers from one another. No one cares exactly how precise the cut is. Furthermore, it is not Makeh Be-fatish, since the containers were completely ready for use even beforehand. Separating them simply removes an external impediment.

    In practice, one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely upon, and one who chooses to be stringent should be commended. It is proper to separate such containers before Shabbat.[11]


    [10]. Orĥot Shabbat 11:43 and 12:5 cite R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv as forbidding opening a pop-top can in the normal manner and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as permitting this. R. Meir Mazuz and Menuĥat Ahava 3:24:5 permit this on condition that one pours the drink into the cup. This approach is also recorded in Eshmera Shabbat 1:1:17. Or Le-Tziyon 2:27:6 permits this on condition that the pop top is not opened entirely, so that the can will not be easily usable. Accordingly, even those who are stringent would concede that a complete melakha was not performed. Yalkut Yosef 314:23 states in the name of R. Ovadia Yosef that technically one may open a pop top, but it is proper to be stringent and not open it entirely.

    [11]. Included among the permissive poskim are: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Shulĥan Shlomo 314:13:3); Or Le-Tziyon 2:27, n. 7; Halikhot Olam vol. 4, p. 254; and Binyan Shabbat 11:3. Included among the stringent poskim are: R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (quoted in Orĥot Shabbat ch. 12 n. 22); Ĥut Shani vol. 1, pp. 128-129; R. Mordechai Eliyahu; and Menuĥat Ahava 3:16:14. Even though some state that this is a Torah prohibition, it seems that Rambam (MT Laws of Yom Tov 4:8) maintains that if there is a prohibition at all, it is only rabbinic. Therefore, I wrote in the main text that one who wishes to be lenient has an opinion to rely upon.

    There is a debate about tearing open small sugar packets that are often perforated to facilitate tearing them. According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, one may tear along the dotted lines, because no one cares exactly where the cut is; the point of the perforation is to make it easier to tear open. R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, however, maintains that the prohibition of Meĥatekh applies because one is cutting precisely. Therefore, the packet must be torn at a different place (Orĥot Shabbat 11:41).

    01. The Melakha of Hav’ara

    The Torah states: “But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:9). The Sages explain that the intent of this verse is to forbid all 39 melakhot that were instrumental in erecting the Mishkan. One of these melakhot is Hav’ara (kindling a fire), which was necessary to prepare dyes for the Mishkan’s curtains. Nevertheless, the Torah explicitly mentions the prohibition of Hav’ara: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on Shabbat” (Shemot 35:3). The Sages ask why it was necessary for the Torah to single out Hav’ara. R. Natan explains that the Torah was using one melakha to serve as an example, to teach us that while all 39 prohibited melakhot are derived from one verse (“You shall not do any melakha”), nevertheless each and every melakha is an independent prohibition. Therefore, if one unknowingly performs multiple melakhot, he must bring a sin offering for each one of them (Shabbat 70a).

    The awesome power of fire allows man to rule over the forces of nature and harness them in his service. Through the use of fire, people created metal tools, improved food, and later created powerful machines. Perhaps this is why Hav’ara was chosen out of all the melakhot to express man’s tremendous ability to improve the world. However, on Shabbat every Jew must rest and rise above all creative activity. We must remember our Creator who took us out of Egypt, and we must enjoy Shabbat via Torah study and festive meals.

    At first glance, there is a basic question about the melakha of Hav’ara. We have a ruling: “All destructive acts are exempt [by Torah law, but liable rabbinically]” (Shabbat 105b). Therefore, if one tore an item of clothing or broke a utensil, he is not obligated to bring a sin offering. To be sure, he transgresses rabbinically, but not by Torah law. In light of this, and given that burning an item generally ruins it, why is lighting a fire on Shabbat considered a transgression of a Torah prohibition? The answer is that any time the positive elements provided by the fire (heating or lighting one’s home) outweigh the loss of the burned item, it is classified as a constructive rather than a destructive act (MT 12:1; see Kesef Mishneh).

    02. The Laws of Hav’ara

    One who lights a fire of any size that meets some need violates a Torah prohibition. It makes no difference whether he starts the fire by rubbing stones together, using a magnifying glass to focus the sun’s rays on straw, lighting a match, or turning on the electricity. It also does not matter if the fire is fueled by oil, kerosene, or electricity. Anytime one intends to start a fire and succeeds in doing so, he transgresses a Torah prohibition.

    However, one who merely causes sparks to be released does not violate Torah law. Furthermore, if the sparks were released unintentionally, there is no prohibition at all. Therefore, one may wear woolen or synthetic clothes, even though sometimes sparks are released when putting them on or taking them off. Since these sparks are released unintentionally and to no purpose, there is no prohibition (SSK 15:76; Yeĥaveh Da’at 2:46).

    Just as it is prohibited by Torah law to kindle a new fire, it is also prohibited by Torah law to increase a pre-existing flame. The law on Yom Tov is different; while one may not kindle a new fire then either, one may turn up an existing flame. On Shabbat, however, one may not even raise a flame. For example, one may not increase the flame on a gas burner by turning the knob controlling the gas flow. Likewise, one may not increase the flow of kerosene to a heater in order to raise the flame or add oil to a burning lamp on Shabbat (Beitza 22a).

    Similarly, one may not stoke coals, since this intensifies the fire (Kereitot 20a). Likewise, one may not open the door of a wood-fired oven because doing so allows air to enter the oven and fan the embers, thus increasing the fire (MB 259:21). If the oven door is already open, or there is a fire in an enclosed area (such as a fireplace), one may not open a window or door facing the fire, because a strong wind may enter and fan the flames. If there is no breeze, one may open the door or window (SA 277:2).

    While an oil lamp is on a table, one must try to avoid shaking the table, because the oil may move closer to the wick and increase the flame, a violation of Hav’ara. However, if it is a wax candle on the table, or if the oil lamp has a floating wick, he does not need to worry that shaking the table will cause the flame to increase (MB 277:18).

    03. Reading by Candlelight

    The Sages ordained that one may not read by the light of an oil lamp on Shabbat, lest the flame become dim and the reader absent-mindedly tip the lamp so that more oil reaches the wick, thus transgressing the Torah prohibition of Hav’ara. To be sure, the Sages also ordained the kindling of Shabbat lamps, but this serves a different purpose. Shabbat candles are meant to provide light for the meal, not for careful examination of texts, and to allow one to walk around in his home without bumping into furniture. In contrast, the Sages forbade doing things that require careful examination by lamplight, out of concern that in such a case one might end up tipping the lamp in order to see better. One who wishes to study by the light of an oil lamp should ask a friend to keep him company, to ensure that he will not tilt it. Alternatively, he may learn together with a friend so that they can look out for each other (Shabbat 11a; SA 275:1-3).

    Many poskim maintain that a lone individual may read by the light of a wax or paraffin candle because there is no concern that he will tilt the candle. Unlike an oil lamp, where the point of tilting is to move oil up the wick to the flame, the wax in a candle is attached to the wick and already close to the flame, so tilting would serve no purpose. Similarly, there is no concern that one might come to adjust the wick, since candles burn well on their own, and there is no need to adjust them at all once they are lit (MB 275:4; Kaf Ha-ĥayim 275:11).

    An individual may study by the light of an electric lamp, even if only one of two bulbs in the lamp is turned on, and even when the intensity of the light can be adjusted by means of a dimmer; the ordinance regarding oil lamps was because of concern that if the light grew dim, one might tilt the lamp to restore the light. There was no concern that one might light an additional lamp or add oil to an existing one. Since electric lights do not grow dim, we are not concerned that one might turn on an additional light or turn up an existing one. Nevertheless, le-khatĥila it is advisable to cover the dimmer knob with a note that says “Shabbat” so that no one will accidentally adjust the light (SSK 13:37; Yeĥaveh Da’at 6:20).

    04. Shabbat Candles

    While a candle is burning at home, one must be careful not to open a window or door facing it, as the wind may blow out the flame. Even if the wind outside is currently too weak to put out a candle, one still may not open a window, since it might happen that at the very moment when the window is opened, the wind will become stronger and blow out the candle. If this happens, it would mean that the act of opening the window blew out the candle. When there is no wind whatsoever, some permit opening the window, while others forbid it. In a case of necessity, such as when it is hot inside the room, one may follow the lenient position, and the window may be opened (MB 277:3).

    One may open a window or door if even a strong wind would be unable to extinguish the candle; for example, if the candle is at a great distance from the window or door, or if the window is at such an angle that very little wind comes through it. Even if the wind is likely to affect the flame and cause it to flicker, as long as it is not powerful enough to blow it out, one may open the door or window (SA 277:1; Menuĥat Ahava 3:26 n. 6).

    If Shabbat candles were lit in front of an open window and then the wind started blowing, the window may be closed in order to protect the flame. By closing the window, one is not acting directly on the flame itself; one is merely preventing the wind from blowing it out (Rema 277:1).

    Similarly, one may close a door in a place where a fire is burning (such as a room with a fireplace), even if the wind coming in is blowing on the coals and fanning the flame, and closing the door will weaken the fire. Closing the door is not considered an act of extinguishing, since it merely prevents more wind from entering and feeding the flame (SA 277:2). In contrast, if the fire is fueled by gas or kerosene, one may not turn down the flow of the fuel. This truly qualifies as extinguishing, since one is acting directly on the fuel itself (SA 265:1).[1]


    [1]. Beitza 22a states: “One who adds oil to a lamp is liable on account of Mav’ir, and one who takes some away is liable on account of Mekhabeh.” According to Tosafot, the reason one is liable for removing oil is that when he does this, the flame is immediately weakened. In contrast, if adding or removing oil has an effect only after a while, this is considered grama; one is not extinguishing a flame but only causing a flame to be extinguished indirectly. However, according to Rosh (Beitza 2:17), even if adding or removing oil does not have an immediate impact, since ultimately it will cause the lamp to stay lit for a longer or shorter amount of time, it is considered Mav’ir and Mekhabeh by Torah law. In his opinion, grama only applies in a case where the action is not done directly to the item in question. An example of this would be filling pitchers with water that will burst when a fire reaches them, thereby releasing the water and extinguishing the fire. However, in our case, one is acting on the fuel itself, directly changing the amount of time the fire will stay lit. It follows that if one adds kerosene to an oven or oil to a lamp, and the strength of the fire immediately increases, all agree that he has transgressed a Torah prohibition. However, if the fire does not show the effect of his actions immediately, but will ultimately stay lit for longer, according to Rosh this is prohibited by Torah law, whereas according to Tosafot the prohibition is rabbinic.

    05. The Melakha of Mekhabeh and the Meaning of Melakha She-eina Tzerikha Le-gufah

    Extinguishing a fire in order to produce charcoal is one of the 39 melakhot prohibited on Shabbat. In the Mishkan they would turn wood into charcoal by setting fire to wood and then extinguishing it. They would then use this charcoal to build a steady and long-lasting fire for preparing the dyes used to color the curtains in the Mishkan. Similarly, if one extinguishes the flame of a candle so that its wick will light more easily later on, he transgresses a Torah prohibition.

    What about one who extinguishes a fire not because he wants the charcoal, but because he wants to conserve fuel, or because the light produced by the flame is bothering him? In other words, he is not essentially interested in putting out the fire; he simply does not want the candle to keep burning. The Tanna’im disagree about this. According to R. Shimon, since this is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah (a melakha that is not needed for its own sake) it is only prohibited rabbinically. However, according to R. Yehuda, even if one’s objective is not the performance of the melakha itself, since he does in fact intend to extinguish the flame, he has performed a melakha and violated Torah law (Shabbat 31b and 93b).

    Practically speaking, Rambam maintains that a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is prohibited by Torah law (MT 1:7), while according to most Rishonim it is rabbinically prohibited (R. Hai Gaon, Rabbeinu Ĥananel, Ha-ma’or, Ramban, and others; see also SA 334:27 and MB ad loc. 85). Since the only difference between a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah and a regular melakha is the intention behind it, performing a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is considered more severe than violating a standard rabbinic prohibition. (See above 9:6.)

    06. Fire that Causes Property Damage

    If a fire breaks out on Shabbat, the first question that must be addressed is whether it presents a danger to human life. If it does, there is a mitzva to do whatever is necessary to extinguish it. However, if it is clear that there is no danger to human life, then even if the fire may cause extensive property damage, as is the case when an entire house goes up in flames, one may not put it out, because monetary loss does not override Shabbat.

    Furthermore, the Sages prohibited moving items from a burning house to the street or courtyard even when there is an eruv. Their concern was that people might be so panicked about saving their property that they may either put out the fire or carry objects from a private domain to a public domain, thereby violating the melakha of Hotza’ah. Only food, clothing, and receptacles/implements needed for that Shabbat may be removed from a burning home (assuming it is within the eruv). If there is a large receptacle in the home, one may fill it with food even if it is more than will be needed for that Shabbat, as long as it can be carried out of the home in one trip. The same principle applies to clothing: as long as one is wearing them as he leaves the house, he may save many items of clothing, even more than are necessary for that Shabbat. This prohibition only applies to moving things into a shared courtyard; but one may salvage any quantity of food and non-muktzeh objects into a private yard where an eruv is not required, or into another apartment in the same building where there is an eruv (SA 334:11, MB ad loc. 28).[2]

    Just as a homeowner may save items that he needs for Shabbat, he may also tell his neighbors that they can take whatever they need. Each neighbor can then take food for himself for Shabbat and put on as many items of clothing as he can. After Shabbat, the custom of the pious is to return the salvaged clothing and items to the original owner (SA 334:9; SSK 41:3-13).

    The poskim disagree about whether one may salvage money and valuables that are not necessary for Shabbat from a burning building. One who is lenient has an opinion on which to rely. However, this is all on condition that he not transgress a Torah prohibition. If, in order to salvage his money, he would need to carry it from a private domain to a public domain, thus violating Torah law, he may not do so. However, he may carry the money out with a shinui, as this is only rabbinically prohibited (SA 334:2; Taz; see MB ad loc. 4-5, SHT ad loc. 3, and BHL s.v. “ve-yesh”).

    Residents of neighboring buildings may remove everything they own from their homes. As long as the fire has not yet spread to their homes, we can assume that they are not so panicked, and so we are not worried that they will end up putting out the fire (SA 334:1).

    Although a Jew may not extinguish the fire, he may hint to a non-Jew to do so. For example, he may say: “Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out.” Or he could call to the non-Jew urgently and tell him that a fire has broken out and that it is forbidden for a Jew to put it out. The non-Jew will then figure out on his own that the Jew wants him to put out the fire, and perhaps will even pay him for doing so (SA 334:26).

    Similarly, one may indirectly cause the fire to go out, since according to Torah law it is only acting directly that is forbidden. Normally the Sages forbid causing melakha to be done indirectly, but in a case of loss, grama is permitted. Therefore, if one side of a cabinet catches fire, one may cover the other side with wet rags so that the fire will go out when it reaches them. Similarly, one may place bags full of water on a spot where the fire has not yet reached, so that they will burst open and extinguish the fire when it reaches them (SA 334:22). One may also pour water on a spot that is not burning, as long as it is far enough away from the fire that the water will only reach the fire and begin extinguishing it after a while (See SA 334:24; SSK 41:16).


    [2]. According to Rambam and those who follow his approach, who maintain that performing a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is prohibited by Torah law, it is clear that there is no way to permit putting out a fire to save one’s possessions. It is also obvious why the Sages ordained that one may not save more than what is necessary for Shabbat. However, according to most poskim, who maintain that a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is only rabbinically prohibited, why does this rabbinic prohibition apply even in a case where following it would lead to a massive loss? After all, the Sages permitted stamping on the grass clogging up a pipe in order to prevent a loss (Ketubot 60a; SA 336:9). Even though many maintain that fixing the pipe would be prohibited by Torah law, the Sages permitted fixing it with a shinui to prevent a loss (Livyat Ĥen §103). Similarly, they were lenient in allowing one to carry valuable possessions into a public thoroughfare with a shinui to prevent their possible theft (Rema 301:33). Some even permit moving muktzeh objects in order to save possessions from fire or theft (SA 334:2). So why didn’t the Sages allow one to put out a fire in order to save all of his possessions?It would seem that the answer is that, as Ran writes (on Rif, 61a, s.v. “u-vimkom”), a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah is more severe than other rabbinic prohibitions. Ran suggests that since performing a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah looks the same as performing an act prohibited by Torah law, and only the intent differs, the Sages were concerned that people would be unable to distinguish between the two and would end up being lenient even with Torah prohibitions. Therefore, the Sages forbade putting out a fire even in the case of a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah. A similar approach appears in Ĥayei Adam 46:1 and BHL §278 at the end of s.v. “mutar.” (A parallel idea appears in the laws of bein ha-shmashot, as explained in MB 342:1.) It also may be that because having a fire in one’s home can make one extremely distressed, one who is worried about his possessions might perform several melakhot in his distressed state. Because of this, the Sages felt a need to reinforce the observance of the melakhot and did not permit even rabbinic transgressions. They allowed rescuing possessions only under very limited circumstances, so as to eliminate the concern that it would cause people to transgress other prohibitions as well.

    R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in SSK ch. 41 n. 8, wonders why we do not seem to be concerned about the emotional state of the homeowner and his family, who might lose their minds upon seeing their home and possessions going up in flames. In fact, it is possible for one to die or to go insane as a result of this kind of trauma. Elsewhere in SSK (ch. 32 n. 83), R. Auerbach points out that some allow the transgression of Torah prohibitions to protect one’s mental and emotional health. In practice it would seem that when there is a real possibility of a family member experiencing psychological trauma, the fire may be extinguished, but when there is no such concern, even if tremendous suffering is involved, one may not extinguish the fire.

    07. Putting Out a Fire When There Is Danger to Human Life

    In a situation where human life might be endangered by a fire, it is a mitzva for anyone who can put it out to do so as soon as possible, since danger to human life overrides Shabbat. Even if the danger is uncertain, it is still a mitzva to put out the fire. For example, if a fire breaks out in a large building, even if it seems that all the residents managed to get out, one must put out the fire as long as there is a possibility that someone may still be inside. Even if the odds are that anyone left inside has already died, since there is still a chance that a rescue is possible, everything must be done to put out the fire (SA 329:3; below 27:1).

    Everything necessary must be done as efficiently as possible on all fronts: Those able to rescue people from the fire should try to do so, and those able to extinguish or control the fire should try to do so with whatever means are at their disposal. At the same time, others should call the fire department. If an observer is uncertain whether the fire department has been called already, even if it seems likely that they have been, he too must call to make sure that they come, because the possibility of saving lives overrides Shabbat. At such a time one must not ask a rabbi what to do, but rather move as quickly as possible to help.

    In practice, nowadays we treat any large fire that breaks out in a residential building as a life-threatening one that must be extinguished even on Shabbat. For example, if a fire breaks out in an apartment building, there is a concern that it may spread to additional apartments and there may not be time to evacuate the residents. Besides, when there is a large fire there is no time to check if there are apartments with babies or disabled people who cannot make their way out on their own. Additionally, some homes contain explosive gas canisters that endanger people outside the building, especially considering that fires often attract large numbers of gawkers. Sometimes it takes longer to clear people out of the area than to put out the fire. If the fire is near other homes, it might spread and endanger those residents. Sometimes a fire breaks out in a storage area containing chemicals whose poisonous fumes may endanger area residents.

    R. Shlomo Goren ruled that if anti-Israel terrorists start a fire that will damage property, it may be extinguished on Shabbat even if there is no danger to life, because if we do not put it out, the terrorists will feel they have succeeded and will be motivated to undertake similar attacks that could endanger lives (this is based on SA 329:6 and R. Goren’s expansion of the category of a “border town,” which may be defended against even property damage on Shabbat, to all cities in Israel, where low-grade conflict can break out; see below 27:12).

    08. Putting Out a Fire to Prevent People from Being Injured

    As we have seen (section 5), one who puts out a fire only transgresses rabbinically, according to most poskim. Only one who extinguishes a fire in order to produce charcoal is doing so le-tzorekh gufo. When one puts out a fire in order to prevent damage from occurring, he is not interested in the act of extinguishing, but in creating a situation in which the fire is gone. Accordingly, this is considered a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah.

    Therefore, even though the Sages insisted that one may not put out a fire in order to salvage property, they permitted extinguishing a fire that has the potential to cause mass injury. For example, if there is a burning ember in a public domain, where many people are liable to be harmed by it, one may remove it even though it is muktzeh. If it is impossible to move it, the Sages permitted extinguishing it in order to prevent harm to the public, even though there is no danger to human life. However, in Israel, one may not call the fire department, because their travel involves Torah prohibitions, and one may not violate Torah law in order to prevent possible harm that does not involve potential loss of life. In the Diaspora, where firefighters are non-Jews, one may call the fire department, as this only involves the violation of a rabbinic prohibition (SA 334:27; see below 27:16).

    To summarize, we have discussed three situations in which one may put out a fire directly or indirectly:

    1) In a situation of danger to human life, it is a mitzva to do everything possible to save lives.

    2) In a situation where there is a danger of harm to the public, one may put out the fire (as the Sages did not apply rabbinic rules in such a case), but one still may not violate Torah prohibitions to do so.

    3) In a situation where there is financial loss but no threat of physical harm to humans, one may not extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, one may do so via grama. One may also hint to a non-Jew to put out the fire.

    01. Turning on Electric Lights and Appliances

    It is prohibited by Torah law to turn on an electric light bulb or activate an electric heating element, because when the bulb is turned on or a heating element activated, the filament incandesces (see above, 4:5 and n. 3, regarding fluorescent bulbs), and this is a form of Hav’ara prohibited by the Torah. While it is true that in the past, people did not generally produce heat or light by heating metal, we nevertheless find that heating metal for any purpose was prohibited by Torah law. Thus Rambam writes that if one heats metal with the intention of tempering it afterward by plunging it into cold water, he transgresses the Torah prohibition of Mav’ir (MT 12:1). Clearly, then, heating metal is forbidden by Torah law if it accomplishes some purpose.

    Extinguishing a light bulb or heating element is only rabbinically prohibited. It is different from a normal act of Mekhabeh, whose purpose is to create charcoal (as explained above 16:5). In contrast, turning off an electrical appliance creates nothing, so its prohibition is rabbinic.

    The Torah forbids performing prohibited melakhot by means of electrical appliances. Thus, activating an electric flour mill on Shabbat constitutes a violation of Toĥen, operating an electric mixer on Shabbat violates Lash, and so forth for all melakhot. Although the person is not manually grinding or kneading, since he presses the button or flips the switch to turn the appliance on, all melakhot performed by the appliance are viewed as melakhot performed by him (Oraĥ Mishpat §70; Aĥiezer 3:60).

    Just as one may not turn on an electrical appliance by pressing a button, so too one may not activate something by remote control. Even though there is no direct contact between the finger pressing a button on the remote control and the appliance, since this is the normal way to turn on such appliances, it is forbidden just as manual activation is forbidden.

    02. Is Using Electricity a Torah Prohibition or a Rabbinic Prohibition?

    One may not activate electrical appliances and devices such as telephones, microphones, alarms, doorbells, fans, air conditioners, and computers on Shabbat. Even if these appliances do not contain an incandescent filament or heating element and do not perform any of the 39 melakhot, it is still forbidden to use them on Shabbat. Aĥaronim disagree, however, whether the prohibition is by Torah law or rabbinic.

    Some maintain that using any electrical appliance violates the Torah prohibition of Mav’ir. They maintain that electricity has the same status as fire since, like fire, it has energy and power that can be harnessed. Rav Kook favors this position, arguing that the key aspect of fire is not its appearance, but rather its power to illuminate, heat, and provide power. Indeed, the Sages state that there are different types of fire (Yoma 21b), including some that do not burn and destroy. One example of this is the fire that Moshe saw at the burning bush (Rav Kook, Oraĥ Mishpat §71). R. Uziel agrees with this approach, adding that turning on electricity is also prohibited as a form of Metaken Mana since activating an electrical appliance renders it useful (Mishpetei Uziel, OĤ 2:36:2). Ĥazon Ish (OĤ 50:9) maintains that turning on an electrical appliance is prohibited on account of Boneh, because completing a circuit creates a kli: when electricity flows through a device, an electrical wire within comes to life and activates the device. Thus, one who completes a circuit builds an implement, and one who breaks a circuit demolishes it.

    Many others maintain, however, that using electrical appliances that do not contain an incandescent filament and do not perform one of the 39 melakhot is only prohibited rabbinically, as it is considered a weekday activity. Additionally, some maintain that turning on appliances is prohibited because it is creating a new entity on Shabbat (Molid), as it creates a new electrical current in the wires (Beit Yitzĥak). No Torah prohibition is involved, because there is no “fire” in appliances without an incandescent filament. There is no problem of Boneh, because an electrical circuit cannot be considered a kli, that is, an implement or receptacle. This is the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minĥat Shlomo 1:9-12) and R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 1:20:10).

    In practice, le-khatĥila we defer to the opinion that using electricity is a Torah prohibition. In times of need, when there are additional reasons to be lenient, we rely upon those who believe that using electricity is only a rabbinic violation.[1]


    [1]. According to Rav Kook, using electricity is prohibited on account of Mav’ir. Therefore, one may not speak into a microphone, as this increases the electric current. His responsa on the subject are not so well known, since Responsa Oraĥ Mishpat, in which they appear (§70-71) was printed in 1979, thirty years after the main debates among contemporary Aĥaronim. At the time, Ĥazon Ish was inclined to say that use of electricity is prohibited by Torah law on account of Boneh, but many disagreed with him, including R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Eliezer Waldenberg. Nevertheless, other Aĥaronim share Rav Kook’s opinion that the prohibition on electricity is due to Mav’ir. These include Mishpetei Uziel, OĤ 2:36:2; Yaskil Avdi 5:38; Brit Olam, Ha-mav’ir Ve-hamekhabeh 1; R. Yosef Messas’s Responsa Mayim Ĥayim, OĤ §134. Also see the entry on “ĥashmal” in the Encyclopedia Talmudit, which focuses on the opinions that disagree with Ĥazon Ish and maintain that the prohibition is rabbinic. One should be aware that according to Ĥazon Ish, if an appliance is already on, increasing the current to amplify the power of the appliance is not prohibited by Torah law. However, according to Rav Kook, who believes using electricity is prohibited because of Mav’ir, increasing the current is prohibited by Torah law as well.Many contemporary authorities accept the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach that there is no Torah prohibition involved in using electricity. However, le-khatĥila they still take into account the opinion that maintains it is prohibited by Torah law (see Yabi’a Omer 1:20; Minĥat Yitzĥak 2:112; and many additional works). Igrot Moshe (OĤ 3:42, 3:55, and 4:84) maintains that the status of the prohibition is unclear. In practice, although many state that in principle the prohibition on using electricity is rabbinic, in fact they relate to the prohibition of turning on electrical appliances as if it were prohibited by Torah law. Thus, even in cases of uncertainty and cases where electricity is required for the sake of a mitzva, to avoid substantial loss, or to help someone who is bothered by a minor illness, they are not lenient and prohibit using electricity via a non-Jew or when activated with a shinui, despite the fact that each of these scenarios would constitute a shvut di-shvut (see above 9:11). Only in cases of true necessity do they take into account the opinion that the prohibition is rabbinic. Therefore, the only way these appliances can be used on Shabbat is if they are turned on before Shabbat. In times of true necessity they can be used through grama (above 9:9), meaning that one’s actions will not directly or immediately cause the appliance to turn on. Examples of the permitted use of electricity on Shabbat include wearing a hearing aid (section 3 below) and adjusting the setting on a timer (as explained below in n. 6). For appliances that appear to work normally but have a built-in grama mechanism, see section 18 below. Regarding the use of computers, see below 18:1 and Harĥavot.

    03. Electrical Appliances That Produce Sound (Telephones and Microphones)

    As we have seen, the prohibition on using electrical appliances on Shabbat includes microphones and telephones.

    Even if a phone is in use before Shabbat, or if a microphone is turned on before Shabbat, one may not speak on the phone or use a microphone on Shabbat, because doing so increases the electric current running through it and violates a Torah or rabbinic prohibition. In addition, the Sages banned hashma’at kol (producing sound) with an object specifically designed for this purpose. Many maintain that one who speaks into a microphone transgresses this prohibition (based on Rema 338:1). Furthermore, using a microphone resembles a weekday activity. It also may seem to belittle Shabbat, as those who hear the amplified sound are likely to think that the microphone was activated on Shabbat (Igrot Moshe, OĤ 3:55).[2]

    Nevertheless, one who is hard of hearing may use an electric hearing aid that rests on or inside the ear on Shabbat as long as it is turned on before Shabbat and he does not adjust the volume on Shabbat. When he wants to go to sleep, he should remove the device without shutting it off. In the morning, he may put it back in without turning it on. Although we stated that one may not use a microphone or telephone because speaking into it increases the electric current, this prohibition applies only when someone speaks directly into them. However, when speaking normally, the activation of the device in the wearer’s ear is secondary and therefore a form of grama, which is permitted when truly necessary. Furthermore, there is no problem of producing sound on Shabbat or belittling Shabbat since the sound is heard only by the wearer.[3]

    Just as one may not turn on a microphone before Shabbat with the intention of using it on Shabbat, so is leaving on an intercom over Shabbat to hear the voices of people coming to visit, or to hear what is going on in the children’s room. To be sure, if one simply speaks normally in the room and not directly into the intercom, the prohibition is less severe since it is then a case of grama. It is nevertheless prohibited, because it is a weekday activity, it belittles Shabbat, and it produces sound with an object designed for that purpose. However, if the intercom was accidentally left on over Shabbat, as long as one does not intend to use it he may speak in a normal fashion in the room with the intercom.[4]


    [2].If a Jew in the United States who does not observe Shabbat calls a Jewish friend in Israel when Shabbat is over in Israel but while it is still Shabbat in the U.S., the latter may not speak with him, because he is benefiting from his friend’s Shabbat desecration. However, a Jew in Israel may speak with a non-Jew who calls him when it is Shabbat in the U.S., since a non-Jew is not obligated to keep Shabbat (SSK 31:27).

    [3]. There is no problem of hashma’at kol since the sound is only heard by the wearer of the device. The only problem is the electrical operations of the hearing aid. Indeed, some prohibit the use of hearing aids (Dovev Meisharim, Levushei Yom Tov §15; R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv cited in Orĥot Shabbat 26:23). However, in practice many have permitted the hearing-impaired to use hearing aids, including Igrot Moshe, OĤ 4:85. Those who maintain that turning on an electrical appliance without an incandescent filament is rabbinically prohibited because it creates a new flow of electricity in the wires do not view increasing the current as a new creative act. At worst, it might be deemed a weekday activity, in which case one may be lenient in the case of a great need. Similarly, for those who believe that turning on an appliance is prohibited on account of Boneh or because it is creating a kli, there is no problem here; since the hearing aid is already on, increasing the current creates nothing new. Based on these rationales, the following authorities permit the use of a hearing aid: R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach; Tzitz Eliezer 6:6; SSK 34:28; Yabi’a Omer 1:19:19; Minĥat Yitzĥak 2:17. See Encyclopedia Talmudit vol. 18, pp. 731-732. It is true that Rav Kook in Oraĥ Mishpat §71 prohibits speaking into a microphone, because the speech causes electric current to flow. He explains that this cannot be considered grama since the result is direct and immediate. It seems, though, that since the sound waves resulting from normal speech are only converted to electric current once they reach the hearing aid, this can be considered ko’aĥ sheni (“secondary power”), a form of grama, as explained in San. 77b and Ĥullin 16a. Grama is permitted under pressing circumstances, as explained in Shabbat 120a, SA 334:20, and Rema ad loc.; see above, 9:9.

    [4]. One who uses a microphone fully intends to speak into it, and this is the normal way to amplify a voice, so it is not considered grama. In contrast, if one simply speaks normally in a room that has a baby monitor and thereby projects his voice over the intercom, since this is not the normal way to converse and his mouth is far from the intercom, it is considered ko’aĥ sheni and thus grama, as in the case of a hearing aid (though this requires further study; see Harĥavot). However, since the sound can be heard in the room with the receiver, it is a weekday activity and belittles Shabbat. It might also be considered hashma’at kol (Rema 338:1; Oraĥ Mishpat §71; also see Rema 252:5). In contrast, if the intercom was left on accidentally, then since one who speaks in that room is using it only via grama, and he is not interested in making his voice heard, this is a case of psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei in the case of a rabbinic prohibition, where one may be lenient in a case of need. In pressing circumstances, such as when one is sick, one may be lenient and leave an intercom on. See Terumat Hagoren §79. Yalkut Yosef (vol. 5, pp. 403-405) permits this even le-khatĥila. One should only rely on this leniency under pressing circumstances.

    04. Elevators

    One may not operate an elevator on Shabbat. Pressing the elevator buttons involves Torah prohibitions or, minimally, rabbinic prohibitions. However, some “Shabbat elevators” are set to operate automatically, meaning that they are set before Shabbat to stop on every floor or every other floor, at which point the doors open on their own for a predetermined amount of time and then close on their own. The elevator then continues on its way. There is a difference of opinion among the poskim regarding these elevators.

    Some prohibit using a Shabbat elevator, maintaining that using it is a weekday activity. Additionally, entering the elevator causes its motor to use more electricity when the elevator goes up and down (Ĥelkat Yaakov, OĤ §144; Minĥat Yitzĥak 3:60; Ĥut Shani vol. 1, p. 206; R. Shmuel Wosner).

    Others maintain that one may go up in a Shabbat elevator but not down. This is because when the elevator goes down, the extra weight helps produce electricity. Thus one who rides the elevator has a hand in generating electricity (R. Levi Yitzĥak Halperin, Ma’aliyot Be-Shabbat).

    A third opinion maintains that a Shabbat elevator may be used. Since the settings are in place before Shabbat, and no action needs to be taken on Shabbat to make the elevator work, there is no prohibition. The fact that the elevator has a system that determines the weight of the passenger, which in turn tells the motor how much power to use, and even makes use of the additional weight to produce electricity, is of no interest to the rider. As long as the elevator goes up and down according to its settings, the passenger does not care about the elevator’s electricity-conserving mechanisms. Therefore, the actions caused indirectly by his entry into the elevator are not attributable to him at all (it is a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei via grama; this is the position of R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin; R. Isser Yehuda Unterman; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK 23:58; Prof. Ze’ev Lev in Teĥumin 2; and R. Yisrael Rosen in Teĥumin 5.)

    In practice, the lenient position is the primary one, while those who are stringent are commendable. In a case of need, even those who are normally stringent may be lenient. Those who are lenient must be careful not to enter or exit the Shabbat elevator when the door is about to close, so as to avoid causing it to reopen. Even for those who are lenient, it is better if the automatic system is programmed under the supervision of an organization that specializes in halakha and technology, as this can help ensure that entering the elevator does not turn on a light or the like and minimize the prohibitions involved according to the stringent view.[5]


    [5]. The lenient position is the primary one, as its reasoning is compelling. Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to view entering an elevator as worse than grama (as this is not a direct action but ko’aĥ sheni). Some are lenient even le-khatĥila in a case of grama (Taz 514:7). To be sure, most poskim permit grama only in cases of need (SA 334:22), but here the grama is combined with a psik reisha, so it is permitted even le-khatĥila (Minĥat Shlomo 1:10:6; see above 9:9 and Harĥavot). In any case, even according to those who do not allow entering a Shabbat elevator, the prohibition is rabbinic, since one who enters the elevator does not intend to do a melakha. Since the poskim disagree, the law follows the principle that we are lenient in cases of doubt about a rabbinic rule.

    05. Using Electricity that Was Produced on Shabbat

    Power supply is a vital need of the State of Israel all week, including Shabbat. Interrupting or impairing the supply can endanger human life. Hospitals are full of devices that depend on the supply of power, and even in private homes there are people who are dangerously ill who rely on electrical devices to stay alive. Police officers and security forces use electrical equipment, and without electricity they would be unable to respond properly to emergencies. On cold days, many homes are heated using electricity. If the electricity were to be withheld on Shabbat, babies and sick people would likely be at risk. Very hot days can also pose a certain risk for those who are ill and require air conditioning. In addition, since nowadays we store food for an extended amount of time in refrigerators and freezers, this food may spoil if the electricity is cut off. In a large population, some would likely contract food poisoning, which can be life-threatening.

    Therefore, it is necessary for the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) – whose employees are predominantly Jewish – to supply electricity nonstop, even on Shabbat. If there is some impairment to the supply of electricity in a particular location, whatever is needed to fix it must be done. Since technicians may fix the grid on Shabbat, everyone may benefit from the electricity that is subsequently generated, even though it was restored on Shabbat. The only exception is if a power outage takes place in a small area where it is known for certain that there is no risk to human life involved, in which case the repair may not be made on Shabbat. If it was nevertheless repaired by Jews on Shabbat, one may not benefit from the electricity until an hour after Shabbat. (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in SSK ch. 32 n. 182; below, 26:6).

    Much to our dismay, it is known that IEC workers perform activities on Shabbat that are not essential to guaranteeing the electricity supply, but that are for the purpose of saving money. Furthermore, if there were greater awareness of Shabbat observance, it would be possible to automate the entire electricity-generating system and eliminate the need for human intervention without extra expenses. It would only be necessary to have a few workers in the power stations, monitoring the system and troubleshooting emergencies. However, since in fact the IEC does not try to avoid performing melakha on Shabbat, several leading rabbis ruled that one should not use its electricity on Shabbat (but rather use a local generator) to avoid benefiting from Shabbat desecration or supporting it in any way. (See Ĥazon Ish, OĤ 38:4.)

    In practice, though, this electricity may be used on Shabbat, even in Israel. It is true that the IEC could take measures before Shabbat to avoid some of the Shabbat violations. Nevertheless, when its technicians do what is necessary to guarantee the electricity supply, they are not desecrating Shabbat, since electricity is necessary for people to live. Because of this, everyone may benefit from the electricity. Since the consumers do not benefit from the melakhot performed by the IEC technicians for the sole purpose of saving money, and from their perspective it would be better if the procedures were automated, they may benefit from the electricity on Shabbat (see Ha-ĥashmal Ba-halakha vol. 2 ch. 1; Menuĥat Ahava 1:24:1). We have recently learned of efforts to automate the grid and prevent Shabbat desecration.

    06. Timers

    Shabbat prohibitions become forbidden at the onset of Shabbat, but before Shabbat begins, one may take actions whose effects will continue into Shabbat. A prominent example of this is using a timer (“Shabbos clock”). Such timers are connected to the power supply and to an appliance, and its settings control the flow of electricity, determining when the device will turn on and off. This is how, nowadays, we can set electric lights to go on and off over the course of Shabbat. One may leave on lights before Shabbat and set the timer to turn them off at bedtime, on again at lunch time, and off again for the afternoon before turning on again for se’uda shlishit. Similarly, one can use a timer to turn on an electric oven or fan, setting it so that the appliance will go on and off at the desired times.

    If one sets a timer to turn off the lights at 11 PM, but then decides that he would like to study Torah until midnight, some say that he may not delay the time that the lights will be extinguished by adjusting the timer’s settings, as in their opinion, the timer is an integral part of the lighting system, and the Sages forbade taking any action that effects a change in the duration of the lights’ operation. This can be inferred from the talmudic case of attaching an oil-filled container to an oil lamp, which the Sages forbid out of concern that one might remove some of the oil on Shabbat (Shabbat 29b; Beitza 22:1).

    Others, including R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, offer a different perspective. They maintain that delaying the time the lights will go out is comparable to the case of one who is sitting in a room with a lit oil lamp. If the wind starts to blow though his window, threatening to extinguish the light, everyone agrees that he may close the window, even though this allows the lamp to burn longer. Since he is not doing anything to the lamp itself, but merely preventing the wind from blowing it out, there is no prohibition. Similarly, one who extends the settings of a timer is not doing anything to the light itself or to the electrical appliance, but merely preventing the timer from turning them off. Assuming that this action is permitted, the switches on the timer are not muktzeh, and they may be adjusted.

    Since the rationale of those who are lenient is compelling and also accords with the widespread practice, one may rely on their opinion even le-khatĥila. Therefore, one may take action to extend the current state of affairs. If the electricity is off, one may extend the time that it will remain off and have the lights go on later. If the electricity is on, he may lengthen the time that it will remain on, and have the lights go out later. Similarly, if the lights are off, one can move the light switch to the off position, so that when the timer eventually restores the power, those lights will not go back on (SSK 13:26-33).[6]

    However, one may not change the timer so that lights or appliances will go on or off earlier. For example, if the timer was set so that the lights would go off at midnight, but it turns out that people want to go to sleep earlier, one may not adjust the timer’s settings to make the lights go off earlier. Although he is not turning them off directly because his actions will not have any effect until later, nevertheless indirectly causing lights to go off is rabbinically forbidden. Similarly, if the timer was set to turn the lights on at 10 AM, it may not be adjusted to make the lights come on earlier, as indirectly causing lights to go on is rabbinically prohibited.[7]

    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2
    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2

    [6]. Some maintain that making any change to the settings of an electric timer is prohibited by Torah law (Yaskil Avdi 7:23), while others maintain that only certain kinds of changes are prohibited by Torah law (Igrot Moshe, YD 3:47:4; Az Nidberu 3:25 and 8:32). If this opinion is correct, then the problem of muktzeh also comes into play. Nevertheless, the logic of those who are lenient is very compelling, as explained in Harĥavot. First, the stringent position is based on the opinion of Rosh and those who follow him, with which many disagree (above ch. 16 n. 1). Second, it would seem that even Rosh would permit in this case, as the action of adjusting the timer is not done directly to the lights. Indeed, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach writes thus in Minĥat Shlomo §13, as does R. Ovadia Yosef in Yabi’a Omer, OĤ 3:18.It should be added that when the lights are off, one may increase the time they will remain off, even if they will go on in the interim period. In other words, if the lights are off during the night, and are set to go back on at 10 AM and turn off again at noon, one may adjust the timer so that the lights will go off at 11 AM. The principle is that while the lights are off, one may cause them to be off for a longer period of time. This is true whether the current state is being extended, or whether the future state is being extended following a period when the lights will be on. Similarly, while the lights are on, one may cause them to be on for a longer period of time, even if in the interim they will turn off for a certain amount of time (SSK 13:30).

    [7]. This applies under normal circumstances. However, in cases of need, those who are lenient allow causing a timer to turn the lights on earlier. According to most poskim, using a timer is considered grama, which some permit even le-khatĥila (Taz), and most permit in times of need (as explained above 9:9). This is the position of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as cited in SSK 13:29, and of R. Ovadia Yosef in Yabi’a Omer, OĤ 3:18. Therefore, when one is sick (even if he is not dangerously ill), if the lights are disturbing his sleep and the timer is set to turn off the lights in a couple of hours, the settings may be changed so that the lights will go out in half an hour instead. An additional reason to be lenient is that turning off lights is only a rabbinic prohibition (above, section 1). In a case of dire necessity, one may make the lights turn on earlier for the sake of a mitzva, such as if the lack of light would cause one to waste much time that would have been spent learning Torah. In deference to the stringent position, however, it is proper to use a shinui when making the adjustment.

    07. Thermostat Controls

    The laws of thermostat controls are the same as those of an electric timer. Some poskim maintain that one may not adjust a thermostat. According to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and others, one may change the setting if it will lead to the extension of the current state.

    For example, if one set the thermostat of an electric oil-filled radiator to medium before Shabbat, but on Shabbat realizes that it is hotter than he had expected, he may lower the setting of the thermostat once it has switched the radiator off. Thus, he ensures that the radiator will remain off for a longer period of time, and the heating element will work for a shorter period of time. However, one may not lower the thermostat while the radiator is on, because this changes the current state by causing the heating element to cycle off sooner.

    If, during the course of Shabbat, one wants a radiator to stay on for longer, he must wait until the radiator has cycled on, and the temperature of the radiator has reached at least yad soledet bo (at least 71 degrees Celsius). Then he may turn up the thermostat so that the radiator will stay on for longer. However, if he does this when the temperature is below yad soledet bo, he transgresses Bishul, because he is causing the oil inside the radiator to heat up. Once the radiator has cycled off, it is not permissible under any circumstances to turn up the thermostat, because this will change the current state and may lead to the radiator turning on immediately.

    The same rules apply to air conditioners and refrigerators that have manual thermostats. When the compressor has cycled on, one may turn down the temperature, which will keep the refrigerator or air conditioner on longer. When the compressor has cycled off, one may turn up the temperature, which will keep the machine off longer (Minĥat Shlomo §10; SSK 23:24).

    Of course, all of this assumes that there is no display recording the temperature. However, if the thermostat is adjusted by pressing buttons to change the temperature, and this is shown in an electronic display (as is the case with many air conditioners), then it is prohibited, both on account of Kotev, and because each press of a button makes direct use of electricity.

    08. Opening a Refrigerator or Oven, and Entering an Air-Conditioned Room

    If opening the door of a refrigerator causes an electrical event to occur, one may not open the door on Shabbat. Most refrigerators have an electric light inside that goes on automatically when the refrigerator door is opened. Thus, if the light has not been removed before Shabbat, one may not open the refrigerator on Shabbat. There are also refrigerators where a fan turns on or off whenever the door is opened. These refrigerators and any with similar electrical mechanisms may not be opened on Shabbat.

    In contrast, if it has been ensured that opening the refrigerator will not turn anything on or off, one may open the door on Shabbat. Indeed, some permit opening a refrigerator when the compressor has cycled on but prohibit opening the refrigerator when the compressor is off, as opening the door causes warm air to enter the refrigerator. Since the compressor is activated by an internal thermostat, opening the refrigerator may cause the compressor to go on immediately, or at least sooner than it would have otherwise.

    However, in practice one may open the refrigerator even when the compressor is off. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is unintentional: The person opening the door does not intend to turn on the compressor. Second, it is uncertain whether opening the door will cause the compressor to turn on, as it is possible that the compressor was about to cycle on anyway. Third, even if opening the door does cause the compressor to cycle on, this was only done indirectly, via grama, as opening the door does not itself turn on the compressor. It simply causes warm air to enter, which may in turn affect the compressor. Accordingly, one does not need to worry about a case where there is uncertainty regarding grama combined with lack of intent.

    For the same reason, one may drink cold water from a water cooler without checking whether or not the compressor has cycled on. One may also enter a room that has a working air conditioner that is controlled by a thermostat, even though opening the door may cause the air conditioner to cycle on. First, it is not certain that opening the door will cause the air conditioner to cycle on. Even if it does cycle on, this was accomplished via grama. Similarly, one may open a door or window in a room that has a thermostat-regulated heater or air conditioner. This is because the person opening the door or window does not intend to affect the machine, it is not certain that opening the door or window will in fact do so, and if the machine is affected it will have been accomplished through grama.

    However, many are stringent regarding an oven that is controlled by a thermostat and will not open such an oven when the heating element has cycled off. Since it is a small appliance, opening the door is more likely to cause it to cycle on. To avoid this problem, some ovens have a Shabbat setting in which the oven produces a steady heat and does not respond to a thermostat. When the oven is on this setting, all agree that it may be opened and shut at will.[8]


    [8]. As explained in 9:9 above, some permit grama even le-khatĥila, while most only permit it in cases of need. Here, even if the act of opening the oven door will definitely turn on the heating element, since he does not intend to turn it on, it is simply a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei, which is permitted even under normal circumstances. This point is even more relevant if it is possible that the oven would have cycled on even if left alone. In that case, opening the door accomplishes nothing. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach writes this regarding a refrigerator (Minĥat Shlomo 1:10), as do R. Ovadia Yosef (Yabi’a Omer, OĤ 1:21) and R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 8:12). However, many recommend being stringent and opening the refrigerator only when the compressor is already on; only then is it impossible for opening the door to cause the compressor to turn on, as it is already on. Even though the influx of warm air will lead the compressor to stay on for longer, this is not prohibited (Responsa Har Tzvi, OĤ 1:151; Ĥelkat Yaakov 3:179). Nevertheless, the bottom line is that one may open a refrigerator without checking whether or not the compressor is on.The law regarding opening a refrigerator is more lenient than the law regarding opening an electric oven. There are two reasons for this distinction. First, an oven is small, and thus opening the door is likely to cause it to cycle on. There is a slight possibility that this would not be considered grama, but rather a direct action. In contrast, a refrigerator is large, and it is unlikely that opening the door will affect it immediately. If this were to happen, it would definitely be considered grama. Second, according to many poskim, turning on the refrigerator’s compressor is only a rabbinic prohibition, since there is no heating element (above, n. 1). In contrast, turning on the oven’s heating element is prohibited by Torah law according to all opinions. Reflecting this distinction, SSK 1:35 is stringent about opening the door of an electric oven, while when it comes to a refrigerator he records the lenient position as well. In contrast, Igrot Moshe, OĤ 4:74, Bishul 28 is lenient even in the case of an electric oven with a thermostat. He maintains that one may open the door even when the oven has cycled off, because it is an uncertain psik reisha in the case of a rabbinic prohibition (as it is performed via grama), and such a combination is permitted. Regarding opening the door of a room that has a radiator or air conditioner, almost no one is stringent. Since there is a relatively large distance between the door and the air conditioner or radiator, even those who are stringent would agree that this is considered grama. See above 10:17.

    09. When the Refrigerator Light Bulb was not Disconnected

    If one did not remove or disable the light bulb of a refrigerator before Shabbat, he may not open or close the door on Shabbat, as this will turn the light on or off. If one needs the food in the refrigerator for Shabbat, he may seek the help of a nearby non-Jew. In order to avoid the prohibition of benefiting from a melakha performed by a non-Jew, one should offer him food from the refrigerator, at which point he will open the door for his own benefit. Once the non-Jew has opened the refrigerator for himself, the Jew may take whatever he needs out of the refrigerator as well. Although generally one may not ask a non-Jew to perform a melakha on Shabbat, here one is not asking him to perform a melakha. Rather, one is asking him to open the refrigerator, which also happens to turn on the light. Afterward, in order to continue opening and closing the refrigerator permissibly, one may ask the non-Jew to remove the bulb, because turning off electric lights is only prohibited rabbinically, and one may ask a non-Jew to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of Shabbat (above 9:11; below 25:2, 5).

    If no non-Jew is available, and the food is truly needed, then when the compressor has cycled off, the refrigerator may be unplugged using a shinui, such as by prying the plug out of the socket using a thin piece of wood or plastic. Since the plug is muktzeh, it may not be moved in the normal fashion (below 23:14).[9]

    In a case where one is uncertain whether or not the bulb was removed, many poskim maintain that one may open the refrigerator. First, he does not intend to turn on the light, but only to open the refrigerator. If the light does go on, it is a case of psik reisha – he is performing a permitted action, and a second prohibited action takes place collaterally – which is normally prohibited. However, since the prohibited action might not occur, this is a case of an uncertain (safek) psik reisha, which is not prohibited. Although some are stringent in such cases, the lenient position is the primary one.

    If the refrigerator was opened and the light went on, food that is needed may be removed. The refrigerator should not be closed. Rather, a towel or some other object should be positioned in a way that prevents the refrigerator from closing and turning off the light. This way, the refrigerator can also be reopened.[10]

    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2
    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2

    [9]. SSK 10:14 permits one to pull the plug using a shinui, but only if it often plugged and unplugged. If this is not the case, he is concerned that unplugging it might qualify as Soter. In 15:3 above I write that even if a particular appliance is not plugged and unplugged regularly, the law follows the majority of plugs (which are plugged and unplugged regularly), and we do not distinguish between types of plug. Therefore, there is no problem of Boneh or Soter. Menuĥat Ahava 1:24:20 is not concerned about this and allows one to remove the plug with a shinui. In any case, as long as a shinui is used, then even concerns of Boneh and Soter amount to a doubt about a rabbinic law, and when necessary one may be lenient. However, it is still forbidden to plug the appliance back in. See Harĥavot for what to do in a case of dire necessity.Nowadays, most refrigerators have near-constant electrical activity, and pulling the plug puts an immediately stop to this activity, resulting in an act of Mekhabeh. Nevertheless, as long as one pulls the plug with a shinui, since the prohibition of turning off electricity is rabbinic, it is a shvut di-shvut, which is permitted for the sake of a mitzva, as explained above in 9:11.

    Asking a minor: In cases of necessity, when the food is needed to feed a minor, one may ask the child to open the refrigerator. Since he has no intention of turning the light on, his act of opening the door is only prohibited rabbinically, and several Rishonim maintain that one may instruct a minor to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for his own needs. Some extend this leniency to cases of great need, and when necessary one may rely on them, as explained below 24:5 and in Harĥavot here.

    [10]. The status of a safek psik reisha is subject to dispute. Taz permits it, while R. Akiva Eger forbids it. The poskim tend to be lenient in times of necessity, especially when it is a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei, in which case it is a case of doubt about a rabbinic law, as explained in BHL 316:3 s.v. “ve-lakhen.” SSK 10:15 applies this rule to the case of a refrigerator, as does Menuĥat Ahava 1:24:20. See above, 9:5 and n. 2 and Harĥavot 9:5:8. If the refrigerator has been opened and the light is already on, and one is desperate to close the refrigerator door so that the food will not spoil, he should push the door in the opposite direction and then let it swing shut on its own. This way it is closed via grama. As San. 77b explains, if one throws a rock upward, and it then falls straight down, such an action is considered grama )Orĥot Shabbat ch. 29 n. 38).

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