05. The Prohibitions of Carrying on Shabbat

    We have seen that the prohibition of Hotza’ah applies to carrying objects from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim or karmelit (which rabbinically is considered a reshut ha-rabim), and vice versa. We have also seen that it is prohibited for one to carry an object four amot within a reshut ha-rabim or a karmelit. Now let us see more precisely how this Torah prohibition is defined.

    The melakha of Hotza’ah has three stages:

    1) picking up an object in one domain (akira, [lit. “uprooting”]);

    2) transporting it to a different domain (ha’avara);

    3) putting it down in that domain (hanaĥa).

    Even if one accomplishes all three of these with one action, for example, by throwing an object from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim, or throwing it four amot within a reshut ha-rabim, he has violated Hotza’ah. Similarly, if one is holding an object or has one in his pocket as he walks from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim, he violates Hotza’ah. When he begins to walk, he “uproots” the object; when he walks from one domain to the other, he transports it to a different domain; and when he stops walking in the second domain, he is putting it down.[3]

    In order to transgress a Torah prohibition, one person must complete all three stages. Thus, if one picks up an item in a reshut ha-yaĥid and extends his arm with the item into a reshut ha-rabim, he has not transgressed by Torah law unless he puts down the item in the reshut ha-rabim. If someone else, standing in the reshut ha-rabim, removes the item from his hand, the item has been transported from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim, but neither person has performed an entire melakha by Torah law, since the first person performed akira and ha’avara while the second person performed hanaĥa.

    The Sages nevertheless prohibited transporting objects in this way, lest people circumvent the Torah prohibition, grow accustomed to taking it lightly, and ultimately transgress Torah law by performing all three stages (SA 347:1).

    It is important to be aware that, according to Torah law, the prohibition on Hotza’ah applies only when it is performed in the usual fashion. For example, if one takes an item in his hand, slips it in his pocket, or puts it in his backpack, he is carrying normally and is thus transgressing Torah law. In contrast, if he uses a shinui, such as carrying a handkerchief in his shoe or on his head, he has not violated Torah law. Nevertheless, the Sages prohibited carrying with a shinui lest people end up carrying without a shinui.

    In sum, the Torah prohibition of Hotza’ah is limited to the performance of the entire melakha by one individual in the way it is normally done during the week. Additionally, the Sages prohibited any action that causes the same result as the melakha, even if it is done with a shinui or undertaken by more than one person. If the goal is accomplished – transferring the item to the desired place – the action is prohibited. It is important to note that even in a karmelit, the Sages prohibited carrying an item with a shinui or by more than one person.[4]


    [3]. One may not carry while walking nonstop from a reshut ha-yaĥid through a reshut ha-rabim into another reshut ha-yaĥid. Some say that this is prohibited by Torah law (Tosafot, Eruvin 33a, s.v. “de-ha”). However, many maintain that as long as one did not stop walking while in the reshut ha-rabim, the prohibition is only rabbinic, because as long as he is walking he has not performed a hanaĥa in the reshut ha-rabim (Rashba and Ritva, Eruvin 33a; Taz 346:2). Indeed, practical halakha follows this position (SAH 347:9; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach cited in SSK ch. 30 n. 134). Therefore, where there is uncertainty about the validity of the local eruv, one may carry while walking nonstop from a reshut ha-yaĥid to another reshut ha-yaĥid via a reshut ha-rabim. As long as he does not stop, his carrying involves an uncertainty about a doubly rabbinic law: first, most poskim maintain that what we call a reshut ha-rabim is in fact a rabbinic karmelit; second, walking nonstop from a reshut ha-yaĥid into another reshut ha-yaĥid via reshut ha-rabim is also prohibited rabbinically.

    [4]. The distinction between a rabbinic and a Torah prohibition lies in the severity of the punishment. One who knowingly violates Shabbat by Torah law is punished with karet (extirpation); if the violation is unknowing, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If he does the melakha with a shinui, which means the prohibition is rabbinic, then if he did so knowingly, he is given rabbinically-ordained lashes; if it is unknowing, there is no punishment. An additional difference is that when it comes to a Torah prohibition, we are only lenient if danger to life is involved; in contrast, when a prohibition is rabbinic, there are certain times of necessity when we may be lenient even if there is no danger to life. For example, one who is sick may violate certain rabbinic prohibitions (below 28:2). Additionally, one who stands to lose a great deal of money may disregard certain rabbinic prohibitions in order to salvage his money by, for example, carrying money with a shinui from a reshut ha-rabim to a reshut ha-yaĥid (Rema 301:33; MB 266:17). The Sages also permitted violating rabbinic prohibitions in order to save tefilin, as explained in SA 301:42. See also the next section.

    06. Carrying Less than Four Amot in a Reshut Ha-Rabim

    We have seen in the previous sections that the prohibition of Hotza’ah includes transporting an object more than four amot in a public domain, since one’s personal space within the public domain is defined as four amot. If he transports an object further, he is deemed to have moved it to a different domain and transgressed Torah law. But within a square of four amot by four amot one may carry. Therefore, only one who carries something a distance greater than the diagonal of a four-amot square (2.58 m) has violated a Torah prohibition, because only then is it clear that he carried outside the permissible area.

    By Torah law, one who wants to transport an object within a reshut ha-rabim may carry it a bit less than four amot, stand still in order to establish a new location for the object, then walk again for less than four amot. He can continue in this way – starting and stopping – until he has transported the object wherever he wants it. However, the Sages forbade this lest one end up carrying more than four amot and thus violate Torah law. Even in a karmelit, which is considered a reshut ha-rabim only rabbinically, they forbade carrying an object less than four amot out of concern that one might come to carry more than four amot in a reshut ha-rabim.[5]

    However, one who stands to lose his money, such as one who is traveling with a large sum of money when Shabbat begins and has no safe place to hide it, and no non-Jew is available to guard the money or transport it to his home, then in order to prevent his suffering a financial loss the Sages permit the Jew to carry his backpack in the manner discussed in the previous paragraph – starting and stopping, and making sure to walk less than four amot each time (paĥot paĥot mi-daled amot). He may continue this way until he reaches a place where he can safely leave the money. This permission applies even in a reshut ha-rabim. In a karmelit, one may generally carry this way for the sake of a mitzva (SA 266:7, 8; BHL 349:5).[6]


    [5]. According to many poskim (Raavad, Ha-Ma’or, Rosh, and others), if many people are there, it is permitted le-khatĥila for each one to carry an item fewer than four amot and pass it to the next person, who will also carry it less than four amot. Using this method, they can transport the object across great distances. Pri Megadim allows this even when there are only two people involved, as long as each one carries the item less than four amot before passing it back to the other person. In contrast, some Rishonim prohibit doing this even with many people (Ramban). These positions are cited by SA 349:3 and BHL s.v. “va-ĥavero.” The Sages permitted carrying tefilin on Shabbat in this manner, if it is necessary in order to keep them safe (SA 301:42).

    [6]. If the person who did not make it home before the start of Shabbat was walking nonstop from before Shabbat began, there is another possible solution. He can run until he arrives at his home. Since the akira of the object was done before Shabbat began, in any case he will not violate Torah law. In order to save his money, the Sages allowed him to run to his house, even though this involves transporting an item to a different reshut (ha’avara) and setting it down there (hanaĥa), which are normally prohibited. They ruled that he should run, to ensure that he does not make the mistake of stopping (Shabbat 153b: “He should run, not go gently [i.e., walk]. Why? Since there is nothing to remind him, he may end up performing akira and hanaĥa”). If possible, upon arrival in the reshut ha-yaĥid, he should take off his backpack with a shinui, so as to minimize the prohibition as much as possible (SA 266:11).

    07. Carrying in a Mekom Petur

    As we have seen (section 3), a mekom petur is an area within a reshut ha-rabim like a stone taller than three tefaĥim (about 23 cm) but less than four tefaĥim wide (about 30 cm). Since a mekom petur is not deemed significant, one may transport an object from a reshut ha-rabim or a reshut ha-yaĥid and place it on a mekom petur, and vice versa.

    According to Torah law one may move an object from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim by first removing it from the reshut ha-yaĥid and placing it on the mekom petur and then picking it up from the mekom petur and placing it in the reshut ha-rabim. However, the Sages forbade this lest people make light of Hotza’ah that is prohibited by Torah law as well.

    Poskim disagree about whether one may use a mekom petur to transfer an item from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a karmelit or vice versa. Some maintain that it is rabbinically prohibited to transfer items by means of a mekom petur even to a karmelit. Even though all the prohibitions of carrying in a karmelit are rabbinic, the Sages did not differentiate here (Ha-Ma’or, Raavad, and Rosh). Others maintain that only when there is a concern that people will end up violating Torah law by carrying from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a reshut ha-rabim or vice versa is it forbidden to transfer items via a mekom petur, but one may transfer them from a reshut ha-yaĥid to a karmelit in this fashion (Rif and Rambam).

    In practice, at times of necessity one may rely on those who are lenient and carry from a reshut ha-yaĥid or a karmelit and vice versa via a mekom petur. This is important for soldiers who are stuck in a place with no eruv on Shabbat. If they want to move something from their tent (which is a reshut ha-yaĥid) to the common area of the encampment (which is a karmelit), they should leave their tent and keep moving until they find a mekom petur on which to place the item. Afterward, they can take it from the mekom petur and put it down in the common area, and vice versa. This should also be the procedure for transferring items from one tent to the next via the common area. The item should be removed from the tent, left on a mekom petur in the common area, and then taken wherever it needs to go.[7]


    [7]. This is the most practical solution for soldiers in the Israeli army. The best mekom petur is a rock or a pole that is higher than ten tefaĥim (76 cm) and narrower than four tefaĥim (about 30 cm). However, if this pole or rock is lower than ten tefaĥim, as we saw in n. 2, the poskim disagree about whether it is deemed a mekom petur. Some say that there is no such thing as a mekom petur within a karmelit, while others maintain that it can exist. In times of necessity, soldiers in the army may be lenient (Meshiv Milĥama §5 and §60). Sometimes the only way to arrange a mekom petur is by using a bench that is narrower than four tefaĥim . The problem is that another doubt arises in this case, because Me’iri states that a finished product (kli) cannot be considered a mekom petur (SHT 345:15). But in times of necessity when there is no other solution, a kli that is lower than ten tefaĥim in a karmelit can be considered a mekom petur (Sho’el U-meshiv 4:3:2; Hilkhot Eruvin ch. 1 n. 16).A person’s shoulder: According to Rashba and Tosafot, another person’s body can be considered a mekom petur, on condition that it is higher than ten tefaĥim; a person’s shoulder generally fits this condition. Others say that a person’s body cannot be considered a place, and therefore cannot be a mekom petur (see MB 347:10). In times of necessity when there is no other solution, one may rely upon the lenient position.

    08. Reshut Ha-rabim as Defined by Torah Law

    The most pressing practical question when dealing with issues of Hotza’ah on Shabbat is whether streets in cities and towns are considered a reshut ha-rabim or karmelit. If streets today are considered a reshut ha-rabim, then it is very difficult to do what is necessary to transform them into a reshut ha-yaĥid. This transformation involves surrounding the entire city with a fence, installing doors in every entranceway, and ensuring that they are all closed at night. Barring this, it would be prohibited to carry in our cities and towns.

    In contrast, if streets today are defined as a karmelit (i.e., only rabbinically are they treated as a reshut ha-rabim), then it is relatively easy to transform them into a reshut ha-yaĥid where carrying would be permitted. This transformation involves surrounding the city with a tzurat ha-petaĥ (halakhic doorway), by erecting poles and extending strings between them to form a sort of doorway between every pole (below 29:2-3).

    Let us preface our discussion by recalling that the prohibitions of Shabbat are derived from the types of labor performed for the Mishkan. When the Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat, it means refraining from Mishkan work, in which the Jews were involved in the desert. If so, then the definition of reshut ha-rabim should also be derived from the Israelites’ desert existence. Since the main thoroughfare in the Israelite camp was sixteen amot wide (7.30 m) in order to enable the passage of the two wagons that transported the different parts of the Mishkan, it follows that only a street equally wide is deemed a reshut ha-rabim. However, Rishonim disagree whether, in order to qualify an area as a reshut ha-rabim, there is also a minimum requirement for the number of people who make use of the street.

    Some maintain that any street or marketplace that is open to the public and is sixteen amot wide is considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. It makes no difference how many people pass through each day. According to this opinion, the eruvin that we construct nowadays (namely, the type known as tzurat ha-petaĥ) are ineffective, because our cities have streets wider than sixteen amot. Furthermore, according to this position, as long as a city has streets that are sixteen amot wide, a tzurat ha-petaĥ is not effective for the smaller streets either; the existence of a reshut ha-rabim within an area encompassed by a tzurat ha-petaĥ invalidates it. This is the opinion of Rambam, Rabbeinu Tam, Ramban, Rashba, and many others.

    Others maintain that since the camp of the Israelites in the desert consisted of 600,000 men, all of whom needed to walk to the Mishkan in order to help build it and to hear the Torah taught by our teacher Moshe, the Kohanim, and the Levi’im, it follows that a reshut ha-rabim is defined as a road or marketplace that is at least sixteen amot wide, and through which 600,000 people pass daily. If fewer people traverse it daily, it is considered a karmelit. This is the opinion of Behag, Rashi, Smag, Rosh, and many others. Within this position, there is an additional debate. Some maintain that an area still qualifies as a reshut ha-rabim even if it is not used by 600,000 daily, but only frequently or even just occasionally. For in the desert, not all the men traveled on the path to the Mishkan every day. In practice, only in megacities such as New York City and Mexico City are there streets traversed by 600,000 people every day. Even most big cities do not have that many people passing through daily. Thus according to this opinion, most streets are not considered a reshut ha-rabim but rather a karmelit. Therefore, carrying there on Shabbat can be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type. According to this opinion, today the streets considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law are mainly intercity highways. Since these roads are meant to serve everybody, and their use is not limited to people of one city alone, they are considered reshut ha-rabim even if fewer than 600,000 people pass through each day.[8]


    [8]. BHL 345:7 lists twelve Rishonim who are lenient and twelve who are stringent. According to the simple reading of SA, one should be stringent. Based on this, a number of Aĥaronim write that le-khatĥila Sephardim must be stringent and not rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type (Yalkut Yosef 345:4; Menuĥat Ahava 3:27:10, 59). In contrast, some Aĥaronim (MA, AHS) argue that R. Yosef Karo did not reach a decision, since SA in multiple places seems to follow the lenient position (303:18; 325:2). In the introduction to the second volume of Or Le-Tziyon 1:1:1-2, R. Ben-Zion Abba Shaul explains that R. Karo is stringent in a case of doubt about a Torah law and lenient in a case of doubt about a rabbinic law. Based on this principle, R. Abba Shaul resolves the apparent contradictions in SA. MA and Taz observe that most poskim tend to be lenient here. Therefore, they continue, one may rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type to permit carrying in our cities. Many Ashkenazim follow this. Other Aĥaronim write that even though we cannot dissuade those who are lenient, nevertheless it is proper for a one who wishes to act virtuously in the eyes of his Creator to be stringent, since this is a doubt about a Torah law. MB 345:23 states similarly.Regarding the lenient position, some questions have been raised. First, if, indeed, it is necessary to have 600,000 use an area in order for it to be deemed a reshut ha-rabim, how is it possible that this criterion is nowhere mentioned in the Gemara? Second, the Sages decreed that we should not blow the shofar on Rosh Ha-shana if it falls on Shabbat and that we should not shake the lulav on the first day of Sukkot if it falls on Shabbat out of concern that people would carry the shofar or lulav in the public domain (RH 29b). In the time of the Sages, there were no streets with 600,000 people passing through. If a place with fewer than that many people is not considered a reshut ha-rabim, no one could have been carrying in a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. If this is the case, why did they make their decree? Third, if there is no such thing as a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law today, why did they decree (section 14 below) that women not go out with their jewelry, out of concern that they would carry it?

    A possible answer is that the reason that the Sages decreed not to blow the shofar or go out with jewelry on Shabbat is that even according to the lenient position, intercity roads are considered reshut ha-rabim regardless of how many people use them, as explained in BHL 345:7 toward the end of s.v. “she-ein.” In the time of the Sages, traveling on intercity roads was common since the cities were small. People would travel from city to city and from village to city on the same roads. The reason for the difference between intracity roads and intercity ones is that the roads outside a city belong to the entire world. Therefore, even if less than 600,000 people traverse an intercity road daily, it still belongs to the public and is considered a reshut ha-rabim. In contrast, a road within a city or adjacent to it belongs to the city residents and is not a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. In such a case, only if 600,000 people traverse it daily is it considered a public road rather than belonging to the city’s residents. Based on this, we can understand why the Sages said that if the gates of Jerusalem had not been locked at night, it would have been a reshut ha-rabim (Eruvin 6b), even though presumably fewer than 600,000 people passed through daily. Since Jerusalem served the entire Jewish people, its streets belonged to all the pilgrims, and thus were comparable to intercity roads. Therefore, had the city not been walled, and had the gates not been locked each night, it would have been deemed a reshut ha-rabim. See more in the next note.

    09. In Practice

    In practice, most observant Jews follow the lenient position and carry in cities, relying on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type. This leads to an interesting question: given that half of the poskim are stringent, believing that an eruv of the tzurat hapetaĥ type is not sufficient in cities with streets wider than sixteen amot (and that it is irrelevant how many people pass through), how is it that most observant Jews follow the lenient position? After all, it is a case of doubt pertaining to a Torah law, where we are normally stringent.

    The simple answer is that in rare cases, when dealing with an issue in which it is very difficult to be stringent, sometimes the custom takes hold to rely on a lenient opinion even though there is a possible Torah violation at stake. Furthermore, it truly is difficult to follow the stringent position here, as that would mean that no one could go out on Shabbat with anything in his pockets, even tissues and the like, which are sometimes necessary. Additionally, families would not be able to visit one another, because one may not push a stroller in a reshut ha-rabim, and there would be no way to bring diapers, bottles, and so on. Since there is no alternative, and given that half of the poskim are lenient, we can rely on the lenient position in this case.

    We should add that the poskim are not really evenly divided in this case. As we will see, some poskim ruled that there are additional requirements that must be met in order for an area to be considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. If we take these requirements into account, it turns out that according to most poskim, today’s streets would not qualify as a reshut ha-rabim. Therefore, an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type is sufficient. First, according to some poskim, an area is considered a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law only when the street bisects the entire city in a straight line. If it is slightly crooked, it is no longer a reshut ha-rabim. Most cities do not have a main street that is completely straight, and thus we may rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type. Second, some poskim feel that since our streets are laid out such that every street is intersected by another street, all the streets are considered enclosed by a wall on three sides. Accordingly, they do not qualify as a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, and an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type is sufficient (AHS and Ĥazon Ish). There are additional reasons to be lenient, as explained in the notes.

    When we combine all these opinions, it turns out that according to the majority of poskim, today’s streets are considered a karmelit, and carrying in them can be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type.

    Nevertheless, according to many, since a Torah prohibition may be at stake, le-khatĥila it is proper not to rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type in a place where there are streets wider than sixteen amot.[9]

    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2
    PENINEI HALAKHA LAWS OF SHABBAT VOLUME 1+2

    [9]. There are four, maybe five reasons that our streets are not considered reshut ha-rabim by Torah law.1) As we have seen, according to half the poskim, if 600,000 people do not traverse an area daily, it is not a public domain. Very few places meet this condition. Even though some maintain that even a street that occasionally has that many passersby is considered a reshut ha-rabim (AHS 345:26; Beit Ephraim, OĤ 26; Hilkhot Eruvin, p. 25 based on the Rishonim’s expression “600,000 found there”), such a street is uncommon as well.

    2) According to Rashi and others, a street is only considered a reshut ha-rabim if it bisects the city in an absolutely straight line. Generally, this is not the case. (However, Igrot Moshe, OĤ 1:148 rejects this reasoning.)

    3) Some (Beit Ephraim, OĤ 26; AHS 345:19-22; Ĥazon Ish, OĤ 107:5-8) state that given the way our streets are laid out, where each street is intersected by another street, all the streets can be considered enclosed by a wall on three sides. For according to Torah law, a wall only needs to be mostly closed. Since buildings line most streets, closing off most of the area, a street is already enclosed by two walls. Since another street intersects it, and this second street also has buildings that are close enough together to be considered a wall, the intersecting street provides the third wall. It turns out that every city street is enclosed by three walls, and thus by Torah law is not deemed a reshut ha-rabim. It is only rabbinically that an enclosure requires four walls and that a wall must be completely closed. Since this is a doubt about a rabbinic law, we can be lenient.

    4) One can present a reasonable argument that it is the Sages who decided that an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type is not sufficient to permit carrying in a reshut ha-rabim; by the original Torah law, a tzurat ha-petaĥ is considered a true wall. Thus the entire debate is on the rabbinic level, and when there is a doubt about a rabbinic rule, we are lenient. (BHL presents this in 364:2 as the opinion of Rambam. Even though difficulties have been raised with it, Or Le-Tziyon 1:30 suggests that Rosh as well maintains that a tzurat ha-petaĥ is considered a wall by Torah law, in which case the debate is on the rabbinic level.)

    5) Perhaps we may also say that since part of the State of Israel is surrounded by walls on three sides (albeit very distant ones), according to Tosafot they are considered legitimate walls by Torah law, so once again we are faced with a doubt about a rabbinic law (see Harĥavot 29:4:3).

    Thus we see that the poskim are not truly evenly divided in this case. Rather, according to most poskim, our streets are not defined as a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. Additionally, it is a sfek sfeika (in fact, there are four uncertainties). According to the rules of halakhic jurisprudence, in such a case the law follows the lenient position.

    Some big cities contain streets where 600,000 people indeed pass through every day – not by foot but by car or bus. At first glance, it would seem that carrying in such cities cannot be permitted with an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that these intracity highways are not considered reshut ha-rabim. For since they are closed to pedestrians, they are not really open to the public. Besides, each car is considered a reshut ha-yaĥid (Yeshu’ot Malko, OĤ 26). Following this reasoning, all would agree that most streets today are not public domains according to Torah law, because once we disqualify the part of a street used by cars, the street is no longer sixteen amot wide. Some disagree with this approach (AHS 345:26; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 1:139).

    Other objections have been raised to our eruvin. First, if a city contains non-Jews or Jews who desecrate Shabbat, the Sages decreed that they cannot be included in the halakhic partnership on which an eruv is based, and thus it cannot work. See below 29:7 for solutions to this problem. Second, there are often large gardens in cities, larger than beit satayim (see n. 1). These areas disqualify the eruv because they are not designed for walking in. However, in practice, if one may walk in these gardens and there are paths running through them, they do not disqualify the eruv. If the gardens are enclosed by a fence, they also do not disqualify the eruv. Third, Rambam maintains that an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type is not effective if the distance between the poles is greater than ten amot (4.56 m). However, since most poskim disagree with him, and the law is rabbinic, we do not take his position into account. (This is according to the anonymous position cited in SA 362:10.)

    Even in an area enclosed by an eruv, some people try to avoid relying on it. For example, when they need to bring a baby or anything else from one house to another via the street, they walk nonstop until they reach their destination. Since there is no hanaĥa in the reshut ha-rabim, according to many this is not considered carrying by Torah law (as explained in n. 3). Doing this adds another rabbinic element to the equation, and it seems that one may thus be lenient even le-khatĥila.

    10. Wearing Clothes Is Not Considered Carrying

    One may put on his clothes, shoes, and hat, and then enter a reshut ha-rabim, because clothes are secondary to one’s body. As long as one is wearing them, they do not have independent status but are viewed as part of his body. Thus, he is not viewed as carrying them.

    Even clothes that are designed to be worn under specific conditions are considered secondary to the body. Therefore, one may wear a plastic raincoat over a coat or galoshes over shoes, since these are examples of normal rain gear. One may also wear two pairs of socks or two shirts, one on top of the other, since in the winter some people do this regularly. Therefore, if one wishes to bring his friend a shirt via a reshut ha-rabim, he can wear it over his own shirt and walk to his friend’s home, even during the summer. However, if he just picks up the shirt or carries it over his shoulder and then enters a reshut ha-rabim, he violates Torah law.[10]

    If a woman wants to carry a blanket or tablecloth through the public domain, she may wrap herself in it the way she would wrap herself in a shawl. Even though these items are not themselves clothes, as long as they are worn in the same fashion as clothes, one may enter a different domain with them. Similarly, one who is going to immerse in a mikveh can wrap himself in a towel and walk through a reshut ha-rabim, and one who wants to carry a kerchief may wrap it around his neck like a scarf, and go out (MB 301:133; SSK 18:48). The underlying principle is that one may wear any item in the normal manner of dressing (SA 301:35-36).

    The Sages ordained that one should not enter a reshut ha-rabim wearing an item of clothing that is likely to fall off, out of concern that he will end up carrying it four amot in the reshut ha-rabim.[11] In contrast, one may go outside wearing a yarmulke, even if it is not held very firmly in place. Even if it were to fall off, we are not concerned that he would carry it four amot, since a man may not walk four amot without a head-covering. Therefore, if it falls off, we can assume that immediately after picking it up he will replace it (SA 301:7; MB ad loc. 153).

    Some maintain that one should not wear gloves in an area without an eruv. After all, if it becomes warm, he might take them off, put them in his pocket, and walk four amot, thus violating Torah law. Le-khatĥila, it is proper to be stringent, but the custom is to be lenient (SA 301:37; see BHL ad loc.).

    The poskim disagree about the status of a plastic cover that is made to protect a man’s hat from the rain. Some forbid wearing this cover, arguing that it is not worn in the same way as clothing, and its sole purpose is to protect the hat. Others permit wearing it, maintaining that it is indeed worn in the same way as clothing. One who wishes may be lenient.[12]


    [10]. According to SA 301:36, any item of clothing may be worn outside, even if it is worn in an unusual way. For example, one may wear two belts, one on top of the other. Since each belt is put on in the normal way of dressing – it is permitted. However, Rema maintains that this is only considered the normal way of dressing if there are people who sometimes dress that way. Accordingly, one may wear two shirts, one on top of the other, or similarly layer two pairs of socks. In contrast, since no one wears two belts in the manner described above, one may not go outside dressed this way on Shabbat.

    [11]. AHS 301:53 maintains that if there is an item of clothing that is technically permissible to wear in a reshut ha-rabim but was rabbinically prohibited (out of concern that one might carry it four amot if it were to fall off, if people were to make fun of it, or if he were to need to remove it to go to the bathroom), that prohibition is applicable only in a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law. The only type of item that the Sages prohibited one to wear even in a karmelit is women’s jewelry (see section 14 below).

    [12]. Igrot Moshe, OĤ 1:108-110 prohibits going out wearing a plastic hat cover. This is based on SA 301:13-14, which states that items designed to protect clothing are not considered clothing, and thus one may not go out wearing them. Since plastic hat covers are meant to protect hats and not people’s bodies, they are not clothing. They are also not decorative, so they may not be worn on Shabbat. This is also the opinion of Minĥat Yitzĥak 3:26. There is also a concern that once the rain stops, one might remove the hat cover and carry it four amot. However, according to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, a plastic cover that was made especially for a hat and that is not removed when the rain stops can be considered an item of clothing, and one may walk in a reshut ha-rabim wearing it (SSK ch. 18 n. 46). This is also the position of Tzitz Eliezer 10:23 and Yabi’a Omer 5:24. This debate constitutes uncertainty about a rabbinic law, for even those who prohibit agree that it cannot be a Torah prohibition, as this is not the normal way to carry. This is also a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah. Moreover, according to many poskim, nowadays there is no public domain as defined by Torah law. Accordingly, one may be lenient.

    11. Items Deemed Secondary to Clothing

    Any items that are normally attached to clothing, such as buttons and pockets, are considered part of the clothing and secondary to the person’s body. Thus there is no prohibition of carrying them. Even though carrying buttons or pouches would be a violation of Hotza’ah, the buttons and pockets that are normally attached to clothing are part of the garment and secondary to it. Manufacturer’s tags are also considered part of the clothing and secondary to it. One may also wear a coat with a hood, even when the hood is not actually being worn but is hanging down behind the person; even though he has no intention of putting it on, the hood is still considered part of the coat. Items attached to clothing for decorative purposes, like buttons on the cuffs of a suit or feathers attached to a hat or another garment, are also considered part of the garment.

    Sometimes, extra buttons are sewn into a garment in a hidden area, to be used as replacements in case one loses a button. These buttons are not used to fasten or decorate the garment. Some maintain that since these buttons are not in current use yet are significant, one may not go out with them to a reshut ha-rabim (Ĥayei Adam 56:3). According to most poskim, however, one may go out with them. Since it is standard for these buttons to be attached to an item of clothing, they are considered a part of it and secondary to it. The same debate pertains to a ripped hanging loop, which is sewn into a coat or jacket to allow it to be easily hung up. Normally, the loop is attached and functional like a regular button. However, if one side of the loop rips, it is not in current use. The strict position would say that that it remains significant, and thus one may not go out with such a coat to a reshut ha-rabim. The lenient position would respond that regardless whether one intends to fix the loop, it is not considered significant, and remains secondary to the coat. Thus, one may wear the coat in a reshut ha-rabim. Since the disagreement here relates to a rabbinic prohibition, the halakha follows the lenient position.[13]


    [13]. The law of extra buttons is the same as that of a ripped belt loop or buttonhole. According to Ĥayei Adam 56:3, if one intends to fix and reattach it, he renders it significant. Since it currently cannot be used for the button or belt, wearing it outside is considered carrying it. The law would similarly apply to one wearing unfit tzitzit outside, which is a transgression (SA 301:30). This is also the status of a hanging loop that has ripped on one side. Since one can no longer hang the item of clothing from it, one may not wear it in a public domain. This is the position of MB 301:150, and SSK 18:33, 42, and 44 follows it as well. Some suggest that one should resolve not to fix the loop, but rather to throw it away and attach a new one. This way the torn loop is not significant for him, and reverts to being secondary to the clothing. Thus one may wear the clothing in a reshut ha-rabim. Many poskim, though, maintain that these loops are not significant and are always considered secondary to the clothing. They are only considered significant if they are made out of gold, and it would be forbidden to wear them outside if they are not functional. This is the position of SAH 301:47, AHS ad loc. 107, Tehila Le-David §32, and other poskim as quoted in Menuĥat Ahava 3:27:27. In any case, it would seem that even those who prohibit would concede that the prohibition is only rabbinic, since this is not the normal way of carrying, and it is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah. Thus, this constitutes an uncertainty about a rabbinic law. (However, further analysis is required before comparing our case to that of unfit tzitzit, which is discussed in SA 301:30. There, one can say that wearing tzitzit on clothing is the normal way to carry them. Furthermore, the act of carrying there is le-tzorekh gufah; it is for the sake of the tzitzit itself, as the mitzva requires the tzitzit to be attached to the clothing that one then wears outside. Even if the tzitzit are disqualified, the person wishes to bring them home in order to fix them, so he is carrying them in the normal fashion. All this is not true of our case, in which the person walks around in the clothing without giving a thought to the extra buttons or torn loop. Thus this is not le-tzorekh gufah, nor is anyone accustomed to carrying buttons or loops in this fashion.)

    12. Items That Serve the Body – Glasses and Bandages

    Just as one may walk in a reshut ha-rabim while wearing clothes because they are deemed secondary to his body, so too one may enter a reshut ha-rabim with other items that serve him, as they too are considered secondary to his body (SA 301:22). For example, one who is hard of hearing may enter a reshut ha-rabim wearing a hearing aid (above 17:3). Similarly, one who is nearsighted may go out wearing glasses, because the glasses are secondary to the body. However, one may not wear sunglasses in a reshut ha-rabim, because there is a concern that when he reaches a shady area he will take them off, put them in his pocket, and carry them. If one needs to wear sunglasses because his eyes are sensitive, and he does not remove them even in the shade, then he may wear them in a reshut ha-rabim. If one has clip-on sunglasses that can simply be flipped up when necessary without being removed from the glasses, he may wear them in a reshut ha-rabim, since there is no concern that one will end up removing and carrying them (see SSK 18:18; Yalkut Yosef 301:35).

    If one is wearing an adhesive or cloth bandage to help heal or protect a cut, it is considered serving his body and may be worn in a reshut ha-rabim. Similarly, one with a wounded arm may go out wearing a sling. One whose ear hurts may go out with cotton in it. Bite plates and orthodontic retainers may also be worn. All of these serve the body and are secondary to it (SA 301:28; MB ad loc. 108; SSK 34:29).

    13. Canes, Seeing-Eye Dogs, and Wheelchairs

    If one is partially disabled and needs a cane to walk, he may walk in a reshut ha-rabim with a cane because the cane has the same status as his shoes – indispensable for walking. However, if he can walk without a cane, even if only with great difficulty, he may not enter a reshut ha-rabim with a cane (SA 301:17).

    A blind person, who normally uses a white cane to help him get around, may not use it on Shabbat if he can manage without it; in such a case, the cane is considered a burden and may not be used where there is no eruv (SA 301:18). If he cannot manage without it, for example, if he needs to navigate an unfamiliar neighborhood, he may go out with his cane (AHS 301:72).[14]

    A blind person may enter the public domain with a seeing-eye dog. Even though he is holding onto the harness attached to the dog, this is not prohibited. Since the harness is always attached to the dog, it is secondary to its body, and there is no problem of carrying (Igrot Moshe, OĤ 1:45; Menuĥat Ahava 3:27:49; see SSK ch. 18 n. 62 and above 20:2).

    One who is wheelchair-bound and propels the wheelchair manually may go out in the public domain with the wheelchair, as the wheelchair is considered comparable to his shoes (SA 30:16-17; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 4:90). However, if the disabled person is unable to propel himself, he may not be pushed, just as a baby who cannot walk may not be carried in the public domain or a karmelit (MB 308:153). For the sake of a mitzva, though, a non-Jew may be asked to push someone in a wheelchair. This is classified as a shvut di-shvut, which is permissible for a great need and for the sake of a mitzva (above 9:11).[15]


    [14]. Nowadays the blind are taught to use a white cane, and so they feel unable to manage without one even in familiar areas. Thus it may be permissible for them to enter a reshut ha-rabim with a cane even in a familiar area.

    [15]. Some question the permissibility of a disabled person propelling himself in a wheelchair on Shabbat (Har Tzvi, OĤ 1:170; SSK 34:27). The concern is that even if the disabled person is able to propel the wheelchair himself, it might still not be considered secondary to him. However, the primary position is the lenient one. See Yalkut Yosef 301:56; Piskei Teshuva 301:9.

    Many maintain that one may only ask a non-Jew to push a disabled person in a wheelchair in a karmelit, because, according to them, the chair is not secondary to the person, and thus pushing it is prohibited by Torah law. Thus in a reshut ha-rabim there is only one shvut involved (Ĥelkat Yaakov 1:66; Minĥat Yitzhak 2:114:6; Nishmat Avraham 301:16, n. 1). Nevertheless, there is room to say that a disabled person’s wheelchair is secondary to him. Accordingly, since “a living being carries itself,” moving him is only rabbinically prohibited. This case is comparable to that of a bedridden person, about whom the Talmud states that carrying him in a reshut ha-rabim is only rabbinically prohibited (Shabbat 93b). Thus, one may ask a non-Jew to push the disabled person even in a reshut ha-rabim. This is the position of Rabbi Peretz (Otzar Piskei Eruvin §38). It can also be argued that the status of the disabled is similar to that of the ill, for whom the Sages permitted transgressing the rabbinic prohibition of having melakha performed by a non-Jew.

    14. Jewelry

    As we have seen, the prohibition of Hotza’ah does not apply to items that are secondary to the body. Therefore, one may go out in a reshut ha-rabim wearing all types of clothing. Following this line of reasoning, it would seem that jewelry, which is used to beautify a person, should be considered secondary to the body as long as it is worn on the body or clothes, and should not present a problem of Hotza’ah.

    Nevertheless, the Sages were concerned that a woman might want to show her friend her jewelry and thus remove it, hold it, forget about Shabbat, and walk four amot in the public domain, thus violating Torah law. Therefore, the Sages prohibited wearing all jewelry that one might want to show someone else. This includes earrings, bracelets, rings, necklaces, and headbands.

    However, since the time of the Rishonim, women customarily go out wearing jewelry on Shabbat. The poskim disagree regarding why this has been the case. Some say that while it is true that technically it is rabbinically prohibited, the rabbis did not try to prevent the practice when it became widespread, because they came to the conclusion that even if they were to protest, the women would not change their ways. Therefore, the rabbis preferred not to publicize the prohibition, as it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly.

    Other poskim try to provide some justification for the practice, explaining that the reason for the rabbinic prohibition was the concern that people would end up carrying four amot in reshut ha-rabim and thus violate Torah law. Nowadays, however, when according to many there is virtually nowhere that meets the criteria of a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, even if one does end up carrying jewelry, it will not be a Torah transgression. We do not extend the prohibition on going out with jewelry into areas considered reshut ha-rabim rabbinically, as there is a principle that we do not enact a rabbinic safeguard around a rabbinic safeguard.

    Others say that since jewelry is more common now, we do not need to worry that a woman will remove her jewelry in the street to show her friends. Therefore, even in an area that is a reshut ha-rabim by Torah law, one may wear jewelry on Shabbat.

    Since the entire issue is rabbinic, one may rely on the lenient opinions. Indeed, women customarily go out wearing jewelry even where there is no eruv.[16]


    [16]. According to Rif and Rambam, in any area other than a reshut ha-yaĥid, a woman may not wear jewelry that she might remove. This is also the primary position cited in SA 103:18. Accordingly, there is no way to permit going out today wearing jewelry (Rosh and Ran). If so, the reason we do not object to this practice is because it is preferable that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly. Ramban and Rashba take this a step further and maintain that one should not wear jewelry even in a courtyard where there is an eruv, because one might forget and wear it in a reshut ha-rabim. In contrast, based on Tosafot, Shabbat 64b, Sefer Ha-Teruma maintains that nowadays, when there are no public domains that meet the Torah’s criteria, there is no prohibition against wearing jewelry. (However, as I explained in n. 8, all would agree that intercity highways are reshut ha-rabim even today. Thus we must ask why those Rishonim were not concerned about this. It would seem that in the times of the Rishonim, women were not accustomed to travel between cities, while in the earlier times of the Sages they had been accustomed to do so. Therefore, the Sages decreed that women may not go out wearing jewelry, but later the Rishonim were less concerned.) R. Shimshon writes in the name of Rabbeinu Sar Shalom that since it has become much more common than it used to be for women to wear jewelry, women are no longer accustomed to removing jewelry to show one another in reshut ha-rabim; therefore a woman may go out nowadays wearing jewelry. This is the common practice. Nevertheless, some maintain that le-khatĥila it is still preferable to be stringent and not wear jewelry in an area without an eruv.It should be noted that there were specific types of jewelry that the Sages prohibited wearing on Shabbat. This was because women customarily immersed in wells and streams to purify themselves after menstruation, and the Sages were concerned that prior to immersion they might remove their jewelry and carry it four amot to the immersion place. However, Orĥot Ĥayim points out (Hilkhot Shabbat §261) that nowadays immersion is done in a mikveh, which is in a reshut ha-yaĥid, so the concern no longer applies. This can justify the current practice of wearing jewelry on Shabbat (SSK ch. 18 n. 55).

    15. Watches, Keys, Identity Cards, and Medications

    The poskim disagree about the status of a watch. Some maintain that only if it is decorative like jewelry may it be worn in the public domain. The test for whether it can be considered decorative is what the owner does if the watch stops. If he would take it off, it indicates that the watch is not jewelry and is used only to tell time. Since that use is not for the sake of his body, wearing the watch in the public domain is considered carrying and is prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, if the owner leaves it on even when it has stopped because it is decorative (for example, if it is made of gold), then it is deemed jewelry and may be worn in the public domain.

    Many poskim maintain that since a watch is worn on the body as is clothing – a person without a watch feels as if he is not fully dressed, and the normal use of a watch is while it is on the body – it follows that the watch is secondary to the body. Thus it is considered like an item of clothing or jewelry, which may be worn on Shabbat in a reshut ha-rabim. The primary opinion is the lenient one, but one who chooses to be stringent should be commended.[17]

    A serious problem arises for people who live in or visit an area without an eruv. What can they do when they leave the house and need to take a key with them? The solution is to use the key as a belt buckle. This means one should take a shoelace and thread it through the key, tie it with a bow knot, and put it on as a belt, so that the key will serve as a buckle. In this way one may wear the key in the public domain (SSK 18:49-50; see n. 10 above).

    There are places where people must carry an identity card or passport on their person at all times. If someone there must go out on Shabbat for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, he should carry the passport or identity card with a shinui. For example, he may place it under his hat, or inside his shirt where it is held up by his belt. In this way, one does Hotza’ah via a shvut di-shvut, which he may do for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva (above 9:11).

    Similarly, if a doctor has ordered a patient not to leave the house without carrying a certain medication, the patient may go out for a great need or for the sake of a mitzva, as long as he carries the medicine with a shinui. One who must rely on this leniency should try not to come to a stop in the reshut ha-rabim until he reaches the reshut ha-yaĥid that is his final destination (SSK 40:7; n. 3 above).[18]

    In a place without an eruv, if life-and-death security concerns demand that people carry a gun and a cell phone, these items may be taken along on normal Shabbat activities. The phone should be carried with a shinui, but the gun should be carried normally, as carrying it with a shinui could be dangerous. One may not go out on Shabbat with a gun or a walkie-talkie just for an outing. This rule will be explained in detail later on (27:17).


    [17]. SSK 18:27 follows the first opinion but adds that those who are lenient have grounds for their leniency. Yaskil Avdi 7:19 and Le-horot Natan 4:26 state similarly. It seems that Minĥat Yitzĥak 1:67 is stringent even when a watch is made of gold. In contrast, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is lenient, as cited in SSK ch. 18 n. 113. Similarly, Igrot Moshe states that the primary ruling permits wearing a watch (OĤ 1:111). This is also the opinion of Yeĥaveh Da’at 3:23 and Menuĥat Ahava 3:27:33. In an area enclosed by an eruv, even those who are normally stringent and do not rely on an eruv of the tzurat ha-petaĥ type for streets wider than sixteen amot are lenient to allow wearing a watch there.

    [18]. First, everyone agrees that the shinui renders the prohibition rabbinic in this case. Second, for those who maintain that there is no reshut ha-rabim today, this becomes a shvut di-shvut. Third, Maharash Engel 3:43 explains that this act of carrying is a melakha she-eina tzerikha le-gufah, because the person does not need the identity card for its own sake (le-gufah), but only to protect himself. However, it is difficult to claim that one who must carry medication does not need the medicine for its own sake (see Tzitz Eliezer 13:34). According to those who maintain that there are areas that qualify as reshut ha-rabim even nowadays, there is less room for leniency. Thus, it is proper when carrying medication to avoid stopping in reshut ha-rabim, as explained above in n. 3 (see Nishmat Avraham 301:2, n. 1). Le-khatĥila, one should not stop when carrying an identity card either.

    01. The Mitzva to Preserve Shabbat as a Day of Rest

    The Torah commands us to refrain from melakha on Shabbat: “But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Lord your God; you shall not do any melakha” (Shemot 20:9), that is, any of the 39 types of melakha done while erecting the Mishkan, as explained to Moshe at Sinai (see above, 9:1-2). The Sages added safeguards (“fences”) so that no one would do anything that might then lead to the violation of a Torah prohibition (see above, 9:3-4). There is an additional commandment in the Torah to rest on Shabbat: “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease” (Shemot 23:12). The point here is that in addition to avoiding melakha on Shabbat, we are also meant to cease and rest from toils and troubles. Thus one should not open his store or move heavy objects in preparation for the workweek. Even though these are not included in the 39 prohibited categories of melakha, nevertheless acting in these ways negates the mitzva of resting on Shabbat (Ramban, Vayikra 23:24; see MT 21:1 and the next section below).

    Continuing with this line of thought, we find the prophets enjoining us to preserve the holy and sanctified atmosphere of Shabbat, a day on which one must avoid mundane activities. One who is careful to follow this merits great rewards, as Yeshayahu proclaims:

    If you refrain from trampling the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day; if you call Shabbat “delight,” the Lord’s holy [day] “honored,” and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them – then you will seek the Lord’s delight. I will set you astride the heights of the earth, and let you enjoy the heritage of your father Yaakov – for the mouth of the Lord has spoken. (Yeshayahu 58:13-14)

    The Sages derive many guidelines about Shabbat from this verse, and the common denominator is that one should not behave on Shabbat as one does during the week. The Gemara elaborates:

    “Honor it” – your Shabbat clothes should not be like your weekday clothes…. “Not go in your own way” – the way you walk on Shabbat should not be like the way you walk on weekdays. “Nor look to your affairs” – it is forbidden to look after your own affairs on Shabbat, but one may look after the affairs of heaven [i.e., religious matters]. “Nor speak of them” – your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on weekdays. Speaking [about mundane matters] is forbidden, but thinking about them is permitted. (Shabbat 113a).

    These directives have a higher status than general rabbinic enactments since they are rooted in the Torah’s commandment to rest and are elaborated upon by the prophets.

    We have already explained the mitzvot connected to honoring and delighting in Shabbat (chs. 2, 4, 5, 7). Honor (kavod) is expressed by wearing special Shabbat clothes, showering, cleaning the house, and lighting candles. Delight (oneg) is expressed by making Shabbat enjoyable through meals, sleep, and Torah study. In this chapter, we will explain the mitzvot and the rabbinic safeguards meant to protect Shabbat’s atmosphere as a holy day of rest. These mitzvot are at the root of everything that the Sages through the ages forbade as a weekday activity. Any activity that is unquestionably mundane is prohibited on Shabbat. This includes ball-playing for adults, swimming, working out, and bike-riding. To protect the spirit of Shabbat, the Sages also introduced the prohibition of muktzeh (as explained in the next chapter) and ordained that one may not play musical instruments (sections 17-19 below).

    Even though the mitzvot to preserve Shabbat’s spirit and avoid weekday activity (uvdin de-ĥol) are of a higher status than the safeguards of the Sages, nevertheless the halakha is stricter in demanding adherence to the safeguards, such as the prohibition to do melakha with a shinui or to ask a non-Jew to do a melakha, which are forbidden even for the sake of a mitzva (as explained above 9:3-4, 11), whereas the prohibitions connected to preserving the spirit of Shabbat may be disregarded in the service of a mitzva (as explained below). There are some prohibitions that are comprised of both of these elements: if prohibited solely to preserve the spirit of Shabbat, it might have been permitted for the sake of a mitzva, but since the Sages decreed that it is prohibited, it remains prohibited even for the sake of a mitzva.

    02. Business

    One may not engage in commerce on Shabbat. One who opens his store, buying and selling on Shabbat just as he does on weekdays, negates a Torah commandment. This prohibition applies even if he is careful to avoid transgressing any of the 39 melakhot. The Torah commands that Shabbat be a “shabbaton” (Shemot 31:15), a complete cessation. One who does business in his store is not resting (Ramban, Vayikra 23:24; Ritva; Ĥatam Sofer). Neĥemia faced this problem when he arrived in Jerusalem and found that people were holding a market day on Shabbat. He recounts:

    Tyrians (merchants) who lived there brought fish and all sorts of wares and sold them on Shabbat to the Judahites in Jerusalem. I censured the nobles of Judah, saying to them, “What evil thing is this that you are doing, profaning Shabbat day! This is just what your ancestors did, and for it God brought all this misfortune on this city; and now you give cause for further wrath against Israel by profaning Shabbat!” (Neĥemia 13:15-18)

    As a result, the merchants began selling their goods outside the city walls on Shabbat. In response, Neĥemia ordered that the gates of the city be closed over Shabbat. “Once or twice the merchants and the vendors of all sorts of wares spent the night outside Jerusalem, but I warned them, saying, ‘What do you mean by spending the night alongside the wall? If you do so again, I will lay hands upon you!’ From then on, they did not come on Shabbat” (ibid. 19-21).

    The Torah prohibition on commerce applies to one who regularly does business on Shabbat. However, one who buys or sells on Shabbat occasionally still transgresses the words of the prophets, as Yeshayahu said: “if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (58:13), and the Sages explained this to mean that one should not deal in mundane matters on Shabbat (Shabbat 113a).

    It should be noted that those verses do not record a prohibition on buying and selling for the sake of a mitzva. Nevertheless, as a safeguard, the Sages prohibited all business dealings, even in service of a mitzva, out of concern lest one write (Rashi and Tosafot, Beitza 37a; MB 306:11). The only exception to this prohibition is the mitzva of settling the land of Israel, for which one may purchase land from a non-Jew on Shabbat. The non-Jew should write the contract and take the money on his own (SA 306:11; Eliya Rabba ad loc. 22; Mor U-ketzi’a; as opposed to MA ad loc. 19; see above 9:12).

    Some are stringent and do not sell aliyot on Shabbat, because of the prohibition of doing business on Shabbat. However, many are customarily lenient, and they have grounds for their leniency. This is because, in this case, there is no acquisition (kinyan) or payment on Shabbat, and the assumption of the obligation to pay for the aliyot is deemed to be for the sake of a mitzva (MB 306:33; Yeĥaveh Da’at 2:41). However, if the synagogue’s income from this practice is minimal, it is improper to be lenient and waste the congregation’s time.

    03. Obtaining Products from Stores

    One who finds himself short of food on Shabbat for the Shabbat meals, whether on account of poor planning or the arrival of unexpected guests, may approach the owner of a store and ask him for food from his store, with the unspoken understanding that the customer will pay for the food after Shabbat. Payment is not mentioned explicitly. Rather, the customer should request the item from the owner in the same way that he would borrow the food from a neighbor. He should not use the words “buy,” “sell,” or “pay.” He may assure the store owner that later, whether Saturday night or afterward, they will discuss what was taken and settle up. Even though the store owner understands from this assurance that the customer intends to pay him, as long as payment has not been explicitly mentioned (but only hinted at), this is not forbidden.

    The store owner and customer should both be careful not to mention the price of a product, nor should they measure it or weigh it out as one would do during the week to determine its price. However, they may fill up a container (not a measuring cup) and agree that the container will be measured on Sunday, with the understanding that the price will be determined based on the amount it holds. One may use a measuring cup to transport food but not to measure out the exact amount to be poured into the customer’s container, because then it is clear that the intention is to measure. For example, one may ask a store owner for five oranges or five bottles because that is the normal way to describe the required quantity. This terminology is not used exclusively for a sale. If this customer has received items from the store owner in the past, the owner may not refer to the accumulating tab nor calculate its updated amount (SA 323:1-4; MB ad loc. 20; SSK 29:18-25).

    If the store owner does not trust the customer to remember to pay him after Shabbat, he may ask him to leave an article of clothing or an object, but he should not refer to it as “collateral,” “security deposit,” or the like (Rema 307:11).

    One who takes food from a store on Shabbat should not carry it out in a large box, as one would normally do during the week, so that witnesses do not think that he is transporting the food for commercial purposes. Rather, he should hold the items in his hands or place them on his shoulders, as one would normally do when bringing food to a meal. Even if this means he will have to make multiple trips in order to bring all the necessary food, this extra walking is preferable to giving the appearance of doing business. However, if one’s guests are waiting for the meal, then he should hurry and bring all the food at once, even if it means carrying the food as he would during the week. Additionally, if he is walking in a place where there is no chance that anyone will suspect him of doing business, he may carry the food in the normal way in order to minimize the walking (“yesh omrim” in SA 323:5; MB ad loc. 25; Rema 510:8).

    If a store or hotel owner would like to make food available on Shabbat for his customers, before Shabbat he may sell different-colored cards or tickets that entitle their bearers to various items. For example, a yellow card presented to a waiter will entitle a guest to Friday night dinner; a green card to lunch on Shabbat day; a red card to a drink; a blue card to cake, etc. If there are not enough different colors for the different options, the names of the options may be written on the cards. However, the prices may not be written on the cards because this would make the cards the equivalent of monetary contracts, which may not be read on Shabbat (MB 307:50 and 323:20; SSK 29:26).

    04. Lending, Borrowing, and Giving Gifts

    Just as one may not buy and sell on Shabbat, one may not lend anything or repay a loan. Since these activities often involve writing contracts, there is a concern that engaging in them may lead one to write. Therefore, one who needs to borrow food, clothing, or chairs for Shabbat should formulate his request in a way that makes it clear that he is borrowing the objects as one would borrow from a friend, not as one would borrow money from a bank, as it is unusual keep a written record when borrowing from a friend. Since English does not distinguish between these two types of borrowing (unlike Hebrew, which has “hashala” to refer to borrowing objects and “halva’ah” to refer to monetary lending), one should simply say “Give me” or “Can I have.” If the owner of the item is concerned that the borrower will forget to return it, he may request that the borrower leave something with him, but he should not refer to it as a deposit or collateral, as he would during the week (Shabbat 148a; Rema 307:11). If the borrower mistakenly asked for a loan, the owner may give it to him while clarifying that he may use it temporarily though one may not make a loan on Shabbat (Shulĥan Shlomo 307:15:2).

    According to many poskim, one may not give or receive presents on Shabbat because by doing so one transfers ownership of the gift, which resembles commerce (MA 306:15; Birkei Yosef ad loc. 7; MB ad loc. 33). Others maintain that one may give a gift on Shabbat because nobody writes contracts for gifts (Beit Meir based on Rif and Rambam). In practice, we are stringent le-khatĥila and avoid giving gifts on Shabbat, but if it is necessary to fulfill a mitzva, everyone agrees that one may give a gift (SA 658:3-4). Therefore, one may give a gift of utensils or food for a Shabbat meal (MB 306:33). One may also give prizes to children for participating in Torah study, as this is for the sake of a mitzva – to encourage the children to study Torah.

    It is proper for one who wants to give a bar mitzva present on Shabbat to perform the act of acquisition (kinyan) before Shabbat. That is, he should request someone else to take the gift, lifting it up (hagbaha) in order to acquire it on behalf of the bar mitzva boy. Thus, the gift is transferred to the boy’s ownership before Shabbat. On Shabbat it may be presented to him, as it already belonged to him prior to Shabbat. If hagbaha was not done, the gift can be left with the boy (who should have in mind not to acquire it) for the duration of Shabbat, and after Shabbat he may officially acquire it (SSK 29:31). Some are lenient and give gifts to a groom on Shabbat, as there is an element of mitzva involved in bringing him happiness (Eliya Rabba; Ĥatam Sofer). In a time of need, one may rely upon them (Seridei Esh 2:26).

    One may not use a lottery or other random selection mechanism on Shabbat in order to decide who will receive each portion of food. Since everyone wants the biggest and tastiest portion, there is a concern that people will end up measuring and weighing the portions or speaking about their price. Moreover, it contains an element of gambling. Members of a household may use a lottery, but only as long as the portions are of equal value (Shabbat 148b-149a; SA 322:6; see below 22:8). One may draw lots to determine who will have the privilege of getting an aliya or saying Kaddish, because there is nothing to measure or calculate (MB 322:24).

    05. Court Activity, Weddings, Teruma and Ma’aser

    The Sages forbade rabbinical courts to sit in judgment or mete out punishment on Shabbat. Similarly, they prohibited betrothals, marriages, divorce, yibum (levirate marriage), or ĥalitza (levirate divorce) out of concern that people would end up writing (Beitza 37a). It is similarly prohibited to redeem a firstborn son on Shabbat, because the redemption (pidyon ha-ben) involves a transfer of money, which resembles commerce. If the 31st day after birth coincides with Shabbat, the redemption is done the following day, Sunday. It is also forbidden to vow, consecrate, or dedicate items or their value to the Temple on Shabbat, as this transfers ownership of the objects to God, as it were, and resembles commerce. However, one may pledge to give charity, because such a commitment involves no act of acquisition. If one did buy, sell, or perform any of these actions on Shabbat, the transaction is effective (m. Beitza 36b; SA 339:4).

    Teruma, ma’aser and ĥalla may not be set aside on Shabbat, because setting them aside resembles dedicating them to God. Additionally, it looks like one is fixing or improving the produce (Beitza 36b; MT 23:14). If one made a mistake and unknowingly set them aside, the remaining produce may be eaten on Shabbat. In contrast, if he did this knowingly, although the action is effective and the remaining produce may be eaten, no Jew may eat it until after Shabbat (m. Terumot 2:3; MB 339:25).

    One who is concerned that he will not have time to separate teruma and ma’aser before Shabbat may recite the formula for the separation before Shabbat (but without the berakha). By doing so, he has begun the process of separation. Then, after Shabbat begins, he may tithe in the normal fashion and recite the berakha. This procedure may also be followed if one is concerned that he will not have time to set aside ĥalla.

    Only the owner of the produce may separate teruma and ma’aser on Shabbat by means of the procedure described in the previous paragraph; it is not effective for anyone else. If a guest is concerned that his host may forget to tithe, he may ask the host before Shabbat to appoint him a shali’aĥ (proxy) to tithe on his behalf. The guest may then recite the formulation before Shabbat and perform the actual tithing on Shabbat (m. Demai 7:1, 5; MT, Laws of Tithes 9:7-9).[1]


    [1]. When I wrote above that only the owner of the produce or his shali’aĥ may tithe on Shabbat by means of this procedure, this applies to cases where the produce definitely has not been tithed yet (tevel). However, if it is uncertain whether the produce was tithed (demai), someone else can tithe this way as well (Orĥot Shabbat 22:65-70). The formula recited before Shabbat is the usual one, but all the words should be changed to the future tense, e.g., “What I will tithe” (Ĥazon Ish, Demai, 9:13:15 as quoted in Orĥot Shabbat 22:62 and n. 86). Be-di’avad, if one simply says, “Whatever I separate tomorrow should be considered teruma and ma’aser,” he has fulfilled his obligation, as he has begun the process of separation before Shabbat (see SSK 11:23). After the tithes are actually set aside, he may not move them, as they are muktzeh.

    06. Immersing and Measuring on Shabbat

    As is well known, a Jew who bought or received an eating utensil or receptacle from a non-Jew may not use it for food until it has been immersed in a mikveh. If one did not immerse it before Shabbat, some maintain that doing so on Shabbat is forbidden because it looks like one is fixing the implement (tikun kli). After all, before its immersion, one may not use it, while afterward, one may (Rosh). Others maintain that if one needs to eat from it, he may immerse it on Shabbat with a berakha. Accordingly, immersion is not considered fixing, because if be-di’avad the kli was used for food without having been immersed, the food retains its kosher status (Rif). If there is a trustworthy non-Jew in the vicinity, it is proper to give the kli to him as a gift, and then request his permission to use it. In this way, a Jew may use the kli for food even though it has not been immersed (SA 323:7). After Shabbat, it is proper to ask the non-Jew to give it back to him as a gift; he should then immerse it with a berakha.[2]

    All agree that one may immerse on Shabbat to purify himself from tum’a. Even those who maintain that kelim may not be immersed because it resembles fixing them agree that when it comes to people, since one may bathe, and since the immersion will not necessarily be seen as an act of purification, one may also immerse to purify himself (see above 14:9). In contrast, one converting to Judaism may not immerse on Shabbat as part of the conversion process because his immersion is transformative; he becomes a new person, a process that certainly qualifies as a tikun. Additionally, immersion for conversion requires the presence of a rabbinic court; just as a court does not meet on Shabbat for judgment, it also does not meet to supervise immersion (Yevamot 46b). If a court transgressed and did supervise an immersion on Shabbat, the immersion is valid, and the person is Jewish (SA YD 268:4).

    One may not measure anything on Shabbat, because measuring is a weekday activity (SA 306:7; MB ad loc. 34). Therefore, one may not weigh himself or measure his height on Shabbat (SSK 14:42). Similarly, one may not measure the dimensions of furniture or a room.

    One may measure and weigh for the sake of a mitzva. Therefore, one may check whether a mikveh has sufficient water (forty se’ah). One may also measure out medicine for sick people and take their temperature (SA 306:7; SSK 40:2). Since a baby has the same halakhic status as a sick person, when necessary one may measure out the amount of food that a baby needs. Similarly, when necessary one may measure if a baby has gained weight after eating (using a non-electric scale; SSK 37:5).


    [2]. According to Beit Yosef, in a time of need one may immerse kelim on Shabbat. Rambam too is lenient, following Rif; and SA 323:7 implies this as well. Maharam ibn Ĥabib writes in Responsa Kol Gadol §15 that the immersion should be done with a berakha (Livyat Ĥen §§72, 75). Others (Zivĥei Tzedek, AHS) maintain that we see from SA YD 120:16 that R. Yosef Karo retracted, and the only solution is to have a non-Jew acquire the kli (so that it is not owned by a Jew). Rema in Darkhei Moshe is stringent, as is Sha’agat Aryeh §56. Be-di’avad, if a kli was immersed on Shabbat, it may be used (MA; MB 323:33). BHL has a thorough analysis of this issue. If the kli still belongs to a non-Jew but is in the possession of a Jew, it should be immersed without a berakha. Therefore, it is proper to ask the non-Jew to return the item to him as a gift so he may immerse it with a berakha (Taz; MB 323:35).

    07. Walking, Running, and Jumping

    The world we live in is full of shortcomings. To perfect it, we rush around all week long, working and exerting ourselves in a variety of ways. However, on Shabbat, which is like the World to Come, we are commanded to cease all work and act as if everything has already been perfected, with no further need to rush around. We are meant simply to delight in the holiness of Shabbat and take a faith-filled look at the perfect inner essence of the world as God created it. There is a mitzva to express this spiritual perspective by walking at a leisurely pace on Shabbat. Thus the Sages expound: “‘Not go in your own way’ – the way you walk on Shabbat should not be like the way you walk on weekdays” (Shabbat 113a).

    Therefore, running is prohibited on Shabbat, as is striding. This prohibition applies to one who is going somewhere for his own sake, in which case he should walk at a leisurely pace to honor Shabbat. However, if one is going to attend a Torah class or to pray, it is a mitzva for him to run (Berakhot 6b; SA 301:1), because running for the sake of a mitzva does not detract from the honor due Shabbat. On the contrary, it expresses the spirit of Shabbat, which allows us to rest from the troubles of this world. This peacefulness in turn encourages us to serve God.

    One may run and jump if one benefits greatly from it. For example, one may run in order to get out of the rain, and one may jump over a puddle to avoid dirtying his shoes. One may also run in order to watch something enjoyable (Shabbat 113b; SA 301:2-3). Children and teens who enjoy running may participate in games that involve running, since this type of running is pleasurable rather than burdensome (SA 301:2). Also, adults may jump for pleasure as part of playing with small children.

    08. Working Out and Riding a Bicycle

    One may not run for exercise on Shabbat, because it is burdensome rather than pleasurable. Even though people who work out enjoy it, this enjoyment derives from their awareness that they are taking care of their health and physical fitness, not from the exercise itself. Even one who is very fit, runs every day, and enjoys it may not run on Shabbat, because it is a weekday activity. It will appear to others that he is belittling Shabbat and treating it like a weekday. However, one who enjoys exercise may jump or work out for pleasure inside his home on condition that he does not overexert himself, does not follow a regimen, and does not use special equipment, any of which would be deemed a weekday activity. One may not play ball for the same reason; even children may not play with a ball that adults use for sports, because it is a weekday activity.[3]

    One may walk on Shabbat for one’s health, on condition that he walks regularly and not more briskly or more intensively than usual. Although one may not address medical needs on Shabbat, since it is not discernible that his walking has a medical purpose, and many people take walks, he may walk for health and fitness on Shabbat (MB 301:7). One may also do gentle stretches in order to loosen up.

    The later poskim agree that one may not ride a bicycle on Shabbat. Some maintain that the reason for this prohibition is a concern that one will travel outside the teĥum, while others say that the concern is that the bicycle will break and he will end up fixing it. In fact, the main reason is that it is a weekday activity, since people ride bicycles primarily to travel to work or to exercise.[4]


    [3]. According to Or Le-Tziyon 2:36:12, exercise is forbidden only when undertaken in order to sweat to improve health, but one may run for callisthenic exercise just as youths may run for pleasure (based on Rambam, and as opposed to Rashi; see BHL 328:42). However, in practice, it would seem that exercise is, in some way, a weekday activity, as we can see from t. Shabbat 17:16, which states: “One may not run on Shabbat for exercise; but walking in the usual fashion, even all day long, is no problem.” Even though youths who enjoy running may run, this is because they enjoy the running itself; but when the pleasure is derived from improving one’s health, it is prohibited. This is made explicit in SA 301:1-2; Taz ad loc. 1; AHS ad loc. 44. It is also the position of Tzitz Eliezer 6:4 and SSK 34:22. One who enjoys the exercise itself may exercise (Melamed Le-ho’il, OĤ 53; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in SSK ch. 16 n. 106) on condition that he does not do so in an organized and professional way, which would qualify it as a weekday activity. It would also seem that an adult who enjoys running may not run outside, because it seems to belittle Shabbat and is consequently deemed a weekday activity. See Harĥavot.

    [4]. However, Ben Ish Ĥai permits riding a bicycle. It explains that we need not be concerned that people will mistakenly conclude that one may ride in vehicles drawn by humans or animals. Furthermore, we do not have the right to enact new decrees (Responsa Rav Pe’alim 1:25). Nevertheless, almost all poskim are stringent, for the reasons mentioned above (Ketzot Ha-shulĥan §110, Badei Ha-shulĥan §16; Yaskil Avdi 3:19; Tzitz Eliezer 7:30; She’elat Yaakov §45; Kaf Ha-ĥayim 404:8; SSK 16:18). Or Le-Tziyon 2:42:1 adds that though it is technically possible to permit, since the widespread practice is to forbid bike riding, it is forbidden.

    Those who maintain that riding a bicycle is a weekday activity can find support in Beitza 25b: “The Rabbis taught: The blind do not go out [on Yom Tov] with their canes, nor do we go out with a chair.” Rashi explains that since canes were considered weekday items, going out with them would belittle Yom Tov. He adds that the chair in question is a sedan chair (litter) carried by people. The Gemara specifies that the prohibition on carrying the chair applies when people lift it up on their shoulders (as opposed to holding it lower down). Rashi explains that when a chair is carried on the shoulders it looks like a weekday activity, it is more public, and it indicates that the chair is being carried further.

    09. Walking for Non-Shabbat Purposes

    Even when one takes a relaxed walk, he may not walk to his fields or factory in order to plan out his workweek. Doing so is included in the category of “your affairs,” which may not be addressed on Shabbat, as it is stated: “if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs” (Yeshayahu 58:13). However, if it is not obvious that his intention is to plan his work, there is no prohibition. Therefore, one may take a Shabbat walk as long as onlookers cannot tell that he is looking over his fields. It is pious to avoid thinking about business on Shabbat altogether (see SA 306:8).

    Similarly, one who is building a house should not check the progress on Shabbat, because it is obvious that he is planning his work, and one who intends to renovate or expand his home may not examine other projects if it is clear that he is planning the renovations. So too, one considering buying an apartment may not check out apartments for sale on Shabbat. In contrast, one considering buying an apartment may walk to a street where new apartments are being built even though his intention is to look them over, as long as it looks like he is just out for a walk and he does not stop and scrutinize them; this way, he does not look like he is planning his purchase. If one is planning to buy an electrical appliance, he may window-shop at appliance stores while walking on the street. However, he should not look at prices (SSK 29:10). In addition, it is pious to avoid thinking about these matters at all on Shabbat.

    Toward the end of Shabbat, one may not walk to the edge of the teĥum in order to hire workers as soon after Shabbat as possible. Similarly, one may not go to his field, store, or factory at that time so that he can begin work immediately after Shabbat. Since it is clear that he is going there on Shabbat in order to work afterward, in effect he is dealing with his weekday affairs on Shabbat. However, if it is not clear that this is the reason he is going there, as is the case, for example, if many people take walks there, then he may walk there on Shabbat even if he intends to hire workers or begin his work immediately afterward. This is because the prohibition only applies when it is clear that he is going for a mundane purpose (SA 306:1; MB ad loc. 1; BHL s.v. “she-me’ayen; SA 307:9; MB ad loc. 40).[5]


    [5]. The prohibition on walking to the edge of the teĥum on Shabbat applies when going to do something that cannot be done permissibly on Shabbat. However, if his objective is to collect already-picked fruits that are outside the teĥum, or to visit relatives who live outside the teĥum, the walking is permitted, as there is no essential prohibition involved (after all, if there were an eruv, he would be permitted to undertake these activities even on Shabbat). In contrast, one may not walk to the edge of the teĥum on Shabbat with the goal of picking fruits or collecting muktzeh fruits after Shabbat, because the act is fundamentally prohibited (there is no way to undertake these activities permissibly on Shabbat). A similar principle governs the prohibition of speech, as described in the next section. One may speak about an activity if it can be done on Shabbat in a permissible way, such as if there were an eruv. So, one may speak on Shabbat of plans to visit an area the next day in order to collect fruit from there (Shabbat 150b; SA 307:8; MB ad loc. 35. SAH, ad loc. 16 explains the basis of the permission. Orĥot Shabbat ch. 22 n. 7 suggests additional reasons for it).

    10. Talking about Work and Business

    It is a mitzva to honor Shabbat in the way one speaks, as it is written: “and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (Yeshayahu 58:13). The Sages elaborate: “‘Nor speak of them’ – your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on weekdays” (Shabbat 113a). This means that one should not speak on Shabbat about things that one may not do on Shabbat. Therefore, one should not say, “Tomorrow I will travel by car,” “I will write a letter,” or “I will buy an item.” Clearly, then, it is also prohibited for one to ask someone else to travel the next day on his behalf, write a letter for him, or buy something for him (SA 307:1). This prohibition applies to things that one intends to do in the future. However, one may speak about what he has already done, as long as he does not intend to provide useful information to the listener on how best to perform the melakha.

    The prohibition applies to talking about actions prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, one may think about them. Thus the Sages expound: “Speaking [about mundane matters] is forbidden, but thinking about them is permitted” (Shabbat 113a). Speech that merely alludes to a melakha is considered “thinking” and is thus permitted. For example, while one may not say, “Tomorrow I will phone so-and-so,” one may say, “Tomorrow I will speak with so-and-so,” even though it is clear that he will do so by phone. Similarly, one may not say, “Tomorrow I will drive to Jerusalem,” since traveling by motor vehicle is prohibited on Shabbat, but one may say, “Tomorrow I will go to Jerusalem,” since one can “go” by walking, and even though Jerusalem is outside the teĥum, theoretically one could build an eruv to Jerusalem and it would be permitted to walk there on Shabbat. Since walking to Jerusalem is not fundamentally prohibited, one may talk about “going” there. Even if the listener realizes that the speaker means that he is planning to travel by car or bus and that the listener may join him if he wishes, the statement is still considered only a hint and is permitted.

    Similarly, if one plans to travel by cab after Shabbat, on Shabbat he may ask his friend who is a cabdriver, “Do you think you will be able to come over after Shabbat?” Since he has not asked his friend to come with his cab in order to drive him, then even though his friend understands that this is what is meant, it is not prohibited. However, he may not say to his cabdriver friend, “Come over after Shabbat, please,” because an allusion in the imperative form is prohibited. Following the same principle, one who wishes to hire a worker on Sunday may say to him on Shabbat, “I hope to see you on Sunday,” but he may not say, “Please come on Sunday” (Shabbat 150a; SA 307:7).

    One may not speak about monetary transactions that have business implications, while one may talk about them if they have no practical import. Therefore, one may not speak about wages owed to workers, but one may speak about wages already paid. Similarly, one may not tell another how much a house sold for if the listener is interested in buying a similar house, while one may pass on this information to someone who is not interested in buying a home. Likewise, one may report on how much yield a field produced the previous year, what the government’s budget is, and the like. This is because the people involved in these conversations have no plans to act on these discussions during the week (SA 307:6).[6]

    It is preferable to minimize trivial conversations on Shabbat. One who enjoys such conversations may engage in them a bit more than usual, as they are part of his physical enjoyment of Shabbat. However, he should not indulge himself excessively, just as he should not eat or sleep excessively, as these indulgences will take away from the time he needs to set aside for Torah study on Shabbat. We have already seen that a minimum of six hours must be dedicated to Torah study on Shabbat (SA and Rema 307:1; MB ad loc. 4; see above 5:1).


    [6]. If there is a great need to speak on Shabbat about business matters (for example, if one encounters a person with whom he will not be able to meet on a weekday, and if he does not speak with him he will suffer a great loss), he may talk about business matters as long as he uses a shinui when choosing his words. For example, he should speak of a hundred challahs rather than a hundred dollars (Eshel Avraham [Buczacz] §307). As with any rabbinic prohibition on Shabbat, using a shinui reduces it to a shvut di-shvut, and is permitted in order to prevent a great loss (She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-halakha 90:3 and Kuntres Aĥaron).

    11. Walking and Talking for the Sake of a Mitzva

    One may speak about activities that are prohibited on Shabbat if it is for the sake of a mitzva. In such a case, one may also examine sites where melakha must be done or make financial calculations for the sake of a mitzva. It is written: “and if you honor it, and not go in your own way, nor look to your affairs, nor speak of them” (Yeshayahu 58:13), and the Sages expound: “‘Nor look to your affairs’ – it is forbidden to look after your own affairs on Shabbat, but one may look after the affairs of heaven (‘ĥeftzei shamayim,’ i.e., religious matters)” (Shabbat 113a). Therefore, if necessary, one may walk to inspect a synagogue construction site. If something is needed for an upcoming wedding or funeral, one may walk to the edge of the teĥum so that one can deal with these matters immediately after Shabbat. Near the end of Shabbat, one may also start walking to a location from which people will be picked up after Shabbat in order to comfort mourners (Shabbat 151a; SA 306:3; SSK 29:13).

    Similarly, in cases of necessity, one may speak about mundane matters that relate to mitzva needs. This includes calculating the costs of a wedding meal or a brit mila, as each of these is a se’udat mitzva (a festive meal associated with a mitzva). One may plan the hiring of a band for a wedding or deal with the bride’s dress. However, one may not actually close a deal, because business deals are prohibited even for the sake of a mitzva. It is altogether prohibited to discuss hiring a photographer for a wedding, or the purchase of wedding outfits for family members of the bride and groom, since these do not qualify as mitzva needs.

    One may take up a collection in which everybody pledges to give a certain amount of money to charity or to a synagogue. Parents may calculate the sum needed for their children’s education, whether religious, secular, or vocational. Those involved in education may discuss school or class budgets. A principal may offer a job to a teacher and mention a salary figure, though it is forbidden to reach an agreement on wages. One may discuss communal needs such as paving roads or levying taxes, as the needs of the community are deemed mitzva needs (Shabbat 150a; SA 306:6). In all these cases, it is proper to be lenient only when there is a specific need. If the matter will be addressed in any case, it is proper not to speak of mundane matters or walk in order to inspect them, even for the sake of a mitzva (MB 307:1).

    If necessary, one may announce that an object has been found on Shabbat, even if the item in question is muktzeh (such as a purse), in order to facilitate the fulfillment (after Shabbat) of the mitzva of returning a lost item (SA 306:12). In an area where it is difficult to locate matza for Pesaĥ or a lulav and etrog for Sukkot, one may announce on Shabbat where they are available for sale (MB 306:55).

    12. Permitted and Forbidden Reading Material

    One may not read contracts and financial documents on Shabbat, such as loan and purchase contracts, bank statements, phone and electric bills, and prices on flyers or in shop windows. Reading them is considered dealing with mundane affairs (ĥeftzei ĥol), which is forbidden on Shabbat (Rosh). Furthermore, there is a concern that as a result of reading them one will end up writing or erasing (Rambam).

    According to Rambam, one may read only sacred words on Shabbat; all other reading material is forbidden, even to study the sciences, so that Shabbat is not treated as a weekday and situations that might lead to writing are avoided. However, in practice, we follow the majority of poskim (Rashi, Ri, Rosh), who limit the prohibition to reading financial and business material. In order to ensure that no one will end up reading these materials, the Sages also prohibited reading secular material that has no value. In contrast, secular material that has value may be read on Shabbat. This includes material on physical fitness, proper nutrition, and ingredient lists on food packaging. One may also study the sciences and other branches of knowledge.

    One may not read run-of-the-mill secular material and stories if they have no value. However, one who enjoys reading them may do so occasionally, as the Sages did not forbid reading for pleasure on Shabbat. In contrast, one should not read gripping novels that cause sadness or anxiety on Shabbat (MB 306:38 and 307:3). It would seem that one may read depressing stories from Jewish history and rabbinic biographies, since they are valuable as Torah and are morally edifying. Nevertheless, it is preferable to study pleasant things, which are more appropriate for Shabbat.

    In principle, one may read the newspaper for informative content. One who enjoys reading news, stories, and analysis may do so, but one may not read sad and worrying content on Shabbat. One may read general financial articles as long as they do not give practical advice, but one may not read articles that give practical business and investment advice. It is also forbidden to read advertisements for products that one may wish to buy in the future.

    Even though technically one may read parts of the newspaper, many maintain that it is proper to avoid reading it on Shabbat because it is full of advertisements and disturbing news, and it is difficult to distinguish between what one may and may not read. Additionally, reading a newspaper negates the main purpose of Shabbat, which is Torah study. Therefore, one may read its informative content and non-disturbing news, but only while in the bathroom.[7]

    One may read (and place) ads in leaflets distributed in synagogues, as long as they are advertising products that fulfill mitzva needs, such as Torah books or homes in Israel (to potential customers from abroad). If these products are being sold cheaply and advertising might encourage readers to fulfill the mitzva, one may even publish the price (see MB 306:55, 307:1, and 323:20).

    One may not read a guest list or menu of a Shabbat meal as it resembles reading a contract. In addition, there is a concern that the host may wish to correct the list by writing or erasing (Shabbat 149:1; SA 307:12-13). In contrast, for the sake of a mitzva, such as the meal accompanying a brit mila, or in order to avoid greatly insulting someone, a waiter may read the list, as there is no concern that he will change it. However, the host or head waiter may not read the list, because they might end up correcting it (MB 307:47; SHT ad loc. 54).

    The gabbai may read the notebook or cards that contain the list of people to be called up to the Torah, since this is for the sake of a mitzva. We are not worried that he will end up writing or erasing, since he is standing in the middle of a group of people. If he forgets and wants to write, others will remind him that it is Shabbat. The gabbai may also call people to the Torah from a list he has been given by a family that is celebrating a special occasion in the synagogue. If they wish to change the list, the gabbai should not review it without at least one other person reviewing it with him who can remind him that it is Shabbat, lest he forget.


    [7]. According to Rambam, only Torah material may be read on Shabbat. All other reading materials are forbidden out of concern that people will end up writing. In contrast, Rashi, Ri, Rosh, Ramban, and Rashba maintain that the original prohibition was limited to reading material dealing with business or other things that are forbidden on Shabbat. The Sages extended this prohibition to include stories or material with no value, to make it less likely that people will read the previously prohibited material. The majority of poskim follow this lenient approach (Baĥ 307:5; SAH 307:21-22; MB 307:52; SSK 29:48-49). The Gemara forbids reading captions under pictures, and this includes mundane stories as well (Shabbat 149a; SA 307:15). According to Ma’amar Mordechai and SAH, even one who enjoys them may not read them, but according to MA 301:4, Birkei Yosef, Pri Megadim, and Maharsham, he may read occasionally. Disturbing material, no matter how gripping, should not be read (see MB 307:3).She’elat Ya’avetz 1:162 states that while technically one may read newspapers, in practice it is proper to forbid it lest people end up reading prohibited material. MB 307:63 states similarly, while Shvut Yaakov 3:13 is permissive. See SSK 29:48 and Harĥavot.

    13. Games on Shabbat

    Poskim disagree whether one may play games on Shabbat. Some say that since Shabbat is meant for Torah study, one may not play games, as that would be wasting time that could be used to study Torah. Accordingly, one may not play checkers, chess, backgammon, billiards, or any ball game, whether the games are played inside on the floor or outside on a paved area. And since one may not play these games, they are considered muktzeh as well (R. Aharon Sasson, cited in Birkei Yosef 338:1; Petaĥ Ha-devir ad loc. 4).

    Others maintain that there is no prohibition on playing games on Shabbat, as long as nobody is playing for money (Rema 338:5; Ma’amar Mordechai). Indeed, some rabbis would play chess on Shabbat, as it is a game that requires thought and sharpens the mind (Shiltei Giborim).[8]

    In practice, it is appropriate for adults to be stringent and not play ball games, chess, and the like, both because it is prohibited according to some poskim and because one should not to get used to neglecting Torah study on Shabbat. Those who wish to be lenient have an opinion on which to rely (see SA 308:45; MA 338:5; MB ad loc. 21; Kaf Ha-ĥayim ad loc. 39). Children should also be trained to study Torah on Shabbat, but almost all poskim agree that one should not prevent them from playing games on Shabbat (as explained below in 24:7).

    In contrast, sports that are a big deal, like soccer, basketball, baseball, and football, may not be played on Shabbat, because of the prohibition on weekday activities. It goes without saying that one may not play them on the court or field designated for them. Children may not play these sports either, because it is a weekday activity (below 24:9).


    [8]. Ĥida is inclined to forbid playing chess (Birkei Yosef 338:1). He suggests that the rabbis who played chess on Shabbat were suffering from depression. In order to take their minds off their worries, they played chess, after which they were able to return to their Torah study. However, barring this situation, one should not play on Shabbat. The Sages tell us that there was a place named Tur Shimon that was destroyed even though the people there respected Shabbat. Some say the reason was that they played ball there on Shabbat (y. Ta’anit 4:5). R. Elazar of Worms explains that by playing games they were wasting time during which they would have been learning Torah (Roke’aĥ §55). Based on this, some conclude that one may not play ball on Shabbat, and that therefore balls are muktzeh (Shibolei Ha-leket, Beit Yosef, and SA 308:45). Others are permissive and maintain that one may play ball in a paved yard (Tosafot, Rema). Nevertheless, one may not play on an unpaved surface, out of concern that people will end up leveling the ground (above 15:2). As for the punishment of Tur Shimon, that was because they were playing ball in the public domain (Vilna Gaon), or because they were taking away too much time from their Torah study.

    14. Payment for Work Done on Shabbat (Sekhar Shabbat)

    The Sages prohibited accepting payment for work done on Shabbat, because this is included in the prohibition on commerce. Even if the “work” is intrinsically permissible on Shabbat (such as guard duty or waiting tables), one may not accept payment for it on Shabbat (BM 58a; SA 306:4). It is also forbidden to accept rent money for anything, whether real estate or objects, that had been rented out on Shabbat (MB 246:3). Even be-di’avad, one may not benefit from money paid for any service rendered on Shabbat (SA 245:6; MB 243:16).

    In contrast, payment for work done on Shabbat may be subsumed within weekday payment. For example, an agreement may stipulate that a worker will do guard duty or wait tables for a few hours after Shabbat as well as on Shabbat itself. Even though, in reality, most of the hours were on Shabbat and the payment is primarily for those hours, as long as an agreement was reached before the work started that the employee would also work on Saturday night, the compensation covers the hours worked during the week as well as those on Shabbat. Thus, the Shabbat payment is subsumed within the weekday payment. However, if an agreement was not reached before the work started, then even if the employee did work after Shabbat as well, each workday stands on its own, the payment for Shabbat work cannot be subsumed within the payment for weekday work, and the worker thus may not accept the payment (Ĥayei Adam 60:8; MB 306:21; SSK 28:64-68).

    Along the same lines, one may rent out a room for Shabbat, as long as the rental period includes time either on Friday before Shabbat begins or on Saturday night after Shabbat ends. A cab driver can rent out his cab to a non-Jew for Shabbat, as long as the rental period either begins before Shabbat or extends after Shabbat, so that the Shabbat payment can be subsumed within the weekday payment. One may also collect interest on one’s bank account, since the calculations are based on the calendar day and not the times that Shabbat starts and ends. Accordingly, whatever is earned over Shabbat can be seen as subsumed within the weekday earnings of Friday morning and afternoon and Saturday night.

    One who immerses in a mikveh on Shabbat may pay the mikveh fee after Shabbat. There are two reasons for this. First, it is for the sake of a mitzva, and second, the payment is not for the immersion itself, but for the cleaning and heating of the mikveh, which started before Shabbat.[9]

    One may give a gift on Saturday night to someone who worked voluntarily over Shabbat. Examples include one who set up the synagogue and one who served as a waiter at a Shabbat meal. Since there is no obligation to compensate him at all, whatever is given is not considered payment (Pri Megadim; MB 306:15).

    The poskim disagree about whether one may accept payment for serving as a ĥazan or for other mitzva-related jobs undertaken on Shabbat. Some say that even when a job involves a mitzva, one may not accept payment for it. If this is correct, a ĥazan may not be paid for leading the services on Shabbat. Others maintain that one may be paid for a mitzva-related job on Shabbat, but that nothing good will come of this income. In practice, it is proper to stipulate that any payment will also include work performed during the week. For example, a ĥazan will be paid for practicing before he leads the Shabbat services, or for an additional prayer service that he will lead during the week. This way the Shabbat payment can be subsumed within the weekday payment (SA and Rema 306:5).

    A doctor who is on call to provide medical care during Shabbat is entitled to demand payment after Shabbat. The reason is that if he cannot assume that he will be paid, he might refuse to provide care in the future (MB 306:24; Minĥat Shabbat 90:19; SSK 28:75).


    [9]. If Shabbat is followed by Yom Tov or vice versa, there is an entire calendar day that is sanctified, and yet one is receiving interest then. At first glance this would seem to be forbidden (Minĥat Yitzĥak 9:59; Be-tzel Ha-ĥokhma 3:38). Nevertheless, this too is permissible because interest is not actually paid daily, but rather all the days are calculated together. Accordingly, the interest in this case can be subsumed within the times before and after the holy days (see Menuĥat Ahava 1:10:30 with n. 69, and Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 133). Similarly, MB 306:20 cites an opinion that payment for Shabbat work is subsumed within payment for weekday work even if an agreement was not reached before the work started if it is likely that the work under the agreement will continue during the week.A waiter may not work on Shabbat with the understanding that his employer will in turn work for him in a different capacity, because working for someone is considered payment. However, one may do guard duty on Shabbat for a friend and arrange for this friend to cover his assigned guard duty elsewhere, because guard duty that prevents loss is not considered payment (SA 307:10). Similarly, one may babysit a family on Shabbat with the understanding that the second person will babysit for the first person’s family at some point in the future (SSK 28:59). If it is one’s turn to set up the dining hall and serve the food on Shabbat, he may switch his Shabbat slot for a different slot. Since there is no monetary compensation involved, swapping is not considered payment (SSK 28:61).

    As written above, one who immerses in a mikveh on Shabbat may pay after Shabbat because the payment is for the cleaning and heating done before Shabbat begins (Noda Bi-Yehuda, Mahadura Tinyana, OĤ 26; SSK 28:72). One can also be lenient and rent an apartment for Shabbat only, since it can be argued that the rent also covers the cleaning that takes place before Shabbat (SSK 28:70). It is important to know that in a time of need, when a large loss is at stake, one may accept payment for work done on Shabbat (Rema 244:6; BHL s.v. “de-bimkom”).

    15. Preparing on Shabbat for Weekdays, and Cleaning Up the House and Table

    Shabbat is meant to bring holiness and rest into our lives. Making efforts on Shabbat to prepare for the week belittles its honor, and therefore the Sages forbade doing so.

    Thus, one may not make the beds on Shabbat in preparation for going to sleep on Saturday night. However, one may make the beds on Shabbat so that the bedroom will look nice on Shabbat. Similarly, one may clear off a table so that one’s home will look nice on Shabbat. For the same reason, if se’uda shlishit is finished well before the end of Shabbat, one may clear the table and put the dishes in the sink. However, if se’uda shlishit finishes only a few minutes before the end of Shabbat, or if people are not planning to remain in the room where it was served, so that clearing off the table is not for Shabbat’s sake but for the week’s sake, one may not clear off the table. One who does so is expending effort on Shabbat to prepare for afterward (m. Shabbat 113a; MB 302:19).

    One may wash dishes if they will be used again at some point on Shabbat. If many dishes were used, and only one cup is needed for later Shabbat use but there are no more clean cups, one may wash all the cups, since he could use any of them. Similarly, if he needs one plate but none are clean, he may wash all the plates and use one of them. However, if he does not intend to use any of them during Shabbat, he may not wash any of them (Shabbat 118a; SA 323:6; MB 323:26).

    One who never leaves dirty dishes in the sink even during the week, and who feels that a pile of dirty dishes left in the sink for hours belittles the honor of Shabbat, may wash the dishes even if they will not be used again during Shabbat, so that his home will be clean in honor of Shabbat. However, even in this case, he may not wash the pots, since they are muktzeh and require burdensome work (Responsa Maharshag, OĤ 1:61; Tzitz Eliezer 14:37). (We have already seen in 13:4-5 how to clean off a table that water or juice spilled on, and in 15:9 how to clean the floor.)

    One may not fold a talit so that it will be unwrinkled for next Shabbat. However, one may fold it so that it will not be left out on Shabbat in a disrespectful way (see above 13:9).

    One may not prepare on Shabbat for weekdays even when a mitzva is involved. For example, one may not roll a Torah scroll to the passage that will be read during the upcoming week or the next Shabbat (MB 667:5). If necessary, one may roll the Torah scroll to the next reading and then study a few verses from it, so that the rolling will serve a purpose on Shabbat as well (AHS 667:2). One may bring a book to the synagogue if it is needed after Shabbat, as long as one studies a bit from it on Shabbat as well.

    On Shabbat one may study for a test in a Torah subject that is scheduled for the upcoming week, since studying these topics is itself a mitzva. However, it is proper not to study on Shabbat for tests in secular subjects. First, Shabbat must be dedicated to Torah study. Second, the student’s primary goal in studying is to succeed on his test, not to become more knowledgeable. In a time of need one may be lenient, since there is intrinsic value to secular studies. In contrast, one may not study a foreign language on Shabbat, because such study has no intrinsic value. It is also prohibited to study for a test in a subject that normally involves writing exercises, because (as we saw) one may read on Shabbat only when there is no concern that one might end up writing or erasing.

    One should not say on Shabbat, “I will go to sleep now, so that I will have energy after Shabbat.” This belittles Shabbat, since he is using it to prepare for weekdays. However, if he does not verbalize this but only thinks it, it is not forbidden, since sleeping on Shabbat is a pleasure (Sefer Ĥasidim; MB 290:4; see above 5:3).

    When Yom Tov follows Shabbat, one may not prepare on Shabbat for Yom Tov. Be-di’avad, if one prepared something on Shabbat for afterward, he may benefit from his actions.

    16. When Preparation on Shabbat for the Weekday Is Permitted

    The prohibition of preparing on Shabbat for the weekday is limited to activities that require effort. However, easy, effortless activities that people routinely undertake are permitted. This is true even if the activities are useful for the weekday, as doing them does not belittle Shabbat. For example, after shaking the lulav on the first day of Sukkot, one may put it back in water, even though this is done to keep it fresh for the next day (Sukka 42a; SA 654:1). One who is studying Torah may insert a bookmark, even though this will not be helpful until he continues his studies during the week. One who took a siddur to the synagogue may bring it home (where there is an eruv), even if he will not be using it again on that Shabbat.

    Similarly, one may put leftover food in the refrigerator as usual. Dishes may be left soaking in water as usual to prevent food remnants getting stuck to them. One leaving the house on Shabbat afternoon may take a key and sweater with him for use after Shabbat, though he should not state explicitly that he is doing so for after Shabbat (see SA 416:2; SSK 28:89).

    In a time of need, in order to avoid serious inconvenience, one may do simple things on Shabbat in preparation for the weekday even if they are not part of the normal routine, but only on condition that it is not obvious that he is doing them for the weekday, so as not to belittle Shabbat. For example, if one is going to a place where it is difficult to find wine for havdala, he may bring wine with him on Shabbat, on condition that he brings it while there is still plenty of daylight left, so that it will not be obvious that he is bringing the wine for after Shabbat. If he drinks some of the wine at se’uda shlishit, he may even bring wine le-khatĥila (see Ĥayei Adam 153:6; MB 667:5).

    In a time of need, in order to prevent a loss, the Sages permitted doing things on Shabbat even when it is obvious that they are for the weekday. Examples include bringing in items from outside and that would likely be damaged by rain, and putting food into the freezer if it would likely spoil if left out (SA 308:4; MB 321:21).[10]


    [10]. If slaughtered meat is left unsalted for three days, it can no longer be rendered kosher through salting. However, if the meat is soaked in water before the three days end, the window for salting is extended. According to MA 321:7, one may not soak unsalted meat whose time is running out and soak it on Shabbat to make sure that it will be permissible to cook after Shabbat, because it is forbidden to deal with something on Shabbat in order to prevent loss after Shabbat. However, MB 321:21 adds that under pressing circumstances, one may rely on Eliya Rabba and Noda Bi-Yehuda, which permit it. This is also the opinion of SSK 28:91 and Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 218.

    17. Playing Musical Instruments and Producing Sound

    The Sages prohibited playing instruments on Shabbat and Yom Tov, lest the instrument break and the player fix it, thus violating Torah law (MT 23:4). In contrast, in the Temple, rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions (shvut) did not apply; therefore, even on Shabbat and holidays, the Levites would accompany offerings with flutes, harps, lyres, trumpets, and cymbals (Beitza 11b).

    Included in the prohibition of playing musical instruments is the prohibition of blowing a shofar. Even on Rosh Ha-shana, once the mitzva of shofar has been fulfilled in the optimal and most beautiful fashion, we do not blow further. Children under the age of bar mitzva may blow the shofar all day on Rosh Ha-shana so that they can learn how to do it (Rema 596:1; MB 3-5).

    One may produce sound that is not musical in nature. Thus, one may clap his hands to wake someone up, knock on a door with his hands or an instrument so that the people inside will hear and open up, or tap a glass or bottle with a spoon to quiet a crowd. One may also snap in order to wake someone up or to make a baby laugh (SA 338:1).

    The poskim disagree whether one may use a door knocker or mechanical bell. Some forbid it on the grounds that it resembles a musical instrument too closely (Rema). Others permit it since one is not trying to make music (SA 338:1). If during the week an electric doorbell is used, then on Shabbat a mechanical doorbell or knocker may be used (MB 338:7).[11]

    One may place a decorative crown with bells on a Torah scroll even though the bells produce sound. Since they are decorative and honor the Torah, it is for the sake of a mitzva, and since the person carrying the Torah does not intend to make noise, it is not forbidden (Shakh and MA, as opposed to Taz).

    Some forbid opening a door that has bells or chimes attached to it, since they are considered musical instruments (Taz and Eliya Rabba). Others permit it, because those entering do not intend to make noise, they just want to open the door (MA). Le-khatĥila, it is proper for homeowners to remove bells from the door before Shabbat; if they did not do so, the door may still be used (see MB 338:6).

    One may whistle on Shabbat because it is considered a type of music made with the mouth, not with an instrument. Some even permit using one’s fingers to improve the whistle (AHS 338:7; see below in 24:7 about toys that make noise).


    [11]. Eruvin 104a records a disagreement about this issue. According to Ula, one may not produce sound on Shabbat even without intent to make music. Therefore, one may not knock on the door so that the people inside will hear him. Rava maintains that only producing sound with the goal of creating music is prohibited. The Yerushalmi tells the story of R. Ila’i, who returned home on Friday night and called out to the members of his household to let him in. They did not hear him. Since he was personally stringent not to knock, he slept outside (y. Beitza 5:2). Indeed, Rabbeinu Ĥananel and the Vilna Gaon rule in accordance with Ula’s strict approach. In any case, even according to them, knocking with a shinui is permitted (BHL 338:1 s.v. “aval”). However, based on the subsequent discussion in the Gemara, Rif and Rambam (MT 23:4) conclude that the law is in accordance with the lenient approach of Rava. Rosh is inclined to follow this as well. Almost all the poskim follow the lenient approach, including SA 338:1, MB ad loc. 2-3, and SSK 28:41. However, regarding a door knocker, an instrument designed to produce sound, Maharil is stringent. Beit Yosef suggests that Maharil’s stringency is due to the concern that the person knocking may in fact intend to produce music. Rema 338:1 is stringent, following Maharil. According to BHL 338:1 s.v. “ho’il,” this is the position of SA as well. However, Livyat Ĥen §110 and Or Le-Tziyon 2:39:1 argue that according to SA, one may use a door knocker. If the knocker is meant to be used only on Shabbat, then Rema permits it as well (MB 338:7; Shevet Ha-Levi 9:76). Therefore, one may use a mechanical doorbell on Shabbat if an electric one is used during the week (SSK 23:55 with n. 159).A ĥazan may not use a tuning fork to help him determine the pitch for his singing, because it is included in the prohibition on musical instruments (MB 338:4). While some are permissive, since a tuning fork produces a sound that is uniform and relatively quiet, and it is being used for the sake of a mitzva, it is proper to be stringent, because that is the opinion of almost all the poskim. If one wishes to rely on those who are lenient, it is not necessary to object (AHS 338:8; see Yabi’a Omer 3:22).

    18. Clapping and Dancing

    The Sages’ prohibition of playing instruments includes dancing, clapping, and slapping one’s thigh with one’s hands to accompany singing out of concern lest one play an instrument and fix it (Beitza 36b). However, one may clap with a shinui, such as using the back of one’s hand; by using a shinui, he is reminded that it is Shabbat and will not end up fixing an instrument (y. Beitza 5:2). It would seem that very muted dancing, in which one’s feet never leave the ground at the same time, is not included in the prohibited dancing (ibid.).

    The prohibition applies specifically while singing, because there is a concern then that it will lead to playing instruments. In contrast, if there is no singing, one may jump a bit for his enjoyment. Similarly, one may clap or to bang on a table in order to wake someone up.

    In practice, many observant Jews dance, clap, and bang on a table when they sing on Shabbat. The poskim disagree about the legitimacy of this practice, as follows.

    One approach, that of many poskim, is that this practice is mistaken. The only reason that the Sages did not object is that the prohibition is not stated explicitly in the Torah, so it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly (Beitza 30a). However, if there is any possibility that people can be convinced to accept the proper halakha, we must teach them not to clap or dance on Shabbat, in accordance with the rabbinic enactment (Rif; Rambam; Rema 339:3). Nevertheless, on Simĥat Torah, when there is a special mitzva to rejoice and honor the Torah, even those who are normally stringent dance and clap (Maharik in the name of R. Hai Gaon). However, for other celebrations with a mitzva component, such as weddings, they are not lenient (MB 339:8).

    A second approach defends the leniency. After all, the reason behind the prohibition is a concern that people will end up fixing a musical instrument. Nowadays, when those who play an instrument do not know how to fix it, the enactment no longer applies, and one may dance and clap on Shabbat (Tosafot, Beitza 30a, s.v. “tenan”). Some do not accept this, maintaining that all the players know how to tune their instrument (tightening guitar strings, harp strings, or the top of a drum), which is considered fixing an instrument. However, there is a different reason to be lenient. Some maintain that the rabbinic enactment was specifically relevant to the times of the Sages, when people would take out instruments whenever there was dancing and clapping. Nowadays, when many people sing, dance, and clap without instruments, the enactment no longer applies (AHS 339:9).

    A third approach notes that the great Ĥasidic masters of recent centuries focused on the value of music and dance to awaken people’s hearts to cling to God joyfully. Such dancing and clapping are considered true mitzva needs. Accordingly, just as there is a leniency for Simĥat Torah, there should be a leniency for every Shabbat (Devar Yehoshua 2:42:4).

    It would seem that even those who are lenient should not drum on the table on Shabbat. Such drumming is very similar to that of an actual drum, which all agree is forbidden, even for the sake of a mitzva. Furthermore, the concern that people will take out a drum is a serious one today, when many are used to bringing drums, darbukas, and the like when they sing. In contrast, when people are singing during prayer, a leader may drum with his hand on the bima. One leading the songs at the Shabbat table may also be lenient.[12]


    [12]. As we said above, on Simĥat Torah all customarily clap and dance based on the opinion of R. Hai Gaon as cited by Maharik and Beit Yosef 339:3. However, the poskim do not apply this leniency to other mitzva situations (SA 339:3). Rema is inclined to follow this as well, commenting that the reason we do not object to those who clap and dance on Shabbat is that it is better that people transgress unknowingly rather than knowingly. However, Rema cites as an alternative the lenient approach of Tosafot, namely, that nowadays there is no reason to be concerned that people will end up fixing a musical instrument. Yam Shel Shlomo (Beitza 5:6) seems to state that technically one may rely on Tosafot when it is in the service of a mitzva. This opinion is quoted in Eliya Rabba 339:1 and MB ad loc. 10. (See SHT 339:6-7.) Based on the logic of this approach, Ĥasidim are customarily lenient (Devar Yehoshua 2:42:4; Minĥat Elazar 1:29). Sephardim may rely on this reasoning as well for the sake of a mitzva (see Or Le-Tziyon 2:43:9 and Harĥavot.) However, the leniency pertains to dancing and clapping – both of which are done with the body – and not to drumming on something else (Eliya Rabba 339:1; MB ad loc. 10; Avnei Yashfe 2:35:1). The reasoning is straightforward. Drumming on a table is similar to playing a drum, which is a musical instrument. Nevertheless, when it comes to a gabbai leading the congregation in song, there are two reasons to be lenient and allow him to drum with his hand on the bima. First, this is more clearly for the sake of a mitzva, and we already saw that R. Hai Gaon and Maharik are lenient for the sake of Simĥat Torah (see SHT 339:7). Second, since the gabbai is in the middle of the congregation, we are not worried that he might bring instruments that will need to be fixed. Perhaps this is also one of the reasons for the leniency on Simĥat Torah. The logic is similar to that of the permission for two people to read by candlelight (Shabbat 12b), or for even one person to read by candlelight as long as his friend is there to make sure he will not unknowingly do anything that would affect the flame (SA 275:3). This also explains why Sha’arei De’a (YD 282) allows putting a crown with bells on a Torah scroll (as opposed to Taz; see Yabi’a Omer 3:22). Perhaps we can extend the leniency to leading the singing at the Shabbat table, and allow one to drum with his hand on the table. Nevertheless, it is not proper for the rest of the participants to drum. Besides, their drumming is not always for the sake of the mitzva, as often these additional drummers actually make it harder to sing because they are out of sync with the song.

    19. Music and Films on Electronic Devices

    There is a clear consensus among poskim that one may not listen to the radio or watch television on Shabbat. Even if the radio or television is turned on before Shabbat so that no melakha is performed on Shabbat, it is forbidden, and for several reasons. First, if there are Jews who work at the station, one may not derive enjoyment from Shabbat desecration.

    Second, even if all the station’s workers are non-Jewish, one may not listen to or watch broadcasts because it belittles and detracts from the honor of Shabbat. We already saw (2:9) that some maintain that one may not leave a flour mill running before Shabbat if it will continue to run on Shabbat, because the noise of the grinding detracts from the honor of Shabbat. Listening to the radio and watching television are much more serious. While the mill makes noise that no one wants to hear, one who turns on the radio or television before Shabbat indeed wishes to listen or watch on the holy Shabbat. All would agree that this infringes upon Shabbat’s honor.

    Third, it is a weekday activity. Just as the prophets and Sages forbade many things that are reminiscent of weekdays, so that our behavior on Shabbat would be different from that of the workweek, so too we should prohibit listening to the radio and watching television on Shabbat.

    Fourth, there is a concern that the radio or television might malfunction, and the listeners or viewers might try to fix it on Shabbat. One might want to raise or lower the volume or adjust the device in some other way (see above 17:2). A similar concern led to the ban on using musical instruments, and the same ban should apply.

    For all these reasons, one may not listen to radio or watch television on Shabbat, even when they are turned on before Shabbat. For the same reasons, it is also forbidden to set a timer to turn on a recording device or video or audio player (see Yesodei Yeshurun vol. 3, pp. 50-55; Tzitz Eliezer 3:16; SSK 42:43; Yabi’a Omer 1:20; Yalkut Yosef 318:34-38).

    01. The Basis of the Prohibition

    The Sages prohibited moving things that are not fitting for Shabbat and that one puts out of his mind (maktzeh mi-da’ato). There are two fundamental reasons for this prohibition: 1) to preserve the atmosphere of Shabbat as a day of holiness and rest. The idea of rest applies to one’s hands as well; they should not move objects or be involved with activities that are not connected to Shabbat; 2) to set up a safeguard so that one will not come to do melakha on Shabbat. We will begin by explaining the first reason.

    In addition to the melakhot that are prohibited on Shabbat, the Torah commands us to rest and relax on Shabbat, as it states: “but on the seventh day you shall cease, so that your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the stranger may be refreshed” (Shemot 23:12). Similarly, we read: “Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day there shall be a Shabbat of complete rest, holy to the Lord” (Shemot 31:15). In order to fulfill the Torah commandment to rest and relax on Shabbat, the Sages established several ordinances meant to protect the spirit of Shabbat as a day of sanctity and rest. One of them is the prohibition of muktzeh.

    If moving items unnecessary for Shabbat were permitted, people might well spend all of Shabbat cleaning and arranging their homes and belongings, thus negating the mitzva to rest. Additionally, the prophets instructed the people that the atmosphere of Shabbat should be different from that of the weekday – one should walk and talk differently. Following this line of thought, the Sages decreed that people should not handle objects and implements on Shabbat in the same way as during the week. This way Shabbat is truly felt by all, including those whose weekday activities do not normally involve any forbidden melakhot. We see that the prohibition of muktzeh is rooted in the words of the Torah and the prophets, while its precise parameters and details are rabbinic (AHS 308:4-5; above, 22:1).

    As we said, the second reason is so that one will not end up doing melakha on Shabbat. As with all mitzvot, the Sages instituted safeguards in order to distance people from sin. The prohibition of muktzeh makes it less likely that people will carry objects in the public domain or use muktzeh items to perform melakha (Rambam and Raavad, MT 24:12-13).[1]

    The prohibition of muktzeh synchronizes the mind and the hands. Any item that one knows is not fit for use on Shabbat will not be touched by his hands either.


    [1]. AHS 308:4-5 suggests that the prohibitions of muktzeh date back to the time of our teacher Moshe. Additionally, the Gemara mentions that in the days of Kings David and Shlomo, the prohibition of muktzeh maĥmat gufo was already in effect (Shabbat 30b). During the time of Neĥemia, the Sages saw that Shabbat desecration was widespread, and they decreed that all implements (kelim) would be considered muktzeh. There were only three kelim, considered necessary for eating, exempted from the prohibition. When the situation improved and people were once again careful about Shabbat laws, the Sages once again permitted the movement of most kelim, though a small number remained banned (Shabbat 123b; SAH 308:17; sections 7-9 below). Rashi and She’iltot maintain that the prohibition of muktzeh is by Torah law, since Rabba’s statement that one must prepare before Shabbat what he needs for Shabbat is based on the verse: “But on the sixth day, they shall prepare what they have brought in” (Shemot 16:5). The implication of the verse is that anything that has not been prepared is muktzeh (Pesaĥim 47b; Beitza 2b). However, almost all Rishonim maintain that Rabba changed his mind and would agree that the prohibition of muktzeh is rabbinic. This is the opinion of Tosafot, Rambam, Ramban, and Rashba. One interpretation of Rashi is that only the most serious types of muktzeh are prohibited by Torah law, while the rest are rabbinic (Pnei Yehoshu’a, Beitza 2b). Alternatively, Ĥatam Sofer explains that Rashi means that muktzeh is prohibited by Torah law only in the case of food items, as we are commanded to prepare food for Shabbat; in contrast, all other muktzeh prohibitions are rabbinic (OĤ 79). In any case, as we wrote in 22:1 based on Ramban, all the laws connected to the spirit of Shabbat are rooted in the Torah, while the Sages established the details of their observance. This is also implied by Rambam. See Harĥavot there.

    02. Principles of Muktzeh

    As a rule, the Sages forbade moving things on Shabbat that are not fitting for use on Shabbat and that one puts out of his mind (section 10 below). There are several types of muktzeh:

    1) Muktzeh maĥmat gufo (inherently muktzeh) – items that are not fitting for any use on Shabbat, such as rocks, trees, sand, animals, and inedible food (as explained below, section 3).

    2) Muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis (muktzeh because of monetary loss) – valuable objects that one takes care not to handle except for their sole designated use, out of concern that they will be ruined. Since they have no use on Shabbat, one puts them out of his mind (section 4 below).

    3) Basis le-davar ha-asur (a base for a forbidden object) – refers to a case where one places a muktzeh item on an object that is not itself muktzeh; since he intends for it to remain there on Shabbat, he puts the “base” out of his mind as well, and it too becomes muktzeh (sections 5-6 below).

    4) Kelim she-melakhtam le-isur (implements whose usage is forbidden) – have a special status. Since they are designed to perform forbidden activities, one puts them out of his mind. On the other hand, sometimes they are used for permitted purposes. Therefore, one may not move them for their own sake (e.g., to protect them, le-tzorekh atzmam), but one may move them to use them permissibly (le-tzorekh gufam) or because one needs the space they occupy (le-tzorekh mekomam) (sections 7-9 below).

    If a muktzeh item is painfully unpleasant, like a chamber pot (graf shel re’i), the Sages permitted removing it (section 12 below).

    The prohibition is to move a muktzeh object manually, but one may touch a muktzeh item without moving it. Therefore, one may spread a cover over a computer, telephone, or other muktzeh items on Shabbat. One may also move muktzeh “from the side” (min ha-tzad). For example, if one needs to pick up an object or food, and in so doing a muktzeh item that is next to the object or food will be moved indirectly, as long as he does not touch the muktzeh item with his hands, it is not prohibited. However, if the muktzeh item needs to be moved for its own protection, one may not move it even min ha-tzad. As long as he is using his hands, even if they have no direct contact with the muktzeh item (for example, if he is using a broom), it is prohibited. However, one may use any other part of the body (be-gufo); for example, one may move an object that is muktzeh using his foot or elbow (section 14 below).

    Sometimes it is unclear whether or not a particular item is muktzeh because we lack facts about the situation. For example, if one found fruit under a tree and it is uncertain whether they fell before Shabbat (and are permitted) or on Shabbat (and are muktzeh), we are stringent and consider it muktzeh (Beitza 24b; SA 325:5). In contrast, if there is a halakhic disagreement about whether an item is muktzeh, the law follows the lenient position (Beit Yosef 279:4; SHT 309:24).

    03. Muktzeh Maĥmat Gufo

    Any item that is unfit for any use on Shabbat is muktzeh maĥmat gufo. This means that it is inherently muktzeh; because it is of no use on Shabbat, it is put out of one’s mind, muktzeh. This category includes rocks, animals, coins, straw, dust, trees, leaves, all types of waste, and corpses.

    This type of muktzeh may not be moved even if one wants to use the item for a permissible purpose. For example, one may not pick up a rock to use as a door stopper or nutcracker. If one wants to prevent the rock from becoming muktzeh, he must either mentally designate it for the desired purpose before Shabbat or use it for that purpose at least once during the week (SA 308:20, 22).

    Sand is muktzeh and may not be used to cover up something disgusting. If the sand has been put in a particular place specifically for this purpose, it is not muktzeh (SA 308:38). Similarly, sand in a sandbox for children is not muktzeh (above, 15:2).

    Food that may not currently be eaten, but that one intends to make permissible after Shabbat – such as food from which teruma and ma’aser or ĥalla have not yet been separated – are muktzeh on Shabbat (MT 25:19). However, non-kosher meat that one intends to give to a non-Jew or feed to a dog is not muktzeh (SA 324:7).

    Foods that can be eaten under pressing circumstances are not muktzeh. However, if they are not edible at all without being cooked or baked – such as flour, potatoes, beans, raw meat, and raw fish – they are muktzeh. Even though animals can eat them, they are still muktzeh, since normally animals are not given food meant for people.

    In pressing circumstances, such as if a freezer has stopped working and the meat and fish inside are likely to spoil, we rely on the opinion that since a dog would eat these foods raw, they are not muktzeh. Accordingly, one may move them into a working freezer.[2]

    Animals are muktzeh since they serve no purpose on Shabbat. In a time of need, one may take hold of them and drag them in order to feed or protect them, but one may not pick them up (above 20:3). House pets, which are normally played with and picked up, are not muktzeh (above 20:5).

    Food scraps that dogs or cats can eat are not muktzeh. Even if one does not own a cat or dog, there are cats and dogs in town that would be happy to have them. Similarly, bones are not muktzeh, since dogs and cats eat them. However, food scraps that neither man nor animal will eat – such as the nutshells, husks, and fish bones – are muktzeh. Additionally, if food scraps would be eaten by some animals but not by any found locally, they are muktzeh (SA 308:29). Apricot pits that children play with and that were extracted on Shabbat are not muktzeh (see SSK ch. 16 n. 33).


    [2]. SA 308:31-32 explains that raw meat is not muktzeh since some people eat meat that way. In contrast, raw fish that people generally do not eat is muktzeh. According to MA and others, raw meat that is soft (such as chicken) is not muktzeh, but raw meat that is hard and inedible is muktzeh. According to Taz (ad loc. 20), if fish is edible by dogs, then even if in practice we do not feed such fish to dogs, it is not muktzeh. See MB and BHL, which incline toward the position of SA. It would seem that nowadays, when there are people who feed dogs meat and fish that people would eat as well, under pressing circumstances one may rely on Taz. This is the opinion of Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 359 and Orĥot Shabbat 19:108.

    04. Muktzeh Maĥmat Ĥesron Kis

    Valuable items that have no use on Shabbat and that people always take care not to move except for the specific purpose for which they are designed (to ensure the items do not get damaged or lost) are muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis. For example, knives designed for ritual slaughter or for leatherworking are muktzeh. Even if one wants to cut his food with them, he may not pick them up (Shabbat 123b, 157a; SA 308:1).

    Included in this category of muktzeh are: musical instruments, smartphones, radios, tape recorders, expensive or fragile music players, cameras, and mixers. These may not be used even for a permissible purpose, for example, as a paperweight. Similarly, one may not wrap himself in an expensive piece of fabric that has been set aside for sewing. In contrast, a valuable or fragile item that is frequently used on Shabbat, such as a gold watch, eyeglasses, or a magnifying glass for reading, is not muktzeh.

    Other examples of muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis are paper money, important business documents, identity cards, credit cards, stamps, bus tickets, parchment to be used by a scribe, and stationery paper that is not used for any other purpose (SSK 20:20).

    Wall clocks and valuable pictures, which people are careful not to move so as to avoid possible damage, are included in this category of muktzeh (MB 308:168). Also included are large free-standing closets that people are careful not to move without a good reason, for fear that they will fall apart (MB 308:8). The prohibition here is limited to moving the entire closet; one may open its doors and drawers, as they are meant to be used regularly.

    Cups, plates, and clothes that are meant to be sold are muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis, since sellers usually insist that no one use them. If a seller does not insist upon this, his wares are not muktzeh. People who sell food generally do not insist that no one eat from their merchandise, and therefore the food in stores and warehouses is not muktzeh (Beit Yosef and Rema 308:1; MB ad loc. 6-7; SA 310:2; MB ad loc. 4).

    05. Basis Le-davar Ha-asur and Conscious Placement

    If a muktzeh item was placed atop a non-muktzeh item with the intention that it stay there all of Shabbat, then the permitted item becomes muktzeh, as it serves as a basis (base) for a forbidden object. For example, if one placed money on a table, then even though the table is not in itself muktzeh, since he placed muktzeh money on it, the table becomes muktzeh because it is now a basis le-davar ha-asur. In other words, the decision to place money on the table implies consent not to use the table on Shabbat, making the table muktzeh just like the money on it. Even if the money were to fall off during Shabbat, it would not matter; since the table was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, it remains muktzeh all of Shabbat (SA 310:7).

    In contrast, if one did not intend for the money to stay on the table over Shabbat but simply left it there by mistake, then the table does not become muktzeh, since he did not decide to make it a basis for something muktzeh. Nevertheless, le-khatĥila one should still not move the table while the muktzeh item is on it. Rather, he should tilt the table so that the money falls off and then move the table wherever he wants. However, if the muktzeh item would be damaged if it slid offupon falling to the floor, then one may move the table along with the muktzeh item to a place where the latter can safely be slid off without being damaged. For example, if the muktzeh item is a smartphone, which would likely break if dropped, one may move the table elsewhere. Similarly, if the muktzeh item is a stone, and next to the table are fragile glass items that would likely break if the stone were to fall on them, one may move the table elsewhere (Shabbat 142b; SA 309:4; SA 277:3; section 14 below).

    The same applies to a laptop left on top of a book, valuable candlesticks left on a tray, valuable knives left in a case, raw potatoes left in a drawer, or a tzedaka box left on the bima. If these items were intentionally placed there, then whatever they are resting upon becomes a basis le-davar ha-asur and is muktzeh. If they were forgotten there, the base does not become muktzeh.

    Sometimes, during the week, one wishes to place something muktzeh in a closet, but because there is no space he puts it on top of clothing in the closet. There is a disagreement whether such a placement renders the clothing muktzeh. Some say that since ultimately the muktzeh was consciously placed atop the clothing, the clothing becomes a basis (Taz). Others maintain that since the person did not intend for the muktzeh to be there specifically, but it simply ended up there, the item of clothing does not become a basis (MA). In practice, when necessary one may be lenient (MB 309:18).[3]

    If one finds money or other muktzeh items in his pocket, he may assume they were forgotten there, so his clothes do not become a basis. However, in order that he not continue to carry around muktzeh in his pocket, he should try to shake it out. If he is embarrassed to do so in public, or if he is worried that the muktzeh item will get lost, he may continue to wear this item of clothing until he reaches a place where he can shake out the muktzeh without fear of losing it or embarrassing himself.[4]


    [3]. If one intended to place the muktzeh item on a permitted item for only part of Shabbat, according to Rabbeinu Tam it does not become a basis, while according to Rashi it does. SA 309:4 is inclined to be stringent, but in times of necessity one may be lenient (MB ad loc. 21). There is a similar disagreement about the law if the muktzeh item was placed atop an item in the middle of Shabbat (by the owner or with his consent). According to Tosafot, as long as the muktzeh item is there, the base is muktzeh; according to Or Zaru’a, however, it is not muktzeh. According to Rashba and Ran, if one’s intention is that the muktzeh remain there until Shabbat is over, then as long as the muktzeh item is there, the base is muktzeh as well. MB 266:26 follows those who are lenient. See BHL 310:7 s.v. “mateh.”The base becomes a prohibited basis only when it serves the muktzeh upon it; but when the muktzeh item serves the base, it does not become prohibited. Therefore, if one places a rock on a barrel to weigh down its cover and prevent it from opening, or if he places pieces of muktzeh wool on a pot to keep it warm, the barrel or pot does not become muktzeh (SA 259:1; MB ad loc. 9).

    [4]. If one intended to leave money in his pocket but decided on Shabbat that he would like to wear the clothing, what is the status of the clothing? If the garment itself is one of the sides of the pocket, as is generally the case with a shirt pocket, then the garment becomes a basis and may not be moved. In contrast, if the pocket is part of a separate lining sewn onto the clothing, as is the case with most pants pockets, the clothing does not become a basis, because the pocket is secondary to the whole garment. Thus, the pants may be moved. However, when possible, one should first shake the muktzeh item out of the pocket, taking care not to put one’s hand in the pocket or touch it from outside in order to shake the muktzeh item out. This is because the pocket itself is muktzeh (Rema 310:7; MB ad loc. 29-30; see SSK ch. 20 n. 275). If a money pouch is tied to an item of clothing, since the pouch is not sewn on, it is not secondary to the clothing, and thus the clothing becomes a basis.

    06. More on Basis Le-davar Ha-asur

    If an assortment of items have been placed on a tray or table, some muktzeh and some not, the muktzeh status of the tray depends upon which items one considers to be more important. If the muktzeh items are more important, then the tray becomes a basis. If the non-muktzeh items are more important, the tray does not become a basis and is not muktzeh (SA 310:8). For example, let us say the Shabbat candles and the challahs are on the table. If the candlesticks are made of clay, the challahs are more important, and the table may be moved. However, if the candlesticks are silver (which makes them muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis), they are more important than the challahs; the table becomes a basis and may not be moved.[5]

    If one left a muktzeh item on top of something belonging to his friend, he has not rendered it a basis; as a general rule, one cannot render someone else’s possession forbidden without permission. However, if he acted at his friend’s behest or he knows that his friend wished it to be done, then he has rendered it a basis (Rema 309:4; MB ad loc. 27).

    Even when the basis is much more expensive than the muktzeh item placed upon it, it still takes on its muktzeh status, since it serves as its base. However, when the muktzeh item is of no importance compared to the basis on which it was placed, the basis does not become muktzeh. Therefore, if one left small change on a table or bones on a plate, since the muktzeh item is negligible vis-à-vis the table or plate, they do not become a basis. Similarly, if the main function of the basis is not to be a basis – for example, if the door of a closet or refrigerator is attached to drawers that contain muktzeh objects – since the main function of the door is to open the closet or refrigerator and not to be a basis for what is in the drawers, the door does not become a basis (MB 310:31, 277:7; SSK 20:77).

    A table that has become a basis may not be moved, but it may be used for eating or studying, as long as it is not moved. One may also expand the table or shorten it, as long as he does not use his hands to move the part of the table that has the muktzeh item on it. If the table has drawers, they may be used as well, as long as the table itself is not moved (Tehila Le-David 310:7; SSK 20:61).


    [5]. Some are lenient even if the candlesticks are silver because, in their opinion, candlesticks are merely kelim she-melakhtam le-isur (R. Akiva Eger). One should not rely on this opinion, because silver candlesticks are very expensive and therefore are muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis (Ĥazon Ish 44:13; Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 334; Piskei Teshuvot 279:1). Also see SSK 20:61 with n. 242.There is a dispute about the status of the basis of a kli she-melakhto le-isur. Some maintain that the base of a kli she-melakhto le-isur assumes the same status as the kli itself. Therefore, one may move it letzorekh gufo or letzorekh mekomo (Tehila Le-David 308:1). Others maintain that since a kli she-melakhto le-isur is not completely muktzeh, it does not render the base supporting it a basis at all (Yeshu’ot Yaakov; see SSK 20:50). Since muktzeh is a rabbinic law, the halakha follows the more lenient position.

    If a desk or table has a drawer that contains muktzeh items of significance, then if the drawer can be completely removed from the table, the desk becomes a basis for the drawer and may not be moved (similar to the case in the previous note of a money pouch tied to clothing). If the drawer cannot be removed from the desk, then it is secondary to it (as a pants pocket is secondary to the pants), and the muktzeh items in the drawer do not render the desk muktzeh. In any case, the drawer itself is muktzeh because it is a basis (MB 310:31).

    07. Kelim She-melakhtam Le-isur

    Kelim she-melakhtam le-isur are objects normally used for activities that are prohibited on Shabbat. Some examples are hammers, scissors, needles, pliers, and phone books. Since they are designed for things that are prohibited on Shabbat, they are muktzeh. Nevertheless, since they can be used for permissible activities as well, one does not put them out of his mind completely over Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages established an intermediate category for such items. On the one hand, they are muktzeh, and one may not move them even if they were left in a place where they are likely to be damaged or stolen. On the other hand, one may move them in two cases: le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam (SA 308:3).

    Le-tzorekh gufo (pl. “gufam”) means using the kli she-melakhto le-isur to do something permissible, like using a hammer to crack nuts, scissors to open a milk bag, a needle to remove a thorn, pliers to open and shut a faucet whose handle is missing, and a telephone book to look up an address. If the same goal can be attained without using a kli she-melakhto le-isur, it should not be used (MB 308:12).

    Le-tzorekh mekomo (pl. “mekomam”) means moving the kli she-melakhto le-isur to use the space it occupies. Thus, if such an object was left on the table one wishes to eat at, the bed he wishes to lie in, or a chair he wishes to sit upon, he may move it. Similarly, if such an item was left on the floor in a spot where people will likely trip over it, one may move it. If the door of a washing machine was left open and is getting in the way, it may be closed. If a kli she-melakhto le-isur makes it difficult to open or close a window, it may be moved.

    Once the kli she-melakhto le-isur has been picked up, whether le-tzorekh gufo or le-tzorekh mekomo, one may move it to where it will be safe (SA 308:3; section 15 below).[6]

    Other examples of kelim she-melakhtam le-isur are: pens, pencils, pencil sharpeners, paintbrushes, lined paper, accounting forms, sandpaper, carbon paper, candles, matches, nails, and cigarettes.[7]

    Some kelim she-melakhtam le-isur, such as an artist’s knives or a diamond cutter’s tools, are considered muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis, since their owners are careful not to use them for other purposes. The laws pertaining to them are stricter – they may not be moved even le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam (see section 4 above).

    Electrical appliances such as fans, washing machines, refrigerators, and other appliances with no incandescent filament are considered kelim she-melakhtam le-isur. Electrical appliances with a heating element or incandescent filament, such as light bulbs, heaters, radiators, and warming trays (platas) that were on during bein ha-shmashot on Friday (when Shabbat started) are considered muktzeh maĥmat gufam and may not be moved during Shabbat even le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam. In contrast, if they were off throughout bein ha-shmashot, they are considered kelim she-melakhtam le-isur and may be moved le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam.[8]


    [6]. Even though one may not move a kli she-melakhto le-isur to prevent it from being damaged or stolen, one may use a halakhic loophole (ha’arama) to accomplish this goal indirectly. In other words, one may pick up the kli initially le-tzorekh gufo or le-tzorekh mekomo and then put it down where it is protected from the elements and from theft (MB 308:16; Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, p. 412).

    [7]. In contrast, any item that is not a kli but is used for an activity prohibited on Shabbat, such as firewood, kerosene, bar soap, thick liquid soap, laundry detergent, and shoe polish – is considered muktzeh maĥmat gufo, and thus may not be moved even le-tzorekh gufo or le-tzorekh mekomo (MB 308:34; Orĥot Shabbat 19:7).

    [8]. An incandescent filament that was on throughout bein ha-shmashot has the same status as a flame that was lit throughout bein ha-shmashot – it is absolutely muktzeh, as explained in SA 279:1. However, some maintain that an incandescent filament differs from a flame, because flames are not normally moved, whereas devices with incandescent filaments are normally moved. Therefore, according to them, the status of the appliance is that of a kli she-melakhto le-isur (Ĥazon Ish 41:16; Igrot Moshe, OĤ 3:50). Nevertheless, according to most poskim an incandescent filament has the same status as a flame, and the entire appliance is considered secondary and a basis to the filament and thus completely muktzeh (SSK 20:15*; Minĥat Yitzĥak 3:43; Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, pp. 425-426; Orĥot Shabbat 19:181-184). See Harĥavot.

    08. Kelim with Both Permitted and Prohibited Uses

    The status of kelim used for both permissible and forbidden activities is determined by the majority of their use (Pri Megadim; MB 308:10). Therefore, a pocket knife with scissors is not muktzeh, because most of its blades can be used as cutlery for eating and are not muktzeh, and it is only the scissors that are used primarily for a forbidden activity. Similarly, a wristwatch with a built-in calculator is not muktzeh, because its primary use – telling time – is permitted on Shabbat. In contrast, a cell phone (that is not a smart phone) that displays the time is a keli she-melakhto le-isur, since its main use – as a telephone – is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, it may not be moved for its own sake, but it may be moved le-tzorekh gufo – in order to see what time it is (however, he should not carry it around in his pocket for that purpose). It may also be moved le-tzorekh mekomo. Thus, if one wants to use the place where the phone is resting, it may be moved. Similarly, if the phone’s alarm goes off, and the owner wants to move it so the ringing will not disturb his rest, he may do so.

    A pot is a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since its primary purpose is for cooking. Nevertheless, when there is food in it, the pot is secondary to the food, and therefore may be moved. Once the food has been removed from the pot, one may remove the pot from the table, even if one does not need the space it is occupying. The reason is that the food waste at the bottom of the pot renders it disgusting, and a disgusting item (graf shel re’i) may be moved (MB 308:20; BHL s.v. “kli”; see section 12 below).

    Even if an oven is used to store baking pans and baked goods, since its primary purpose is baking, it is a kli she-melakhto le-isur. Nevertheless, one may open its door to remove food, since this is moving it le-tzorekh mekomo. If one wishes to put food in the oven and keep it there on Shabbat, he may open the door and close it, because this is le-tzorekh gufo (SSK 20:79).

    Tefilin are considered a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since one may not wear them on Shabbat and Yom Tov (SA 31:1). Therefore, they may be moved only le-tzorekh gufam or le-tzorekh mekomam. Le-tzorekh gufam would apply if one wishes to put the tefilin on, in the hope that they will protect him from danger. Le-tzorekh mekomam would apply if they are sitting in their bag together with a talit, and one wishes to remove the tefilin in order to get to the talit on Shabbat (Taz; MA). Under pressing circumstances, if the tefilin are in danger of being damaged, they may be moved (MB 31:2; BHL ad loc.).

    A flower pot is a kli she-melakhto le-isur, since it is associated with several melakhot – planting, watering, and picking. Thus, it may be moved le-tzorekh gufo – to decorate the table – or le-tzorekh mekomo – to use the place where the flower pot is sitting (see above 19:10).

    09. Kelim She-melakhtam Le-heter, Food, and Books

    Kelim that are used for permitted purposes (kelim she-melakhtam le-heter), a category that includes tables, chairs, beds, pillows, thermoses, clocks, and brooms, may be moved for any reason, though one may not move them for no reason at all. In Neĥemia’s time, when people failed to observe Shabbat, the Sages decreed that no kelim should be moved at all. When meticulous observance was restored, they permitted moving kelim she-melakhtam le-heter but left the decree in place for moving them for no reason. The idea was for people to pay attention to what they do with their hands on Shabbat. Making sure not to move kelim without a reason keeps people aware of Shabbat and makes it more likely that they will not end up transgressing any Shabbat prohibitions. Furthermore, on Shabbat one aspires to inner peace and restfulness. This includes one’s hands as well – they should be at rest, not busy moving and carrying things unnecessarily.

    In contrast, no decree ever limited the movement of food, books, clothes, or jewelry. Because they make Shabbat enjoyable, one may move them even without a reason.

    The poskim disagree regarding kelim that are used very frequently, such as cutlery, plates, and cups. According to some, these kelim possess the same halakhic status as food and may thus be moved for no reason. Others maintain that they have the same status as kelim she-melakhtam le-heter, which may not be moved without a reason. Since muktzeh is itself a rabbinic law, the lenient position is the primary one. Le-khatĥila, though, since many poskim are inclined to be stringent, it is preferable to take their opinion into account and to avoid moving cutlery and dishes for no reason.[9]


    [9]. According to a beraita in Shabbat 123b, in the time of Neĥemia, when many failed to keep Shabbat, the Sages decreed that all kelim are considered muktzeh (except for three; see below). Once the people returned to meticulous observance, the Sages again permitted moving kelim in a three-step process. Rava explains that the Sages permitted moving a kli she-melakhto le-isur only le-tzorekh gufo and le-tzorekh mekomo, but kelim she-melakhtam le-heter could be moved even in order to prevent their being damaged. According to most Rishonim, this permission to move kelim used for permissible things is limited to situations where there is a reason to move them (such as “from the sun to the shade” to protect them), but one may not move them unnecessarily. This is the opinion of Ran and Magid Mishneh (which derives this position from Rambam), and Rashba is inclined to be stringent as well. Tur and SA 308:4 rule accordingly. However, according to Ra’ah and Ritva, when the Sages permitted moving kelim from the sun to the shade, they also permitted moving them for no reason at all. Aĥaronim recommend being stringent here, following SA.In contrast, all agree that food and books were never decreed muktzeh at all and may be moved even for no reason. This is also the case regarding clothing and jewelry (Ketzot Ha-shulĥan §105, Badei Ha-shulĥan §7 as cited in SSK 20:83).

    There is a disagreement about kelim that are regularly used during meals. The first position is that of Rambam (MT 25:1-3), Shlah, Ĥayei Adam 66:3, and Ben Ish Ĥai, Year 2, Miketz 1. According to them, as stated in the Mishna (Shabbat 123b), three kelim were not included in the decree of muktzeh because they were necessary for eating. These three are: a tool for cutting pressed-fig cakes, a spoon to remove scum from the surface of soup, and a small knife left on the table to cut bread and meat. However, other kelim used for eating may not be moved without a reason. The second approach is that of Tosafot (Shabbat 123b, s.v. “miktzo’a”), Rosh, Shiltei Giborim, Tehila Le-David 308:4, Ĥesed La-alafim, and MB 308:23. According to them, the three kelim mentioned in the mishna are only examples of kelim used frequently at meals. In fact, all tableware – cutlery, cups, and plates – have the same status and are not muktzeh at all. R. Ovadia Yosef rules stringently, even forbidding a nervous person from fidgeting with such items in order to calm his nerves (Yalkut Yosef vol. 2, pp. 452-457). Some who are generally stringent about kelim are lenient in this last case. This is the implication of AHS 308:15. SSK 20:83 agrees: “It is permitted for one to move an item if he finds pleasure in occupying himself with it, even if there is no practical purpose.” Orĥot Shabbat ch. 19 n. 108 records a similar ruling in the name of Ĥazon Ish. mia man sis for it, and therefore, is absolutely muktza (SSK 20:15*; Minhat Yitzhak 43: Yalkut

    10. An Item that was Muktzeh Throughout Bein Ha-shmashot

    If an item was muktzeh throughout bein ha-shmashot on Friday, it remains muktzeh throughout Shabbat, even if the reason it was considered muktzeh no longer applies. Therefore, if one left money on a table before Shabbat, the table becomes muktzeh as a basis le-davar ha-asur. Even if the money falls off the table at some point on Shabbat, the table remains muktzeh, since it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot (SA 310:7; section 5 above). Similarly, if an oil lamp or a candle was lit before Shabbat, it may not be moved on Shabbat even after it has burned out, and its leftover oil or wax may not be used. Since it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, it is muktzeh for the whole day (SA 279:1; MB ad loc. 1). So too, if a valuable item that was muktzeh maĥmat ĥesron kis broke into usable pieces during Shabbat, the pieces remain muktzeh, since the item was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot (MB 308:35 following MA 308:19).

    Nothing is muktzeh unless it meets two conditions:

    1) The object was not fit for use during bein ha-shmashot on Friday.

    2) One has put the idea of using it out of his mind.

    The Talmud’s classic example is figs and grapes that were left to dry on the muktzeh (an open space in a back yard). During the drying process, they are inedible because they are fermenting, so one puts them out of his mind. Even if the drying process is completed on Shabbat and they become edible, since they were muktzeh at bein ha-shmashot, they remain muktzeh for all of Shabbat.

    However, if only one of these conditions is met, the item is not muktzeh for all of Shabbat. For example, one may have left wheat on the ground to take root, and has put it out of his mind. Since in fact the wheat was still edible during bein ha-shmashot, it does not become muktzeh, and may be picked up on Shabbat and eaten (SA 310:2).

    Similarly, if one knows that an item that was unusable during bein ha-shmashot will become usable on Shabbat, he does not truly put it out of his mind. Therefore, it does not become muktzeh. For example, if a pot is on the plata when Shabbat starts, even if the food is inedible at that point, nevertheless since one knows that it will be ready to eat later, he does not put it out of his mind. Similarly, if damp clothes were hung out to dry before Shabbat, even though they are not wearable during bein ha-shmashot, as long as the climate is such that they will definitely dry over the course of Shabbat, one does not put them out of his mind. Therefore, one may move them once they are dry (Levushei Serad; SSK 22:11).[10]


    [10]. Why are a cooking pot and a burning lamp treated differently? A pot does not become muktzeh, because one does not especially want the food to cook during bein ha-shmashot. He would be happy if it had finished cooking beforehand. In contrast, a lamp remains muktzeh throughout Shabbat because one does want it to give off light during bein ha-shmashot. Since he puts the lamp out of his mind during that time, it stays muktzeh all of Shabbat (SA 279:1). Interestingly, if one has in mind to use the leftover oil after the lamp burns out, then since it is clear that the candle will go out, the remaining oil is not muktzeh (SA 279:4). However, according to Rema, once the lamp became muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, it may not be moved all day, and one’s intentions are irrelevant.MB 308:63 states that clothes that were wet during bein ha-shmashot are muktzeh for all of Shabbat. Many explain that he is referring to a case where it is not certain that they will dry over the course of Shabbat. In contrast, if it is clear that they will dry, MB would agree that they are not muktzeh (Minĥat Shlomo 1:10:2, n. 4; Minĥat Yitzĥak 1:81). Alternatively, some explain that the clothes remain muktzeh because there is a concern that people will end up wringing out the clothes to dry them, which is prohibited on Shabbat (Az Nidberu 1:5). In any case, in practice if it is clear that the clothes will dry on Shabbat, they may be moved (Livyat Ĥen §37; Orĥot Shabbat ch. 19 n. 563 in the name of Ĥazon Ish). See Harĥavot.

    If pieces of fruit were still attached to their tree during bein ha-shmashot, and then fell off during Shabbat, they are muktzeh for all of Shabbat because they were not fit for use during bein ha-shmashot. It is assumed that one puts them out of his mind; had he wanted to use them on Shabbat, he would have picked them before Shabbat began (SA 322:3; MB ad loc. 7). Additionally, the Sages made a special decree against eating fruits that fall off on Shabbat, to ensure that no one would end up picking them on Shabbat (Beitza 3a; MB 325:22). Therefore, even if it is known before Shabbat that a non-Jew is planning to pick the fruit on Shabbat, in which case they are not muktzeh, they nevertheless may not be eaten because of this decree (SHT ad loc. 26).

    In contrast, if a kosher animal was alive during bein ha-shmashot, and was slaughtered on Shabbat to feed a dangerously sick person, a healthy person may eat from the fresh meat. We do not say that it was muktzeh during bein ha-shmashot, as we do with the fruit. The difference is that while anyone can pick fruit (and would have done so before Shabbat if they were interested), not everyone knows how to slaughter. Thus, even though the owner did not slaughter the animal, that does not mean he put it out of his mind (SA 318:2; MB ad loc. 8).

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